

BETTER ASSISTANCE IN CRISES PERFORMANCE EVALUATION


Midline Evaluation - Appendix B: Supporting Analyses


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1 Administrative data analysis

This section presents the results of a descriptive analysis of the proposed BASIC Research portfolio initially developed during the component inception phase, completed in February 2022. The analysis aimed to characterise the portfolio across a number of factors, including geography, thematic focus and aspects of the delivery model, as well as how this portfolio was expected to change in light of planned budget cuts. This analysis was used by the evaluation to understand the intent and focus of BASIC programme delivery.

1.1 BASIC Research

To meet the aims set out above, this review will answer the following questions:

- 1. What are the initial characteristics of the proposed programme of BASIC Research activities?
- 2. How has this programme of work changed since the latest budget cuts?

We compiled the records of BASIC Research Project Concept notes into a dataset for analysis. Each concept note outlined its project’s purpose, research questions, methods, thematic focus, proposed countries, proposed partners, team, main audience. One researcher created the dataset, and a senior researcher quality assured the data set by checking a 10% sample of datapoints; 100% of the checked sample was coded correctly. We undertook descriptive analysis of a subset of factors to describe the portfolio. These factors considered the distribution of projects by geography, thematic focus, local engagement, and the proposed customer. Several factors were not considered, including the research questions posed, methods employed, and team composition.

A total of 21 concepts were specified by BASIC Research. [Table 1.1](#) BASIC Research Concept Overview

#	Concept note title	Proposed Counties	Thematic Focus
1	Climate and Livelihoods - Cash Plus to enhance livelihoods	Nigeria, Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Colombia, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Niger, DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Syria	Climate and Livelihoods
2	Climate and Livelihoods - Livelihood pathways and climate resilience studies	Nigeria	Climate and Livelihoods
3	Climate and Livelihoods - Politics of intersecting vulnerabilities	Niger (Diffa region); Ethiopia	Climate and Livelihoods
4	Inclusion and Participation - Digital	Nigeria	Inclusion and Participation
5	Inclusion and Participation - Displacement	Lebanon; Pakistan; DRC	Inclusion and Participation
6	Inclusion and Participation - Lived experiences of Access to Social Assistance	Uganda; Iraq	Inclusion and Participation
7	Inclusion and Participation - Local Accountability in Fragile Contexts	Iraq; Nigeria; Somalia	Inclusion and Participation
8	Lebanon - Devaluation and social assistance	Lebanon	Systems
9	Lebanon - Geographies of social assistance in Urban Informal Settlements	Lebanon	Inclusion and Participation
10	Niger - Local solidarity mechanisms	Niger	Systems
11	Nigeria - Qualitative - Institutions and systems	Nigeria	Climate and Livelihoods; Inclusion and Participation; Systems
12	Nigeria - Quantitative - lived experiences	Nigeria	Climate and Livelihoods; Inclusion and Participation
13	Politics of social assistance	Lebanon; Niger, Nigeria, Yemen	Politics
14	Politics- Finance and coordination	Yemen; Nigeria; Niger; Lebanon	Politics
15	Synthesis - Five Global Reviews	Global	Politics; Climate and Livelihoods; Inclusion and Participation; Systems
16	Systems - Assessing Social Protection responses to conflict, displacement and return in Ethiopia	Global	Systems
17	Systems - Crisis resilience in National Systems	Iraq; Syria; Lebanon; Yemen; Ethiopia	Systems
18	Systems - Targeting	n/a	Systems
19	Yemen - Capacity and systems	Yemen	Inclusion and Participation
20	Yemen - Interoperability - Harmonisation and Reforming Social Assistance	Yemen	Politics; Systems
21	Yemen - Targeting	Yemen	Inclusion and Participation; Systems


presents a summary of the initially proposed BASIC Research portfolio.

Table 1.1 BASIC Research Concept Overview

#	Concept note title	Proposed Counties	Thematic Focus
1	Climate and Livelihoods - Cash Plus to enhance livelihoods	Nigeria, Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Colombia, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Niger, DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Syria	Climate and Livelihoods
2	Climate and Livelihoods - Livelihood pathways and climate resilience studies	Nigeria	Climate and Livelihoods
3	Climate and Livelihoods - Politics of intersecting vulnerabilities	Niger (Diffa region); Ethiopia	Climate and Livelihoods
4	Inclusion and Participation - Digital	Nigeria	Inclusion and Participation
5	Inclusion and Participation - Displacement	Lebanon; Pakistan; DRC	Inclusion and Participation
6	Inclusion and Participation - Lived experiences of Access to Social Assistance	Uganda; Iraq	Inclusion and Participation
7	Inclusion and Participation - Local Accountability in Fragile Contexts	Iraq; Nigeria; Somalia	Inclusion and Participation
8	Lebanon - Devaluation and social assistance	Lebanon	Systems
9	Lebanon - Geographies of social assistance in Urban Informal Settlements	Lebanon	Inclusion and Participation
10	Niger - Local solidarity mechanisms	Niger	Systems
11	Nigeria - Qualitative - Institutions and systems	Nigeria	Climate and Livelihoods; Inclusion and Participation; Systems
12	Nigeria - Quantitative - lived experiences	Nigeria	Climate and Livelihoods; Inclusion and Participation
13	Politics of social assistance	Lebanon; Niger, Nigeria, Yemen	Politics
14	Politics- Finance and coordination	Yemen; Nigeria; Niger; Lebanon	Politics
15	Synthesis - Five Global Reviews	Global	Politics; Climate and Livelihoods; Inclusion and Participation; Systems
16	Systems - Assessing Social Protection responses to conflict, displacement and return in Ethiopia	Global	Systems
17	Systems - Crisis resilience in National Systems	Iraq; Syria; Lebanon; Yemen; Ethiopia	Systems
18	Systems - Targeting	n/a	Systems
19	Yemen - Capacity and systems	Yemen	Inclusion and Participation
20	Yemen - Interoperability - Harmonisation and Reforming Social Assistance	Yemen	Politics; Systems
21	Yemen - Targeting	Yemen	Inclusion and Participation; Systems

The portfolio predominately considered issues of inclusion and participation and systems. The portfolio targeted four main themes relating to the use of social protection approaches during crises (Figure Figure 1.1.) Inclusion and Participation was the most common theme considered by concepts (34%; n=10), followed by systems (31%; n=9). Climate and Livelihoods (21%; n=6) and Politics (14%; n=4) were considered to a lesser extent.

Figure 1.1 Distribution of projects by a) top 10 countries and b) thematic focus




Source: Adapted from IDS (2022). BASIC Research Inception Report. N.B. Multi-coding of concepts to themes and countries was permitted.

1.1.1 Geography

A majority of projects detailed a global focus, with several countries forming the focus on deeper in-country research. Over half of concept notes had a global focus, i.e. considered research

activity in more than one country. The research portfolio proposed activity in a total of 19 countries. These countries spread across four regions: MENA; Sub-Saharan Africa; South Asia; Latin America & Caribbean. Nigeria, Lebanon, Niger, and Yemen were the most common focus countries, which reflects their deep-country engagement status. Of these, Nigeria was the most common in terms of project count (33%; n=9) followed by Lebanon, Niger, and then Yemen (Figure 1.2). Other countries specified by the concept notes were Iraq, Ethiopia, DRC, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, Jordan, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda, Columbia, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Uganda.

Figure 1.2 Top 10 additional countries per concept note




Source: Adapted from IDS (2022). BASIC Research Inception Report. Multi-coding of countries was permitted.

1.1.2 Local Engagement

The majority of the portfolio had already engaged with local actors. We considered the extent of local engagement in the case of each research project. The majority of projects had engaged with local FCDO country offices (61%; n=13) and identified and engaged with local partners (76%; n=16).

Figure 1.3 Distribution of projects by Partner Type



Source: Adapted from IDS (2022). BASIC Research Inception Report. Multi-coding of Partner Type was permitted.


1.1.3 Partner Type

Partner engagement was highly detailed within the research project concept notes with over three quarters listing one or more proposed partners (76%; n=16). We considered the type of partner engagement and their proportion across the portfolio. Partner engagement was split between local and international actors. The largest proportion of partner engagement identified as 'local organisation' (27%; n=9), followed closely by 'international charities' (23%; n=7). 'Local research institutes', 'Universities', 'FCDO branches', and 'UN agencies' were also partners identified.

1.1.4 Customer

The portfolio’s main target customer were governments in or preparing for crisis. We considered the types of customers in the case of each research project. The portfolio specified seven types of target customer (Figure 1.4). ‘Governments in or preparing for crisis’ was identified by the largest proportion of concept notes (23%; n=10). ‘FCDO’ and ‘International Donors’ were identified less frequently (18%; n=8) and (16%; n=7) respectively. ‘Local Actors’, Humanitarian/Aid Agency’, NGOs, and Researchers were mentioned to a lesser extent.

Figure 1.4 Distribution of project by Customer Type



Source: Adapted from IDS (2022). BASIC Research Inception Report. Multi-coding of Partner Type was permitted

1.1.5 Budget revisions

The BASIC Research portfolio fares significantly better under the best cast scenario proposed budget cuts. We compared impacts in BASIC high-level planning for £2.2 million (best case scenario) with £3mil (worst case scenario) budget cuts (Table 1.2). Under the proposed £2.2 million budget cuts up to a quarter of projects can continue as planned (23%; n=5). This was reduced significantly with the higher levels cuts, with only 14% (n=3) able to continue as planned.

Table 1.2 BASIC Research budget revisions scenario planning

Concept note title	Best case - £2.2 million cuts (£4.5 million remaining budget)	Worst case - £3 million cuts (£3.7 remaining budget)
Climate and Livelihoods - Cash Plus to enhance livelihoods	Project to continue as originally planned.	Project will continue as originally planned
Climate and Livelihoods - Livelihood pathways and climate resilience studies	Additional budget means more ambitions survey work, increased sample size.	Consolidate projects: the <i>Politics of Intersecting Vulnerabilities</i> and the <i>Livelihood and Climate Resilience</i> project
Climate and Livelihoods - Politics of intersecting vulnerabilities	Consolidate projects: the <i>Politics of Intersecting Vulnerabilities</i> and the <i>Livelihood and Climate Resilience</i> project	Consolidate projects: the <i>Politics of Intersecting Vulnerabilities</i> and the <i>Livelihood and Climate Resilience</i> project
Inclusion and Participation - Digital	Cut to the number of interviews, project continuation dependant on partners willing to restart.	Cut entirely unless funded in the final year
Inclusion and Participation - Displacement	Life history and key informant interviews cut.	Cut life history interviews from 20 to 10 to reduce salary costs
Inclusion and Participation - Lived experiences of Access to Social Assistance	Project to continue as originally planned.	Project will focus only on Uganda, only budget for phase 1 of project
Inclusion and Participation - Local Accountability in Fragile Contexts	Cut entirely unless funded in the final year	Cut entirely unless funded in the final year
Lebanon - Devaluation and social assistance	No cuts proposed, project will merge with <i>Politics of Social Assistance</i> in Lebanon to ensure cohesion	No cuts proposed, project with merge with <i>Politics of social assistance</i> in Lebanon to ensure cohesion
Lebanon - Geographies of social assistance in Urban Informal Settlements	Fieldwork ambitions downscaled; fewer fieldwork sites and reduced depth of activity	Fieldwork ambitions downscaled; fewer fieldwork sites and reduced depth of activity

Niger - Local solidarity mechanisms	Cut entirely unless funded in final year	Cut entirely unless funded in final year
Nigeria - Qualitative - Institutions and systems	Team will be disbanded	Team will be disbanded
Nigeria - Quantitative - lived experiences	Team will be disbanded	Team will be disbanded
Politics of social assistance	Country studies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Somalia.	Niger, Nigeria, and Yemen country studies all dropped. Will continue with a study in Lebanon
Politics- Finance and coordination	Cut entirely unless provided funding in the final year.	Cut entirely unless funded in the final year
Synthesis - Five Global Reviews	Continue as outlined	Continue as outlined
Systems - Assessing Social Protection responses to conflict, displacement and return in Ethiopia	Continue as outlined	Continue as outlined. Will be unable to fund policy engagement with stakeholders to validate report.
Systems - Crisis resilience in National Systems	Reduce scope of fieldwork in Syria and Iraq.	Reduced scope of field work to Syria and Iraq
Systems - Targeting	Continue as outlined	Continue as outlined
Yemen - Capacity and systems	ACAPs dropped as partner	ACAPs dropped as a partner.
Yemen - Interoperability - Harmonisation and Reforming Social Assistance	Cut entirely unless funded in the final year	Cut entirely unless funded in the final year
Yemen - Targeting	Project to be incorporated into Targeting Systems work.	Project to be incorporated into Targeting Systems work.

1.2 BASIC Technical Assistance

This note presents a descriptive overview of BASIC Technical Assistance delivery since BASIC’s inception. It covers BASIC Technical Assistance (TAS), Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19 Expert Advice Service (SPACE), and Social Protection Technical Assistance, Advice, and Resources (STAAR) Facility. Although at the time of drafting (September 2022) STAAR delivery plans and associated budgets had not yet been finalised. It draws on administrative data sets compiled by the BASIC TA supplier, DAI. This analysis provided an overview of BASIC outputs achieved, as well as guide the programme of qualitative work completed elsewhere by the evaluation.

The analysis aimed to answer the following descriptive questions:

- Over what time period was BASIC TA delivered by its various entities?
- What was the nature of BASIC technical assistance provided by DAI in terms of its subject and geographic focus, outputs produced and intended targeted users?
- What were the actual costs (and anticipated costs in the case of STAAR) of inputs used to deliver BASIC TA?

1.2.1 Data

The analysis was based on two sources of administrative data shared with the evaluation team by FCDO and DAI.

- **BASIC TA activity trackers** - a total of three Microsoft Excel data sets were shared with us which described 1) the delivery of all BASIC TAS activity including SPACE as three projects, 2) a more detailed overview of SPACE activity delivered within the three SPACE projects described in dataset 1, and 3) the current STAAR activity tracker – a management tool used by DAI to summarise the STAAR portfolio in real-time.
- **STAAR Inception Report documents** – in particular these documents were used as a source of financial records for the proposed activity of STAAR.

At the time of reporting, budget uncertainties relating to BASIC were still being resolved by FCDO which may have implications for the analysis presented in this note. The midline evaluation period commenced in May 2022 and largely closed at the end of August 2022. We made data requests in May 2022 and July 2022 for Administrative data and documents to use as a basis for

the evaluation. However, it is possible that the data and documents reviewed as part of this analysis are outdated for STAAR activity.¹

1.2.2 Results

Baseline analysis indicated that BASIC TAS had delivered 28 projects, engaging with 45 countries – 33 of them more than once – through 128 unique engagements.² FCDO spent £2.62m across 28 BASIC TAS projects delivered between March 2019 and March 2022 (Table 1.3). Just under half of the reported spend related to the delivery SPACE. SPACE accounted for 105 assignments, delivered across three projects. As such, if we consider mean spend using SPACE assignments the mean spend for SPACE is the lowest (£0.01m) while highest for HSOT (£0.06m)

Table 1.3 BASIC TAS nominal spend (including HSOT projects) March 2019-March 2022


Project type	No. projects	Mean spend (£m)	Spend (£m)	Spend (%)
SPACE	3	0.41	1.22	47
BASIC TAS	16	0.05	0.84	32
HSOT	9	0.06	0.55	21
Total	28	0.09	2.62	100

Source: FCDO BASIC project Tracker – shared in December 2021. Total value reflects the total amount spent, or the total budget if spend information was not available.

The inception of STAAR commenced in September 2021 and was expected to close in December 2021, although this was delayed with implementation commencing in June 2022. Delays in the sign-off of inception products and associated budget uncertainties mean that STAAR implementation did not formally commence until June 2022 (Figure 1.5), although some assignments were completed as part of the inception phase; in particular, those related to the Ukraine response. Numerous demand-led and STAAR-led opportunities were identified as part of the inception phase but due to budget cuts, a reprioritisation exercise was undertaken which reduced the scope of STAAR to deliver strategic, STAAR-led initiatives.

Figure 1.5 Start date of assignments by BASIC assignment type

¹ The evaluation team received a copy of the STAAR tracker in July 2022. The evaluation team requested a more recent update of this tracker in October 2022 with the aim of presenting the most up to date STAAR activity plans. An updated version of the STAAR inception report was shared in response to this request, but an update STAAR activity tracker was not shared.
² A more detailed descriptive analysis of the BASIC portfolio at Baseline can be found in Integrity (2021). BASIC Performance Evaluation – Baseline Report Appendices. Date accessed: 10/10/2022. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3EweaUG>.



Source: STAAR Activity Tracker (2022). Last updated in September 2022. N.B. Assignments assigned a status of ‘pipeline’, ‘on hold’, ‘not proceeding’ or ‘removed’, were removed from our analysis. n=49. A total of 25 STAAR assignments were not listed with a start date; two thirds of these (68%; n=17) were indicated as being scoped or in procurement at the time of analysis.

A total of £4.6m has been made available to deliver STAAR. This level of funding has been provided for delivery between June 2022 and March 2024. It is expected that a cost extension will be granted for an additional year of delivery. The final budget for STAAR was not yet confirmed at the time of reporting and final figures may be subject to revision.

Based on records shared with the evaluation team, a total of 34 STAAR assignments have been specified (Table 1.4). Half of these are currently being or have been delivered (50%; n=17). The majority of assignments were demand-led, i.e., scoped to respond to an explicit need identified by the facility (76%; n=26). Those assignments that were STAAR-led related to the provision of a pilot country lead in Nigeria and a climate lead to support the STAAR leadership team, as well as the STAAR inception phase and management team. Five assignments were related to the Gender-responsive Social Protection Programme – these assignments do not form the primary focus on our evaluation. A minority of assignments made use of International Climate Finance (ICF) (15%; n=5). The five ICF assignments covered the aforementioned climate finance lead, and assignments relating to COP26, the HSOT Nigeria advisor, a political economy analysis in Pakistan, and a Zambia assignment focused on the links between social protection and biodiversity loss.

Table 1.4 STAAR Assignment overview

Assignment stage	N	%
Scoping	14	41
Procurement	3	9
Implementation	10	29
Concluded	7	21
Total	34	100
Assignment type	N	%
Demand Led	26	76
Not stated	4	12
STAAR Led	4	12
Total	34	100
ICF Funding used?	N	%

Assignment stage	N	%
No	21	64
Not stated	8	24
Yes	5	15
Total	34	100

Source: STAAR Activity Tracker (2022). Last updated in September 2022. N.B. Assignments assigned a status of ‘pipeline’, ‘on hold’, ‘not proceeding’ or ‘removed’, were removed from our analysis.

In total, 12 countries have been targeted to receive STAAR support but multiple had a thematic not geographic focus (Table 1.5). Four fifths of these previously received BASIC support but India and Ukraine have never previously received BASIC support. Somalia, Nigeria, and Yemen have been targeted by the most STAAR assignments, although the count of assignments may not reflect the distribution of STAAR spend.³ A large number of assignments were not country specific – these typically related to STAAR management activities, or broad thematic activities, like digital cash, climate and environment, or food security.

Table 1.5 Countries targeted for STAAR support

Country	Previous BASIC support received	STAAR	Total
N/A	N/A	12	35
Somalia	1	4	12
Nigeria	1	3	9
Yemen	1	3	9
Ukraine	0	2	6
Lebanon	1	2	6
India	0	2	6
South Sudan	1	1	3
Pakistan	1	1	3
Ethiopia	1	1	3
Zambia	1	1	3
Democratic Republic of Congo	1	1	3
Nepal	1	1	3
Total	9	34	100

Source: STAAR Activity Tracker (2022). Last updated in September 2022. N.B. Assignments assigned a status of ‘pipeline’, ‘on hold’, ‘not proceeding’ or ‘removed’, were removed from our analysis.

FCDO was still the primary intend user of BASIC. FCDO was the lead user for the majority of STAAR assignments (55%; n=19), which largely reflects the status at baseline (Table 1.6). STAAR-led activities listed STAAR as the lead user. Several agencies and donors were listed but only UNICEF was listed as the lead user for more than one assignment. A partner government was listed as a lead user once, and three assignments did not report a lead user.

Table 1.6 Specified users of STAAR support

STAAR User	N	%
FCDO	19	56
STAAR	4	12
Not stated	3	9
UNICEF	2	6
USAID	1	3

³ Financial data at the assignment level was requested by the evaluation. This information was not shared at the time of reporting.

N/A	1	3
Cash Working Group	1	3
WFP	1	3
Partner Government	1	3
GiZ	1	3
Grand Total	34	100

Source: STAAR Activity Tracker (2022). Last updated in September 2022. N.B. Assignments assigned a status of 'pipeline', 'on hold', 'not proceeding' or 'removed', were removed from our analysis.

2 Secondary data analysis

This section presents a descriptive analysis of the context in which BASIC operates across a number of dimensions. It draws on publicly available data to describe the country levels of social protection coverage, investment in social protection and humanitarian programming, and key actors providing finance and/or operating in humanitarian and social protection. This note supports the evaluation team to address a subset of our evaluation questions. In particular, the analysis supports an understanding of the relevance of BASIC, and the strength of contribution claims identified in other evaluation data sources. The remainder of this note summarises that data that underpins the analysis, our theory on what to expect if improvements to social protection systems are realised, a summary of our results, and what these mean for the evaluation.

Table 2.1 BASIC operation context summary

Focus area	Summary findings	Implications for the evaluation
Social protection coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none">SP coverage marginal global increase between 2016-2020; SP coverage varies significantly between regions, with some experiencing significant drops in coverage and others considerable increases.BASIC targeting covers wide spread of countries with different levels of SP coverage and varying levels of fragility.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Uptick in SP coverage suggest relevance of social protection globallyRegional variance in increase and decrease of coverage highlights significance of contextual factors.
Investment in social protection and humanitarian programming	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Social protection spend has varied since 2011 with a noticeable, albeit inconsistent, increase since 2019.Out of the case countries Yemen receives the most humanitarian funding and has the highest level of social protection coverageThe destination of government humanitarian support is largely UN agencies, in particular, WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF, which were active spenders across all case countries in 2021; humanitarian spend is significantly greater in all case countriesWhile SP commitments from donor governments remained low, these did increase over time for all case countries, especially SP commitments from institutional donors like the WBThe ability of humanitarian appeals to be fully funded decreased over time for all countries running appeals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Case specific data offers insight to inform context and case study line of questioning.Data supports global and caser specific donor (state and institutional) mappingDifferences in social protection and humanitarian spend at the case level outlines donor dynamics and potential issues pertaining to the nexusDecrease in humanitarian funding versus appeals over time could suggest as well as increase in social protection funding suggests growing interest in the latter, especially in response to C-19.
Composition of social protection sector actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none">The top five state donors with largest SP commitments between 2011 and 2020 were the EU, US, UK, Germany, and JapanIn 2020, Germany accounted for the largest commitment among this group (38%)The largest institutional donors across the period were the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Bank (IDB), UNICEF and Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI).The WB was a key donor, accounting for almost of all commitments in 2020 (84%).Social protection commitments from donors fluctuated between 2011-2020, with a markable increase for certain donors in 2020, most likely linked to C-19 responses.Notable increases were observed in 2020 across all countries (except for state spending commitments to Yemen)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Case level stakeholder mapping highlights key players and funding patterns providing the evaluation team with further contextual understandingDonor lists support the identification of key stakeholders for case study key informant interview recruitmentLargest donors at global level with inform key informant interview recruitment for baseline evaluation report.Differences and similarities in humanitarian and social protection donor lists provide insights into nexus at global and country case level.

2.1 Data

An overview of the data sources used to understand the context in which BASIC operates is presented in [Table 2.2](#) below.

Table 2.2 Overview of BASIC’s context

Focus area	Indicator	Source
Social protection coverage: An estimate of what proportion of an economy’s population is covered by social protection benefits.	The proportion of persons effectively covered by a social protection system , including social protection floors. It also reflects the main components of social protection: child and maternity benefits, support for persons without a job, persons with disabilities, victims of work injuries and older persons. Effective coverage of social protection is measured by the number of people who are either actively contributing to a social insurance scheme or receiving benefits (contributory or non-contributory).	ILO
Investment in social protection and humanitarian programming: The level of spending allocated by global actors to finance and/or delivery humanitarian or social protection policies and programmes	The financial value of aid commitments provided by all bilateral and multilateral donors to that country for social protection activity (16010: Social Protection). A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.	OECD
	The total value of humanitarian assistance funding provided to a country. This is calculated by taking the difference between all incoming and outgoing humanitarian assistance financial resources within a given country and disaggregated by donor and implementing actors.	UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service
Composition of social protection sector actors: Distribution of any social protection programming and support funded or delivered by other international actors in evaluation case-study countries of interest.	The number and value of social protection-related programmes by country and key donor and delivery actors. This draws on self-reporting data returns by entities that report into IATI systems.	IATI
Extent of fragility in a country: An estimate of a country’s overall fragility risk across a number of dimensions.	The Fragile States Index (FSI) score. A composite index that defines the fragility status of a country. The higher the score, the more fragile the context.	US Fund for Peace

2.2 Links to our theory of change

We expect to see the following observable implications to arise in countries receiving BASIC support if the Theory of Change works as anticipated. The extent of these implications will likely be limited within the timeframe of the lifecycle of the BASIC programme.

- **Increase in social protection spending and coverage:** Acknowledgement that social protection approaches can be a cost-effective means of crises response, uptake of BASIC outputs is expected to attract additional investment in social protection infrastructure, either from internal or external sources, which will ultimately led to broader or more significant coverage of the population with social protection. While spend data is currently not disaggregated by general spend on social protection and spend on social protection approaches to crises, proxy indicators, such as fragility or conflict indices can be used to support analysis.

- **Increased proportion of social protection spend versus humanitarian spend in crises:** This increased focused on social protection infrastructure is expected to reduce the reliance of crises-affected nations on humanitarian systems. In practice, this could be reflected in reduced commitments from international partners to provide resources to support humanitarian initiatives and reduction in the frequency and scale of humanitarian appeals.
-
- **Decrease in fragility:** With improvements to social protection infrastructure, it is expected that affected populations can make socio-economic choices and decisions at all levels with more certainty, which is expected to promote equitable national growth and stability. Other variables are likely to influence this outcome, and the relatively short timeframe will limit the ability to measure impact.
-
- **Transition from donor/agency to nationally-led systems:** Expanded and improved social protection systems that can more effectively respond to crises is likely to affect the composition of actors that provide support in a country. The net effect on the presence of actors and their focus is not clear. Improvements to social protection infrastructure could attract a broader range of actors to provide more focused, specialised forms of support. Conversely, improvements may reduce the need for international assistance, and the volume of actors providing assistance in this area may decrease and the scale of assistance may decrease.

2.3 Social protection coverage

This section presents an analysis of the level of social protection coverage over time globally and for countries receiving BASIC support at least once. Globally, SP coverage increased from 45% to 47% between 2016 and 2020.⁴ The highest levels of coverage in 2020 were found in Europe and North America, while the lowest levels were found in Latin America, and the Caribbean (56%), Asia and the Pacific (44%) and Africa (17%). This broadly aligns with countries targeted by BASIC for support, which had 23% of their populations covered on average. The marginal increase between 2016 and 2020 observed globally is not reflected by all regions, with some regions experiencing improvements in SP coverage (e.g., West, East and Southern Asia), while others experienced no change or a decrease in coverage (e.g., Southeast Asia, Central America).

Figure 2.1 SP coverage (%) regional level

Region	2016 (%)	2020 (%)	Difference (pp)
Europe and Central Asia			
Western Europe	99.2	99.2	0
Northern Europe	94.3	94.2	-0.1
Northern, Southern and Western Europe	-	90.4	-
Southern Europe	84.1	76.1	-8
Eastern Europe	83.6	84.6	1
Central and Western Asia		66.9	-
Central Asia	59.3	56.5	-2.8
Asia and the Pacific			
South-Eastern Asia and the Pacific	-	61.5	-

⁴ Data was not available for the three years in between 2016 and 2020 at the global and regional level, with 2016 observations not available for 153 countries and 29 observations for 2020 not available.

Region	2016 (%)	2020 (%)	Difference (pp)
Western Asia	54.9	73.9	19
Eastern Asia	64.1	72.3	8.2
South-Eastern Asia and the Pacific	-	61.5	-
South America	58.7	59.9	1.2
Central Asia	59.3	56.5	-2.8
South-Eastern Asia	45.7	33.2	-12.5
Southern Asia	14.2	22.8	8.6
Latin America and the Caribbean			
Central America	67.2	52	-15.2
South America	58.7	59.9	-
Americas	-	64.3	-
Africa			
Southern Africa	43.7	45.6	1.9
Northern Africa	39.2	33.8	-5.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	12.9	13.7	0.8
Western Africa	8.7	13	4.3
Central Africa	-	11.2	-
Eastern Africa	11.1	10.6	-0.5
Northern America			
Northern America	78.5	78.5	0

Source: ILO (2022).

When considering income level, as expected, the highest levels of SP coverage were observed for upper and upper-middle income countries, with a considerable gap between upper and lower-middle income groups (39%).

Figure 2.2 SP coverage (%) income level

Income level	2020 (%)
High income	85
Upper-middle income	64
Lower-middle income	25
Low income	13

Source: ILO (2022). N/B World Bank Atlas method

Of those countries targeted by BASIC at least once ([Figure 2.3](#)), the highest level of coverage was found in Turkey (80%), whilst the country with the lowest SP coverage in 2020 is Uganda (3%).⁵ The mean level of SP coverage across BASIC countries in 2020 was 23% and the median 18%.

⁵ observations were not provided for several countries – e.g., there was no 2020 observations for Nigeria and Venezuela, and no observations in any year for Somalia, Mauritania, or Madagascar.

Notable positive outlier BASIC countries include Turkey, Colombia (53%), South Sudan (44%), Lebanon (41%) and Yemen (40%). Some countries with average levels of social protection coverage also suffer from high levels of fragility, as defined using the Fragility State Index (FSI)⁶, and we identified a weak positive correlation between these two variables for BASIC countries (0.35) which is highlighted in [Figure 2.4](#). For instance, Yemen and South Sudan, which rank 1st and 3rd on the FSI are, as mentioned above, amongst some of the BASIC countries with highest SP coverage.

Other countries providing high SP coverage feature in the top 30th percentile of the FSI (i.e., Turkey, Colombia, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan). Two other outliers include Ghana and Peru, which, within the context of BASIC countries, provide a little bit above average SP coverage and yet rank much lower on the FSI (Ghana 108th, Peru, 97th out of 179 states). At the other end of the scale, countries providing below the average of BASIC countries SP coverage (i.e., 23%) range from ranking 69th in the FSI through the Occupied Palestinian Territories with 18% SP coverage to 5th with Congo, Democratic Republic of the providing 14.1% SP coverage. BASIC appears to have been effective at targeting countries with low levels of social protection coverage, providing support at least once to 12 of the 20 lowest ranking countries in terms of social protection coverage. This is well illustrated in [Figure 2.4](#) with a high concentration of countries converging with high FSI scores and low SP coverage.

Figure 2.3 SP Coverage and Fund for Peace – Fragile State Index 2020 ranking for BASIC countries


Country	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	FSI
Turkey				79.8	79.8	59th
Colombia	40.8	40.8			52.5	65th
South Sudan					43.9	3rd
Lebanon			30		41.3	40th
Yemen					40	1st
Iraq					37.5	17th
Jordan					35.2	67th
Peru		25.5			29.3	97th
Tajikistan				26.6	26.6	66th
Ghana	18.3				25.3	108th
Zambia	15.3				24.6	41st
Niger	20.6				20.6	19th
Ethiopia	11.6				20.1	21st
Occupied Palestinian Territory				16	18	69th
Nepal				17	17	49th
Zimbabwe					16.3	10th
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	14.1				14.1	5th
Mozambique	10.9				13.4	27th
Kenya	10.4				10.1	29th
Mali					9.3	16th
Sudan					9.3	8th
Lesotho	9.2				9.2	60th

⁶ Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>. Date accessed: 19/07/2022.

Country	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	FSI
Pakistan				8	9.2	25th
Afghanistan				7.5	7.5	9th
Cameroon	8.7				6.8	11th
Sierra Leone					4.4	42nd
Uganda	2.9				2.8	24th
Madagascar						57th
Mauritania						33rd
Nigeria	4.4			11		14th
Somalia						2nd
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of		54.2				28th

Source: ILO (2022), Fund for Peace (2022); N.B. Blue indicates a BASIC case country.

Figure 2.4 Association between SP Coverage and Fund for Peace – Fragile States Index 2020



Source: ILO (2022), Fund for Peace (2022)

2.4 Social protection spending

We analysed social protection spending globally and at the case country level between 2017 and 2020 using ODA social protection commitments recorded in the OECD creditor reporting system (CRS).⁷ The dataset includes all donors reported on by OECD and is disaggregated by donor institutions and donor countries, and recipient countries and recipient regions. Data completeness across years and countries was inconsistent and significant data gaps are highlighted as appropriate.

⁷ As defined using the sector code “16010 – Social Protection”. The variable used was “social protection official development assistance donor commitments (USD, constant prices)”.


We acknowledge there may be some double counting across government donors, financial institutions, and agencies. We considered these groups separately in the analysis.

2.4.1 Global level

The top five state donors with largest SP commitments between 2011 and 2020 were the EU, US, UK, Germany, and Japan (Figure 2.5). In 2020, Germany accounted for the largest commitment among this group (38%), followed by the UK (31%) US (15%). While state donors are all high-income countries⁸ and part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the largest institutional donors cover multiple regions, with higher representation from the Americas, with limited African institutional representation.

The largest institutional donors across the period were the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Bank (IDB), UNICEF and Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The WB was a key donor, accounting for almost of all commitments in 2020 (84%). Social protection commitments from these donors fluctuated between 2011-2020, with a markable increase for certain donors in 2020, most likely linked to C-19 responses.

Figure 2.5 Social protection commitments from largest 6 state and institutional/agency donors (USD billions), 2011-2020



Source: OECD (2022). Credit Reporting System. N.B. Note the different scales across the two charts in the Figure.

When we restricted the analysis to BASIC countries receiving ODA, the top five state donors remain the same, but institutional donors servicing Latin and South America were less prominent given the focus on BASIC in across Africa, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East. Instead, the Arab Fund and African Development Bank feature in the top five set of institutional donors but accounted for less than 3% of total commitments made in 2020. Again, the World Bank was the main institutional donor, committing the most in 2020 to BASIC countries (95%).


Evaluation case study countries

At the case study level commitments varied considerably between 2011-2020 for both donor groups, especially for Nigerian institutional donor commitments (Figure 2.6). Notable increases were observed

⁸ As defined using the Atlas method employed by the World Bank.

in 2020 across all countries (except for state spending commitments to Yemen). State donor commitments to Jordan generally remained consistent in an upward trend. Despite featuring second on the FSI Somalia received the lowest level of commitments. Commitments to Yemen decreased between 2014 and 2018 before increasing slightly from 2018 onwards.

Figure 2.6 Social protection commitments to case countries from state and institutional/agency donors (USD billions), 2011-2020



Source: OECD (2022). Credit Reporting System. N.B. Note the different scales across the two charts in the Figure.

Figure 2.7 presents the largest five donors for each case country. Some donors feature across multiple case studies, in including the EU (2 times), Germany (2 times), World Bank (3 times), UK (3 times) and UNICEF (2 times). Some of these donors are expected given they feature as the largest donors in the social protection sector. Other donors that featured in one case are either regional actors (AfDB, AFESD, Kuwait) or countries with special and/or historical relationships with recipient countries (Japan, US, Denmark, and Norway). Total SP commitments are relatively equally spread across the five largest donors for Jordan and Yemen, while Nigeria and Somalia received commitments largely from the World Bank.

Figure 2.7 Largest five donors in terms of SP commitments per BASIC evaluation case country (US\$ millions)

Case	Donors	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Jordan	United States	12.4	8.3	4.1	8.2	4.7	5.8	11.8	24.0	3.4	12.7	95.4
	Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.3	0.0	8.1	47.3	57.5
	EU Institutions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	23.9	4.3	0.0	27.4	55.6
	United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	32.1	32.4
	Japan	0.9	0.8	0.6	3.2	0.8	2.8	2.6	0.6	3.1	1.9	17.4
Nigeria	World Bank	0.0	1.3	309.5	134	0.0	648.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	377	1470.1
	AfDB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	30.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	30.8
	EU Institutions	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.1	0.0	0.0	16.0
	United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	14.0	0.0	0.0	14.7
	UNICEF	0.2	0.3	0.3	2.2	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.4	12.0
Yemen	World Bank	0.0	0.0	2.9	86.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	185.5	274.6
	AFESD	102.9	0.0	0.0	1.3	35.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	139.7

Case	Donors	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
	United Kingdom	25.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.3	6.7	0.0	6.4	51.8	27.6	134.3
	Kuwait	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.4
	EU Institutions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.6	0.0	6.9	0.0	17.6
Somalia	World Bank	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.8	47.0	113.8
	Denmark	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.6	6.9	22.5
	Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	8.5	8.8
	Norway	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	6.9
	UNICEF	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.7	1.9	1.4	1.0	0.1	0.4	0.3	6.2

Source: OECD (2022). Credit Reporting System. N.B. We acknowledge double counting between state and institutional donor entities may exist.

Figure 2.8 indicates that total number of donors active in each year for each case country, which provides a crude proxy for donor complexity in each case. We found that Jordan and Nigeria represented the most complex operating contexts in terms of SP commitments, while Somalia and Yemen SP commitments were comprised of fewer donors.

Figure 2.8 Count of unique state donors and institutions providing social protection commitments for BASIC case countries, 2011-2020

Case Study	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Jordan	8	9	5	9	7	10	13	9	12	13	95
Nigeria	6	6	10	8	7	7	7	10	9	8	78
Somalia	4	5	6	6	6	4	3	5	8	8	55
Yemen	6	4	6	7	6	4	2	4	6	6	51


2.5 Humanitarian spending

We estimated the scale and flow of humanitarian spending by government donors between 2017-2021 in each case study country using records reported by the UNOCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) and OECD ODA Spend data.⁹ In the last five years, Yemen was the main recipient of donor spending for humanitarian projects, as shown in Figure 2.9 below. But support resources provided to Yemen fluctuated over the period and decreased overall since 2017, while resources provided to other countries was stable.

The US and Saudi Arabia have spent the most in 2021, with at least 40% of spend allocated to Yemen across all years (Figure 2.10). Several donors distributed spend broadly evenly across case countries, but several countries focused their spend. For example, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait focus their spend in Yemen, and Japanese spend is limited in Nigeria. EC, German, UK, US spending features prominently across all case countries.

⁹ While the FTS includes agencies, NGOs, financial institutions as funders, it is likely that some of this funding is double counted, i.e., FCDO may provide funding at an institutional level to an NGO which could feature as multiple projects in the data. We focus analysis on spending provided by governments only to address this. We did not adjust for funds that enter a country that are then spent in a different country, as outgoing country spend accounted for less than 1% of all spending in the time period. Finally, several projects were listed as multi-country, but these projects were associated with no spending and were excluded from the analysis.

Figure 2.9 Humanitarian spending by government donors in evaluation case study countries



Source: UNOCHA (2022). Financial Tracking Service. Data extracted: 27 July 2022.

Figure 2.10 Top 10 government donors in case countries in 2021 (US\$ millions - current prices)

Gov.	Case country	Jordan	Nigeria	Somalia	Yemen	Total
US		225	398	545	664	1832
Saudi Arabia		18	3	8	1042	1071
EC		24	70	72	174	340
Germany		78	27	27	183	315
UAE		32		3	232	266
UK		4	38	24	180	246
Canada		18	29	32	62	140
Sweden		4	21	27	75	127
Japan		14	8	13	64	99
Norway		13	12	19	28	72

Source: UNOCHA (2022). Financial Tracking Service. Data extracted: 27 July 2022. N.B. Total funding here does not account for all donors, just the top 10

The destination of government support was largely UN agencies, in particular, WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF, which were active spenders across all case countries in 2021 (Figure 2.11). Again, several organisations were only active in a subset – for example FAO was not very active in Jordan in 2021 and the Yemen Humanitarian Fund was only active in Yemen.

Figure 2.11 Top 10 government donors in case countries in 2021 (US\$ millions - current prices)

Recipient org.	Case Country	Jordan	Nigeria	Somalia	Yemen	Total
WFP		115	173	368	800	1457
Saudi Dev. & Reconst. Prog. for Yemen		0	0	0	573	573
Famine Relief Fund		0	0	0	460	460
UNHCR		121	23	29	107	281
UNICEF		53	28	35	141	258
ICRC		7	20	25	77	129
Yemen Humanitarian Fund		0	0	0	110	110
IOM		5	32	14	32	83
FAO		0	3	64	15	83
UNPF		16	3	0	28	47

Source: UNOCHA (2022). *Financial Tracking Service*. Data extracted: 27 July 2022. N.B. Total funding here does not account for all recipient organisations, just the top 10; \$729 million of 2021 spend was not allocated to an implementing organisation – FTS is a real time reporting tool which is regularly updated, and data gaps are common.

While several common donors and organisations were active in all countries, the above analysis is likely skewed by the large volume of spend in Yemen. We identified further variation in terms of donors spend and implementer activity by country as summarised in [Figure 2.12](#) and presented in more detail by country below.

Figure 2.12 Variation in terms of donors spend and implementer activity by country

	Characteristic	Jordan	Nigeria	Somalia	Yemen
Total spend since 2017 (US\$ billion)		3.14	3.81	5.27	15.94
2021	Total spend (US\$ million)	483	635	978	2818
	No. government donors	23	21	20	43
	No. recipient orgs	31	45	50	69
	3 donor concentration ratio (%)	69	80	66	69
	3 recipient concentration ratio (%)	63	37	48	65
	One donor with over 50% of spend	No	Yes	Yes	No
	One recipient with over 50% of spend	No	No	No	No
	Top Donor	US	US	US	Saudi Arabia
	Top recipient	UNHCR	WFP	WFP	WFP

Jordan

In 2021, 23 government donors provided financial resources for humanitarian projects delivered by 31 organisations in Jordan. Just under half provided by the US, and 91% of spend was accounted for by the top 10 donors ([Figure 2.13](#)). UN organisations feature prominently in the set of organisations implementing projects, with UNHCR and WFP accounting for just over half of all government donor spend, and the top 10 accounting for 84% of government spent, which suggests donors typically work with a small number of large organisations.

Figure 2.13 Jordan – Top 10 donors and recipient orgs. by 2021 spend (US\$ millions – current prices)

Donor	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %	Recipient organisation	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %
US	225	47	UNHCR	121	27
Germany	78	63	WFP	115	52
UAE	32	69	UNICEF	53	63
EC	24	74	Red Crescent Society - UAE	27	69
Saudi Arabia	18	78	UNRWA	24	75
Canada	18	82	UNPF	16	78
Japan	14	85	NRC	12	81
Norway	13	87	ICRC	7	82
Australia	13	90	IOM	5	83
Austria	6	91	INTERSOS	4	84

Source: UNOCHA (2022). *Financial Tracking Service*. Data extracted: 27 July 2022. N.B. \$36 million of government spend was not linked to a specific recipient. This value was excluded from the analysis.

Nigeria

In 2021, 21 government donors provided financial resources for humanitarian projects delivered by 45 organisations in Nigeria. In total, 97% of spending was accounted for by the top 10 donors, with the US, European Commission, and the UK accounting for 80% of this spend. (Figure 2.14). Again, UN organisations are the most prominent recipient organisations, with the World Food Programme taking on just under 30% of all government spend, with the top 10 accounting for just over half of all government spend. This suggests that government donors work with a broad range of organisation, with the WFP taking on a significant share of spend.

Figure 2.14 Nigeria – Top 10 donors and recipient orgs. by 2021 spend (US\$ millions – current prices)

Donor	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %	Recipient organisation	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %
US	398	63	WFP	173	27
EC	70	74	IOM	32	32
UK	38	80	NGA Hum. Fund	30	37
Canada	29	84	UNICEF	28	42
Germany	27	88	UNHCR	23	45
Sweden	21	92	ICRC	20	48
Norway	12	94	NRC	14	50
France	8	95	IRC	11	52
Japan	8	96	Action Against Hunger	10	54
Switzerland	7	97	WHO	7	55

Source: UNOCHA (2022). Financial Tracking Service. Data extracted: 27 July 2022. N.B. \$175 million of government spend was not linked to a specific recipient. This value was excluded from the analysis

Somalia

In 2021, 20 government donors provided financial resources to 50 named organisations for humanitarian projects in Somalia. Nearly 60% of spending was accounted for by the US, with all other top government donors accounted for less that 10% of spend respectively (Figure 2.15). On the recipient side, the WFP account for nearly 40% of government donor spent, again will all other recipients accounting for less than 10% of spend respectively.

Figure 2.15 Somalia – Top 10 donors and recipient orgs. by 2021 spend (US\$ millions – current prices)

Donor	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %	Recipient organisation	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %
US	545	56	WFP	368	38
EC	72	63	FAO	64	44
Canada	32	66	UNICEF	35	48
Sweden	27	69	UNHCR	29	51
Germany	27	72	Somalia Hum. Fund	26	53
UK	24	74	ICRC	25	56
Norway	19	76	WHO	16	58
Japan	13	78	IOM	14	59
Netherlands	8	79	Concern Worldwide	13	60
Saudi Arabia	8	79	Save the Children	12	62

Source: UNOCHA (2022). Financial Tracking Service. Data extracted: 27 July 2022. N.B. \$167 million of government spend was not linked to a specific recipient. This value was excluded from the analysis.

Yemen

In 2021, 43 government donors provided financial resources to 69 organisations to delivery humanitarian projects in Yemen. Of all case countries, Yemen is associated with the highest number of active government donors and recipient organisations. Spend allocated was most significant from Saudi Arabia, followed by the US and UAE. Again, UN agencies were common recipients, with a significant level of spend taken on by a Saudi development agency.

Figure 2.16 Yemen – Top 10 donors and recipient orgs. by 2021 spend (US\$ millions – current prices)

Donor	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %	Recipient organisation	Spend (\$m)	Cumulative %
Saudi Arabia	1042	37	WFP	800	28
US	664	61	Saudi Dev. & Recon. Prog. Yemen	573	49
UAE	232	69	Famine Relief Fund	460	65
Germany	183	75	UNICEF	141	70
UK	180	82	Yemen Humanitarian Fund	110	74
EC	174	88	UNHCR	107	78
Sweden	75	90	ICRC	77	81
Japan	64	93	Dynasafe Int. Group	34	82
Canada	62	95	IOM	32	83
Norway	28	96	UNPF	28	84

Source: UNOCHA (2022). Financial Tracking Service. Data extracted: 27 July 2022. N.B. N.B. \$137 million of government spend was not linked to a specific recipient. This value was excluded from the analysis.

2.6 Social protection sector composition

Using self-reporting records made available by IATI, we considered the extent of social protection programming delivered by the development sector in our case study countries.


- Total number of projects per country over time
- Total and average budget per country over time
- Qualitative focus of programmes
- Most common actors by country

2.7 Testing the theory

Considering the above analyses together, we compared levels of social protection and humanitarian programming investment with the volume of appeal funding requested between 2017-2020. As discussed above, we expect spending on humanitarian appeals and appeal needs to decrease as investment in SP increases. It may be the case that changes in humanitarian spend lags social protection investment, given the time take for SP investment to realise change.

Figure 2.17 below presents these comparisons for each case country. In all cases except Jordan, which had no humanitarian appeals active in the period, humanitarian appeals were active in all years between 2017-2020. Humanitarian funding demand, as approximated through set appeal targets, remained significantly higher than SP commitments and increased slightly in all cases. In Jordan, we present instead total humanitarian spending, which has decreased slightly over the period. While SP commitments from donor governments remained low, these did increase over time for all countries, especially SP commitments from institutional donors like the WB. Finally, the ability of appeals to be fully funded decreased over time for all countries running appeals.

Figure 2.17 Trends in SP and humanitarian spend and crisis appeals, 2017-2020 (US\$ million)



There are several limitations to a comparative analysis like this. For example, it does not include national investment in SP from case country governments, which is a considerable limitation given the relative importance of state financing of SP systems. We used donor government commitments to SP as a proxy for investment in the analysis. Second, while SP commitments appear low, it is typically expected that SP infrastructure is more efficient in responding to crises. Without a clear target for the volume of SP investment needed, it may be misleading to compare commitments made across humanitarian and SP sectors. Finally, in the absence of a quantitative casual inference strategy, this analysis cannot be used to draw correlational or causal inferences alone.

3 Survey analysis

This note presents the results of a survey of FCDO country offices that were prospectively targeted to receive BASIC support. We surveyed FCDO in-country advisors between 13 June 2022 – 8 September 2022 to collect views on BASIC programme delivery and performance, as well as broader changes in the use of social protection approaches during crises. The survey population included humanitarian, social development, conflict, and climate and environment advisors, some of which had not previously received support from BASIC. This note presents an overview of the survey population, response rate, results. The survey population was finite (n=101); confidence intervals were corrected to reflect this.¹⁰ Given the expected small sample size, results were triangulated with other evaluation data sources to answer evaluation questions.

3.1 Population and response rate

The survey generated a response rate of 30 percent. The FCDO Social Protection Team shared a list of 147 FCDO advisors with the evaluation team. Of which, 124 were working in country posts and were contacted to take part in the survey. Of these, 23 were either no longer in post or had never worked on social protection programming and were removed from the sample, leaving 101 potential respondents. In total, 30 advisors participated in the survey – a response rate of 30 percent overall (Table 3.1), which varied somewhat by region and advisor type.

Table 3.1 Survey response rate

Variable	Value
Total units shared	147
Relevant population	124
Removed units - no longer in post	14
Removed units - never worked on SP	4
Removed units - engaged elsewhere in evaluation	3
Removed units - duplicate	2
Final population	101
Respondents	30
Response rate	0.30

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey population and respondent records.

¹⁰ As the sample size is larger than five percent of the total population (30/101=30%). The finite population correction factor = $\sqrt{(N-n) / (N-1)}$, where N=population and n=sample size.

Table 3.2 Survey response rate by region and advisor

Group	Variable	Population	Sample (N)	Sample (%)	Response rate (%)
Region	Central Africa	3	0	0	0
	East Africa	31	6	20	19
	LATAM & Caribbean	4	3	10	75
	MENA	19	4	13	21
	South Asia	17	3	10	18
	South-East Asia	3	2	7	67
	Southern Africa	9	4	13	44
	Sub-Saharan Africa - regional	2	1	3	50
	West Africa	13	7	23	54
Advisor type	Climate and environment	21	7	23	33
	Conflict	9	2	7	22
	Humanitarian	32	5	17	16
	NA	3	3	10	100
	Social development	36	13	43	36
Overall		101	30	100	30

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey population and respondent records.

There was some risk of sampling bias arising from self-selection. To test for sampling bias, we compared the distribution of the population and sample achieved by region and advisor type. These distributions were broadly comparable, but some differences arose (Table 3.3). It may also be the case that respondents differed in systematic ways from non-respondents in non-observable characteristics.

Table 3.3 Comparison of population and sample distribution by region and advisor type

Group	Variable	Population (%)	Sample (%)	Absolute percentage point difference (pp)
Region	Central Africa	3	0	3
	East Africa	31	20	11
	LATAM & Caribbean	4	10	6
	MENA	19	13	5
	South Asia	17	10	7
	South-East Asia	3	7	4
	Southern Africa	9	13	4
	Sub-Saharan Africa - regional	2	3	1
	West Africa	13	23	10
Advisor type	Climate and environment	21	23	3
	Conflict	9	7	2
	Humanitarian	32	17	15
	None	3	10	7
	Social development	36	43	8

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey population and respondent records.

3.2 Results

3.2.1 Crises context

Multiple crises were reported, with the most common arising due to natural hazards and Covid-19. A range of crises were identified by respondents ([Table 3.4](#)) and no respondent suggested the country that formed the focus of the survey had not experienced a significant crisis since 2018. In fact, three quarters of respondents reported at least three significant crises had been significant since 2018; the average number of crises reported was three (95%CI: 2.6; 3.4). Since the baseline, the significance of conflict and fragility and displacement crises has relatively decreased and crises arising from economic conditions have become increasingly prominent.

Table 3.4 In in your view, which types of crises have been significant since 2018, if any?

Crises Type	Midline		Baseline	
	N	%	N	%
Crises caused by natural hazards (excluding infectious disease)	23	77	9	16
Crises caused by infectious diseases	18	60	14	24
Crises caused by conflict and fragility	16	53	17	29
Complex crises (caused by overlapping natural and man-made factors)	13	43	6	10
Displacement crises	10	33	11	19
Crises caused by economic conditions	9	30	0	0
N	30	100	17	100

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question A5.2. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 13%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted

3.2.2 Initial BASIC experience

Respondents were largely aware of BASIC, but less familiar with BASIC Research.

Respondents were more aware of BASIC overall (60%) than its constituent components. While the results suggest more awareness with BASIC TA (BASIC TAS, SPACE or STAAR) differences between respondent awareness of BASIC TA and Research were not significant. Awareness of all aspects of the BASIC programme was less during the midline compared to the baseline. However, we expect this is due to the broader sample achieved at midline as a result of the change in survey mode.

Table 3.5 How aware are you with the BASIC programme and its specific components?

Type	BASIC component	Unaware (baseline)	Neither aware nor unaware	Aware (baseline)	% / N
%	Overall	30% (0%)	10% (6%)	60% (94%)	100%
	TA	47% (0%)	7% (6%)	47% (94%)	100%
	Research	63% (6%)	7% (18%)	30% (76%)	100%
N	Overall	9	3	18	30
	TA	14	2	14	30
	Research	19	2	9	30

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question B1. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 13%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals.

Only a small component of the sample has received BASIC TA, which was used to support coordination and no one in the sample has used BASIC Research services. In total 33% (n=10) of the sample had received BASIC TA support. TA took the form of short-term technical advisors, short-term assignments, and global knowledge products, and were used to inform programme

adaptations, support coordination, and develop conceptual understanding of nexus issues (Table 3.6). In one case, a respondent did not have the time to make use of BASIC support due to changing policy priorities in their office.

Table 3.6 What BASIC services have you accessed if any, and how did you make use of them in your work, if at all?

Access	N	%
Short term advisor	6	60
Global SPACE research products	3	30
Short term assignment	3	30
Total	10	100
Use	N	%
Inform partner engagement and coordination	6	60
Adapt SP system to respond to C-19	4	40
Inform business case development	3	30
Inform government engagement	2	20
Was not able to use BASIC outputs	1	10
Adapt SP system - general	1	10
Accelerate conceptual and operational development of nexus linkages	1	10
Adapt SP system to respond to climate shock	1	10
Total	10	100

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, questions B2 and B2.1. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 28%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted.

Lack of awareness and the presence of non-FCDO support were key reasons for not using BASIC. Multiple reasons for not using BASIC were identified (Table 3.7) with lack of awareness and other available sources of support the most common reasons among them. This result is not consistent with the result presented in Table 5 which indicated respondents were aware largely of BASIC. It is possible that respondents were answering this question in general terms, rather than referring to their own experiences. It is also possible that awareness was interpreted broadly, and that respondents may have been aware of BASIC, but not enough to know how to use it.

Table 3.7 Do any of the following reasons explain why you have not accessed BASIC services in your work?

Reason for not accessing BASIC	N	%
I am not aware of BASIC or its services	10	33%
I use other sources of non-FCDO social protection research and advisory support	9	30%
No reason provided	8	27%
I use other sources of FCDO social protection research or advisory support	7	23%
The services it offers are not relevant to my work	6	20%
I indirectly benefited from BASIC through other colleagues	4	13%
I or my team do not have enough time to access BASIC	2	7%
I use other sources of FCDO social protection research and advisory support	1	3%
I was not clear BASIC was accessible to climate advisors	1	3%
Total	30	100%

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question A5.2. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 13%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted.

3.2.3 Efficiency & Effectiveness

FCDO country offices were a key primary user in all cases, with a range of other users targeted. Respondents were asked to indicate which groups were the primary and secondary users of BASIC outputs (Table 3.8). FCDO were a key user of BASIC support, but other groups highlighted. Multilateral agencies were reported as the next most common primary user, and national authorities were reported as the most common secondary user but there were broadly no significant differences between these other group. The private sector and research community were not reported as a targeted user by any respondent.

Table 3.8 Thinking about the support provided by BASIC, in your view, which groups made use of this support in [country]?

Type	User group	Primary (%)	Secondary (%)
%	CSOs	10	17
	FCDO	100	0
	Financial institution	0	33
	local/national authorities	10	50
	Multilateral agency	40	33
	Other donor	20	33
	Research community	0	0
	Private sector	0	0
	DK	0	0
	NA	0	0
N	CSOs	1	1
	FCDO	10	
	Financial institution		2
	local/national authorities	1	3
	Multilateral agency	4	2
	Other donor	2	2
	Research community	0	0
	Private sector	0	0
	DK	0	0
	NA	0	0
N		10	6

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question B3.1. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 28%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted, i.e., the row sum of percentages will not equal 100. Instead, the percentage denotes how many respondents indicated that a user group was primary or secondary – for example, of the 10 that received support, all of them said FCDO was the primary user, but 40% also reported a multilateral agency was also a primary user.

BASIC TA was seen as valuable and improved capacity but is still in the process of being used to affect change in SP systems, especially with partner governments directly. The Kirkpatrick model is an approach used to assess learning effectiveness of that we have employed to assess the effects of providing TA. It considers effective training to be comprised of four levels sequential levels (reaction, learning, behaviour, and results). We asked respondents to indicate their agreement with a set of statements that approximate each level of the Kirkpatrick model (Table 3.9). The results suggest BASIC TA was largely valuable to respondents (Level 1) and resulted in capacity improvements (Level 2). While there is a suggestion that new learning and capacity was being applied to realise improvements to SP systems, especially directly with governments (KP4.2), there was less agreement at these levels from respondents (Level 3 and 4). This pattern broadly aligns with the result identified during the baseline.

Table 3.9 Regarding the specific technical activities you engaged in, can you indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements?

Kirkpatrick level	Strongly disagree -%	Disagree - %	Agree nor disagree -%	Agree -%	Strongly agree -%	DK -%	NA -%
1. Reaction	0	0	15	30	45	0	10
1.1 – Helpful and relevant	0	0	0	30	60	0	10
1.2 – Timely delivery	0	0	30	30	30	0	10
2. Learning	0	3	7	23	43	7	17
2.1 – Met its intended aims	0	0	0	30	50	0	20
2.2 – Support not available elsewhere	0	10	20	10	30	10	20
2.3 – Considered GESI issues	0	0	0	30	50	10	10
3. Behaviour	0	10	10	45	25	5	5
3.1 – Improved FCDO collaboration	0	10	10	50	20	10	0
3.2 – New/improved use of SP approaches in FCDO	0	10	10	40	30	0	10
4. Results	5	15	30	20	15	5	10
4.1 – New/improved SP approach adopted by other donors / agencies	0	10	20	40	20	0	10
4.2 – New/improved SP approaches adopted by partner governments	10	20	40	0	10	10	10

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question D3.1. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 28%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals.

Multiple changes were identified relating to the use of SP during crises, namely the development of new plans, policies, and programmes. The most common changes reported as significant by respondents was the development of new/improved SP programmes, improved political commitment to social protection, and improved capability and capacity (Table 3.10). These typically related to outcome level changes, but respondents did also report changes at the sub impact level, especially regarding design adaptations to make SP more inclusive, especially in response to C-19. Multiple respondents reported the application of technological innovations as a key change in their own right but many of these was at an early stage of implementation and were expected to yield significant changes at a later date. To produce this result, respondents were asked to characterise the most significant changes they had observed regarding the use of social protection approaches during crises since 2018. We coded these changes broadly against the BASIC Theory of Change to understand the prominence of different changes.

Table 3.10 What are the most significant changes you have observed since 2018 in the use of social protection approaches during crises in [country]?

ToC level	Change category	N	%
Outcome	New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes, and systems designed and implemented (FCDO, bi-laterals, multi-laterals, local actors, Governments)	13	50
Outcome	Increased political commitment to and use of social protection approaches in crises	10	38
Outcome	Improved human and institutional capability and capacity (FCDO, bi-laterals, multi-laterals, local actors, Governments)	10	38
Other	Technological innovation	8	31
Sub-impact	Design and delivery of social assistance in crises is more inclusive (gender, age, disability and marginalised groups)	8	31
Outcome	Greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives	7	27
Sub-impact	Diversified and more sustainable funding for social protection approaches in crises (domestic, development, private)	7	27
Outcome	Evidence used by governments, donors, and agencies to inform policies and practice	4	15
Sub-impact	More efficient social assistance in crises (earlier, timelier, less fragmented, lower cost)	3	12
Sub-impact	Social assistance in crises more effective in addressing household needs	2	8
Total		26	100

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question D7. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 14%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted.

Wider FCDO teams, multilateral agencies, partner governments and financial institutions (largely the World Bank) were suggested to be the main actors responsible for these changes.

We asked respondents to rank the top three actors that contributed to the changes they put forward. For the most part, respondents indicated the continued work of FCDO country offices, agencies local governments and financial institutions as key actors responsible for change. Looking at respondent rankings in detail, agencies are suggested to be more central to change, but broadly speaking, differences in proportions across these key actors was not significant. BASIC was ranked as a top three contributor to the changes described by respondents in a minority of cases (n=2).

Table 3.11 Thinking about these changes, rank the top three actors in [AUTOPUNCH A4] which made the most significant contributions to these?

Actor responsible for change (count in top 3 rank)	N	%
Other FCDO teams or programmes	18	69
Multilateral/UN agencies	17	65
Local or country governments	16	62
Financial institutions	10	38
CSOs	5	19
Other donors	4	15
BASIC	2	8
Private sector	1	4
Other	1	4
Total	26	100

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question D9. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 14%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted.

Actors focused on a wide set of changes. We compared key actors in terms of the types of change they were suggested to have contributed to in Table 3.11. We found that these actors contributed to a wide range of changes and there were no discernible trends in terms of the type of change that actors focused on or specialised in. Multiple barriers to further use of SP approaches during crises with political will and government capacity cited as key barriers. We asked respondents to comment on any residual barriers they faced in support further use of SP approaches during crises. We categorised these changes into six groups which relate to the design, delivery, and politics of social protection (Table 3.12). Political challenges were the most common, with a particular focus on limited political will and realising sustainable finance for SP.

Table 3.12 In [country] what significant barriers to change in using social protection approaches to respond to crises still exist, if any?

Barrier	N	%
Political		
Limited political support for SP	16	55
Sustainable finance challenges	8	28
Design		
Challenges implementing SP graduation mechanisms	2	7
Climate SP linkages remain unclear	5	17
Residual exclusion of marginalised groups	6	21
SP targeting challenges	4	14
Operations		
Data protection and information security challenges	1	3
Insufficient data access to inform SP	1	3
Residual uncertainties about what market mechanisms can support SP	1	3

Barrier	N	%
SP delivery challenges	7	24
Technological barriers	2	7
Capacity		
FCDO capacity gaps - SP systems	1	3
Government capacity gaps - SP systems	9	31
Coordination		
Access to technical and market partners	3	10
Actor coordination challenges	4	14
Fragility		
Instability and fragility	7	24
Total	29	100

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question D10. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 13%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted.

Table 3.13 which of the following areas would you most like BASIC to help you achieve, and what do you use to find out about FCDO support available to you?

Support area	N	%
Sustainable financing of emergency responses through social protection systems	22	73
Clarifying the links between the use of social protection approaches and the climate change agenda	20	67
Improving the quality of social protection systems in their own right	19	63
Improving the linkages between the humanitarian system and social protection approaches	18	60
Improving anticipatory action	17	57
Making existing social protection provisions more inclusive	16	53
Improving the capacity of FCDO in the use of social protection approaches during crises	15	50
Improving the capacity of multilateral agencies, donors, and financial institutions in the use of social protection approaches during crises	13	43
Improving the quality and reach of humanitarian response	13	43
Making better use of evidence to inform programming and engagement	5	17
Improving the monitoring and evaluation of social protection systems	2	7
Improving the capacity of partner governments in the use of social protection approaches during crises	1	3
Improving the use of data by social protection systems	1	3
Total	30	100
Preferred learning channel	N	%
Adviser Cadre mailing lists	21	70
Direct communications with FCDO Social Protection Team	18	60
Informally through colleagues	14	47
Intranet	12	40
Direct communications with BASIC suppliers	11	37
Cross-cadre events	3	10
Adviser cadre events	2	7
FCDO SP community of practice	2	7
DK	2	7
NA	1	3
SP community of practice mailing list	1	3
Online events	1	3
Total	30	100

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question B5 and B5.1. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 13%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted.

4 Country Case Study - Jordan

This section presents a summary of the BASIC midline evaluation country case study for Jordan. The case study provides a background of social protection in Jordan, an overview of BASIC support in Jordan to date, and the impacts of BASIC support, including response to support, key changes observed, and limitations.

4.1 Context

4.1.1 Crises faced by Jordan

Jordan continues to host the second highest refugee population per capita in the world. Over the past two years, resulting pressures on the economy and service provision have been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and secondary impacts of the war in Ukraine. Contact-intensive sectors such as services and tourism, which are large income generators in Jordan, were hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, resulting in the country’s first GDP contraction in three decades. This year, economic growth is expected to accelerate as the removal of travel restrictions supports the revival of the tourism industry. Nevertheless, Jordan’s high unemployment rate coupled with higher food and fuel prices is putting pressure on households and their purchase power ([Table 4.1](#)).

This corroborates with crises data which indicates that the severity of the crisis in Jordan has remained fairly stable over time, with the exception of 2021 when the pandemic exacerbated pre-existing social and economic vulnerabilities ([Table 4.2](#)).

Table 4.1 Characteristics of crises and associated vulnerabilities

Poverty & economic insecurity	Protracted refugee crisis	Economic
Jordan has been affected by recession, debt, and unemployment for more than two decades. While Jordan's GDP has averaged around 2% per year since 2016, this hasn't been sufficient to keep up with the country's young workforce.	Since 2011 the Syrian conflict, has had a detrimental impact on Jordan's poverty reduction, and debt accumulation. The state has secured large volumes of foreign aid to be able to provide services to the refugee population (most of whom live in host communities alongside Jordanians).	Mobility and other restrictions associated with the Covid-19 pandemic put pressure on Jordan's vulnerable macroeconomic position.

Source: Integrity (2022). Triangulation of stakeholder perspectives and document review.

Table 4.2 Overview of Jordan crisis – INFORM Severity Index (2019-2022)

Crises in Jordan	2019	2020	2021	Jan-July - 2022
Syrian refugees in Jordan	2.5	2.6	3.0	2.7

Source: ACAPS (2022). INFORM Severity Index. N.B. The Index is scored between 1 and 5. Low index values represent a less severe humanitarian crisis, and high index values represent a more severe humanitarian crisis. Data accessed: 16/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3QKYmzZ>.

4.1.2 Overview of Jordanian social protection infrastructure to respond to crises

The social assistance and protection (SA/SP) landscape in Jordan is characterised by the co-existence of a mature government-operated social assistance system, mostly accessible only to Jordanian nationals, **and a series of large-scale humanitarian agency interventions** that target refugees.¹

The main national social assistance programme in Jordan is operated by the National Aid Fund (NAF), a comprehensive scheme, including regular CTs, that operates as a semi-autonomous arm of the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD).² During Covid-19, the NAF was able to build on a series of longer-term systems building efforts (not least the operationalisation of a national unified registry in 2019) to expand dramatically, both vertically and horizontally (see section 5.1 for more). Other key institutions include the Social Security Fund, which provides social insurance benefits to insured persons and their families. The main policy framework for SP in Jordan is the National Social Protection Strategy which covers the period 2019 to 2025.

Humanitarian social transfers provided to Syrian refugees by UN agencies and INGOs take the form of cash and vouchers, with the largest programmes in terms of coverage delivered by WFP and UNHCR. Jordan is often held up as an example of a country in which humanitarian transfers are delivered through particularly sophisticated systems, including electronic registration, e-wallets and iris recognition software. At midline, key informants reported that WFP and UNHCR have taken steps over the past year to harmonise their operations, undertake a joint profiling exercise on refugee capacities and develop a joint approach to policy advocacy, to lay the groundwork for the integration of refugees into the national system (i.e. strengthening of the humanitarian-development nexus as it relates to SP and work).

4.2 Origins and scope of BASIC support

BASIC TA support to FCDO Jordan has centred on gathering evidence to inform and weighing design options for two new SA/SP programmes, the Emergency Social Protection in Jordan (ESPJ) and Strengthening Societal and Economic Resilience in Jordan (SSERJ) programmes. As set out in the baseline study, in late 2019 the then-Social Development Adviser (SDA) approached SPT for support on the design of a five year programme (now known as SSERJ) focused on systems strengthening. SPT directed him to BASIC TA. In April 2020, BASIC TA support to this programme was put on hold and support sought from SPACE on the design of an emergency CT programme (ESPJ) to cater to immediate needs of vulnerable Jordanians, as FCDO pivoted to support the government with its Covid-19 response. From autumn 2020, FCDO and BASIC TA returned to, and built on preliminary work already undertaken on, the design of the longer-term SP programme – as well as support to FCDO’s leadership of an SP donor group which seeks to strengthen coordination amongst actors across the humanitarian-development nexus.

No BASIC activity has been delivered in Jordan since the baseline. The British Embassy Aman (BEA) team responsible for work on social protection are sufficiently aware of STAAR and the services it offers, but no longer have a need for external TA as the new SP programme currently in procurement (whose design was informed by support from BASIC TAS) will establish a TA facility specifically for Jordan. BEA is in a unique position as one of very few (or possibly the only) embassy which has recently designed a new SP programme. Other sources of short-term technical support are also available to embassies. The BEA humanitarian adviser – whose programme portfolio includes funding to UNHCR and WFP social transfers – plans to draw on the FCDO-funded K4D Research Helpdesk to identify and address evidence gaps and best practice on the linking humanitarian and SP systems, to inform the design of a successor programme.

4.3 BASIC support provided

4.3.1 Technical Assistance

Five assignments have been provided to FCDO Jordan by BASIC TA across the life of the programme, all of which had been completed at baseline (Table 4.3). All assignments have fed directly into the design of one of two new SA/SP programmes suggesting that support provided was highly relevant to FCDO Jordan’s needs. With the business case for SSERJ still outstanding at baseline, the midline case study assesses the extent to which BASIC contributed to this programme’s development.

Table 4.3 Overview of BASIC TA support to FCDO Jordan

#	Date	TA facility	Summary
1	Dec 2019 – April 2020	TAS	Development of overarching framework to guide FCDO’s involvement in social assistance in Jordan for the following 5 years (paused): Terms of Reference (ToR) issued in December 2019. Planned March 2021 mission cancelled due to travel restrictions and pivot to Covid-19 response. <i>Interim deliverable:</i> working Summary Document outlining the main technical, policy, and political economy issues related to strengthening the social protection system in Jordan.
2	April – May 2020	SPACE	Support to FCDO support to GoJ social assistance response to the Covid-19 pandemic: Clinic discussion, centring on key issues arising from analysis by the SPACE team of documentation relating to proposed FCDO support to the Government of Jordan’s Emergency Cash Transfer initiative in response to the economic impacts of the pandemic, to be implemented through the NAF. Support to development of the Business Case for this support (FCDO ESPJ programme). <i>Deliverables:</i> appraisal case, including proposed VFM measures, theory of change and logframe narrative and structure, gender and social inclusion (GESI) analysis, as well as additional analysis.
3	Sept 2020	SPACE	Assessment of the social and gendered risks and impacts of the emergency cash transfer project: To inform updated project protocols and operational manual. <i>Deliverable:</i> Rapid social and GESI assessment.
4	Sept 2020	SPACE	VFM analysis: Return to longer-term planning. Analysis setting out the value for money (VFM) case for greater integration of the social transfer system in Jordan. <i>Deliverable:</i> VFM note covering potential areas of integration, benefits, political economy, and recommended next steps.
5	Jan – July 2021	TAS	Development of overarching framework to guide FCDO’s involvement in social assistance in Jordan for the following 5 years (revisited): Return to and updating of December 2019 ToRs for developing an overarching framework to guide FCDO’s longer-term involvement in social assistance (SSERJ programme). Including stakeholder consultation exercise, and consideration of the ways in which a new programme could strengthen NAF and then, over time, facilitate and encourage the eventual alignment of the humanitarian cash with public sector social assistance in Jordan. <i>Deliverables:</i> Synthesis report on stakeholder engagements and potential implications for FCDO Jordan. Two versions, one internal and one for sharing with external stakeholders. Options report for 5 year programme. Sessions with ambassador and embassy staff to communicate options, as well as session with the SP donor group to share key findings.

4.3.2 Research and KML

Many research-related needs will be met by FCDO Jordan’s new SP programme. Despite interest from FCDO staff in-country, Jordan was not selected as a focus country for BASIC Research.

At baseline, this was viewed as a missed opportunity by FCDO Jordan to address key data gaps – around vulnerabilities, for instance. At midline, FCDO Jordan expected that its new SSERJ programme, whose planned five year programme will include a policy and evidence sub-component, would meet many research-related needs. Areas of interest cited by advisers included the social contract and tax-financed SP. They anticipate that research generated by SSERJ could be used to influence GoJ policy.

As regards uptake of KML products, as at baseline a minority of key informants indicated some limited awareness and use of centrally-produced SPACE publications beyond the FCDO, though the outcomes of this are unclear. WFP staff reported using SPACE resources to inform their programming and having flagged SPACE as a useful resource to the NAF in the context of its Covid-19 response. Key informants had not used BASIC KML products more recently (i.e. since baseline).

4.3.3 Coherence across BASIC components and with other FCDO programming

Closer working between BEA advisers is creating opportunities to build linkages between the (BASIC TA-supported) SP and humanitarian programming portfolios. With Jordan not a research focus country, the evaluation case study has explored the question of coherence with reference to the coherence of BASIC TA support with other FCDO programming. Both the humanitarian and social development adviser report working together more closely than in previous years. Given the prominence of the humanitarian-development nexus in Jordan this is not attributable to BASIC support, but opens up valuable opportunities for synergies between the BASIC-supported SSERJ programme – which seeks to strengthen and expand a core part of the national SP system -- and funding to humanitarian social assistance for refugees.

4.4 Response to support provided

4.4.1 What worked

At baseline, FCDO Jordan characterised BASIC TA support and deliverables as high quality, rapid and flexible. They particularly valued that support facilitated cross-country learning and mainstreamed gender and inclusion-related considerations well.

At midline, FCDO reported that the approach adopted by the TA consultants enabled deliverables to feed directly into the design of the new SSERJ programme:

‘My sense was that we were very lucky with consultants that we got who led on the piece of work. They were fantastic and really made sure that they didn’t go off and do their own thing. There was a lot of back and forth, hours spent mulling things over, and trying to get to the root issues. So the options paper delivered was incredibly useful because I very much felt that we had already decided the approach, so we were able to extrapolate and use a lot of that to build the basis of the Business Case. Because of that two-way conversation. [We were] confident that options put forward were a genuine reflection of where the UK could have added value.’

KII with FCDO

The SSERJ Business Case was approved in February, and a Memorandum of Understanding with MoPIC for the programme recently put in place. FCDO did not use any other external sources of support to develop SSERJ.

4.4.2 Challenges and limitations

Limitations of BASIC TA support identified at baseline included: mixed views amongst FCDO staff as to whether BASIC support sufficiently integrated political economy (PE) considerations; differences of opinion between the original commissioner and consultants around timescales for building the humanitarian-development nexus, with implications for programme framing; and lack of on-the-ground support.


The approved business case for SSERJ and ToR for a programme management agent reflects only one substantive change from the design recommended by the BASIC consultants: the addition of technical assistance to ILO, who are overseeing a core programme of support to the Social Security Corporation. FCDO view ILO oversight as key for effective delivery, and financial and risk assurance; but ILO would be unable to join a consortium bid due to internal governance requirements. The change is therefore due to external factors rather than any inherent shortcoming of the design proposed by BASIC.

It is worth noting that at the time of data collection, procurement of a management agent for SSERJ was expected to begin shortly, but was on hold while funding cuts were pending.

4.5 BASIC’s contribution to change

Figure 4.1 Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Jordan overleaf indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which were most relevant to BASIC’s support to FCDO Jordan since the baseline. Statements in boxes shaded in blue were directly relevant to the types of support provided by BAIC to date. This section explores BASIC’s contribution to changes in Jordan, with reference to – for sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 on FCDO’s use of BASIC support and indirect results – ToC output and outcome statements and – for section 5.6.3 on enablers and constraints – ToC assumptions.

Figure 4.1 Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Jordan



4.6 Changes observed

4.6.1 Key changes

Key changes identified by all types of key informants coalesced strongly around three themes, each indicating a trajectory towards sub-impact level change as articulated by the BASIC ToC.

Change 1: Rapid horizontal and vertical expansion of NAF Takaful programmes

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key drivers	BASIC contribution
1 year	High	Low	Earlier reforms; Covid funding	Medium

Change and its significance: The National Aid Fund both increased the value of beneficiary transfers and significantly expanded its caseload in response to the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. At baseline, the NAF was well underway with implementing the addition of 85,000 Jordanian households to Takaful’s caseload between 2018 and 2021. Following the onset of the pandemic, two additional Takaful programmes (‘Takaful 2’ and ‘Takaful 3’) were introduced to cover newly vulnerable households and then to respond to the second wave of Covid-19. These emergency cash transfers reached a total of 241,332 and 154,690 households respectively.¹¹ In short, the NAF provided *social assistance which ‘more effective[ly]...met household needs’ (sub-impact).*

Sustainability: Likelihood of sustainability has been scored ‘low’ because the NAF’s expansion was temporary. However, it should be noted that the scaling of Takaful demonstrated that NAF systems are sufficiently mature to be scaled quickly again in response to future crises.

‘[The horizontal and vertical expansion of the NAF] has demonstrated that building a mature system and having that in place means that you are able to respond quickly; it gives extra confidence that you’ll be able to do so again.’

KII with FCDO

Drivers of change: Several donors, as well as the World Bank, provided funds to enable Takaful’s expansion. That it was possible for the NAF to respond as quickly as it did (with the first payments to beneficiaries made within three months of the onset of Covid-19), is testament to a series of longer term reforms, also supported by the FCDO (specifically, the Conflict, Security and Stability Fund) and led by the World Bank, to develop NAF systems – for instance, with the development of a National Unified Registry and Management Information System which automates payments.

BASIC’s contribution: BASIC TA contributed directly to the design of the ESPJ programme, which disbursed funds to the NAF through: i) £20m as grant finance through a World Bank (WB) Trust Fund, blending UK financial aid with a US\$350m loan from the World Bank, making it more affordable for GoJ by reducing interest on the WB loan; and ii) a £14m grant under a Joint Funding Arrangement (JFA).¹² As noted at baseline, use of the two funding modalities recommended by SPACE enabled the FCDO to leverage other donor funding. *The new FCDO programme (4) supported by SPACE enabled government social assistance to meet household needs more effectively (8) and resulted in diversified funding for social assistance (10), albeit temporarily.*

¹¹ FCDO (2022) Programme Completion Review – Emergency Social Protection in Jordan.

¹² Ibid.

Barriers to change: Many of the usual barriers to provision of emergency SP were removed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, not least those related to insufficient funding or political will.

Change 2: Consolidation of NAF Takaful programmes into a single unified cash transfer programme

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key drivers	BASIC contribution
Ongoing	High	High	Covid prog.; WB support	Low

Change and its significance: Building on its expansion during the pandemic, the NAF has begun the process of consolidating its various programmes into a single, more cohesive Unified Cash Transfer (UCT) Programme. Critically, the unified programme will adopt a more sophisticated targeting approach, which is better aligned with the proxy means testing approaches used by the UN agencies delivering humanitarian cash in Jordan. Previously, inclusion in the NAF was based on membership of one or more specific vulnerable groups, with different programmes operating different eligibility criteria, which meant that some poor households were overlooked. The need for a better developed and more consistent NAF targeting approach was raised repeatedly by donors and multilaterals at baseline, but had not been resolved at the time.

‘The new targeting formula...is to eliminate any human decision on deciding the level of poverty... To enhance fairness and equality.’

KII with GoJ

‘[Beneficiary selection] was previously been based on NAF experience rather than data. Now indicators and weights are based on data coming from the HEIS [Household Expenditure and Income Survey].’

KII with multilateral agency

According to the World Bank, these changes are being communicated effectively to existing beneficiaries, most whom will be migrated to the consolidated programme. The NAF is reviewing the circumstances of households who would become ineligible under the new approach, with a view to refining targeting indicators if necessary. And providing a supplementary programme to ensure that groups originally selected based on lifecycle vulnerabilities are not excluded.¹³ Overall, the NAF is on track to provide ‘more efficient’ and fairer, ‘more inclusive’ social assistance (sub-impact).

Sustainability: Given the maturity of NAF systems, reforms are expected to be sustainable.

Drivers of change: The UCT is being supported primarily by a World Bank loan. The NAF has not sought support from donors subsequent to Covid-related programming. Rapid expansion during the pandemic not only created the various programmes to be consolidated, but contributed strongly to the government’s decision to adopt a more uniform approach.

‘We started discussing this [with the government] in 2019. Covid helped to accelerate the process of unifying the programme...The emergency programme helped the government to understand the importance of using a formula to determine poverty rather than ‘titles’.’

KII with multilateral agency

¹³ Ibid.

BASIC’s contribution: BASIC’s contribution to this change has been minor and indirect. An FCDO programme whose development was supported by SPACE part-funded the expanded NAF programming whose consolidation is now underway.

Barriers to change: With key decisions already made, and the World Bank funding in place, expected barriers are primarily technical – relating, for instance, to NAF staff bandwidth and capacity to implement the new targeting approach.

Change 3: Shift towards more sustainable financing for social protection

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key drivers	BASIC contribution
Ongoing	High	Medium	Protraction: fewer int. funds	Medium

Change and its significance: This change is comprised of several elements and, at midline, is only partially achieved. First, in 2022 there is a line for a contribution to the NAF in the government budget for the first time. This year the budget line is being funded by a WB loan, but both the NAF and donors view this as an important first step for a potential future government contribution.

Second, donor interests and funding have shifted markedly towards more sustainable financing models for social protection. In interviews, donors identified graduation approaches and contributory SP as key priorities. This is reflected in support to the Social Security Corporation (SSC), which has not previously received donor funding. FCDO’s new SSERJ programme will support Estidama++, an SSC programme which aims to extend the coverage of contributory SP to informal workers by providing wage subsidies and income support for 18 months to enable workers to register with the SSC.

‘We set out to design a long-term programme that is driven by needs but also reflects an appropriate approach to support in an MIC. We wanted to put front and centre the idea of strengthening societal and economic resilience...in a way where we can use UK funding as a catalyst, pioneering new pilot schemes with idea that in the medium to long term they would become government-owned with government taking on burden sharing of them.’

KII with FCDO

Stakeholders on both sides of the humanitarian-development nexus reported increased dialogue and more concerted programming around graduation approaches. That is, enabling CT recipients to transition to contributory social protection schemes; for instance, through livelihoods support and gradual tapering of CTs. GoJ stakeholders likewise reported specific instances of increased coordination between the NAF and SSC (including quotas for targeting NAF beneficiaries in SSC programmes). Both the GoJ and donors are therefore aiming to bring about *‘more sustainable funding for SP’ (sub-impact)*.

Sustainability: The obstacles to sustainability for more sustainable funding of SP are considerable. There is a dearth of evidence as to how likely (poor) workers who are registered for contributory SP through subsidy programmes are to continue to make contributions (which are relatively high cost) themselves once the subsidy ends. There is also potential for adverse unintentional consequences here, as workers who default on their contributions may face challenges engaging with other state services as a result.

Drivers of change: The original Estidama programme began in 2019 as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic (providing support to workers affected by industries on which operating restrictions were imposed). Both Estidama and its successor (Estidama+, an extension of the original programme) were funded by USAID.

The Estidama++ programme has been developed by the SSC, the Netherlands and ILO with funding also committed from the outset (c. two years ago) by Norway, under the umbrella of the PROSPECTS partnership. The World Bank and UNHCR are also working with the SSC to enrol informal workers – by introducing a social security element into their cash for work schemes, for instance.

The SSC reported that the experience of the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated the value of social insurance improved public trust in the SSC as an institution (*'We were able to support the private sector in the hard times which encouraged everyone to join'*).

BASIC's contribution: BASIC TA contributed directly to the design of the SSERJ programme and therefore to FCDO funding of Estidama++. FCDO is providing more than half of currently committed donor funding to Estidama++ (USD 20m over three years, alongside USD 6m from the Netherlands and USD 9m from Norway, both over 1.5 years). Dutch Embassy staff report, first, that the FCDO's contribution had helped them to finalise contracting with the GoJ, which had been significantly delayed (c. 1.5 years). And, second, that they expect their contribution to drive the programme forward by enabling it to reach a higher number of beneficiaries and to expand sectors to be covered (currently, restaurants, tourism, private drivers). *If successful, the new FCDO programme (4) supported by TA would enable 'more inclusive' SP which addresses widespread informality in Jordan's workforce (9), as well as more sustainable funding through the expansion of contributory SP (10).*

Barriers to change: In addition to the uncertainties identified under 'sustainability' above:

- The World Bank expressed reservations about the Estidama++ approach in that it seeks to address informality in social security without first undertaking parametric reforms which WB sees as fundamental.
- There appears to have been relatively little communication recently between donors on their priorities as they relate to contributory SP.
- The delay in securing government approvals for Estidama++ mentioned above was caused at least partly by ministerial turnover.
- And, finally, one key informant indicated that the user interface is insufficiently user friendly.

4.6.2 Key drivers and enablers

The evaluation identified three key drivers and enabling factors which cut across the key changes discussed above. These are ranked in order of prominence, and were all well triangulated in terms of evaluation evidence (that is, identified by multiple stakeholder groups as well as in secondary data):

Covid-19 demonstration effects, enabled by long-term systems development: The experience of the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the value of SP and accelerated or catalysed key reforms – both the expansion and then consolidation of national social assistance programming (key changes 1 and 2) and push to expand contributory social insurance to informal workers (key change 3). In the case of key change 1 in particular, support to systems development (e.g. unified registry, MIS) over the preceding 3+ years made the rapid expansion of the NAF feasible.

Effective donor coordination, co-led by FCDO (and supported indirectly by BASIC TA): A key achievement cited by several donors and multilaterals was securing agreement amongst donors of shared objectives and 'common messages' on SP in July 2021. These are fairly comprehensive, covering the areas of: inclusive systems; expansion of coverage and complementarity between different systems; localisation and the nexus approach; and scaling-up and providing evidence-based support. As Co-Lead of the SP donor group (described variously by multilaterals as *'dynamic'* and *'the*

best [they had] ever seen’), the FCDO has driven the identification of these shared priorities. As noted at baseline, SPACE support enabled internal FCDO discussion of related issues, in doing so helping them to position themselves externally as a thought leader in a crowded donor environment. Against the BASIC ToC, ‘strengthening relationships amongst humanitarian and development partners’ (3) has led to ‘greater coordination between actors’ (6). The extent to which a more coordinated approach amongst donors will translate into sub-impact level change remains to be seen, with donors suggesting a need to rebuild momentum through coordination specifically on support to contributory social insurance.

Continued FCDO funding to SP in Jordan: As a country of significant strategic importance, FCDO funding to Jordan has been less significantly affected by ODA cuts than other countries in the region. Within this frame, BEA’s support to social protection is categorised as humanitarian spending (which remains a key priority of the 2022 UK strategy for international development) and has therefore been relatively well protected from recent spending reductions.

4.6.3 Constraining factors and limitations

The evaluation identified several constraining factors and limitations which either have or have the potential to affect BASIC’s contribution to change:

Reduced international funding: Beyond FCDO, all types of key informant reported decreasing levels of international funding as a result of donor fatigue, the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on donor economies and diversion of funding to Ukraine. Emergency Covid-related funding has come to an end. Global inflation and price increases are exacerbating the impact of funding cuts on SA delivery by reducing beneficiaries’ purchasing power. Humanitarian agencies expect to have to reduce both their caseloads and the value of transfers significantly.

Persistent political barriers to refugee integration: Compared with other sectors (e.g. health, education) strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus by integrating refugees into national SP systems has been a sticking point. A longstanding government commitment to pilot the integration of refugees into the NAF has not been realised. At midline, some key informants reported more reason for optimism in this area than at baseline. Tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities are reportedly diminishing with time. Compared to c. five years ago, NAF systems are now sufficiently mature and increasingly harmonised with the humanitarian system (e.g. digitisation of beneficiaries, new targeting approach). And, at the 2021 Brussels Conference, Jordan shared a white paper which proposed a new Jordan Compact which could include a focus on refugee self-reliance. In response, donors are, in coordination, laying the technical groundwork for integration by gathering relevant evidence and supporting pilots where feasible (e.g. Estidama++ will expand coverage of social security to some refugees). Critically though, withdrawal of international funding is giving credence to government fears that they could be left financially responsible for a very large caseload.

Insufficient GoJ human resources: When asked about GoJ capacity, key informants pointed to limited bandwidth in human resources within key institutions. While NAF cash programming has expanded, the GoJ hiring freeze has prevented NAF from hiring the civil servants needed to effectively run its operations. This has been partially mitigated through UNICEF/WFP financial support for hiring and training new employees to run the fund’s cash operations, but these staff members have not been formally integrated into the civil service.¹⁴

¹⁴ Ibid.

Insufficient evidence generation and access to data: As at baseline, key informants identified insufficient data sharing by government as a barrier to delivering effective SP. While GoJ is currently collecting data for its 2022 Household Expenditure and Income Survey (the first since 2017/18), this process has faced delays and stakeholders lack confidence that the results will be made publicly available in a timely manner.¹⁵ A positive is that the WB was given access to the previous HEIS for the specific purpose of supporting the NAF to develop its new targeting approach.

Lack of attention to climate change within SA systems and programming: Despite Jordan's status as the second most water scarce country in the world, SP systems and programming pay little attention to climate-related vulnerabilities. All types of key informants reported other crisis dynamics to be more pressing vis-à-vis SP policy and programming and referred interviewers to more directly related areas of their portfolios (mostly, development of climate-resilient infrastructure). A notable exception is the WB, SP support globally now includes climate-related performance indicators.

4.7 Closing reflections

Whilst demand for BASIC TA is unlikely to continue in Jordan, earlier TA support will continue to inform FCDO support to national SP systems through the SSERJ programme. At endline, it will be important to explore the following lines of enquiry:

- Is support to contributory social insurance helping to build a more sustainable model for SP?
- How are donors coordinating their support to contributory social protection? Is momentum being maintained?
- How are patterns in donor funding changing and what are the implications for the development of more effective, efficient and inclusive SP?
- Has there been any progress on government budgetary commitments to SP?
- Has there been any progress integrating refugees into national SP?
- Are graduation approaches being integrated into SP systems? How?
- Are limitations on government bandwidth (capacity) affecting implementation?
- Are evidence gaps and limited data sharing affecting implementation? How and how far is SSERJ addressing this?

¹⁵ Ibid.

5 Country Case Study - Nigeria

This section presents a summary of the BASIC midline evaluation country case study for Nigeria. It provides a background of crises faced in Nigeria, namely conflict and displacement, and an overview of social protection responses to these crises, highlighting the gaps in Nigeria social protection infrastructure and thus the scope of BASIC support.

5.1 Context

5.1.1 Crisis faced by Nigeria

Nigeria has been increasingly affected by multiple crises in the past year, especially conflict and displacement in the North. Nigeria is Africa's largest country and economy with aspirations to become a player in multiple global markets. The baseline characterised Nigeria as a populous and poverty-stricken nation. A year on, this assessment is largely unchanged. In the last year, economic and civil conditions were suggested to have deteriorated, with crises across three main areas suggested to have become more pronounced or widespread by all stakeholders (Table 5.1). This corroborates with crises data which indicates the severity of crises in Nigeria has increased over time, with most now cited as severe or very severe (Table 5.2).

“The conflict stemming from the insurgency of non-state armed groups in north-east Nigeria continues as intensely as ever. The attacks and insecurity have displaced millions of people, devastated agricultural production and other livelihoods.”

UN (2022). Humanitarian Response Plan – Nigeria – Feb 2022

Table 5.1 Characteristics of crises and associated vulnerabilities

Poverty & economic insecurity	Instability in Northern States	Climate-related disasters
Widespread poverty among an increasing population, exacerbated by conflict, instability, climate change, and economic insecurity arising from C-19 and inflation.	Rising conflict and insecurity in the Northeast due to increased non-state armed group conflict, ¹⁶ IDP camp closures, and challenges arising from limited humanitarian access. Increased banditry, kidnapping, insurgencies, and food security concerns in the Northwest have also decreased stability.	Flooding, droughts, desertification were all suggested to have negative livelihoods, agricultural productivity, and food security impacts, which can affect national food security. Biodiversity loss was also cited by one stakeholder as a long-term crisis that has negative environmental implications.

Source: Integrity (2022). Triangulation of stakeholder perspectives and document review.

Table 5.2 Overview of Nigerian crises – INFORM Severity Index (2019-2022)

Crises in Nigeria	2019	2020	2021	Jan-July - 2022
Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.2
Complex cross-cutting crisis in Nigeria	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.1
Regional Boko Haram Crisis	3.5	4.1	4.2	4.3
Northwest Banditry	0	2.2	3.1	3.6
Middle belt conflict	2.2	0.4	2.9	3.2
Cameroonian Refugees in Nigeria	0	2.2	2	2
Average total	2.3	2.8	3.4	3.6

¹⁶ Boko Haram is the group typically held responsible for these attacks, although we acknowledge this is now used as a collective term for multiple factions, as described in EUAA (2021). Boko Haram, including JAS, ISWAP and Ansaru. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3Kdq32j>.

Source: ACAPS (2022). INFORM Severity Index. N.B. The Index is scored between 1 and 5. Low index values represent a less severe humanitarian crisis, and high index values represent a more severe humanitarian crisis. Data accessed: 16/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3QKYmzZ>.

Climate-related crises are present and increasingly reported on. Several stakeholders made explicit references to climate-related crises. And with clear references to climate related vulnerabilities in various policy documents, and an estimated 153,000 people displaced annually due to floods and storms on average between 2019-2021, we found an increasing interest in climate-related crises.¹⁷

These crises are interlinked and negatively reinforce crisis-related vulnerabilities. The presence of multiple crises across different sectors and geographies has also resulted in challenging conditions for vulnerable groups, as the issues arising from these crises become increasingly interlinked and negatively reinforcing. For example, increased levels of conflict and banditry in the Northern States were suggested to have limited humanitarian access to some groups. These groups, who may have faced lower crop yields due to floods, or face illegal taxes from violent groups, may have less economic security, which could result in food insecurity (especially in the Northeast)¹⁸ and health-related challenges arising from negative coping mechanisms.

“...the risks that might present as a climate shock, could very easily translate into a livelihood shock. And then that's to kind of enforce some of the ... challenges that are already... within the community.”

Wider stakeholder

5.2 Overview of Nigeria social protection infrastructure to response to crises

5.2.1 Federal Level

The main national social assistance programme was conceived in 2016 by the World Bank and is currently being scaled-up. This programme formed part of the US\$1.83bn National Social Safety Nets Project (NASSP), of which US\$500 (27%) was provided in credit by the World Bank.¹⁹ This project accounted for the largest investment in social protection infrastructure by any international actor between 2011 and 2020.²⁰ It implements targeted cash transfers to poor and vulnerable households included in a National Social Register (NSR), developed as part of the project. The National Social Safety-Net Coordinating Office (NASSCO) was established to implement and coordinate this programme, while building federal and state-level capacity in the design and use of social protection systems. NASSCO reports into the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD), and transfers are delivered by the National Cash Transfer Office (NCTO), which sits within NASSCO. This project is now being scaled-up, as described below.

After some delay, a federal social protection policy is being finalised, and several federal entities coordinate on responding to crises. The Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget, and National Planning (FMFBNP) is leading on the revised National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) described in Section 5, which has faced some delays in light of C-19. FMHADMSD, created in 2019, continues to lead on coordinating humanitarian responses at the federal and state levels, with delegation of

¹⁷ IDMC (2022). Global Internal Displacement Database. Date accessed: 16/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3dzYRn9>.
¹⁸ IPC (2022). NIGERIA: Acute Malnutrition | Sep-21-Aug-22. Date accessed: 16/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3QuAtwO>.
¹⁹ World Bank (2016). Nigeria-National Social Safety Nets Project. Date accessed: 16/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3A3KeLo>.
²⁰ OECD (2022). Credit Reporting System – ODA commitments to Social Protection sector (sector code: 16010).

responsibilities through sub-agencies – for example, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), which leads on disaster monitoring and management, and state entities.

5.2.2 State Level

A programme of multisectoral support has been provided to Northern States in response to protracted conflict and instability. Numerous, albeit fragmented, projects have been implemented since the baseline by multiple partners to predominately respond to crises in the Northern States, with a focus on the Northeast.²¹ This response is largely coordinated by the UN and includes programmes of cash and voucher assistance, coordinated by the Borno Cash Working Group. E-vouchers were the main delivery mechanism for assistance delivered in 2022. Stakeholders indicated that continued use of e-vouchers and increased use of digital unconditional cash payments depended on access to complementary infrastructure, like local banking services and point of service kiosks (PoS).²²

But despite increasing interest in social protection, political will issues and uncertain state level budget commitments mean social protection coverage is low and highly political. The enthusiasm for developing Nigeria’s social protection system identified at baseline is still present. All stakeholder groups indicated this was due to the commitments made by the President of Nigeria in public speeches and recently published poverty reduction plans and strategies, and the positive demonstration effect of various COVID-19 responses. For example, the development of the Rapid Response Register to identify and support informal urban workers during the pandemic.²³ But the proportion of the population covered by at least one social protection benefit is still suggested to be insufficient, with estimates suggesting that coverage increased from 4% to 11% between 2016 and 2019. Stakeholders also suggested that state governments may not always be incentivised to fully fund, or disburse funding for such programmes, due to political considerations or corrupt behaviours.

5.2.3 Coordination and international actors

A number of coordination mechanisms exist at multiple levels, but coordination failures still exist. The Abuja Cash Working Group (CWG), Development Partners Group (DPG), and the Technical Working Group on Social Protection (TWG SP) all provide national forums for humanitarian, social development, and government actors to convene around specific issues.²⁴ A range of state level and humanitarian working groups also exist to permit coordinated responses in specific areas, especially in the Northeast, and to a lesser extent, the Northwest. Despite these efforts coordination challenges still exist, and duplicative or inequitable access to humanitarian relief and/or cash was suggested to be common.

The World Bank, UN agencies, FCDO, and the EU are key actors engaged providing humanitarian and development assistance. Analysis of social protection and humanitarian spend data indicated that the World Bank, UN Agencies (WFP, OCHA, UNICEF, IOM, UNHCR) were key financial contributors to the development of the social protection system or implementing humanitarian responses. Nigerian government stakeholders shared mixed views on the role of FCDO,

²¹ OCHA (2021). Nigeria: 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan. Date accessed: 22/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3Tanx1a>.
²² OCHA (2022). North-East Nigeria: Cash and Voucher Assistance (Jan - Mar 22). Date accessed: 23/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3wpvzpg>.
²³ NASSCO (2021). Nigeria steps forward its Rapid Response Register. Date accessed: 16/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3Qvkmz9>.
²⁴ Our baseline case study provides a more detailed overview of the role of these groups. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3zZGA5w>.

ECHO and GIZ, with some indicating the technical advisory role of these donors, while others suggested they provided some support but limited financial resources.

5.3 Origins and scope of BASIC support

The rationale for BASIC support continues to be underpinned by in-country coordination failures among key actors groups. As set out in the baseline study, FCDO Nigeria, CWG and DPG have received multiple rounds of support since October 2019. And despite limited BASIC activity in the past year, the need for public intervention still reflects the original rationale outlined in the programme business case. While multiple efforts exist to address humanitarian needs and enhance the social protection system to better serve vulnerable groups, these efforts are suggested to not be sufficiently coordinated. These coordination challenges result in suboptimal welfare outcomes, as vulnerable groups are not sufficiently protected against crises.

“Basic needs are high across Northeast Nigeria and cash modalities are increasingly used to respond. However, the use of cash modalities is fragmented, duplicative and highly limited by access. Meanwhile access to social protection is limited in Northeast.”

HSOT Nexus Advisor Scope of Work

Since the evaluation baseline, the Nexus Advisor role was re-contracted and the final SPACE assignment was completed. The Nexus Advisor role (#7, Table 4), originally procured through SPACE on a short-term assignment, has been contracted four times in total, of which three were funded by BASIC. The Nexus Advisor scopes of work are consistent with one another and largely focus on providing technical advice and developing relationships with multiple actors around strengthening shock responsive social protection and taking a longer-term approach to humanitarian cash. A short-term SPACE assignment (#9, Table 4) on targeting was also submitted to FCDO Nigeria.

Beyond this activity, no further BASIC TA, or Research assignments were scoped. Beyond these, no other BASIC activity was delivered in Nigeria since the baseline, although one TA assignment (#10, Table 4) was being scoped at the time of reporting by the new BASIC TA Facility - Social Protection Technical Assistance, Advice, and Resources (STAAR). This was suggested to be because of delays in the main-stage implementation of BASIC. These delays were suggested to have arisen due to extended BASIC Research and STAAR inception periods, considerable FCDO SPT staff turnover in the past year, and residual uncertainties relating to BASIC’s overall budget allocations.

5.4 BASIC support provided

5.4.1 Technical assistance

Nine assignments have been provided to FCDO Nigeria by BASIC TA across the life of the programme, with #7 on-going and #9 submitted since the baseline evaluation ([Table 5.3](#) overleaf).

Some support provided has remained relevant, but several factors constrained the overall relevance of BASIC. STAAR inception documents and Nexus Advisor ToRs identify clear FCDO Nigeria demand for in-country technical assistance. FCDO Nigeria stakeholders also identified the need for in-country technical expertise in both humanitarian assistance and social protection to support meaningful cross-sector partnership development, which the re-contracting of #7 provides. FCDO stakeholders also indicated that the results of a novel internally displaced persons (IDP)

targeting approach (#9) were highly relevant for FCDO and key donors, including the World Bank and the World Food Programme, as the results offered opportunities to reach vulnerable groups more effectively and efficiently. But some donor stakeholders suggested that SPACE outputs were less relevant now given C-19 was an especially unique crisis and now less of an immediate issue relative to other crises present.

Table 5.3 Overview of BASIC TA support to FCDO Nigeria

#	Date	TA facility	Summary
1	Oct 2019	TAS	Linking Social Protection Systems and Humanitarian Cash Transfers in Nigeria: Mapping of ongoing humanitarian cash transfers and social protection programmes in the BAY States as a first step towards identifying potential linkages.
2	Dec 2020	SPACE	Linking to the Cash Working Group: Excel spreadsheet setting out COVID-19 responses of partners - mapping SP programme adaptations and responses to COVID-19 by Nigerian Government and donors, NGOs etc.
3	May 2020	SPACE	Strategy Decision Matrix and Evaluation Matrix: This work focused on options/strategies to COVID-19 response via adapting existing social protection programmes or leveraging social protection delivery systems /capacity.
4	Sept 2020	SPACE	How social protection fits into the national development plan: Support to the DPG to set out policy response areas which should be taken forward in a High-Level Forum for Development Partners with the Vice President of Nigeria.
5	Not dated	SPACE	Support to CDGP: A consultant was commissioned to review the FCDO Children Development Grant Programme in order to explore the feasibility of a possible extension.
6	Dec 2020	SPACE	Risk analysis - Cash Working Group: Identification of risks associated with the impact of COVID-19 on members' cash and voucher assistance operations in the BAY States in order to inform mitigation measures.
7	Jan 2021 – to date	SPACE	Nexus Advisor: The main aim of this role was to drive coherence between humanitarian cash, social protection cash programmes and systems at operational and policy levels focusing on strengthening coordination mechanisms, relationship building and technical inputs. The role evolved with delivery, to focus more on humanitarian actors to promote more cohesive use of cash modalities in particular a modality shifts from vouchers to cash (Cash Common Donors Approach).
8	April 2021 - draft	SPACE	Case Study - Nigeria: This case study documents experiences from the government of Nigeria and partners' social protection and humanitarian responses to COVID-19. It aims to contribute knowledge and learning to inform both the direction of social protection in Nigeria, as well as global debates on shock responsive social protection (SRSP) and linking humanitarian action and social protection (HA-SP).
9	May 2021 – September 2022	SPACE	Proxy Means Testing: This assignment is presently underway to inform targeting for humanitarian cash assistance for non-camp based Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and host communities, using an approach to prioritization that is methodologically aligned with the government. It aims to help enable the humanitarian community to inform and support the extension of the government system into areas where coverage is currently limited.
10	Scoping	STAAR	Nigeria Country Lead: Similar to the Nexus Advisor role, the aim of this role is to identify opportunities for further STAAR TA. This role is designed to act independently of FCDO. At the time of reporting, the terms of references for this role has not been drafted.

5.4.2 Research

- Since the baseline, a programme of engagement with Nigerian actors was completed by BASIC Research to develop a research programme and partnerships. Multiple engagements were facilitated by FCDO and the Nexus Advisor (#7). This engagement supported IDS scope a programme of research in Nigeria, which was still classified as a deep engagement country at the midline, comprised of nine research concepts. Seven of these had a global focus and considered multiple issues including the politics of social assistance, digital systems, targeting and financing and coordination. Two research concepts had a singular focus on Nigeria:
- Quantitative – lived experiences - Navigating climate and conflict-related risks and experiences of social assistance
- Qualitative - Institutions and systems for linking humanitarian and social assistance
- Efforts had also been made to identify possible supporting partners with several academic and implementer organisations and research customers having been identified in concept notes produced by IDS.
- **No actual delivery of BASIC Research activities has taken place in Nigeria to date due to budget cuts and uncertainties.** Despite the considerable engagement undertaken, the budget cuts and uncertainties identified above have considerably delayed implementation. The budget for Nigeria was suggested to have been cut relatively more than other countries as a result of less formalised partnership development in country.²⁵ At the time of the reporting, a revised programme of work for Nigeria has not yet been confirmed, and beyond some limited engagement with the Nexus Advisor (#7) and FCDO Nigeria staff, no stakeholder group reported that they had significantly engaged with BASIC Research about a revised research programme since its initial scoping stage.

5.4.3 KML and research uptake

Beyond the uptake and use already documented by the baseline, TA uptake was enabled by the Nexus Advisor role. Since the baseline, uptake of BASIC TAS products occurred organically, and was led by the Nexus Advisor. Beyond areas of use we identified in the baseline, the main area of uptake in the past year has been efforts led by #7 and the BASIC Programme Funded Post²⁶. Stakeholders that engaged with #7 were also suggested to have benefitted from other BASIC outputs, with #7 acting as a knowledge broker for BASIC outputs for other FCDO personnel and actors where needed. In some cases, external actors had unknowingly engaged with BASIC outputs, or had considered SPACE outputs to be of less relevance to their work now that C-19 risks have reduced relative to other crises. For example, humanitarian assistance stakeholders working in the Northeast continue to use and reference #1 when conceptualising possible linkages between existing humanitarian cash and social protection programmes. Because no BASIC Research outputs have been produced, full consideration of evidence uptake for BASIC Research was not relevant.

BASIC branding comprehension issues does not appear to have affected uptake and use significantly, and early signals suggest that STAAR KML plans may respond to these issues. Limited comprehension of the BASIC brand may have arisen because of implementation delays, limited implementation of a centralised BASIC KML strategy, and/or the limited communication or use BASIC's brands by FCDO – an issue also noted during the Baseline. But several stakeholders

²⁵ It was not possible for the evaluation to confirm this at the time of reporting as budget discussions were still ongoing.

²⁶ An FCDO staff role seconded to DAI to provide coordination and programme implementation support.

challenged whether this was an issue, with some indicating that additional branding can make external engagement more challenging, especially given the wider range of initiatives and support on offer. That said, there are early signals to suggest that STAAR KML knowledge management systems may make it easier for suppliers, FCDO SPT, and customers to access assignment scopes, deliverables, track interdependencies and uptake going forwards.

“I would question whether we need people in the international community to know what [BASIC] is... they're all these different things that support the main effort and... the focus is on the implementation on the ground and the collective.”

Direct BASIC beneficiary

5.4.4 Coherence across BASIC components and with other FCDO programming

Despite implementation delays, efforts had been made to coordinate across components in the context of Nigeria. The delays identified above have limited the need and opportunity for operational and technical engagement between BASIC components since the baseline. The Nexus Advisor (#7) was the main coordination mechanism identified by the evaluation, with the scope of work requiring engagement with BASIC Research and STAAR Facility, and FCDO stakeholders indicating #7 had performed this function as expected. Coordination mechanisms between TA and Research are also set-up centrally, and the PFP was reported to have engaged with FCDO Nigeria multiple times since the baseline, but it was unclear how far these efforts guided coordination between BASIC components in Nigeria itself.

Beyond BASIC, the Nexus Advisor was the main coordination link between BASIC and other FCDO and actor programmes. The Nexus Advisor scope of work identified a need to engage with BASIC and Nigerian actors to support engagement and identify demand for support. FCDO and wider donor stakeholder views identified this role was being fulfilled, although delays in delivery have tempered #7’s engagement with BASIC in the past year. The Nexus advisor has also engaged wider FCDO colleagues and initiatives but again, had undertaken limited marketing of BASIC support in the past year due to delays and uncertainties.

5.5 Response to support provided

Given the limited role of BASIC in Nigeria since the baseline, this section is focused on responses to the Nexus Advisor (#7) and the Proxy Means Testing assignments (#9).

5.5.1 What worked

All stakeholder groups valued the technical and interpersonal skills of the Nexus Advisor role (#7) as well as the understanding of the country and actor context it provided.

Both the inter-personal and technical skills of the Nexus Advisor role were highly valued. Stakeholders suggested the Nexus Advisor had been especially effective because of their technical experience in both social development and humanitarian sectors. Their inter-personal skills and ability to lead on coordinating and convening groups with specific agendas was also valued. For example, engagement with UNOCHA to achieve consensus on how to encourage the World Bank to better consider the needs of IDPs and other vulnerable groups in the design of the of a new programme (Change 2, section 6.7).

‘...[the Nexus Advisor]] hustles on behalf of us... [the Nexus Advisor] does a lot in the background, and it gets in touch with the right people, and gives us all that local knowledge that... we don’t have.’

The Nexus Advisor role enabled focused FCDO influencing. The Nexus Advisor (#7) was suggested to be critical in FCDO’s efforts to engage with and influence actors around issues specifically related to humanitarian cash and social protection linkages. This included formal and informal engagement with government, development, and humanitarian actors to review and feedback on policies, strategies, and approaches, attending and feeding into coordination meetings, and coordinating the initiative and activities of different donors, drawing on the Common Donor Approach.²⁷ In particular, this was suggested to have enabled the development of practical, coordinated plans around improving SP infrastructure to deal with humanitarian shocks.

The Nexus Advisor role facilitated cross-sector working. BASIC and the Nexus Advisor (#7) was suggested to have encouraged consideration of cross-team solutions to issues that may have typically been responded to in silos. For example, engagement with financial services, environmental, governance and humanitarian blocks to develop the humanitarian assistance business case. Although, evidence also suggests that cross-sector working may have been partly facilitated by the use of thematic blocks to organise FCDO activity – the Lake Chad Basin block in this case. On balance, while FCDO Nigeria, was organised to encourage cross-sector working, the role of #7 in convening teams together around a specific issue to inform a business case was suggested to have been additional. Without the advisor, FCDO stakeholders suggested that they would not have come together as quickly as they would have needed to guide business case development.

There were mixed views about how tightly **the Nexus Advisor ought to deliver against their Scope of Work to deliver BASIC.** Some FCDO stakeholders suggested that efforts to focus the Nexus advisor role on delivering the requirements of the ToR was critical in accelerating delivery. Without regular 1/1s, and reviews of the SoW, there was a risk that the BASIC support would have become backstop support for the FCDO Nigeria team. While picking up SDA account management and delivery and/or policy work would be valuable to the country office, it was suggested it is time consuming and would have prevented the advisor from fulfilling their SoW in a timely manner. The risk of this happening was made more acute by significant technical capacity gaps in FCDO Nigeria, especially across other FCDO teams like Governance. That said, other FCDO stakeholders suggested that providing broader support to a country office may have helped #7 better understand the needs of the office and build relationships with in-country partners.

5.5.2 Challenges and limitations

Several challenges were identified that negatively affected the delivery or uptake of BASIC outputs:

BASIC implementation delays and uncertainties curtailed momentum. The BASIC implementation delays outlined in Section 2 were suggested to have affected BASIC performance in two main ways. First, the gap between assignments contracted through BASIC TAS and SPACE and those that may arise through STAAR may have created a loss of momentum and missed opportunities for the uptake and use of BASIC outputs. This point also reflects a baseline finding that assignments perform best? when they are clearly linked and build upon one another. Second, delays were suggested to have affected relationships with external actors. While providing technical assistant to actors beyond FCDO is admirable, this highlights the potential for reputation and relationships damage if assistance is offered in a delayed or insufficiently staggered manner. For example, while #9

²⁷ CALP Network (2019). Common Donor Approach to Humanitarian Cash Programming. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3MVCfGt>. Date accessed: 23/09/2022.

provided valuable insights, delivery was delayed which was suggested to have stalled momentum in working with partners and created some minor concerns about future BASIC engagement in country.


Short-term contracts affected delivery approach. The Nexus Advisor (#7) was contracted four separate times on short term contracts of up to six months. Several stakeholders indicated that this affected delivery. In particular, with a longer-term view, it was suggested the outcomes sought by the role may have been more ambitious, and that the Nexus Advisor would have taken more time to develop trust and rapport with local actors. That said, it was acknowledged that short term advisory support was useful for testing the need for longer-term support, and the accelerated engagement with local actors is likely to have contributed to faster development of common plans regarding social protection and humanitarian cash linkages, as discussed below.

Sustainability concerns regarding Nexus Advisor posting. Beyond #7, evaluation evidence suggested that no FCDO Nigeria advisor was fully responsible for the management of issues concerning social protection and humanitarian response linkages. While the Nexus Advisor is well placed to take on this remit, FCDO stakeholders acknowledged the sustainability considerations this raised. For example, if the advisor managed BASIC engagement, and wider relationships regarding social protection, these relationships may be lost when the advisor position finishes. This issue was less prominent when everyone was working remotely during C-19. There are signals to suggest this issue has been accounted for in the resourcing of the newly proposed FCDO Nigeria humanitarian programme (Section 5).

5.6 BASIC’s contribution to change

This section explores BASIC’s contribution to changes in Nigeria, with reference to FCDO’s use of BASIC support and indirect results, ToC output and outcome statements and, and possible presence of enabling and constraining factors. [Figure 5.1](#) below indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which were most relevant to BASIC’s support to FCDO Nigeria since the baseline, based on the assignments that have been completed or are ongoing to date. Statements in boxes shaded in blue were directly relevant.

Figure 5.1 Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Nigeria



5.7 Changes observed

5.7.1 Key changes

Change 1: Development and validation of the National Social Protection Policy

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
2 Years	Medium	High	Government	Low

Change and its significance: The revision and further validation of the National Social Protection Policy (NSPP), a federal social protection policy framework which builds on the 2017-2020 National Social Protection policy.²⁸ This revised policy identified several areas that warranted improvement, including further consideration of inclusion, adequacy, and financing issues. In July 2022, the policy underwent a validation process with federal and state government representatives and the international community to collect feedback on possible enhancements to the policy. Government stakeholders engaged suggested the policy, which was delayed due to C-19, may pass into law by the end of 2022.²⁹ An operational framework is also being developed. Taken together, these developments can guide the review, design, and implementation of state level SP policies, which was considered the most significant change by stakeholder engaged indicates an ‘Increased political commitment to and use of social protection approaches during crises’.

Drivers of change: This change was largely led by federal officials, mainly from the FMFBNP, but also included other federal and state level officials and the international community. In particular,

²⁸ NASSCO (2021). Revised Draft National Social Protection Policy – October 2021. Date accessed: 23/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3dPD1Yf>.
²⁹ Once the NSPP is approved by the Federal Executive Council (FEC), an Executive Bill will be sent to the National Assembly to enact a law on Social Protection.

technical capacity development provided by the Expanding Social Protection for Inclusive Development (ESPID) programme (which is FCDO funded but implemented by Save the Children)³⁰ which suggested to have played a significant role in improving knowledge and understanding of how social protection systems operate.

BASIC contribution: BASIC directly engaged in the policy validation process via #7. Multiple stakeholders suggested feedback provided focused on challenging the policy to sharpen plans to engage with humanitarian actors, and further consider GESI issues, especially regarding IDPs. That said, multiple stakeholders engaged in this process said it may have happened in any case. But evaluation evidence suggested it would have gone ahead with less of a GESI and SP/humanitarian linkages focus, which could have had significant repercussions for the extent to which the vulnerable groups are actually served by the policy in practice.

Barriers to change: While this change is significant, changes in state level systems have not yet been realised and can take time, because states have autonomy on how they receive or implement a federal initiative. While this policy revision represents a strong signal of change, challenges in operationalising the policy and confirming state-level financial commitments were identified as key barriers to further systems change in the medium-term.

Change 2: Scale-up of the World Bank National Social Safety Nets Project

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
1 Year	Medium	High	World Bank	Medium

Change and its significance: In December 2021, the World Bank approved \$800 million in credit from the International Development Association (IDA) for the National Social Safety Net Program Scale-Up (NASSP-SU).³¹ This represents the largest current social protection initiative in Nigeria, especially because it expects to expand existing social protection coverage by the project from two to just over ten million households. It aims to provide shock responsive cash transfers to poor and vulnerable households in rural and urban areas, extend the delivery of regular NASSP cash transfers, and continue strengthening the social protection system, covering improvements to governance and delivery. This development was considered highly significant by the majority of stakeholders engaged, largely because of the project’s aim to improve government and cross-sector programme coordination, resilience to shocks, and the use of data and digital systems. It is expected to contribute to ‘new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented’.

Drivers of change: The World Bank approved credit for this initiative, which largely forms a continuation the existing NASSP programme, which is coordinated by NASSCO and largely funded by the Nigerian government. This credit was approved largely due to the perceived success of this existing as well as increasing socio-economic insecurity.

BASIC contribution: BASIC directly engaged with the planning and design of the project since its confirmation via #7, with a focus on GESI issues - in particular, by advocating for improved access among IDPs and vulnerable households based in insecure locations, and encouraging the project to increase its engagement with humanitarian actors through the project. It was suggested WB benefited from FCDO skills in designing social protection systems for vulnerable/hard to reach groups and which were regarded as additional by stakeholders. #7 also played a role in sharing other BASIC

³⁰ The follow-on programme of the FCDO-funded Save the Children Child Development Grant Programme. Available at:
³¹ World Bank (2021). Nigeria to Scale-up Delivery of Social Assistance to 10.2 Million Households. Date accessed: 23/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3CoOmIQ>.

outputs with the Bank, namely #9. But delays in delivery, and perceptions that C-19 products were less relevant curtailed any influence other BASIC outputs might have had. Without #7’s influencing efforts and wider access to FCDO expertise in SP, payment systems, sustainable development, the design of the programme may not have sought to fully address all vulnerable groups.

Barriers to change: There is a risk that WB funding may be affected by rising instability as described above. More specifically, #7 plays a key coordinating function between FCDO and the Bank. One the advisor role concludes in March 2023, there is a risk that previous GESI influencing efforts cease to affect the project’s ongoing design and delivery.

Change 3: Development of FCDO Nigeria programme business case

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
1 Year	Medium	Medium	FCDO Nigeria	High

Change and its significance: A new business case for an FCDO humanitarian assistance programme has been developed, which is expected to replace the recently concluded FCDO North-East Transition to Development Programme.³² This proposed programme presents plans for humanitarian support that primarily responds to crises in the Northeast but also the Northwest to a less extent and is comprised of four main pillars (humanitarian cash, humanitarian access, protection, and food and insecurity) and several cross-cutting themes such as localisation, inclusion and women and girls. FCDO stakeholders indicated the development of this business case was the most significant internal change in the last year.

Although the programme business case was being appraised by HMT at the time of reporting, the advanced conceptualisation of social protection and humanitarian cash linkages presented sets a cautiously optimistic tone for more long-term humanitarian assistance.³³ Again, it is expected to contribute to ‘new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented’.

Drivers of change: The FCDO humanitarian team with support from BASIC via #7, and wider FCDO technical and operational colleagues were found to be the key drivers of this change.

BASIC contribution: BASIC contributed significantly to the development of this business case directly via #7 but also indirectly through the collective development of all assignments specified (Table 4). For example, #7 provided extensive advice, drafting, QA and oversight support, as well as convening other external actors around the business case development. Without the nexus adviser, #7 the business case was suggested to have been less ambitious and reduced in scope, with less consideration of nexus issues such as accommodating IDPs in SP and SRSP responses.

5.7.2 Wider changes

Several other contextual changes were reported by stakeholders which are relevant to the theory of change, but where BASIC was found to have made relatively less or no significant contributions towards:

Wider strategy development that is supportive of pro-poor growth and social protection policies. Several federal strategies that promote poverty reduction through a range of approaches in multiple sectors have been published recently. These include the 2021 National Poverty Reduction

³² More information available at: <https://bit.ly/3woRvET>. Date accessed: 22/08/22.
³³ Given the stage of development of these business cases, documentation was not available at the time of reporting to verify views provided by stakeholders on this change.

with Growth Strategy, and the 2021 National Development Plan.³⁴ These strategies often reflect on the importance of adequate social protection systems and communicate federal-level commitments to these sectors.

Financial market development, with a focus on mobile and digital payment systems. Entry costs for firms looking to enter the mobile/digital payment sector in Nigeria are suggested to have decreased in the past year. With wider support from key donors, including the World Bank, this development is suggested to have helped reach commitments from senior government and global donors on improving the SP system. In particular, mobile/digital payments are increasingly accepted by consumers, regulation changes by the Central Bank of Nigeria have permitted two large telecoms companies to enter the mobile money market, and multiple innovation projects are on-going to support the humanitarian sector draw on the sector to safely expand its mobile/digital payment operations. Several innovations projects supported by FCDO also received guidance and support from #7 as part of the latest Scope of Work.

The development and delivery of smaller SP-related programmes and initiatives. More broadly, a range of other programmes and initiatives have been implemented in the past year, which is likely to have also contributed towards to positive political economy around the use of social protection approaches during crises in Nigeria. These include other, albeit smaller, social protection and humanitarian cash programmes,³⁵ and other complementary efforts such as pilots to improve early anticipatory action by UNICEF³⁶, efforts to expand social registers that could increase social protection coverage, and the development of a new multi-dimensional poverty index that could aid more efficient targeting of social protection measures.

Climate change agenda development. Beyond social protection Nigeria is increasingly focused on climate-change mitigation and adaptation commitments, which was suggested to have increased national interest in cross-sector collaboration on climate-related disaster responses. Recent developments include a revision to Nigeria’s non-determined commitments (NDCs) which recognises social protection as an adaptation priority,³⁷ the passing of the Nigeria Climate Change Act into law³⁸, and the development of a National Adaptation Plan and framework,³⁹ which seeks to develop coordinated plans at multiple level to improve adaptation to climate-related crises.

5.7.3 Key drivers

Multiple drivers of the key changes set out were identified by the evaluation. The following drivers, which are ranked in order of prominence, reflect the most plausible and well triangulated in terms of evaluation evidence – in other words, those that were identified by multiple stakeholder groups, documents, and secondary data sources:

Demonstration effects: Several developments have enabled advocates of social protection approaches to demonstrate their effectiveness. This evidence was suggested to have reduced levels of uncertainty associated with the expected payoffs arising from investment in social protection

³⁴ Government of Nigeria (2021). The National Poverty Reduction with Growth Strategy. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3MZRCNX>. Date accessed: 23/10/22.

³⁵ For example, see <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/543218-un-spends-2-million-on-social-protection-in-nigeria-official.html>

³⁶ ADD

³⁷ World Bank (2021). National Social Safety Net Program-Scale Up (P176935). Project Information Document. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3VOLcWh>. Date accessed: 23/08/23.

³⁸ Government of Nigeria (2021). NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FOR NIGERIA 2021 – 2030. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3z7XOOq>. Date accessed: 23/08/23.

³⁹ Government of Nigeria (2020). Nigeria’s National Adaptation Plan Framework. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3DoEBua>. Date accessed: 23/08/23.

infrastructure, which in turn may have made additional investments by the government and international actors more viable. These demonstrated effects occurred across three main areas:

- **Programme efficacy demonstration effects.** While the changes in social protection infrastructure highlighted above are recent, numerous social protection and humanitarian cash programmes have been piloted and delivered in Nigeria in recent years.⁴⁰ The positive efforts to enhance and scale up these pilots successfully, especially by UN agencies, Save the Children and FCDO, evidenced the capability of such interventions to address development challenges.
- **C-19 demonstration effects.** While C-19 created considerable challenges globally, it also presented opportunities to demonstrate the benefits of social protection approaches in operational environments. In Nigeria's case, the launch of a C-19 Cash Transfer, underpinned by digital registration processes,⁴¹ and the funding of wider initiatives to improve social protection coverage,⁴² were suggested to have additionally demonstrated the efficacy of using social protection approaches in response to crises.
- **Private sector and technological developments.** The potential and actual use of new products, services, processes, and business models, such as the use of digital payment and registration systems, or the use of blockchain to reduce duplication of payments, is expected to reduce delivery costs, as well as security and financing challenges. Market deregulation, especially in the mobile money and digital payments sector was also suggested to positively affect social protection delivery cost in the medium term. These trends provide reasonable signals that social protection programming will become more efficient, which suggests the value for money of any future investments in social protection infrastructure will increase.

Active, and longstanding international engagement and support. Qualitative evidence from multiple sources identified a sustained and reasonably coordinated international engagement on issues relating to social protection. While social protection programming in the past is often cited as fragmented, these disparate efforts have been guided technically and operationally by international actors, with UN agencies, FCDO and Save the Children commonly cited as key positive influencers.

Positive political will and appetite to strengthen social protection systems. Political conditions and dynamics are important for realising lasting change. Without agreement from a sufficient number of senior government officials on crises vulnerabilities and the expected benefits that social protection interventions can produce, as well as a genuine commitment to improve systems, systems change is unlikely to be realised. Evaluation evidence strongly suggests that the demonstration effects highlighted above, combined with a technical and practically oriented international community, has resulted in a favourable political economy for social protection, especially at the federal level.

5.7.4 Constraining factors

Building on the discussion above, the evaluation identified the following constraining factors that affected continued to affect BASIC's contribution to change:

Residual network failures: Evaluation evidence collected across the case study suggested that coordination challenges still exist. These challenges are numerous and cover links between different

⁴⁰ World Bank (2016). Nigeria – National Social Safety Nets Project – Project Appraisal Document. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3FpG5pN>. Date accessed: 23/08/23.

⁴¹ NASSCO (2021). Nigeria steps forward its Rapid Response Register. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3SryKZC>. Date accessed: 23/08/23.

⁴² Such as the World Bank COVID-19 Action Recovery and Economic Stimulus Program.

government departments and levels, humanitarian and social development actors, and social protection, humanitarian, and climate adaptation personnel within the same organisation. These challenges were suggested to slow down the development of joint plans or result in plans that fail to consider all points of view. For example, government engagement on issues relating to social registries did not fully consider data protection and humanitarian principle concerns held by humanitarian actors. And while cross-sector working is seen as positive, it can also create semantic difficulties which take time to address, although evidence suggested that #7 addressed this to some extent. Together, these coordination challenges were suggested to have increased the time taken for BASIC theory of change pathways to materialise and limit opportunities for accelerating efforts to make social protection more inclusive.

UK political uncertainties: Uncertainties relating to the international and development priorities of the UK government created delivery challenges for BASIC and FCDO Nigeria. In both cases, it made it challenging to commit resources to initiatives or reformulate programming against periodically revised strategies. These challenges are compounded by related budgetary uncertainties, which can also make it hard to engage in meaningful partnership development. Again, this factor was suggested to have increased the time taken to realise change.

FCDO SDA capacity gaps: FCDO Nigeria has suffered from significant technical social development adviser gaps in the last year due to staff turnover. This has affected the ability of the team to deliver against its mandate fully and take up outputs from centrally managed facilities. For example, internally led situational analysis of the scale and location of crises was suggested to have been weak in some cases, which affects crises responsiveness.

5.8 Closing reflections

Despite context challenges, continuity in BASIC’s in-country engagement means systems change is possible. Nigeria’s context is complex, and systems change can take years of sustained engagement. Positive political will, long-term international investment, and continued international community engagement, in part from BASIC via #7, appears to have created a level of continuity in-country. All in spite of a range of political and economic uncertainties, both in the UK and internationally.

These efforts seem to have permitted relationships and trust to develop and coalesce around nascent, but increasingly united, social protection and humanitarian cash assistance plans, both for the government and international actors.

While favourable political will has made change possible, its sustainability was questioned: The positive political will fostered around a common purpose and set of solutions in Nigeria should be applauded. That said, several factors were suggested to have negatively impacted political will, which may affect change in the medium term. These include the upcoming 2023 Nigeria elections, the requirement for state governments to fund implementation of the NSPP, and to a lesser extent, the loss in momentum from international engagement, such as that seen in the case of BASIC.

Demand for BASIC in Nigeria is likely to continue, especially when it is focused and locally-led. Multiple FCDO stakeholders expressed an interest in future engagement with BASIC. In particular, efforts to coordinate the sector, especially humanitarian and social development actors, engagement on climate-related crises, and continued technical advisory support on how to achieve more efficient, adequate, and inclusive social protection systems.

At the endline, it will be important to explore the following lines of enquiry:

- What level of political will is sufficient to realise change?
- How successful will state level NSPP domestication and implementation be?
- How inclusive will NASSP-SU and NSPP be?
- Were the stated ambitions of the FCDO humanitarian assistance programme realised?
- What are the relative merits and demerits of providing in-country TA using different modalities?
- What interactions/synergies/missed opportunities between BASIC components occurred?

6 Country Case Study - Somalia

This section provides a summary of the BASIC midline evaluation country case study for Somalia. Somalia faces crises such as climate fuelled shocks, protracted violent conflict, forced internal displacement, and lack of essential infrastructure. This case study presents an overview Somalia's burgeoning social protection infrastructure, then the scope of BASIC support within this infrastructure. BASIC's contributions to change are largely focused on assisting FCDO understanding of social protection in Somalia.

6.1 Context

6.1.1 Crises faced by Somalia

Somalia continues to face a multitude of different crises, including recurrent and protracted climate fuelled shocks^{43,44}, such as seasonal flooding⁴⁵, locust infestations⁴⁶ and devastating droughts reaching unprecedented levels⁴⁷. Beset by decades of violence, conflicts across the southern and western regions of the country⁴⁸ have compounded vulnerabilities and contributed to some of the 3 million Somalis who have been forcibly displaced in the country^{49,50}. The result of these complex crises has left parts of the country on the brink of famine⁵¹, and over half of the population in urgent need of humanitarian assistance by the end of 2022⁵².

“Vulnerable communities are the hardest hit by the effects of the climate crisis, leaving many families unprotected and increasing displacement,”

In-country stakeholder

Table 6.1 Characteristics of crises and associated vulnerabilities

Climate related disasters	Poverty and economic insecurity	Instability and insecurity south and central Somalia
Somalia is currently experiencing unprecedent levels of drought after a historic two-year dry spell and failure of four rainy seasons which has left parts of the country on the brink of famine and has displaced over a million people since January 2022. Seasonal flooding and extreme locust infestations continue to have negative impacts, contributing to food insecurity and displacement.	70% of Somalia's population lives below the international poverty line (\$1.90 per day). This is exacerbated by climate change, protracted conflict, forced displacement, financially weak government, and economic contraction.	Protracted conflict(s) in the form of territorial disputes in the north, clan rivalries in the southern and central regions and ongoing clashes between government forces and armed groups controlling rural areas in southern areas. Implications are high numbers of forced displacement, political instability and increased vulnerability.

Source: Integrity (2022). Triangulation of stakeholder perspectives and document review.

⁴³ Care, 2022. <https://www.care.org/news-and-stories/news/somalia-drought-climate-change-has-been-reality-for-us-for-a-long-time/>
⁴⁴ NRC, 2022. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2022/june/somalia-faces-climate-emergency-and-famine-as-fourth-rainy-season-fails/>
⁴⁵ Reliefweb, 2021. <https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fi-2021-000051-som>
⁴⁶ World Bank, 2021. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/17/somalia-s-most-vulnerable-households-and-locust-response-efforts-to-receive-185-million-boost>
⁴⁷ UNHRC, 2022. <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2022/8/62f4c3894/million-people-displaced-drought-somalia.html>
⁴⁸ There are territorial disputes in the north; clan rivalries persist in southern and central Somalia; and government forces continue to clash with armed groups.
⁴⁹ IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia>
⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia>
⁵¹ UN, 2022. <https://www.npr.org/2022/09/05/1121105281/somalia-famine-this-year-the-u-n>
⁵² Oxfam, 2021, <https://www.oxfam.org/fr/node/18668>

Table 6.2 Overview of Somalia crises – INFORM Severity Index (2019-2022)

Crises in Somalia	2019	2020	2021	Jan-August- 2022
Complex crisis in Somalia	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.4
Mixed Migration Flows in Somalia	1.6	2.0	1.9	1.7
Average total	5.7	6.5	6.2	6.1

Source: ACAPS (2022). INFORM Severity Index. N.B. The Index is scored between 1 and 5. Low index values represent a less severe humanitarian crisis, and high index values represent a more severe humanitarian crisis. Data accessed: 05/09/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3QKYmzZ>.

Crises are exacerbated by a lack of essential services, including health and education, and basic infrastructure. More recent economic contraction of 1.5% has impacted growth and income gains – especially amongst lower income groups - achieved since the 2017 drought^{53,54}. The cyclical and protracted nature of crises erodes community resilience. With approximately 70% of Somalia’s population living below the international poverty line⁵⁵, a majority of Somali households lack the resources to effectively withstand and manage crises, with one in ten people liable to falling bellowing the poverty line as a result of a shock.

“What I believe the biggest and most unfortunate event or consequence of the crisis in Somalia is that the frequency by which the country has been hit by one disaster of the other, it has really undermined, if not reversed, the gains made through other initiatives like recovery and development.”

- Other in country stakeholders

Conditions have worsened somewhat compared to the baseline with a devastating drought affecting the northern and southwestern parts of the country in particular⁵⁶, leading to increased displacement and more generally intensifying the protection crisis across the whole country. This assessment is aligned to crisis data outlined in [Table 6.2](#), which shows a high level of ‘complex crisis’ in Somalia, as well as a slight deterioration from 2021 to 2022, which is expected to continue to increase as the effects of the drought and conflict worsen.

6.2 Overview of Somalia social protection infrastructure to response to crises

6.2.1 Social protection policy

Somalia’s first social protection policy was only published in 2019, and as such the system is still nascent. Other forms of social assistance delivered through clan-based support mechanisms and remittances from the diaspora have been (and continue to be) a key support to vulnerable, crisis affected communities. More formalised support has historically come through short-term humanitarian led crisis response⁵⁷. Recognising the need to move away from the humanitarian model, which, in a context of recurrent and protracted crises, is unsustainable, the Federal Government of Somalia

⁵³World Bank, 2022. World Bank to Support Somalia’s Drought Response through Cash Transfers to 500,000 Households. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3DWFCdW>
⁵⁴ BASIC, 2021. Cash Strategy.
⁵⁵ World Bank, 2022. The World Bank in Somalia. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3Rsx0hY>.
⁵⁶ World Bank, 2022. Mapping climate change and drought in Somalia. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3UTyvZs>.
⁵⁷ According to UNOCHA’s Humanitarian Actors data, since 2012, over 111 international organisations have been involved in providing humanitarian support to Somalia, spending a combined total of 3.64 billion USD.

(FGS) and international donors explored long-term development led social protection approaches to responding to crises⁵⁸.

It is within this context that in 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) developed a landmark Social Protection Policy (SSPP) through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). Somalia's social protection policy looks to develop transitional safety nets before moving to a more comprehensive and far-reaching social protection programmes. The Social Protection Policy is oriented toward an ambitious long-term vision, from a perspective of 20 years. By 2040, FGS is aiming to have progressively established a functional social protection system which delivers predictable assistance to those who need it. Social protection features as an important part of the FGS's strategy to fight poverty and promote resilience, especially against climatic shocks⁵⁹.

6.2.2 Social protection programming

MoLSA is responsible for implementing Somalia's social protection policy, designing interventions with donors, partners, other ministries, and Federal Member States, and setting out standards for programme implementation. MoLSA manages and implements the Baxnaano Programme, Somalia's first formal and largest social protection programme launched in 2019. Funded by the World Bank, the programme objective is to provide cash transfers to targeted poor and vulnerable households and establish the key building blocks of a national shock-responsive safety net system⁶⁰. It supports poor and vulnerable households through nutrition-linked cash transfers to meet immediate consumption gaps and protect against food insecurity. Sustainability being a key principle of the programme, it also supports the FGS strengthen institutional resilience and capacity. To date, the programme has targeted close to 200,000 poor and vulnerable households (amounting to up to 1.2 million individuals) across Somalia. It also includes various shock responsive mechanisms to support households suffering from locust infestations and the drought, increasing reach to up to a total of 500,000 households^{61,62}.

The Sagal programme, launched in 2021, is the second largest social protection programme in Somalia. Funded primarily by the European Union (EU) with support from Denmark and Sweden, the MoLSA managed programme is worth €27 million and will run for up to 39 months. The objective of Sagal is to improve resilience and poverty reduction of vulnerable communities in Somalia. The programme has two components: improving social protection systems at the Federal and Federal Member States level through capacity building and collaboration, and cash based social transfers. Crucially, Sagal's approach to safety nets is different from Baxnaano with different minimum expenditure baskets (MEBs). The intention here is to test different approaches to enable FGS to eventually assess on what form of safety nets are most effective. The programme has supported 44,000 households⁶³.

The implementation of these programs is supported by both development and humanitarian partners, including UNICEF, World Food Programme, and the Somalia Cash Consortium. Implementation is not yet led by the FGS due to systems not yet being in place (as highlighted by the capacity building components of both Baxnaano and Sagal). Baxnaano and Sagal, having grown out of a system built around humanitarian cash assistance, illustrate a gradual policy and programming

⁵⁸ Capacity4Dev, EU, 2017. From the ground up: The long road to social protection in Somalia. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3USiAL5>.

⁵⁹ FGS, 2019. Somalia Social Protection Policy Document. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3riGLoi>.

⁶⁰ Baxnaano, 2022. About the Baxnaano Programme. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3CmAChc>

⁶¹ World Bank, 2022. From Protracted Humanitarian Relief to State-led Social Safety Net System: Somalia Baxnaano Program

⁶² Baxnaano, 2022. World Bank to Support Somalia's Drought Response through Cash Transfers to 500,000 Households. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3CckNJS>


⁶³ European Commission, 2021. SAGAL Project Summary. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3Spil8x>.

shift towards social protection. Other smaller scale programmes with social protection components exist such as the WFP’s Urban Safety net Programme⁶⁴, the FCDO and ECHO funded Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) programme⁶⁵ and the EU funded Somalia cash consortium mobile money cash transfer programme⁶⁶.

6.2.3 Coordination

There are several social protection and humanitarian coordination mechanisms, some more established than others, operating in Somalia. Humanitarian coordination is reported as having a well-developed architecture but remains limited in terms of efficacy and reach⁶⁷. On the other hand, social protection coordination is described as less developed, with more work needing to be done through government leadership and capacity building to effectively coordinate and build coherence across the sector⁶⁸. Social protection coordination has also been destabilised in the past due to external factors, for instance during the 2022 Presidential elections government led coordination mechanisms fell away and donor meetings happened infrequently⁶⁹. More generally, it is clear that coordination needs between the two sectors are very different, with humanitarian aid being very decentralised with a large number of actors and social protection being a government led sector.

Figure 6.1 Government donor humanitarian spending vs. social protection in Somalia, 2011-2022



Source: OECD (2022). Credit Reporting System. N.B. the financial value of aid commitments provided by all bilateral and multilateral donors to that country for humanitarian (700 VIII Humanitarian Aid, Total) and social protection activity (16010: Social Protection). Data accessed: 05/08/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3fdWpyR>

Despite some efforts, there remains little coordination between social protection and humanitarian sectors. Different agendas have made it difficult to coordinate across the sectors. There continues to be a tension between the sectors, programme design and delivery is siloed⁷⁰. While donors and agencies have been somewhat vocal about the need to improve coordination this hasn’t translated into action⁷¹. With a large majority of donor funding (as shown in [Figure 6.1](#)) directed towards the humanitarian sector, and humanitarian coordination being well established, the incentives to engage in, and improve coordination across sectors are perhaps not there yet.

⁶⁴ WFP, 2019. Building resilience among the most vulnerable in Mogadishu. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3rl6nkw>.
⁶⁵ BRCiS, 2022. BRCiS Consortium - Building Resilient Communities in Somalia. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2qd3EgP>
⁶⁶ Somalia Cash Consortium, 2021. Somalia: Launch of €6.5m mobile money cash transfer programme. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3SFFCTq>.
⁶⁷ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders; KII Group 4: Delivery Teams, August 2022
⁶⁸ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders
⁶⁹ KII Group 1: Direct beneficiaries
⁷⁰ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders; KII Group 1: Direct beneficiaries
⁷¹ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders

“The government really has put in place policies and implementation frameworks to ensure that there is a mechanism of coordinating social protection, however it’s not yet well developed. This is especially the case with the humanitarian sector, even if we do have a few spaces where we interact with the humanitarian agencies.”

Other in country stakeholders

Table 6.3 Social protection, nexus and humanitarian coordination mechanisms

Name	Description	Sector
Donor Working Group (DWG) ⁷²	The EU established a Donor Working Group (DWG) in 2017–18 to initiate the process of bringing the donor community together to initiate policy discussions on a longer-term safety net approach. The DWG was instrumental in the design and development of BAXNAANO and SAGAL.	Social protection
Government Development Partner Social Protection Group	Led by MoLSA and co-chaired by the World Bank. Includes social protection agencies, donors, development partners, the Cash Working Group (CWG) and implementers. Meets quarterly.	Social protection
Social Development Pillar Working Group	Led by the Office of the Prime Minister and brings together ministries that work under the Social Development Pillar	Social protection / cross government
Social Protection Steering Committee	Chaired by office of the deputy prime minister and co-chaired by MoLSA. Is meant to meet twice a year (although as of writing had still not met for 2022). This is a high level coordination mechanism which only includes government officials.	Social protection
The Somalia Cash Consortium ⁷³	Brings together key international organisations implementing cash transfers across Somalia	Nexus
Cash Working Group ⁷⁴	Supports humanitarian cash transfers and is co-led by the WFP and Concern Worldwide.	Humanitarian
OCHA led cluster system ⁷⁵	Multi-donor country-based pooled mechanism created in 2010 to allocate funding for the most urgent life-saving interventions in Somalia. Also works to coordinate actors to avoid duplication. Operates both at sub-national and Federal Member States (FMS) level.	Humanitarian
Donor Cash Forum (DCF) ⁷⁶	The Donor Cash Forum, established in 2019, is a space for donors to discuss and advance shared positions on key themes affecting cash transfers. The DCF emerged from the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. It is a global body with country level fora, of which Somalia is a key country. Chairs include ECHO and FCDO.	Humanitarian
Humanitarian Country Team ⁷⁷	Works to ensure that the activities of humanitarian organisations are coordinated, and that humanitarian action in Somalia is principled, timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery. The HCT is made up of 17 members and two standing invitees. This includes seven UN agencies with humanitarian activities, six NGO representatives selected from within the NGO community, the Director of the Somalia NGO Consortium and two standing invitees. Since October 2013, three donors	Humanitarian

⁷² CALP Network, 2018. Somalia Donor Working Group (DWG) – Safety Net Terms of Reference (ToR). Available at: <https://bit.ly/3SgFGa7>.

⁷³ IMPACT Initiatives, 2022. Somali Cash Consortium MPCA Midline Assessment (December 2021). Available at: <https://bit.ly/3y81m2K>.

⁷⁴ CALP Network, 2022. Somalia Cash Working Group. <https://bit.ly/3SMPgnm>.

⁷⁵ Somalia NGO Consortium, 2015. UN Humanitarian Coordination Structures. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3UPAY7s>.

⁷⁶ CALP Network, 2022. The Donor Cash Forum. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3SL1ZqN>.

⁷⁷ Somalia NGO Consortium, 2015. UN Humanitarian Coordination Structures. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3UPAY7s>.

Name	Description	Sector
	(Sweden, ECHO and FCDO) have joined the HCT as full members.	
The Somalia Donor Group (SDG) ⁷⁸	The primary, most inclusive donor coordination mechanism for Somalia. It includes the vast majority of bilateral donors and meets regularly at Nairobi level. NGOs can be invited to this forum, which is otherwise closed. The primary humanitarian donor coordination mechanism is the Humanitarian Donor Group which is a key partner for NGO humanitarian advocacy.	Humanitarian

6.3 Origins and scope of BASIC support

FCDO Somalia engagements with BASIC have focussed on developing a better understanding of social protection in Somalia. This is due to the office’s focus (past and current) on humanitarian interventions. FCDO Somalia are not established in the social protection space, and as a result are more focused in finding ways to layer in support through their humanitarian shock response experience. This was the case during the baseline and has continued to be the case during the midline.

Two assignments have been designed and delivered since the baseline. This includes the Cash Strategy, produced to support the approach to cash programming in the Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Building in Somalia (HARBS) business case, and a co-coordinator role within the DCF, to develop the group’s objectives, ToRs and workplan, and lead on coordination. The support for the Cash Strategy was requested specifically to support the HARBS business case. It also aligned more widely with FCDO Somalia’s plans around cash programming and exploring forms of financial and technical support toward social protection programming. The author of the Cash Strategy went on to take the DCF co-coordinator role given their recent experience and strong understanding of the nexus is Somalia. Beyond addressing identified needs, both of these assignments were requested because they were realistic and achievable, and less contentions than more complex issues, such as, trying to directly influence the social protection agenda in Somalia.⁷⁹

As during the baseline, the scope of BASIC TA’s engagements over the past year were discussed and defined informally through conversations between BAISC TA consultants and FCDO Somalia’s humanitarian advisor(s). A good working relationship had been established between BASIC TA and FCDO and on this basis the Cash Strategy was scoped, which then led to an opportunity through the DCF co-coordinator role.

BASIC Research and FCDO Somalia have had limited engagement. A scoping discussion was held between BASIC Research and the Somalia office to discuss FCDO’s interests, how BASIC research might add value in Somalia and potential areas of focus⁸⁰. This did not lead to further work, and no further direct engagements were made.

As reported during the baseline, the overall process of requesting support over the past year has been good. Aligned to FCDO Somalia’s expectations and ways of working, it offered substantial flexibility to respond to priorities and was able to feed in directly towards key objectives.

⁷⁸ Somalia NGO Consortium, 2022. Donor Coordination Structures. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3C4EVg6>.

⁷⁹ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022

⁸⁰ IDS, 2022. BASIC Research: Quarter 1 Narrative Report (QR1).

6.4 BASIC support provided

6.4.1 Technical Assistance

Between May 2020 and January 2022, FCDO Somalia engaged with SPACE five times and BASIC TAS twice to produce the seven outputs as shown in Table 6.4. There have been no further assignments since January 2022. This pause in delivery is in part explained through shifting priorities at FCDO Somalia. When BASIC was last engaged for the Cash Strategy and the DCF co-coordinator role, FCDO Somalia were going through a period of reflection. There was a need and interest in receiving support to feed into strategy and the HARBS business case. Since then, however, the submission of the business case and the onset of the severe drought has transferred FCDO’s priorities towards dealing with that emergency over and above the longer-term conversation which were being had around the work that BASIC was involved in⁸¹. FCDO Somalia has not needed that level of technical assistance with the type of cash work that has been prioritised over the last 12 months and has not had the bandwidth to engage on more complex issues around the nexus⁸². The stage of the programme cycle – past conceptualisation and waiting on internal approval – not leave many opportunities or incentives to embark on new technical endeavours.

Table 6.4 Overview of BASIC TA support to FCDO Somalia

#	Date	TA facility	Summary
1	May 2020	SPACE	<p>Providing core questions and areas of focus for the existing technical assistance facility and providing additional review of documents. This engagement provided FCDO with two matrices to support integration of COVID-19 in country programming.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Strategy Decision Matrix helped structure an independent and unbiased analysis of COVID-19 response options.• The Delivery Systems Matrix helped SP teams think through potential COVID-19 response options/strategies via existing social protection programmes, or through leveraging social protection delivery systems and capacity.
2	Nov 2020	BASIC TAS	<p>Economic Inclusion Programming. This engagement focussed on delivering the Economic Inclusion Programming document. The note considers lessons learned from economic inclusion programming globally, outlines several key considerations for implementing such an approach in Somalia and discusses GESI considerations.</p>
3	March 2021	SPACE	<p>Somalia Selective Light Touch Review – Donor Cash Principles. Assessing Four Donor Cash Countries against donor cash principles. This engagement included scoping conversations around donor cash principles with other donor agencies and ultimately focussed around delivering the Light Touch Review. The Light-Touch Review sought to determine the impact of COVID-19 on specific elements of humanitarian cash and social protection programming. It focused on three principles: i) Accountability to Affected Populations/ Localisation; ii) Coordination and iii) Alignment of Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection programmes.’</p>
4	May 2021	SPACE	<p>Framework for a Localisation Shift. Applying Donor Cash Principles, Cash Localisation and BRCiS. This engagement was aligned to recommendations coming out of the BRCiS programme. It delivered analysis for the Somalia BRCiS programme to support a greater shift in power, funding and process to support localisation</p>

⁸¹ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022

⁸² Ibid

#	Date	TA facility	Summary
5	Aug 2021	SPACE	SPACE Somalia Case Study. This engagement focussed around the delivery of the SPACE Somalia Case Study. The purpose of the case study was to document the scaling up of shock-responsive safety nets in Somalia during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. While overall there was a limited response to the pandemic itself, the main scale ups over this period focussed on additional needs caused by floods and locust infestation, of arguable greater importance, especially in rural areas.
6	Dec 2021	BASIC TAS	Somalia Cash Strategy. The report was commissioned by FCDO Somalia to support their approach to cash programming for basic needs under the new HARBS business case.
7	Jan 2022	BASIC TAS	Somalia DCF Co-Coordinator. Funded role in the DCF to support coordination of the DCF and work on informing cash initiatives and the wider cash agenda in Somalia.
8	Sep 2022	STAAR	In process: scoping support to GIZ. Kismayo. Support to scope options for potential social protection project in Kismayo, Somalia.

At the time of writing, GIZ had requested short term support from STAAR. The request was specifically aimed at supporting GIZ to scope options for a potential social protection project in Kismayo, Somalia. As this assignment was live it is not possible to provide any further comment. That said, depending on whether the project goes ahead, there are potential plans for STAAR to provide support in the appraisal of the chosen option and technical support to ensure social protection – humanitarian linkages and gender responsiveness⁸³.

6.4.2 Research

There have not been any BASIC Research Somalia specific assignments. This accounts for the entire period since BASIC Research’s inception. Despite being considered as a potential candidate for a BASIC Research country of deep engagement (Yemen was selected instead), engagements with the Somalia country office have been limited to one initial scoping conversation.

BASIC Research selected Somalia as a case country in multiple studies, however, these have not yet been produced. This includes a study on local accountability in fragile contexts addressing the evidence gap around how more effective accountability can be supported at the intersection of humanitarian and development approaches to social protection. Whilst planning meetings were held with Somalia based researchers the study is likely to get cut this year⁸⁴. Other relevant studies include a study on Targeting which eventually took the decision to drop Somalia as a key case, and another, titled the Politics of Social Assistance, which has been paused in waiting for budget decision to be made⁸⁵. It is our understanding that despite the delays and uncertainties, it remains within BASIC Research’s plans to use Somalia in case studies to feed into the global thematic research.

6.4.3 Knowledge management and learning and research uptake

BASIC assignments delivered over the past year have had limited reach and uptake has largely been within FCDO Somalia. The main reason for this is the fact that BASIC assignments have had FCDO as a primary - and at times, like with the delivery matrices, the Light touch Review of cash principles, the case study and the Cash Strategy – only audience⁸⁶. FCDO Somalia has not made

⁸³ KII Group 4: delivery teams, August 2022.
⁸⁴ IDS, 2022. BASIC Research – Quarterly Narrative Report Quarter 2 Implementation
⁸⁵ FCDO, 2022. Completion Report for the SNHCP Targeting Evaluation.
⁸⁶ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022

efforts towards socialising outputs, nor have they requested support to do so from BASIC TA. An exception to this was the Localisation Framework, where the redacted version was shared around with other humanitarian organisations and with other country offices.

The BASIC brand is not widely recognised, and neither is the concept of FCDO funded TA.

Most respondents had not heard of BASIC, or more generally of an FCDO TA facility working on social protection approaches to crises⁸⁷. Of those that had heard of BASIC, a majority of them had done so through global level SPACE outputs published on SP.org. This presents a similar assessment to the one found at baseline.

6.4.4 Coherence across BASIC components and with other FCDO programming

There has been no coordination between BASIC TA and BASIC Research on Somalia related delivery. There have been no direct communications between the two components⁸⁸. This can in part be explained by the very limited engagement BASIC Research have had with Somalia to date, as well as the overall reduction of FCDO Somalia engagements with the BASIC programme since January 2022. Reduced engagement has overall lessened the need for coordination between the two BASIC components. However, when engagement increases, as it is expected to once the HARBS business case is approved and BASIC Research’s budgetary issues are resolved, there will need to be coordination across the components to ensure coherence

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6.5 Response to support provided

Given the limited role of BASIC in Somalia since the baseline, this section is focused on responses to the Cash Strategy and the DCF co-coordinator role.

6.5.1 What worked

FCDO Somalia reported valuing the targeted support provided by BASIC through the Cash Strategy and the DCF co-coordinator.

The support provided met FCDO’s expectations. The Cash Strategy responded to the stated needs, effectively feeding into FCDO Somalia’s HARBS business case and providing useful options and approaches to cash programming within the Somalia context. Likewise, the DCF co-coordinator role delivered against its scope, addressing a gap around the further development of the DCF and coordination across its members. As reported at baseline, the BASIC support continued to be “timely” and “collaborative”⁹⁰.

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ KII Group 4: delivery teams, August 2022.

⁸⁹ KII Group 4: delivery teams, August 2022.

⁹⁰ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022

“Yes, it was all useful. I cannot remember receiving support that wasn’t valuable wasn’t along the lines of what was agreed.”

Direct beneficiary

The Cash Strategy directly fed into, and informed parts of the HARBS business case. This was the primary objective when scoping out the piece of work and was successfully achieved. As a result of this assignment, the HARBS programme is likely to integrate elements of social protection programming within its own components, moving in the direction of the nexus⁹¹. The Cash Strategy has also helped FCDO ground its objectives in terms of cash assistance policy within the Somali context⁹². It supported FCDO in thinking about ways to shift its approach to cash programming to be more geared towards shock responsive safety nets, and how to move away from stand-alone cash programming.⁹³

“It will be some time before there is any impact of BASIC on changes to programming that makes changes to people’s lives. That said, we can see contributions from BASIC in terms of programme development and ways of working which will hopefully make a tangible difference to peoples”

Direct beneficiary

The DCF co-coordinator role contributed to the growth and coherence of the DCF. The DCF had been created under ECHO’s leadership but initially failed to gain momentum. Together, the two co-coordinators (the other role was funded by CashCap) developed the rationale, ToRs, a coherent agenda and led workplanning within the forum. They prioritised key topics relevant to the current drought and coordinated work around donor harmonisation of transfer values. The BASIC funded role was able to represent FCDO interests in coordination and on the DCF agenda. The role also helped FCDO translate policy and programme plans into donor language, effectively supporting donor coordination.

Outputs delivered during the baseline phase of the evaluation continue to be useful. For instance, the SPACE Somalia case study was used to inform sections of the Somalia Cash Strategy. This was both in terms of providing secondary background research to sectoral context, as well as referencing recommendations from the case study, which continue to be relevant, i.e., producing an early warning and triggering system⁹⁴. Moreover, discussions were held between the FCDO and Netherlands to produce follow up work on the localisation framework⁹⁵. Whilst this did not end up happening (for reasons that our unknown to us), it highlights the continued relevance of the localisation framework, as well as its potential use in generating interest in localisation specific policy development in Somalia’s humanitarian sector.

Global level BASIC TA outputs have been engaged with and used by other social protection and humanitarian stakeholders. Respondents reported benefiting from resources produced through SPACE, which they engaged with on SP.org, as well as SPACE led webinars. Opportunity to access COVID-19 specific resources was described as valuable⁹⁶. Respondents indicated the positive impact of these outputs, explaining that resources were used as supporting evidence to programming and were also shared around with partners, to outline links between social protection and humanitarian programming and how to scale up in crisis contexts.

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² KII Group 4: delivery teams, August 2022

⁹³ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022

⁹⁴ BASIC, 2022. Cash Strategy

⁹⁵ BASIC, 2022. STAAR Costed Workplan

⁹⁶ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022

6.5.2 Challenges and limitations

A few key issues were identified as challenges and limitations to the delivery of BASIC in Somalia.

FCDO Somalia do not have a social protection strategy and as such have less use for BASIC support. While the approach is to continue supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance that is complimentary of social protection delivery (i.e., looking at ways that cash assistance can be provided more effectively and get to a situation where less needs to be spent on humanitarian cash programmes because social protection programmes are running effectively), the priority remains on humanitarian programming. In fact, due to a lack of developmental resources, the decision was made not to engage in social protection programming⁹⁷. The consequence of this humanitarian focus is a reduced incentive to utilise BASIC TA service.

FCDO Somalia contextual issues have impacted engagement. The office in Somalia is in an awkward period of their programme cycle. They have been awaiting approval of the HARBS business case, a major programme which will define approach, priorities, and strategy for the next few years to come. As a result, it is difficult for the team to commit to new pieces of work whilst they are still waiting on business case approval⁹⁸. Moreover, limited bandwidth within FCDO Somalia has meant that decisions have been made around how to prioritise existing resources⁹⁹. The result has been, since January 2022, a fitful form of engagement with BASIC TA, where planning and delivery of work has been impacted by the challenges of maintaining consistent engagement^{100,101}. It also means that when other priorities emerge, such as the emergency response to the drought crisis, social protection focussed technical assistance provided through BASIC is deprioritised.

Budget cuts have impacted BASIC Research’s ability to plan and deliver work on Somalia. While Somalia was ultimately not selected as one of BASIC Research’s countries of deep engagement, they did have plans to produce research which included Somalia as a focus country. This has, to date, not happened due to the proposed budget cuts and the uncertainty they have created. This has been the case for three aforementioned studies on local accountability in fragile contexts, the politics of social assistance and targeting¹⁰².

The short-term nature of the DCF co-coordinator role was constrictive. The three month short-term contract stunted potential impact and cut the progress that was being achieved short¹⁰³. Indeed, stakeholders reported the need for more sustained engagement in order to deliver more comprehensive results, especially within the complicated context of Somalia’s nexus¹⁰⁴. The fact that the role was not replaced reduced coordination capacity within the DCF¹⁰⁵. This was also reported during the baseline, where limited days allocated to SPACE consultants meant limited availability, which resulted in stakeholder disengagement, i.e., on support offered through SPACE around cash programmes.

⁹⁷ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022

⁹⁸ Ibid

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ KII Group 4: delivery teams, August 2022

¹⁰² IDS, 2022. BASIC Research – Quarterly Narrative Report Quarter 2 Implementation.

¹⁰³ KII Group 4: delivery teams, August 2022

¹⁰⁴ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022


¹⁰⁵ FCDO, 2022. Donor Cash Forum – Support to country-level cash coordination: Review of experiences and proposed way forward (April '22).

“The co-coordinator role in the DCF was useful. It helped with the coordination between the DCF and the Cash Working group and the other main programmes. The benefits were evident. However, it was very short-term unfortunately. Too short term.”

6.6 BASIC’s contribution to change

Figure 6.2 overleaf indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which were most relevant to BASIC’s support to FCDO Somalia since the baseline. Statements in boxes shaded in blue were directly relevant. This section explores BASIC’s contribution to changes in Somalia, with reference to, for sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.2 on FCDO’s use of BASIC support and indirect results, ToC output and outcome statements and, for section 7.7.3 on enablers and constraints, and ToC assumptions.

Figure 6.2 Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Somalia



6.7 Changes observed

6.7.1 Key changes

Change 1: Establishment of social protection system in Somalia

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
2-3 Years	High	Medium	Government and donors	Low

Change and its significance:

The recent emergence of a national social protection system represents the most significant recent development. This was the view of most key informants, who repeatedly pointed to the nascence of the social protection system as the central development over the past two to three years. The FGS only drafted and published its first Social Protection policy framework in 2019. Large national programmes, such as the Baxnaano and Sagal, have only been running and supporting

vulnerable communities since 2019 and 2020 respectively. Over the space of two years, the Baxnaano programme has grown to provide monthly payments to approximately 200,000 households and has shock response mechanisms covering up to 500,000 vulnerable households¹⁰⁶. The Sagal programme supports up to 44,000 households.

Both programmes have been working towards building out the foundations of the system and strengthening capacity at the federal level, within MoLSA in particular. This has led to normative change around support for social protection policy across government as a sustainable approach to responding to crises and development¹⁰⁷. For example, Somalia’s social protection policy has the backing of the President’s Office and the Deputy Prime Minister chairs the Social Protection Steering Committee¹⁰⁸.

Drivers of change:

Somalia’s social protection system has been driven by the FGS and donors. FGS and the World Bank worked together to draft Somalia’s social protection policy. While the World Bank and the EU fund the Baxnaano and Sagal, it is the FGS which has led the roll out of the policy and manages the programmes through MoLSA. This has been enabled through a strong political commitment, which has grown over the years of developing and implementing policy, and MoLSA’s work around system and capacity building¹⁰⁹.

BASIC contribution:

BASIC did not directly contribute to the establishment of Somalia’s social protection system. In country support has been aimed at supporting FCDO develop its own understanding and approach to social protection in Somalia rather than FCDO’s support of Somalia’s social protection system. FCDO has supported the development of shock responsive social protection in Somalia, through its support of BRCiS, by supporting activities to compliment the Baxnaano programme and through its wider influencing across donors and FGS. As reported in, FCDO’s Resilience Pilot stocktake report¹¹⁰, the work delivered through BRCiS has directly fed into Somalia’s social protection policy and the Baxnaano programme. However, the link between BASIC’s support to FCDO Somalia and these outcomes are tenuous at best. This could be interpreted as a missed opportunity by FCDO to harness expertise of BASIC to provide direct support to the sector and in turn develop its own experience and build out relations.

Openings around FCDO support to Baxnaano are promising. Although there have been some scoping conversations between BASIC TA and FCDO Somalia around providing support to the Baxnaano programme¹¹¹, these have not yet materialised into assignments. Considering the importance of the Baxnaano programme in Somalia, the added value that FCDO and BASIC could bring to its growth represents a good entry point for FCDO. This is further reinforced by the fact that

¹⁰⁶ World Bank, 2022. World Bank to Support Somalia’s Drought Response through Cash Transfers to 500,000 Households. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3DWFCdW>

¹⁰⁷ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ FCDO, 2021. Priorities for FCDO Somalia resilience pilot: A stocktake of progress, learning and opportunities to build resilient households, communities, societies, and economies in Somalia

¹¹¹ The scoping conversation produced the following for prospective areas of work:

- Helping FCDO refine their influencing objectives around WB Baxnaano’s planned horizontal expansion in response to droughts;
- Supporting coordination between those working on SP and safety nets (WB, WFP) and humanitarian actors;
- TA to the WB to improve their targeting mechanisms (including inclusivity and GESI)
- Support FCDO with longer term country plan objectives focussed on developing social protection mechanisms that support resilience objectives

multiple respondents from FGS, donors and implementing partners alike all identified the need for additional TA at an institutional level and said they would welcome support from FCDO in that capacity¹¹².

Barriers to change:

Sustainability of Somalia’s social protection system is perhaps its biggest challenge. Somalia’s social protection system is currently almost entirely externally donor funded. The prospect of FGS being able to independently fund the system in its current, and still premature form, in the next five to ten years is very low. There, are concerns that if donor funding is reduced, or ceases altogether, Somalia’s social protection system would collapse.

“A lot of positions within MoLSA are funded by programmes. When thinking about sustainability, we need to make sure that the department doesn’t fall apart when financing changes.”

Other in country stakeholders

Emergency response continues to be dominated by a much larger and more developed humanitarian system. While coordination mechanisms exist, they are not yet effective. The two sectors mainly operate side by side, rather than coherently together.

Change 2: Development of FCDO Somalia programme business case

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
6-12 months	Medium	Medium	FCDO Somalia	Medium

Change and its significance: Development of FCDO’s new business case. FCDO Somalia, is, at the time of writing, waiting to receive approval for the HARBS business case. This new programme was designed to replace the previous humanitarian programme, SHARP, which ran between 2017-2022. FCDO stakeholders indicated that the development of the business case and the subsequent impending inception of the new programme signified one of the most important internal changes to happen over the last 6-12 months.

Drivers of change: The FCDO humanitarian team, as the owners of the business case and the office’s humanitarian strategy are the drivers of this change.

BASIC contribution: BASIC made a considerable contribution to this business case through the production of the cash strategy document. The document has the stated objective to inform decision making around the upcoming FCDO business case for HARBS and to support their approach to cash programming for basic needs. “Given the changing context over recent years in the social safety net / shock responsive social safety net space (SRSN), plus reductions in FCDO funding,” the document explains, “it is timely to think through how best for FCDO to position itself and its funding over the coming years”¹¹³. Feedback from FCDO respondents confirmed that the document directly fed into specific areas of the business case, relating to cash programming and leveraging humanitarian experience and expertise towards approaches to social protection¹¹⁴.

Barriers to change: BASIC’s contribution to the HARBS programme was aimed at ways of integrating cash programming into the business case. FCDO Somalia’s historically humanitarian led

¹¹² KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022
¹¹³ BASIC, 2022. FCDO Somalia Cash Strategy.
¹¹⁴ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022

approach to crisis response in Somalia may mean that these elements introduced by the BASIC programme are lost in implementation, thus undermining linkages to the nexus.

6.7.2 Wider changes

Several other contextual changes were reported by stakeholders which are relevant to the theory of change, but where BASIC was found to have made relatively less or no significant contributions towards:

MoLSA has begun the process of developing a national registry to enable better targeting and improved reach of its social protection programmes. Owned and managed by MoLSA, the national registry represents a multi-sectoral instrument which will exchange across ministries (some work has begun around pensions which could be linked to social protection system)¹¹⁵. The instrument will enable improved targeting and inclusion, greater reach to marginalised communities, enhanced coordination and agile shock response through rapid scale up and scale down¹¹⁶. Work is happening in parallel around the Data Protection Act, which once completed should enable the implementation of the registry¹¹⁷. Members of the humanitarian community have raised some reservations around the utility of the tool for targeting of humanitarian responses given the different approaches utilised by development and humanitarian programmes¹¹⁸. Others have also pointed to concerns around data protection issues as well as the persistence of limited targeting and reach due to geographical issues¹¹⁹.

The social protection sector in Somalia has seen improvements in institutional capacity and capability. This is largely due to capacity building efforts coordinated by FGS and donors (World Bank, EU, et al.). Both the Baxnaano programme and Sagal have important capacity building components, i.e., component two of the Baxnaano is: “development of the delivery systems and institutional capacity”¹²⁰. The result of this work is noticeable growth in capacity across MoLSA¹²¹. However, some respondents indicated that capacity building has only been targeting advisors, who are often short-term contract staff, whereas it should be targeting and investing at the civil service level where individuals are working there long-term¹²². This offers a more sustainable model and would help preserve institutional knowledge.

Social protection programmes are introducing early warning systems and shock responsive mechanisms. The World Bank has been working with MoLSA and the Office of the Prime Minister to set up emergency structures which will have early warning indicators. Although coordination around these early warning indicators remains an issue, there has been some clear progress over the past couple of years¹²³. As for shock responsive mechanisms, Baxnaano has made impressive strides in developing these – reaching up to 500,000 households - to support communities suffering the consequences of locust infestations as well as droughts. That said, reportedly slow response and delivery times indicate further margin for progression¹²⁴.

¹¹⁵ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ BASIC, 2022. FCDO Somalia Cash Strategy

¹¹⁹ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022

¹²⁰ Al-Ahmadi & Zampaglione, 2022. From Protracted Humanitarian Relief to State-led Social Safety Net System: Somalia Baxnaano Program. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3r88tnP>

¹²¹ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022

¹²² KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Ibid

Coordination mechanism between social protection and humanitarian sectors are being discussed. Donors and FGS are interested in, and keen to enhance coordination and coherence across sectors. While there has been some development through coordination mechanisms, such as the cash working group and the Development Partner Social Protection Group, overall coordination is irregular, informal, and insufficient.

6.7.3 Key drivers

The evaluation identified a series of drivers crucial to the development of social protection in Somalia.

Key stakeholders have been responsible for driving the social protection agenda forward in Somalia. MoLSA has led on the implementation of Somalia’s social protection policy since its publication in 2019, has managed both Baxnaano and Sagal, and has been instrumental in generating political will and cross departmental buy-in for social protection. MoLSA’s influencing, internal coordination and good performance was a big contributor to this rapid shift¹²⁵. There are clear signs that MoLSA will continue to advance social protection in Somalia for years to come. For instance, the focus on internal capacity building indicates intent for continued growth and eventual autonomy¹²⁶. Internal development of the national registry signifies the ability to improve targeting and increase coverage. Finally, the eventual takeover programme delivery (instead of WFP), underscores the aspiration for the system to be nationally owned and run¹²⁷.

On the donor side, the World Bank, as well as the EU and other smaller donors have contributed to driving the social protection agenda. The World Bank was involved in drafting the policy and designing the Baxnaano programme and is the biggest social protection donor in the country. In turn, the EU co-designed and financed Sagal. WFP has equally played an important role as the implementing partner on Baxnaano. All-together, these actors have built and advanced a growing social protection system that did not exist three years ago.

Programme efficacy demonstration effects. Somalia’s main national social protection programme has come a long way in a short amount of time. The reach that the Baxnaano programme has achieved over two years (200,000 households, or 1.2 million individuals) is considered a success. The introduction of new shock responsive mechanisms demonstrates the intent and ability to develop a system fit for purpose within Somalia’s context (even if there are improvements to be made around timeliness). Existing accomplishments and perceived potential for further growth and success has generated momentum around social protection in Somalia and has contributed to the positive political economy around the sector.

Other smaller programmes, some predating Baxnaano, such as WFP’s Urban Safety Net programme, BRCiS which has some social protection components as well as the Somalia Cash Consortium, and others coming after Baxnaano, such as Sagal, have also contributed to this momentum. They have in different ways underscored the benefits and use cases of social protection and have played a role in driving the conversation ahead.

Continued context of recurrent and protracted crises highlights the need for a functional social protection system. Whilst Somalia’s emergency response mechanisms are still geared towards humanitarian interventions, the context crisis (which some say is worsening) stresses the importance of changing approach. As previously described, Somalia continues to be severely affected by climate fuelled disasters, conflict, and mass internal displacement. This complicated context

¹²⁵ Ibid
¹²⁶ Ibid
¹²⁷ Ibid

eroding community resilience and contributing to high levels of poverty demonstrates the importance of establishing a more sustainable and responsive social protection system to provide long-term support to vulnerable households. It is why FGS and donors developed a social protection policy in the first place and continues to be one of the best arguments for investment in the sector. Indeed, the context is central to social protection programming business cases, and it forms part of the narrative when making the case for diversified and increased financing.

6.7.4 Constraining factors

A few constraining factors which affected BASIC’s contribution to change were identified by the evaluation:

FCDO Somalia is a key player in the humanitarian sector, but new to the social protection sector. FCDO Somalia’s portfolio has been and continues to be focussed on the humanitarian sector. It does not have a social protection strategy; it does not have a social protection budget and it is not a vocal or active stakeholder within the sector. Other stakeholders perceive FCDO as having interests in potentially supporting social protection programming, but not as a leader or major donor¹²⁸. While FCDO Somalia have worked towards integrating social protection approaches into their portfolio and have shown interest in layering support to social protection programming, the continued emphasis on humanitarian interventions represents a constraining factor to building out linkages to the nexus.

Coordination issues have impacted the development of Somalia’s social protection system. Coordination within the social protection sector is still underdeveloped. MoLSA who lead on coordination are under-resourced and over committed, and so despite their best efforts have struggled to develop robust coordination mechanisms^{129,130}. Whilst there are several different mechanisms (as outlined in [Table 7.3](#)) issues of divergence around targeting, transfer values¹³¹ and data systems persist¹³². The mechanism is also vulnerable to external factors getting in the way of coordination – such as during the election process where government led efforts ceased and donor level coordination slowed down significantly.

Nexus coordination is lacking. Formal, established coordination mechanisms do not exist. For instance, there is no formal, systematic link between the CWG and the other forums discussing the same issues, namely the donor Social Protection Working Group and Government-led development partners working group. Where informal or indirect coordination happens, different donor interests, priorities and political pressures get in the way of agreeing to a clear agenda^{133,134}. The difficulties in achieving coordination results in limited engagement, essentially creating a self-fulfilling cycle of disengagement. At the government level, tensions exist between MoLSA and Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs & Disaster Management (MoHADM) further straining coordination efforts. Whilst WFP are one of main implementers working both on social protection and humanitarian interventions, they do not play a formal coordination role^{135,136}. The consequence is fragmentation and siloed

¹²⁸ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022
¹²⁹ Ibid
¹³⁰ KII Group 1: direct beneficiaries, August 2022
¹³¹ A study on the Minimum Expenditure Basket and the HEA from the Food Economy Group is expected to support the harmonisation of transfer values
¹³² KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022
¹³³ KII Group 3: other in country stakeholders, August 2022
¹³⁴ Some efforts have been made to try and revive the resilience working group with the federal level which could provide a new platform to link the sectors, however the result of this is still to be seen.
¹³⁵ It has been suggested that a coordination focussed TA embedded within WFP would be well placed to link the nexus.
¹³⁶ KII Group 4: delivery teams, August 2022

working, and a failure to build confidence across both humanitarian and social protection stakeholders to take joint action, diversify financing and develop coherent programming¹³⁷. It represents a significant barrier to creating linkages and developing the nexus.

6.8 Closing reflections

Somalia’s social protection sector is nascent and has continued to grow and develop over the past year. The complex context of multiple recurrent and protracted crises continues to demand sustainable approaches to support vulnerable communities. Strong political will – both at the government and donor level – and successful efforts at developing the system, implementing programmes, and supporting vulnerable households has firmly established social protection as a long-term crisis response and poverty reduction mechanism.

FCDO Somalia’s support to the social protection sector has been limited. Work through other programmes, such as BRCiS and influencing of donor agenda around coordination and localisation, has indirectly contributed to the development and implementation of programmes. FCDO Somalia more directly supported the Baxnaano programme’s shock responsive mechanism, however this was quite small on the scale of the intervention. BASIC’s engagement in country has also been limited to supporting FCDO Somalia develop its own social protection capacities rather than being aimed directly at the system. This has largely been due to the FCDO’s focus on humanitarian interventions and small social protection portfolio and experience.

The growth of Somalia’s social protection system signifies an opportunity for FCDO Somalia and BASIC. While FCDO’s Somalia portfolio is geared towards humanitarian approaches to crises, experience in designing and deploying shock responsive mechanisms could be leveraged as an asset in social protection programming – especially under the current need of emergency drought responses. BASIC’s technical expertise of working across the nexus could facilitate this, as well as to improve coordination across both the social protection and humanitarian sectors.

Demand for BASIC support in Somalia is likely to increase. The impending approval of the HARBS business case is expected to elicit calls for support around cash or social protection related standby partnership requests. Coordination and operational needs within the CWG may also result in another short-term programme funded post. Scoping conversations around supporting the World Bank should result in BASIC programme level support around system building. Furthermore, the interest from a multitude of social protection stakeholders in receiving TA support from BASIC, reciprocated by STAAR’s stated intent, suggests potential for new local level partnerships.

At the endline, it will be important to explore the following lines of enquiry:

- Have social protection programmes in Somalia continued to develop?
- Has social protection system building progressed?
- Has FCDO Somalia increased its stake in social protection in Somalia?
- Has the new HARBS programme integrated elements of social protection?
- How, if at all, has BASIC supported FCDO expand its influence and contribution towards social protection in Somalia?
- How has the nexus developed since the midline?
- What interactions/synergies/missed opportunities between BASIC components occurred?
- How, if at all, has BASIC reached other key stakeholders in Somalia?

¹³⁷ Ibid

7 Country Case Study - Yemen

This section provides a summary of the BASIC midline evaluation country case study for Yemen. The characteristics of crises in Yemen include instability, severe poverty, and climate related disasters. The section provides an overview of the scope of BASIC support in Yemeni social protection, the key changes this support has elicited, and the challenges and limitations.

7.1 Context

7.1.1 Crises faced by Yemen

The crisis in Yemen remains extremely severe. According to the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan 16 million people in Yemen are targeted for humanitarian assistance in 2022 – out of a total population of 30.5 million.¹³⁸ The crisis is fuelled by conflict and is further exacerbated by the economy’s decline, natural hazards such as floods or drought, and epidemics, notably COVID-19. Prior to the current conflict, Yemen was already one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa region with widespread food insecurity, malnutrition, and poor health, exacerbated by structural underdevelopment and widespread poverty. The conflict’s increasingly protracted nature has resulted in economic collapse, the degradation of public services, increased poverty and the breakdown of community safety nets.

Table 7.1 Characteristics of crises and associated vulnerabilities

Instability and insecurity	Poverty and economic insecurity	Climate related disasters
More than seven years of armed conflict in Yemen has caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties and displaced over 4 million people, including at least 158,000 in 2021. ¹³⁹ Confrontations involving the Government of Yemen, supported by the Saudi-led coalition, and the Ansar Allah authorities continue and a comprehensive political settlement remains elusive.	A substantial devaluation of the Yemeni rial contributed to the further worsening of Yemen’s economy in 2021, driving up the prices of essential goods and services including food, fuel and healthcare. In addition, Yemen has been particularly exposed to the consequences of the Ukraine related escalation in world food prices, given its high reliance on imports.	Natural hazards also continue to aggravate the crisis, as flooding devastated southern communities and fuelled the spread of diseases, desert locust infestations remain a threat and natural water sources are heavily depleted. ¹⁴⁰

Source: Integrity (2022). Triangulation of stakeholder perspectives and document review.

According to the INFORM severity index the Yemen crisis remains as severe as previous years (Table 7.1) The operating environment remains restricted and characterized by extensive access challenges and insecurity. Some 10.9 million people live in areas of Yemen where bureaucratic and logistical impediments, as well as armed conflict and insecurity, represent major challenges for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

¹³⁸ Yemen 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan ([Yemen | Global Humanitarian Overview \(unocha.org\)](#))

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ OCHA (2022) Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022. April 2022.

Table 7.2 Overview of Yemen crises - INFORM Severity Index (2019-2022)

Crises in Yemen	2019	2020	2021	Jan-August- 2022
Complex crisis in Yemen	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.1
Mixed Migration Flows in Yemen	2.7	2.8	3.3	3.9
Average total	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.0

Source: ACAPS (2022). INFORM Severity Index. *N.B. The Index is scored between 1 and 5. Low index values represent a less severe humanitarian crisis, and high index values represent a more severe humanitarian crisis.* Data accessed: 05/09/22. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3QKYmzZ>.

While needs have grown since 2020, the percentage of unmet needs has increased substantially since 2019 (see [Table 8.3](#)), this was attributed by stakeholders to donor fatigue and competing priorities from new and emerging crises elsewhere.

Table 7.3 Coverage of Humanitarian Needs in Yemen (2016 - 2022)

HRP	Millions of people in need	Millions of people targeted	Requirements (US\$bn)	Funding coverage ¹⁴¹
2022	20.7	16.0	4.96	36
2021	20.7	16.0	3.85	57
2020	24.0	15.6	3.20	59
2019	24.1	24.1	4.19	87
2018	22.2	13.1	3.64	81
2017	18.8	10.3	3.11	75
2016	21.2	13.6	2.34	63

Source: Yemen 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan ([Yemen | Global Humanitarian Overview \(unocha.org\)](#) updated with 2022 data from [Appeals and response plans 2022 | Financial Tracking Service \(unocha.org\)](#))

7.1.2 Overview of the Yemen social protection infrastructure to respond to crises

Social Protection: Two national social protection institutions continue to operate in Yemen.

Yemen’s Social Fund for Development (SFD), established in 1997 under Yemeni law, is a quasi-governmental organisation that has a strong reputation for independence and neutrality. SFD’s work improves poor communities’ access to basic social services (education, water, health, rural roads), enhances economic opportunities, and reduces the vulnerability of the poor. SFD is a community-led development organisation supporting Yemen’s poorest and most vulnerable people with cash-based safety nets, restoration and improved access to basic services and assets (e.g. clinics, schools, water points), and economic development opportunities (e.g. through access to microfinance).

Yemen’s Social Welfare Fund (SWF) was established in 1996 through Yemeni Social Welfare Law. Until 2015, it was primarily financed by the GoY (plus a small number of donors) to provide quarterly, unconditional cash transfers to some of the country’s most vulnerable households. In 2014 cash transfers under the SWF covered 1.5 million beneficiary households, representing 29.1% of the population. The impact of the SWF was limited by the low adequacy of its transfer value, targeting errors (both of inclusion and exclusion), and the weakness of delivery systems for payments,

¹⁴¹ As of 27th September 2022 (see [Appeals and response plans 2022 | Financial Tracking Service \(unocha.org\)](#))

grievance redress and monitoring. The SWF suspended payments to beneficiaries in 2015 when the conflict escalated.

The World Bank has sought to maintain and sustain these key national social protection institutions through the period of conflict. In 2017, the World Bank set up the Emergency Cash Transfer Programme (ECTP) to continue to provide quarterly cash transfers to up to nine million poor and vulnerable people on SWF's beneficiary list, in partnership with UNICEF. The World Bank is now seeking to transition delivery of the cash transfers from UNICEF to SFD as an interim measure to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and strengthen national institutional capacity. SFD is seen as having more latitude in revising both the beneficiary lists and transfer amounts – both of which have remained frozen since 2014 under the SWF. As the SWF is the legally mandated entity for the implementation of the UCT, the long-term goal is to eventually transition the program back to the SWF, once the conditions permit.

UK funding and engagement has supported improvements to the ECTP, for example by topping up transfer values and better measuring the impact it has. FCDO have also supported SFD to review its targeting strategy and develop an action plan to improve its monitoring and evaluation systems using SPACE resources.


Humanitarian assistance: The 2022 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan has three strategic objectives: (1) Preventing disease outbreaks and reducing morbidity and mortality (2) Improved living standards and resilience, and (3) Prevent and mitigate protection risks. The second objective, targets the largest number of beneficiaries and represents the bulk of the humanitarian appeal, where the \$2.1 billion requested by the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster – which de facto responds to basic needs – dwarfs the other sectoral appeals.

The humanitarian food assistance response is fragmented amongst a large number of partners, with challenges to coherence and coordination. In practice the provision of humanitarian food assistance is heavily dominated by the World Food Programme. While there has been some progress towards ensuring coordinated actions amongst these actors, significant challenges remain in terms of establishing standardised targeting criteria, consistent transfer amounts, coordinated payment mechanisms and common complaints and feedback mechanisms.

The push towards the increased use and coordination of cash-based programming as part of the humanitarian response – noted in the baseline – has continued with a specific section in the HRP detailing an approach to the scaled-up use of Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA). This includes commitments to (i) harmonize tools and approaches (for example in standardised transfer amounts and targeting criteria), (ii) promote inter-operability of systems and operations (for example through promoting data exchange to allow integration among beneficiary information and assistance management systems), and (iii) promoting the humanitarian-development- peace nexus through integrating and strengthening the humanitarian- social protection linkages, with a more cohesive and collaborative approach by “layering” humanitarian and livelihood assistance provided by different actors, or facilitating referrals between these instruments.

While the response in Yemen has remained dominated by humanitarian spending there has been a significant increase in the financing of social protection instruments, largely as a result of World Bank programmes ([Figure 7.1](#)).

Figure 7.1 Humanitarian vs Social Protection spending in Yemen



7.1.3 Coordination and international actors

The business case for the new FCDO Yemen Food Security Safety Net Programme¹⁴² includes a detailed analysis of the current coordination architecture and challenges, and the coordination failings identified provide a key rationale for the programme itself. This challenge is compounded by the large number of UN, NGO and other agencies who are part of the response. The OCHA FTS data lists 69 agencies as receiving humanitarian funds. This has resulted in significant coordination challenges between humanitarian actors, including unharmonized transfer amounts which are poorly adapted to needs and overlaps in caseloads, with “a fragmented landscape of programmes that risks leaving people excluded or not necessarily receiving the type of assistance that is cheaper and works best for their situation”.

Ultimately it is argued that fragmentation and poor coordination hamper the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of all types of assistance. The IAHE Yemen Evaluation found that “There is a lack of overall harmonization of beneficiary lists, meaning that across the collective operation there are likely to be significant inclusion and exclusion errors “. ¹⁴³Removing duplications is expected to support substantially more people in acute need.

As noted above, there has been a move with the humanitarian community to strengthen their coordination. The Cash and Markets Working Group (CMWG)¹⁴⁴ is leading the development of a strategy to address the identified priorities of harmonisation and interoperability. However, the case

¹⁴² FCDO (2022) Business Case - Yemen Food Security Safety Net Programme.

¹⁴³ Sida, L et al (2022) Inter-Agency Evaluation of the Yemen Crisis. Valid.

¹⁴⁴ The CMWG is the main coordinating body for cash assistance in Yemen, with wide participation from the UN and NGO community. As well as being an active member of the Cash and Markets Working Group (CMWG), the UK has funded the cash coordinator position since 2017.

study found that progress on this strategy had stalled as the CMWG coordinator, provided by CashCap with FCDO funding, had not been replaced.

The evidence gathered by the case study confirmed that the humanitarian and social protection systems are poorly coordinated. Coordination between humanitarian and social protection systems is currently close to non-existent. Formal, established coordination mechanisms do not exist. For instance, there is no formal, systematic link between the CWG and the other forums discussing the same issues, namely the donor Social Protection Working Group and Government-led development partners working group. Nor is there a mechanism to coordinate between the two primary social protection mechanisms in the country, SWF and SFD.¹⁴⁵ Coordination is further challenged by the fact it takes place across multiple locations in country (Sanaa’ and Aden), and abroad, as several actors - including donors like the UK - are not based in country for security reasons.

Better coordinated social protection and humanitarian interventions will stretch aid further. But beyond this, it was also suggested that coordination is a first step towards a nationally owned and financed response to food insecurity – where humanitarian and development investments work together in ways that lay the foundations for a nationally owned system.

The diversity of donors necessitates strong donor coordination to ensure consistent messages and priorities to implementing partners (see [Table 7.4](#)). FCDO identified the need for better donor coordination to create a collective vision and has supported the formation of a Cash and Social Protection Donor Working Group in Yemen. However, this is yet to meet on a regular basis.

Table 7.4 Top 10 Humanitarian Donors to Yemen (2021)

Donor	Amount (\$m)	Cumulative %	Percentage of Total
Saudi Arabia	1042	37%	37%
US	664	61%	24%
UAE	232	69%	8%
Germany	183	75%	7%
United Kingdom	180	82%	6%
EC	174	88%	6%
Sweden	75	90%	3%
Japan	64	93%	2%
Canada	62	95%	2%
Norway	28	96%	1%

Source: OCHA FTS (2022).

7.2 Origins and scope of BASIC support

The context in Yemen provided a very relevant context for the use of BASIC resources. Crisis assistance is still a priority but there is a great deal of fragmentation and inefficiency in the response. FCDO Yemen also identified the central problems of continuing to use a short-term humanitarian

¹⁴⁵ Ruta Nimkar. Cash and Social Protection in Yemen. CaLP. N.d.

financing model and the need to shift towards a more predictable coordinated and longer-term response to address poverty and food insecurity in an integrated way.

BASIC provided a natural technical counterpart to supporting the interests of FCDO Yemen in developing a more strategic approach – both for their own programmes and in influencing the collective donor response. The original SRO of BASIC had moved to become the humanitarian adviser for FCDO in Yemen, which provided a further bridge. Her inside knowledge of the capacities provided by BASIC, and commitment to the approach, naturally led to request for support

This led to a flurry of BASIC assignments starting in 2019 and continuing until 2021. Primarily this technical assistance supported a deeper analysis of the challenges and opportunities in Yemen for using social protection approaches in crisis and helped the FCDO move towards developing a new business case – as well as meeting other more bespoke purposes. These assignments are outlined in more detail below.

In addition to the technical assistance, there has been a strong level of interest in using BASIC research in Yemen. There was an articulated desire by FCDO to capitalise on the more rigorous and field-based evidence generated by research to potentially support the implementation of the FCDO business case. This local demand underpinned the selection of Yemen as a deep engagement country for the basic research component.

7.3 BASIC support provided

7.3.1 Technical Assistance

The BASIC TA support to FCDO in Yemen has encompassed a number of pieces of work with broadly connected objectives. The main support provided to FCDO Yemen by BASIC TA and SPACE is outlined in Table 5 below.

Most of the TA studies were oriented towards understanding the opportunities for a more efficient, effective and sustainable emergency response in Yemen. These inputs contributed to the development of the FCDO business case. This started with the study on 'Linking humanitarian cash and social protection' (Assignment 1 in [Table 7.5](#) below), which included: a mapping of existing social protection and humanitarian cash programmes, a review of the capacity, complementarity and limitations of existing mechanisms and political economy analysis to identify drivers of change. This was carried forward and further developed through the various pieces of work done under Assignment 2 and 3. These investigated specific technical questions (such as the evidence around Cash plus interventions) as well as engaging with different stakeholder groups (donors and NGOs).

In addition, FCDO used BASIC TAS and SPACE to address other bespoke decision-making needs. This included:

- An analysis Covid-19 impacts on vulnerable populations and advised on appropriate responses (Assignment 2A).
- An analysis of coordination mechanisms in Yemen and developing a plan for the establishment of a donor cash and social protection working group (Assignment 2D)
- A decision-making framework to guide annual allocations to the four partners receiving funds from the new FCDO business case (Assignment 4A).

Finally, SPACE (Assignment 4B) was used to conduct a review of the targeting mechanisms used by the national institution - the SFD. The objective of this was to assist the SFD in improving its' internal resources.

Table 7.5 Overview of BASIC TA and SPACE support to FCDO Yemen

#	Date(s)	BASIC TA or SPACE?	Summary	Deliverables
1	2019	BASIC TA	Framework Development for Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Yemen Initial scoping and mapping exercise followed by conversations with partners on the way forward	Internal reports produced for Inception Phase and two Phases of implementation. Only last report available for review by the evaluation team.
2A	March - April 2020	BASIC TA	Needs assessment and options paper for potential cash and/or social protection response to COVID-19 pandemic	Report covering situational analysis and needs assessment, vulnerability analysis, a risk analysis and scenario planning and programming options.
2B	May – June 2020		Evidence review, gap analysis and value-for-money & risk assessment of cash-plus and complementary livelihoods programming in Yemen	Report providing a definition of cash plus programming, an evidence and VFM review and a gap analysis.
2C	July – August 2020		Action plan of technical priorities, informed by political economy analysis, to support cash harmonisation	Report on (a) the political economy analysis of the barriers and incentives of key stakeholders (UN agencies, SFD, NGOs, de facto authorities, GOY) to engage with cash harmonisation and coordination and (b) an assessment of the feasibility and desirability of priorities and social protection system building ambition.
2D	September – December 2020		Cash Reform Strategy	Report presenting a vision, stakeholder analysis, mapping of harmonisation efforts on-going, a workplan and a rolling engagement strategy. External paper on Donor Cash and Social Protection Working Group Workplan.
3	2020	SPACE	Roundtable Meeting on NGO Cash Programming in Yemen	Mindmap summarising the workshop outcomes.
4A	2020/21	SPACE	Concept Note – Decision-making framework for new Food Security Program for FCDO Yemen	Developed a decision-making framework to guide annual allocations to FCDO food security partners.
4B	2020/21	SPACE	Mapping and review of prioritisation: Social Fund for Development, Yemen	Analysis of current SFD approaches to programme and project prioritization and followed by conclusions and recommendations.

7.3.2 Research

A major development during the midline phase was the development and finalisation of the basic research plans. Yemen was selected as one of four focus countries for BASIC Research. A research agenda was developed based a literature review and stakeholder consultation that has assessed the state of the evidence, key evidence gaps and critical issues where further research is needed, and the BASIC Research programme could add most value.¹⁴⁶ This included 41 key informant interviews

¹⁴⁶ BASIC Research - Yemen Country Report - Annex to BASIC Research Inception Report.

including FCDO, other key donors, UN agencies, NGOs (national and international), a wide range of civil society, and government bodies in Yemen.

The Yemen BASIC Research proposal was divided into three strands:

- Targeting strand (examining both the degree of inclusion and exclusion errors and people's perceptions of the targeting mechanisms)
- Systems strengthening and capacities strand (asking how national social protection programmes and systems that pre-exist a specific crisis can be sustained and maintain business continuity during or following a crisis)
- Systems strand – focused on inter-operability (examining the barriers, benefits, risks and opportunities in strengthening inter-operability to enable referrals and layering of assistance)

This initial research agenda balanced addressing specific local needs through more bespoke research questions, especially the third strand on inter-operability, with extracting evidence from Yemen to feed into answering the global thematic research questions. Local partnerships for research were developed with the ACAPS Yemen Analysis Hub and the Yemen Policy Center, which also had the potential (albeit with limitations) to contribute to local capacity building. This resonated with the interest of FCDO in localising both capacities and the debate on the use of social protection.

FCDO stakeholders also saw that an important added value was that the research – especially the first strand – would provide empirical evidence from beneficiaries and support improved accountability. There is a strong demand for recent field level data is in short supply given access constraints. As noted in the IAHE Evaluation *"Difficulties obtaining permission for regular data-gathering in Ansar Allah areas, combined with complexity, security challenges and scale, have made presenting a clear and current picture of need very difficult"*.¹⁴⁷

Interviews also suggested an interest in the research amongst other stakeholders including Government with the *"hope that it would improve limited understanding of international actors on local situation – the reality on the ground"*. However, at the time of the midline study the finalised research plans have yet to be shared with stakeholders in country including FCDO. Therefore, the understanding of the final research agenda remains low and it is unclear to what extent this will meet the differentiated needs of a variety of users.

Post inception cuts to the research budget by FCDO saw a particularly heavy cut to the planned research agenda in Yemen. This decision factored in the considerations of researchability; the relatively high costs involved in conducting primary data collection in Yemen as well as the access constraints to the field. As one stakeholder commented *"The authorities in the north tend to restrict access amongst international agencies to anything other than the delivery of assistance"*. With limited resources the Research component has focussed on less risky research opportunities elsewhere.

The research strand on targeting has been extensively scaled back and has been reoriented to supporting the thematic work on targeting. The third strand on interoperability has also been paused in its entirety and will be reconsidered should additional funds become available in the future. Consequently, the revised research agenda is heavily focused towards addressing and supporting the global thematic research questions with diminished relevance to local users. The partnering arrangements with local research institutions have also been removed from the proposal – in part due

¹⁴⁷ Sida, L et al (2022) Inter-Agency Evaluation of the Yemen Crisis. Valid.

to the heavy costs - which has diminished possible contributions towards localization of research capacities - as well as creating short term reputational damage.

7.3.3 Coherence across BASIC components and with other FCDO programming

In general, there was perceived to be a good degree of coherence across BASIC TA and Research components – at least at the level of inception planning. The primary factor promoting coherence was the convening role played by the FCDO office in country. The in-country posts had a clear conception of the role they wanted both the TA and Research components to play in supporting the FCDO strategy and objectives and played an active role in aligning the various contributions. Aspects of the research appeared to be highly complementary to the tailored advice provided by the TA, providing data and evidence from the field on beneficiary perceptions and impact.

A second important factor was that the research proposal was developed by two of the BASIC TA consultants – one international and one national. This was seen as ensuring a high degree of consistency between the proposals contained in the Yemen inception report, with the earlier work done by BASIC TA and the thrust of the FCDO a business case in country. While there is a clear IDS Research Country lead, in the absence of any sort of longer-term TA presence in country, the research team lacked a TA technical counterpart to coordinate with. So this cross over of staff was particularly useful.

Several of the initially proposed research activities were very operational, and closely linked to both the preceding BASIC TA work and the specific country level needs. However, much of this has been lost with the amended plan, which now talks more to the global and academic research agenda.

In practice external stakeholders were poorly informed on the BASIC TA component and while they had been consulted by BASIC Research, were not well informed of the final research plans. Consequently, the external stakeholder understanding of the linkages – and indeed BASIC as a whole – was generally lacking outside of FCDO.

7.4 Response to support provided

7.4.1 What worked

As noted above no additional pieces of technical assistance support were implemented. Consequently, the midline did not capture additional information on the process of designing and delivering TA assignments. Furthermore, the BASIC research was not yet initiated at the time of the midline interviews. However, the ‘legacy’ use of the earlier BASIC TA assignments assistance was captured and evaluated during the midline exercise.

The main direct result of BASIC TA has been in supporting the finalisation of the FCDO business case. The BASIC analysis helped to illustrate how poorly coordinated and incoherent the current humanitarian response is. It also pointed to important evidence gaps on the effectiveness of livelihood interventions to complement cash transfers. While the overall vision remained a shock responsive national social protection system, an incremental strategy was required for achieving this. The immediate strategy focussed on reforming the humanitarian system, while at the same time social protection systems are kept on the agenda and to be brought into the conversation progressively. At this point it was not judged realistic to move directly to embedding crisis response in Government systems.

In addition, the final two SPACE assignments (4A and 4B) were still under finalisation at the time of the baseline and additional evidence on the use of these products was captured during the midline evaluation round.

Assignment 4A supported FCDO Yemen's new five-year food security program works with four main partners (WFP, SFD, an NGO consortium and UNICEF) and a defined envelope of total funds to be allocated across the four partners. FCDO Yemen wished to retain the flexibility within the broader program to determine the annual allocation to each partner. FCDO commissioned BASIC to develop a decision-making framework to guide these annual allocations. The resulting proposal looked to reward and incentivise partners who displayed commitment to principles including, coordination, harmonisation, inter-operability and meaningful commitment to long term reforms.

FCDO indicated that the paper developed by SPACE to guide the allocation of resources to FCDO partners under the new business case (Assignment 4A) was not adopted as a decision-making tool. It was understood that there were different views within the FCDO team and on balance it was felt to approach the problem from "*too much of a system strengthening perspective*" and overly complicated. However, the exercise was seen as useful in "*preventing a purely humanitarian decision*". This is evidenced as it has helped to find a balance in how the funds were allocated with SFD receiving 32% of the budget labelled as humanitarian.

Assignment 4B was designed by FCDO as a contribution to institutional strengthening in SFD –to help in sharpening the targeting of their assistance activities. A SPACE assignment mapped SFD's approach to targeting and evidence-based programming at the portfolio and program levels and draw some key conclusions on potential improvements which can be taken forward through the development of the new Crisis Response Plan (CRP) 2021-2023.

The report found that the targeting systems were relatively robust and did not lead to SFD making changes to its approach. SFD conclusion from the exercise was fairly direct "*I think they concluded that our mechanisms just perfect.*" While the TA used to support SFD did not serve the originally intended purpose, it did help to improve the understanding of, and confidence in, targeting processes used by SFD by FCDO. It is not clear whether this report also served a similar purpose amongst the wider donor community as the report does not appear to have been widely circulated or read by other stakeholders.

The report did identify two areas of possible improvement. The first was around GESI. While gender and disability are currently mainstreamed through SFD portfolio, particularly on targeting and collection of disaggregated data, opportunities were identified to further strengthen the process, including the use of the Washington Group of Questions across the portfolio, improved participation of women and girls, GBV & SEA risk assessments and improved referrals to protection actors.¹⁴⁸ The report proposed budgetary support from FCDO, including on-going mentoring from an international expert. This recommendation has not been followed up by FCDO.

The second area of recommendation was for SFD to strengthen its collaboration with the humanitarian sector, in shaping the inter-operability agenda and potential development of a common registry, with an objective of layering of humanitarian transfers with the SFD livelihood interventions. The recommendations here were directed principally towards SFD, although further TA support was also suggested. There was evidence of a shift in SFD in this direction, who reported that "*Basically,*

¹⁴⁸ Powerpoint Presentation. SFD Donor Meeting 15-16 February 2021 - FINAL.

bundling is the current idea that SFD is going on; bundling either with some of the SFD's partners, such as the Public Works Program, with the World Bank, or with other funders such as FCDO."

The other main objectives of previous BASIC support focussed around the development of the Yemen business case (which is discussed in the section below) and in stimulating the formation of a donor coordination group. Various earlier BASIC TA assignments had laid out a vision and workplan for a proposed new Donor Cash and Social Protection Working Group. The objective of this was to promote *"a more cohesive, holistic systems approach that delivers assistance effectively and efficiently to the most vulnerable people, links together humanitarian cash assistance with sustainable long term safety nets and social protection, and optimises complementary programmes to enhance outcomes"*.¹⁴⁹

The donor coordination paper was well received by FCDO. As noted in the baseline it has been useful in creating consensus on the agenda and support for the idea amongst key partners. However, action on this has stalled with no follow-up action on donor coordination by FCDO or other donors. No meetings held have been held over the last year. Some of the possible reasons for this are discussed below.

7.4.2 Challenges and limitations

No additional TA assignments were conducted during the baseline period. Several reasons appear to have combined and contributed to this pause.

A significant factor was that FCDO Yemen was awaiting approval of its' new business case. There was a significant timing factor, where with the business case drafted there was a limited need for additional conceptual inputs from BASIC TA over the last year. Over this period the FCDO posts were primarily focussed on the approval of the business case, rather than commissioning new assignments.

In addition to this, a further factor was that the FCDO business case proposed its own technical assistance facility. There was an expressed preference for dedicated funding under the control of FCDO Yemen. There is a degree of uncertainty attached to the use of a centralised programme such as basic come up with no guarantee that requests will be approved or funded. Consequently, requests to BASIC were paused while the size and scope of this country level facility was being decided. This was a specific example of how the wider FCDO budget uncertainties have delayed decision-making. Ultimately the country level funds available were smaller than asked for, which was increased country level demand for BASIC support. There is an independent reserve that can be used to fill gaps that BASIC is not designed to fill or cannot prioritise. An anticipated example of this would be funding the coordinator for the CMWG.

On-going discussions with STAAR were reported regarding possible future TA assistance. The three assignments proposed to STAAR were:

- B032_Donor Coordination for Food Security and Social Safety Nets Programme
- B034_Review of Village Saving and Loans Associations and Self Help Group programming within FSSN
- B047_VfM analysis of activities in FSSN from different partners, and modelling of how FDCO Yemen could optimise VfM and localisation of its funding.

¹⁴⁹BASIC (2020) Donor Cash and Social Protection Working Group Workplan 2021 Adopted 25th November 2020.

There has been some work done on developing ToR for the first, with the plan to develop the other two at a later stage.

A further factor slowing down the commissioning of new work was the extended STAAR inception period. While in theory the EACS call down mechanism used for BASIC TA could still be used, there was an understanding that new requests should wait for the new STAAR programme to be launched. Delays in the inception phase combined with contextual factors to delay the commissioning of additional new assignments.

Other constraints and limitations were observed in the immediate use of BASIC products. The attempt to use BASIC to provide capacity strengthening in SFD provides potentially interesting lessons. The midline indicated different perspectives on the objectives of Assignment 4B. From the FCDO perspective this was seen as a contribution to institutional strengthening in SFD – with technical resources provided to help in sharpening the targeting of their assistance activities. From the SFD side, interviews suggested that the institution had not requested this specific support and did not perceive particular challenges in the way that their programmes were targeted. They saw the exercise as serving “an information gathering purpose for FCDO”.

As noted above while the assignment did add value it was not in the way that was originally envisaged. This points to the importance and challenges of clear communication and dialogue with external users in defining the scope of assignments. This was particularly acute in the case of working with quasi-Governmental authorities in Yemen, where the FCDO staff and offices are based outside of the country.

In several cases the direct follow-up actions to earlier BASIC assignments have not been actioned. For example, the donor working group has not yet started to meet, nor was the provision of further GESI support to SFD pursued. It was suggested that the main factor constraining action was the limited capacities of FCDO Yemen posts. Key FCDO staff are clearly very busy and their attention is pulled in multiple directions.

One important observation was that the responsibility for action occasionally fell between different FCDO advisors. Both the humanitarian and social protection advisors understood that the primary responsibility to follow up on the work with FSD would be carried forward by their counterpart.

In addition, there has been a degree of churn amongst the FCDO team¹⁵⁰ and the incoming staff were not always fully sighted on previous basic outputs. A notable finding of the midterm evaluation was that the awareness and use of basic reports was not only concentrated within FCDO, but was often limited to the specific individual posts who had commissioned the work. This further concentrates the ownership and responsibility for follow up within a very limited group of people.

The capacity constraints of FCDO come across clearly as the critical bottleneck. So far there has been limited progress in identifying alternative human resource which could help to carry forward the agenda identified through the shorter-term analysis. As noted above the recruitment of the donor coordinator has not yet been actioned. Nor is there a capacity or mandate for the BASIC TA team to maintain the momentum. As yet, there is no provision for STAAR to provide complementary resources to provide strategic oversight and ongoing inputs to Yemen.

7.5 BASIC’s contribution to change

¹⁵⁰ The social development advisor and the team leader both changed between the baseline and the midline.

[Figure 7.2](#) Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Yemen overleaf indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which were most relevant to BASIC’s support to FCDO Yemen since the baseline. Statements in boxes shaded in blue were directly relevant. This section explores BASIC’s contribution to changes in Yemen, with reference to – for sections 8.6.1 and 8.6.2 on FCDO’s use of BASIC support and indirect results – ToC output and outcome statements and – for section 8.6.3 on enablers and constraints – ToC assumptions.


However, other pathways shaded in light blue, were seen as less effective or relevant for Yemen.

There was very little appetite in FCDO Yemen to attempt to link the climate change agenda with the rest of BASIC. While there were a few initial conversations, and a limited entry point around livelihoods and access to water was seen. But overall the position was that “*it is already complicated so the climate change issues were not taken forward*”. Essentially there was no capacity in FCDO Yemen to do this and it was given a lower priority.

The added value of BASIC in capacity building was limited. The initial experience of supporting SFD in targeting and prioritisation points to the need for a sustained partnership in building capacity and the limitations of using short-term technical assistance. The main capacity building efforts in support of national institutions are being led by UNICEF

Financing and political will – In the context of Yemen there was a consensus that it is still too early to expect that response costs can be shifted on budget. Furthermore, there is limited political willingness of donors to provide developmental funding in Yemen. Nor is there evidence that the more global BASIC outputs have been drawn upon in Yemen.

Figure 7.2 Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Yemen



7.6 Changes observed

7.6.1 Key changes

Key changes identified by all types of key informants coalesced strongly around three themes, each indicating a trajectory towards sub-impact level change as articulated by the BASIC ToC.

Change 1: Development of the new FCDO Yemen Business Case

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
2 Years	Medium	Medium	FCDO Yemen	High

Change and its significance: Over the last year FCDO Yemen has received approval for the Yemen Food Security Safety Net Programme. This programme will provide cash transfers to up to 1.5 million of Yemen’s most food insecure households. As FCDO’s Yemen’s flagship programme it is the backbone of the humanitarian response. It will spend up to £250 million over 5 years, replacing 3 existing programmes. This programme brings together existing programmes that provide cash to Yemen’s most vulnerable, taking a more strategic, longer-term development approach with UN, NGO, and national Yemeni partners. Leading donors’ efforts to bring together cash transfer programmes under one coherent response will improve accountability, deliver better value for money and provide a more predictable and sustainable response to addressing food insecurity. It aims to address the underlying challenges of fragmentation and poor coordination hamper their efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

This has been a key change over the period for FCDO and also significant for the work of FCDO partners including WFP, UNICEF, SFD and NGOs.

Sustainability: Sustainability is judged to be medium. humanitarian support in Yemen remains a priority and FCDO funding has been committed over the next five years, but remains uncertain beyond this timeframe. However, the institutional changes in partner agencies should endure over a longer time period.

Drivers of change: The FCDO humanitarian team, as the owners of the business case and the Yemen Country Business Plan are the drivers of this change.

BASIC contribution: BASIC is acknowledged to have played a significant role in both developing the business case itself and in providing supporting evidence for the approval process. The various outputs had been heavily drawn on by posts to support all stages of the business case development including the pre-concept note decision making and support to development of concept note and related business case, through both input to the technical content and evidence for submission to Ministers. BASIC provided posts with an important challenge function prior to turning outward to engage with other stakeholders.

Barriers to change: Several barriers were noted to the uptake of the core BASIC messages on progressing from a humanitarian driven response, to one that promotes institutional change, within the Business Case. Some differences of opinions were noted within FCDO, for example on the potential use of annual funding allocations to encourage partners to embrace change. The policy and funding uncertainties created by significant changes in FCDO at global levels were a further barrier.

Change 2: Increased harmonisation and interoperability between the different humanitarian and social protection actors

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
2 Year	Low	Medium	Donors, CMWG	Low

Change and its significance: There is evidence of an increased awareness of, and action by, a range of stakeholders to improve the harmonisation and inter-operability of transfers. On the humanitarian side this work has been led by the CMWG where there has been significant progress in technical areas such as standardising transfer amounts. Moving the responsibility for the distribution of cash transfers from the SWF to SFD means that there is the possibility of improved harmonisation of transfer amounts with national systems.

While there have been a number of studies on interoperability, concrete progress on data exchange and common registries has been slower to achieve amongst humanitarian agencies. Interviews indicated that SFD had actively sought to reach out to the humanitarian community to discuss the potential for referrals.

The significance of change is currently rated as low on the basis that there has been little concrete progress. However, the potential significance of change is high, in reducing inclusion and exclusion errors and transitioning humanitarian caseloads towards more predictable forms of support. As oone donor noted *“A huge part of the caseload is protracted. Humanitarian support wrong and we want to transition towards more predictable support.”*

Sustainability: Once the barriers to introducing the changes have been overcome, the prospects for sustainability are reasonable. These changes have limited financial repercussions and the benefits for efficiency and effectiveness are significant which is likely to sustain pressure for these developments to be maintained.

Drivers of change: The push for increased interoperability and harmonisation is coming collectively from the donors, as this process will increase the efficiency and potentially effectiveness of aid. At the technical level this has been supported and driven by the CMWG.

BASIC contribution: While basic conducted a study on improve improper ability and harmonisation this was primarily targeted to the specific use of FCDO rather than the wider community. Some impacts are noted. There was a degree of technical collaboration without the actors in the technical assistance work that helped to develop the core arguments. There has also been an indirect impact through the FCDO business case. However, it is clear that there are a large number of other actors in Yemen who are actively engaged promote improved interoperability and harmonisation.

The Research strand investigating inter-operability has been paused subject to adequate budget being confirmed. FCDO remain interested in how BASIC might contribute further to this strand of work in future.

Barriers to change: Interviews with several of the stakeholders interviewed remained resistant to change due to their internal organisational interests and priorities, primarily competition for resources. For example WFP were seen to be encroaching on SFD territory rather than interested in referrals.

The continuing lack of donor coordination to prioritise this change is a constraint, as are agency level policy barriers to data exchange based on respecting data privacy. At a technical level the lack of a

common unique identifier (national ID) is a challenge, alongside a resistance to allowing international agencies to collect biometric data.

The CMWG coordinator position, previously funded by FCDO, has been vacant for some time presumably related to funding uncertainties. This has severely compromised the capacity of the CMWG to push forward this agenda.

Change 3: Increased efficiency and effectiveness of national social protection institutions

Time taken	Change significance	Likelihood sustainability	Key driver	BASIC contribution
1 Year	High	Medium	World Bank	Low

Change and its significance: The cash transfers provided through SWF reach a large number of beneficiaries in Yemen. Transferring responsibility for the delivery of cash transfers from SWF to SFD should improve the targeting of these transfers and allow a more realistic transfer value to be set. It may also improve effectiveness by creating direct linkages of the SWF cash transfer caseload with the other livelihood interventions of SFD.

Sustainability: The SFD has remained as a highly resilient incapacitated organisation despite the instability in Yemen. However, the operations of SFD remain almost entirely dependent on continuing external finances. Based on this the sustainability of changes are rated as medium.

Drivers of change: The main actor agenda has been the World Bank as the main financier, supported by UNICEF providing the technical assistance to SFD. However, UNICFCDO is supportive of the change but only peripherally involved.

BASIC contribution: While a potential role for basic in supporting capacity development in SFD has been identified by FCDO, so far there has been relatively little action on this point. There was one technical assistance assignment by BASIC in support of this governmental agency on targeting, but as noted above this had limited impact all relevance from the perspective of the agency. *Work on transforming their systems was understood to already be in-process and led internally.*

FCDO remain interested in how BASIC might contribute further to this strand of work in future.

Barriers to change: Several of the key donors – including USAID – have strict limitations in working with development partners. Donor coordination remains weak.

7.6.2 Contribution to wider results

There were no other significant changes noted in relation to the use of social protection approaches in crises in Yemen.

7.6.3 Key drivers and enablers

The entry of the World Bank as a significant player in providing support to social protection systems in crisis affected countries has been a critical driver in moving forward the agenda. The World Bank is one of the few developmental actors active in Yemen and is making consistent and significant contributions that have proved critical to maintaining the existence of national social protection institutions including SFD.

This assistance has complemented the resilience of national institutions through the duration of the war. SFD in particular, has maintained a cadre of well trained and capable staff. It has remained a well-respected and impartial institution that has proved able to work across the entire country.

The continuation of FCDO support through the new business case is providing support to system changes. UK government still provides significant humanitarian assistance in Yemen. On the positive side the new business case is being used more strategically, in a structured way to incentivise system change. While the ideas promoted by BASIC may be sound, this was not always seen as sufficient to overcome institutional inertia or, in some cases, active resistance in itself. Therefore, an important influencing channel lies in tying funding to a strategic vision – such as influencing key UN actors.

At the same time the significant decline in the availability of humanitarian resources has increased the awareness and receptivity of the various actors to change. There is a growing perception that a business as-usual approach will no longer work and there is the need to innovate and increase efficiency.

In terms of BASIC technical assistance there was a strong call from some stakeholders for longer-term technical assistance. *"We want someone in place fulltime. I have seen a huge difference in using longer postings, this enables building relationships."*

7.6.4 Constraining factors and limitations

The constraining factors to progress in some regards mirror the drivers and enablers. UK humanitarian spend in Yemen has declined steeply, and with it the same degree of direct influence it can assert. However, the programmes continues in absolute terms to be large and significant so the loss of influence should not be over-stated.

Not all agencies have yet accepted the need for change. Implicit in the conversations with some actors was the message that the institutional incentives of individual implementing agencies, specifically competition for resources, continues to act as a drag on system change. For example, WFP remained highly ambitious in their programming in Yemen and were more focussed on promoting internal coherence (between their emergency and livelihood interventions) than external coherence. The reaction of one partner to the new FCDO programme was disappointing in the way that it emphasised continuity over change *"We will implement programmes as before. The main difference is that we will be speaking on a quarterly basis to discuss with other participants to link up and learn. There will be more information sharing."*

Coordinated action by donors and implementing agencies is critical to making change happen – but challenging to achieve. Coordination, at both agency and donor levels, remains challenging. A significant constraint has been the inactivity of the CMWG over the last two years.

Donors maintain differing policy objectives and operational parameters. For example, USAID is limited largely to humanitarian aid and within that mostly the provision of in-kind assistance. This compromises its ability to engage with aspects of the more ambitious agenda being proposed by FCDO. Other donors remain bifurcated between humanitarian and development, which makes it challenging to bring them together on supporting the use of social protection in crises.

7.7 Closing reflections

Despite context challenges, continuity in BASIC’s in-country engagement means systems change is possible.

Demand for BASIC in Yemen expected to continue, given issues in BASIC BC not fully addressed, especially when support is focused and locally-led.

Specific lines of enquiry at the endline were suggested to include:

- Progress in the use of BASIC resources to support coordination and Influencing
- The results associated with research products
- The interactions and synergies between BASIC components
- The extent to which the stated ambitions of the FCDO humanitarian assistance programme were realised
- The contribution of BASIC to system level change in Yemen

In addition, the design will remain flexible and adjust to the contextual developments prior to the endline exercise.

8 Learning Case Study - Climate and Environment

This section presents a summary of the BASIC midline evaluation learning case study for climate and environment. It lays out the frames of reference for BASIC's climate related work, namely proportion of climate financing in BASIC's budget and climate as a cross cutting issue within the BASIC portfolio. It gives an overview of BASIC's limited activity regarding climate to date, highlighting flaws such as lack of country prioritisation.

8.1 Background

8.1.1 Learning case studies in the BASIC evaluation

In addition to four longitudinal country case studies, the evaluation carries out a single, one-off ('horizontal') learning case study in each phase. At midline, the learning case study focuses on BASIC and strengthening social protection (SP) responses to climate-related crises.

The midline learning case takes a twin track approach, exploring programme level efforts relating to the intersect between climate-related crises and social assistance to help vulnerable people cope better with crises and meet their basic needs; supported by a deeper-dive into activities in a country where relevant work has been undertaken. It explores how this intersect is conceptualised and integrated into the planning of activities, as well as the extent to which this conceptualisation has been followed through into delivery. Pakistan was selected for the deeper dive as the only country in which a TA assignment with a specific climate focus has been delivered.

8.1.2 Frames of reference for BASIC's climate related work

Climate financing accounts for a sizeable, and increasing, proportion of BASIC's budget. Of the programme's total budget, £5m is sourced from UK Government International Climate Finance (ICF), with £3m allocated to the Research component and £2m to TA. ICF funding has been protected during both rounds of budget cuts which have affected BASIC. Only a small proportion of available ICF funds were spent by both components during inception, with most remaining available for implementation.

BASIC's proposed approach to ICF reporting indicates a high level of ambition for climate-related work. Whilst FCDO SPT has not yet finalised an agreement with both delivery teams as to which ICF key performance indicators BASIC will report against, they expect to select KPI 15: *'The extent to which ICF intervention is likely to lead to Transformational Change'*. This selection suggests an expectation that BASIC leverages SP not only to protect vulnerable people from the immediate impacts of climate shocks, but also to contribute to longer-term resilience – for example, by enhancing people's ability to cope with climate stressors *ex ante* or, less directly, contributing to adaptation.

The BASIC theory of change (ToC) references climate explicitly only in relation to context, specifying the 'climate crisis' as one of three main types of crisis context in which BASIC works. Implicitly, however, climate can be woven into all impact pathways – from outputs, through outcomes to sub-impacts – articulated by the ToC (see section 5 for an assessment of climate-related work and specific impact pathways). It is also worth noting the (potential) specific relevance of climate finance to sub-impact on 'diversified and more sustainable funding'.

8.2 Overview of coverage of climate-related issues by BASIC to date

Overall, BASIC TA has undertaken little climate-focused work to date relative to the total volume of assignments undertaken and learning products generated, as well as the size of ICF funding received, with select notable (and, in the case of SPACE publications, widely referenced) exceptions. BASIC began to explore climate-related issues in phase II of SPACE with the publication of a dedicated paper exploring the options for strengthening linkages between social protection and climate change response. Additionally, SPACE produced a series of papers on financing, one of which integrates an explicit focus on responding to climate change. A further two explored linkages between SP and disaster risk finance, and SP and African Risk Capacity response to natural disasters, respectively.¹⁵¹ Mainstreaming of climate in other SPACE assignments has tended to be limited to discussion of context.

STAAR inception documents position climate as a strategic priority for the new facility. Indeed, climate is the only area to which STAAR will immediately take a more strategic approach following the recent budget reduction, facilitated by the recruitment of a dedicated lead (though this has been delayed by the extended inception phase). Of the small number of assignments delivered in the interim, three have had an explicit climate focus, suggesting that this shift is already underway. They are: at country level, a political economy analysis (PEA) for the British High Commission (BHC) in Pakistan and, at global level, support to a note produced by the UK-funded Risk Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP) and a course produced for the FAO e-learning academy. Two further country level assignments – a review of the evidence on SP and outcomes related to climate resilience and biodiversity commissioned by FCDO Zambia, and support to BRACE II in South Sudan – were in scoping at the time of data collection.

Table 8.1 Overview of TA outputs with a climate focus throughout BASIC's lifetime

Name	Geography	Scope	TA facility	Dates	Status
Learning products					
Climate and Social Protection: Scaling up Ambitions	Global	Paper articulating the role of social protection in addressing major socioeconomic challenges arising from climate change, especially for low- and middle-income countries, and the need to strategically link social protection and national climate change responses.	SPACE	May 2021	Complete
What are future financing options for shock responsive social protection? A technical primer	Global	Paper intended to inform the discussion on financing SRSP. It provides an overview of current and potential sectoral financing sources for SRSP, as well as specific financing instruments, their applicability and limitations for SRSP, and how they can be better institutionalised. It presents similarity of principles across financing for SRSP and DRF as the main opportunity to improve funding of SRSP.	SPACE	May 2021	Complete
Support to the REAP paper 'Early action and climate crisis'	Global	Note exploring how social protection can support the Risk Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP) agenda of 'making one billion people safer from climate related	STAAR	December 2021	Complete

¹⁵¹ These papers do not explicitly reference climate (other than in passing reference to context) and so not included in table 1. They are:

Costella, C. (2021) 'Synergies between African Risk Capacity and Social Protection in East and Southern Africa, SPACE Rapid Review', Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19 Expert Advice Service (SPACE), DAI Global UK Ltd, United Kingdom.
Scott, Z. (2021) 'How disaster risk finance can link with social protection: maximising the effectiveness of shock response', Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19 Expert Advice Service (SPACE), DAI Global UK Ltd, United Kingdom.

Name	Geography	Scope	TA facility	Dates	Status
could social protection be a game-changer?’		disasters’, making a case for increasingly integrated early action and SP approaches to address increasingly complex and risky contexts. STAAR funded the time of some contributors to the paper (i.e. partial contribution).			
E-learning course on managing climate risks through social protection for FAO	Global	Course produced for the FAO e-learning academy, targeting professionals working in the field of social protection, disaster risk management, climate change adaptation and mitigation, especially those focusing on rural areas and agri-food systems.	STAAR	2022	Complete
TA assignments					
PEA to inform BHC Pakistan’s current and future programmes on resilience building and climate adaptation (B017)	Country – Pakistan	BHC in Pakistan commissioned a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) to inform the design of a new programme, BRAVE, which is intended to support government efforts to build climate-resilient communities. The PEA explores seven climate resilience themes, mapping how key stakeholders in Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan define and apply ‘resilience’ in planning, budgeting, implementation and demand articulation – and identifies opportunities and entry points. Recruitment of a STAAR climate lead to ensure specialist insight on climate and help determine opportunities for engagement. The led will maintain demand led approach but also have a strategic overview of demand, including on country engagement to generate demand.	STAAR	November 2021 to March 2022	Complete
STAAR Climate Lead (S015)	Global	Recruitment of a STAAR climate lead to ensure specialist insight on climate and help determine opportunities for engagement. The led will maintain demand led approach but also have a strategic overview of demand, including on country engagement to generate demand.	STAAR	September 2022 onwards	Scoping
Links between social protection and preventing deforestation/ protecting biodiversity (B024)	Country – Zambia	Planned literature review commissioned by FCDO Zambia but linked to a request from government, to synthesise the global evidence on the ability of SP to improve outcomes related to climate resilience, climate smart agriculture, deforestation and biodiversity. Requirements include a stakeholder workshop to discuss policy options and/or pilots to enhance the climate responsiveness of SP in Zambia.	STAAR	September 2022 onwards	Scoping
BRACE II Cash for work programme – food security and climate resilience (B045)	Country – South Sudan	No ToR yet available	STAAR	TBC	Scoping
USAID Bureau for Resilience and Food Security (b043)	Global	No ToR yet available	STAAR	TBC	Pipeline

Research will feature climate as both core theme and cross-cutting issue, albeit at a lower level of ambition than originally planned. Climate and livelihoods resilience is one of four main Research themes being taken forward to implementation, answering the following question: ‘In what ways can social assistance in crises effectiveness contribute to climate change adaptation and resilient livelihoods?’ Table 8.2 outlines the Research concept notes which fall under this theme, which focus: at global (or multi-country) level, on the politics of intersecting vulnerabilities, livelihood pathways and climate resilience, and cash plus interventions; and, at country level, lived experiences, and institutions and systems in north east Nigeria. Delivery will be supported by a partnership with the Red Cross Climate Centre, who are leading on climate science aspects of the research.

Inception documents also position climate as a core issue for mainstreaming, stating that ‘analysis of how social assistance responds to climate shocks will be addressed across all four themes.’ Of the 15 concept notes which fall outside of the climate and livelihoods theme, seven indicate explicitly reference linkages with climate-related issues.¹⁵²

As a key priority, climate-focused work has been less affected by the reduction than other parts of the Research component, but has been scaled back significantly. Planned Research strands focusing on climate and livelihoods have been reduced and consolidated into a single strand. The far-right column of [Table 8.2](#) indicates the likely status of each concept following the budget reduction, as at the time of data collection. The team has sought to streamline climate-focused work, ‘*without losing sight of what we are trying to achieve*’ and whilst protecting the time of local partners as much as possible. The three multi-country concepts have been scaled back, whilst a global review of climate related findings has been suspended, along with the other four planned syntheses. At country level, planned quantitative work in Nigeria has been discontinued and qualitative work scaled back, now taking the form of two case studies.

The status of planned climate mainstreaming was unclear at the time of data collection, but key informants did observe that it has become less visible over the past six months, having previously been a point of emphasis. This could represent a missed opportunity to make linkages between climate and other themes, such as how financing opportunities,¹⁵³ how politics and governance affect people’s ability to build climate resilience and transformation of systems to integrate climate.

Table 8.2 Research concept notes falling under the climate and livelihoods theme

Concept note	Research questions	Country/ies	Data / methods	Likely status after budget reduction
Global thematic research				
Synthesis – Five Global Reviews	One of five key global reviews address the question, in what ways can social assistance in crises effectively contribute to climate change adaptation and resilient livelihoods?	Global	Evidence review, mapping of policies and programmes, online discussion, stakeholder roundtables, key stakeholder interviews, secondary data analysis.	Discontinued
Politics of intersecting vulnerabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- What are the historical and recent drivers of vulnerabilities, as experienced by populations exposed to conflict and displacement?- To what extent have social assistance programmes been addressing drivers of vulnerability, including factors of social difference?- How may social assistance be improved to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience in the context of plausible climate futures?	Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria	Qualitative, participatory, secondary (e.g. needs assessments, household economy studies). Potential for site specific survey and analyses of climate change.	Scaled back

¹⁵² These concept notes are, at global level: politics of social assistance; finance and coordination; inclusion and participation - lived experiences of access to social assistance; systems – targeting; *systems – assessing social protection responses to conflict*. And, at country level: *displacement and return in Ethiopia – livelihoods*; Yemen – targeting; Niger – Local solidarity mechanisms.

¹⁵³ Working paper 15 – Financing in FCAS for basic assistance: what is known, and what are the opportunities and barriers to improving financing? – proposes possibilities for climate/social protection financing, and presents the limited existing evidence on existing channeling of climate funding to social protection.

Concept note	Research questions	Country/ies	Data / methods	Likely status after budget reduction
Livelihood pathways and climate resilience studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- How are livelihood pathways perceived, negotiated and contested by key actors, and what is the role of climate related shocks and stressors?- To what extent are social assistance programmes as implemented helping or hindering efforts to build climate-resilient pathways in contexts of protracted conflict, protracted displacement and recurrent climate shocks?- How can social assistance be more effectively and efficiently delivered so that lives are protected and livelihoods are supported in protracted crisis situations?	Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria	Secondary data analysis (General Household Survey panel data) in Nigeria. Secondary data analysis (Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey) and primary data collection (one round of mixed-methods work as a follow up to an existing survey) in Ethiopia. Primary data collection (two waves of mixed-methods) in Niger.	Scaled back
Cash plus to enhance livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- How can social assistance best contribute to livelihoods that show greater resilience /adaptation to protracted situations characterised by conflict, climate shocks and/or forced displacement?	Possible cash plus programmes identified across 18 countries.	Secondary (impact evaluations, climate vulnerability indicators, comparison of cash only and cash plus RCT experiments, cash plus design and implementation) and primary (key stakeholder interviews).	Scaled back
Focus country research				
Nigeria – quantitative, lived experiences	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- What are peoples' experiences of receiving government and non-government social assistance in NE Nigeria?	Nigeria with a focus on the North East	Secondary data analysis (General Household Survey panel data) and programme mapping. Survey of specific vulnerable groups. Qualitative interviews with beneficiaries using a life history approach.	Discontinued
Nigeria – qualitative – institutions and systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- How can existing systems be revised to enable better coordination and improved social assistance delivery?- How are capacities within social assistance systems built, applied and maintained in NE states?	Nigeria with a focus on the North East	Action research with Mercy Corps, key stakeholder interviews, capacity assessment and mapping of coordination mechanisms and capacity initiatives.	Scaled back to two case studies on capacities and institutional aspects of targeting.

8.3 Relevance

8.3.1 Alignment of BASIC’s climate related activities with FCDO priorities

Whilst climate is rapidly gaining prominence as an FCDO-wide priority, at this stage the level of ambition for SPT team’s priorities around linking climate and social protection is undecided. SPT report that interest from FCDO colleagues working on climate in exploring linkages with SP has been reinforced by external developments, not least relevant discussions at COP 26 and the G7. As a relatively new area for SPT, priorities around this intersect are still in development. Flux in the UK policy environment has also constrained the FCDO’s ability to take full advantage of influencing opportunities as they arise, though the UK’s ICF-related commitments are expected to stand.

Both STAAR and Research have already conducted, or plan to carry out, activities aligned with priorities on climate-SP proposed by SPT. Of four potential broad areas where social protection can play a role in managing climate risk identified by the SPT climate lead, relevant TA work to date has focused most on ‘protection from climate-related disasters’ through shock responsive SP. This reflects the global policy

and programming environment, as well as the existing evidence base. There has also been some coverage by TA assignments and products of each of ‘resilience building’ and ‘adapting livelihoods’. There has been very little on ‘just transitions’; perhaps partly because this area is less likely to feature as a key issue in crisis contexts. As set out in section 2, plans for the Research theme on ‘climate and livelihoods’ are comprised of three main work strands, of which one – a foundational strand exploring the linkages between social assistance (SA) and vulnerability to climate shocks and stressors - was relevant to all four FCDO SPT priority areas, and the other two resilience and livelihoods (one examining the potential for SA programmes to enhance livelihoods’ resilience and the other cash plus for strengthening livelihoods). So far, Research’s approach to SRSP appears to be more ambitious than STAAR’s, viewing SRSP as ‘necessary but not sufficient’ and taking a political economy approach to the linkages between climate and SP that explores structural (political, economic and social) drivers of vulnerability.

Country prioritisation has proven less straightforward. Until very recently, there has been a clear difference in understanding between FCDO and the TA delivery team vis-a-vis the remit of the facility’s climate-related work, with BASIC TA envisaging their role as exploring the linkages between climate-related crises and social protection in general but the current SP team expecting the facility to prioritise exploring this intersect in FCAS contexts. SPT’s recent steer to this effect is consistent with the rest of BASIC (including STAAR’s approach to country prioritisation) and seeks to address a dearth of programming and evidence at the intersect of climate, social protection *and* fragility which continues to be under resourced. It is worth noting though that exploring the three-way intersect is ambitious precisely for this reason, with far more previous work having been undertaken in contexts of recurring climate shocks than in conflicted-affected countries.

By contrast, Research staff working on climate identified generating empirical data from FCAS contexts, including those experiencing protracted conflict, as a core aim (with the rationale that the linkages between SA and climate have so far been better evidenced in stable settings). Accordingly, all three Research concept notes with a climate focus specified contexts of protracted crisis, conflict and/or displacement as a parameter. Research staff noted that cuts to climate-related research strands were minimal in 2021 (if not 2022) precisely because the interest between climate and FCAS has been a priority for the FCDO and the programme.

8.3.2 Responsiveness of BASIC outputs to user needs

When asked to select from a list the areas in which FCDO advisers would most appreciate support from BASIC, better linking SP approaches and climate change (though not explicitly related to working in FCAS) ranked second highest (with positive responses from 67% of respondents), exceeded only by sustainable financing (at 73%) (see [Table 8.3](#)). This suggests that strong demand for support in this area outstrips the (small but rapidly growing) volume of relevant work delivered to date.

Table 8.3 Survey responses to the question, ‘Which of the following areas would you most like BASIC to help you achieve?’

Support area	N	%
Sustainable financing of emergency responses through social protection systems	22	73
Clarifying the links between the use of social protection approaches and the climate change agenda	20	67

Improving the quality of social protection systems in their own right	19	63
Improving the linkages between the humanitarian system and social protection approaches	18	60
Improving anticipatory action	17	57
Total	30	100

Source: Integrity (2022). Analysis of survey responses, question B5 and B5.1. N.B. a proportion of 50% has a 95% confidence interval of +/- 13%, with all other proportions have smaller intervals. Multi-coding was permitted.

8.3.3 TA (SPACE and STAAR) publications

Qualitative case study data suggests strong uptake of climate-related publications produced by SPACE. The core climate-related paper produced by SPACE – ‘Climate and Social Protection: Scaling up Ambitions’ -- was cited by several key informants within and outside of FCDO as a seminal paper on the linkages between climate and social protection. Notably, this paper is cited in the World Bank’s very recently published SP strategy.¹⁵⁴ KIIs indicated strong continued demand for digestible, operationally-focused climate-related products geared at practitioners, which they can use to inform programming and influence decisionmakers (both within their own institutions and in national governments). As well as trust in FCDO and its programmes as a source of high quality products:

“For evidence I would come to the FCDO, including BASIC, first every time...we used the knowledge created by SPACE...in different countries...it was extremely useful. They also managed the knowledge and evidence really well, it was very accessible.”

KII with multilateral stakeholder

One KII specifically reported having looked to BASIC to find out whether they were undertaking any work on linkages between climate, social protection and peace.

STAAR has begun to build on the legacy of SPACE’s contribution to knowledge on climate-SP linkages. Most KIIs – both FCDO country staff and externals in global level roles – who had engaged with SPACE publications and events were not yet familiar with STAAR, suggesting a risk of losing momentum on contributing and, critically, encouraging uptake of global public goods. Nevertheless, STAAR inputs to the development of the Risk-Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP) paper – ‘Early action and climate crisis: could social protection be a game-changer?’ – in autumn 2021 represented an extremely promising first step, with REAP describing STAAR consultants as *‘responsive and fantastic to work with...[and having helped to] push things forward’* (see section 9.5.1 below for results of this support).

8.3.4 STAAR assignments

In **Pakistan**, both British High Commission staff and the TA consultant team expressed dissatisfaction with delivery of the **political economy analysis (PEA) of climate resilience and shock responsive**

¹⁵⁴ World Bank Group. 2022. Charting a Course Towards Universal Social Protection : Resilience, Equity, and Opportunity for All. World Bank Group, Washington, DC. © World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/38031> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”

social protection -- one of only six STAAR assignments undertaken since baseline, as well as the only STAAR assignment which has been delivered in full and the only country level TA assignment with an explicit climate focus which has been carried out throughout BASIC's lifetime.

Some of the reasons for this discontent related specifically to the assignment's climate focus. For example, the delivery team reported that the design (including ToC) of the FCDO programme the PEA is intended to support – resilience building and climate adaptation programme BRAVE – created an “*unnecessary separation*” between the SP component and the wider programme which flowed through to the assignment. Despite the team's efforts to develop a framework which brought together disasters, climate change and social protection, they ultimately found it challenging to implement a truly integrated approach in practice. Team members attributed this in part to the diversity of expertise required by the assignment (across PEA, climate, social protection and the specificities of Pakistan's politics and governance) and their own lack of experience of working across these intersects.

“It was difficult bridging climate change and social protection. We ended up not managing that as well as we could have. [Consultant] is fantastic on social protection and we had strong PEA expertise, but we fell down on the climate piece. We had two local experts but...working across the three areas became tricky and the piece felt a little silo'ed.”

KII with STAAR assignment team

“BHC established a partnership with the World Bank taking the lead on social protection. HMG is now a legacy funder in SP initiatives. DFID was a key player in early cash transfers...But BHC has whittled down its programmes... The assignment was structured on the basis that it will link climate resilience and SRSP; but BHC is leaving SP to the World Bank. In effect, it compartmentalised the two areas when trying to build linkages... Nevertheless, the report spoke clearly about the need to look at SP with an adaptive lens and identified which SP actors to work with.”

KII with STAAR assignment team

This suggests that whilst STAAR is able to put together sufficiently multidisciplinary teams, at country level potential challenges in identifying consultants with experience of working on the linkages between climate and social protection may present a risk to quality. The BHC commissioner also reported that specific areas on which they had expected to receive information, most notably tracking of climate finance budgets, were omitted from the draft – suggesting that this may also be a gap in expertise amongst STAAR consultants.

Other reasons for user dissatisfaction were more general in nature. First, STAAR selected a local climate expert with an ongoing contracting relationship with the government for the expert's insight into key climate institutions; for BHC, this represented a conflict of interest with the potential to bias findings. Second, the consultant team reported a lack of a clear steer from the FCDO commissioner (including but not limited to their expectations vis-a-vis linkages between climate and social protection), changes to the scope throughout the assignment and insufficient access to information about the programme the PEA was intended to inform.¹⁵⁵ Third, the feedback process on the inception report and drafts took several

¹⁵⁵ The FCDO planned to procure BRAVE shortly afterwards.

months, by which time a change in government had rendered many of the PEA’s findings irrelevant (though the consultant team did go to significant efforts to update them).

The experience of scoping the second relevant TA assignment indicates a need for STAAR to respond rapidly to windows of political opportunity around climate-related issues at country level. Of the two STAAR assignments currently in procurement, one has an explicit climate focus: a review, and sharing with national stakeholders in Zambia, of the global literature on the potential for SA to contribute to climate resilience, reduced deforestation and biodiversity loss, and use of climate smart agriculture. The assignment commissioner is a repeat user in that they had drawn on SPACE to support the vertical and horizontal expansion of government cash transfers to respond to C-19. FCDO Zambia is seeking to take advantage of a window of political opportunity, with strong and explicit demand from government for this evidence, as well as for FCDO support to progress related programming. However, the development of ToRs and procurement for the assignment were delayed by several months, due to the length of the STAAR inception period.

“For COP27 Zambia will be the lead African negotiating country...We are keen to support a shift for CTs to...engage with people’s resilience. It’s about shifting the long-term piece by taking advantage of the current government priority...to work with government on what they want to pilot. [But they] don’t have evidence on what works elsewhere...We asked SPT if we should commission this ourselves or if they had anything we could use. They suggested a pilot for STAAR [But] it has taken a long time.”

KII with FCDO

The Zambia assignment also draws attention to a potential mismatch between the focus on FCAS on the one hand and countries with clear entry points, and possibly more demand, for working on climate-SP linkages (through SRSP). It is worth noting that it appears to have been the request from FCDO Zambia which prompted discussion between FCDO and DAI around country prioritisation (see section 3.1 above). The implication of the FCDO’s steer is that, whilst the Zambia assignment is moving forward, a similar request may not be prioritised in future, compared to demand from countries classified as FCAS. It is likely that a high level of effort will be needed to generate demand from FCAS countries.

8.3.5 Research

Research on climate, as originally envisaged, is well aligned with user needs as expressed by key informants – though the strength this alignment may be undermined by the scaling back of those plans. There was a strong consensus amongst interviewees within and outside of the FCDO that the most important evidence gap in this area is empirical data from country contexts that addresses the intersect between social protection, climate *and* conflict/fragility – particularly in the medium to long term. Specifically, they expressed a need for quantitative evidence, as well as evidence of what works (e.g. impact evaluations of pilot projects). Research staff working on climate echoed this, arguing that:

“The biggest opportunity is that we can get some real empirical data from FCAS settings with protracted conflict. This is an area where there has been little empirical research so far. A lot of linkages between social assistance or social protection and climate change have been researched and understood in more stable settings. This is an opportunity for strong messages from the field about what’s happening, what the role of SP can be, and what the limitations around building resilience in FCAS in a context of increased climate shocks and stresses are. This is really important.”

KII with Research staff

However, the strength of the alignment between the Research agenda on climate and user needs may have been put at risk by the recent budget reduction, with climate resilience studies and work on the potential contribution of cash plus programming likely to be scaled back, and country level quantitative work in Nigeria discontinued. Some practitioners also expressed a concern that future Research outputs may be more theoretical and academic, and not sufficiently applied or grounded in country context to inform their decision making and operations (though it is too early to assess the fairness of these perceptions). Nevertheless, interest in Research findings in this area, both amongst FCDO staff and multilaterals, was strong.

The Research team has made early efforts to contribute to the learning agenda, but these may have been premature. A webinar and e-discussion on climate resilience was held over three days at the end of June, supported by an informal hangout discussion to encourage knowledge sharing across sectors. The latter was attended by 17 people, but it is unclear what proportion of these already involved in Research. Records of the e-discussion suggest that external engagement may have been fairly limited. And only one key informant (who is tangentially involved in Research themselves) reported having attended the e-discussion. Research staff have reflected that they would do these sessions differently in future: whilst they raised awareness of what Research is trying to achieve, they also surfaced differences of approach between communities of practice without being able to offer concrete findings that might enable them to develop common ground. However, the events did spark the interest of FCDO staff working on DRF policy in engaging with Research.

8.3.6 Balancing demand-driven and strategic approaches

Early STAAR engagements are striking a balance between responding to country demand and pursuing strategic opportunities at global level, but are not yet underpinned by a written strategy. Unlike other strategic priority areas planned during STAAR’s inception, following budget cuts climate is retaining a dedicated lead within the programme’s Technical Senior Leadership Team. However, this climate lead is not yet in place and a climate strategy for STAAR has not yet been developed. This has resulted in a lack of clarity as to focus areas, what kinds of requests will be supported, and whether and how demand will be generated. In light of its eventual length, the inception phase represented a missed opportunity to develop such a strategy. Nevertheless, some early STAAR assignments have been strategic in nature, most notably the support to the development of the REAP paper which seized momentum around COP26 to catalyse coordination between policy actors. Over time, FCDO and DAI expect country level engagements to consolidate, ‘surface entry points for strategic KML activities’ and become ‘increasingly aligned with portfolio rationale’.¹⁵⁶

“They have been quite specific pieces of support...opportunistic; STAAR did well to identify specific moments where and when support was needed to push something over the line, and bring in resources and skills...But going forward we would expect assignments to not fall solely in this space, to also be demand led.”

KII with FCDO

The BASIC Research team set out their thinking and plans for climate-related work clearly during inception, but the scaling back of those plans may mean the deprioritising certain areas which are both

¹⁵⁶ STAAR implementation strategy.

strategic priorities for FCDO and for which there is strong demand from users. The clearer articulation of the Research strategy for climate is owed in part due to the nature of the component's more structured thematic approach. The STAAR inception report considers strategic engagement explicitly – for example, by planning for the KML Lead to undertake six monthly 'horizon scanning' of entry points for engagement and dissemination aligned with 'influencing themes' and priority countries. However, as regards climate specifically, one implication of the merging of the climate and livelihoods workstreams is that work related to climate finance is (perceived to be) no longer as a good fit with the theme – despite FCDO SPT wishes for it to feature highly on the Research agenda and, as evidenced under 3.2, strong demand from FCDO advisers for support on both climate and financing.

BASIC's climate-related work has not yet – with the exception of the SPACE paper on finance cited above – taken a strategic approach to developing more diverse and sustainable financing options, a core element of the programme ToC. At country level, in Pakistan KIs agreed that climate finance is not widely being used to fund adaptation of SP systems. Barriers identified include a disconnect between how large multilateral funds (e.g. Green Climate Fund and UNFCCC adaptation fund) define climate finance and country spending on SP to respond to related risks in practice (with the exception of some climate financing of public works programmes). As well as a dearth of experts with the in-depth contextual knowledge of the likelihood of different disaster scenarios needed to access specific funds, as well as SP and climate finance expertise. At national level, relevant provincial level bodies lack the capacity to work together to raise climate financing from the centre. FCDO's BRAVE programme will include TA and capacity building to support access to climate finance, though it is unclear at what level and whether this will include a focus on flows to SP. Other international organisations seeking to develop the use of climate financing for SP are GIZ, UNDP and the World Bank.

At global level, both KIs and analysis of secondary data suggest that the majority of existing climate financing comes from humanitarian actors to support mitigation. Whilst levels of available climate finance globally increased from USD 574bn in 2017/18 to USD 632bn in 2019/20, split roughly evenly between public and private, the majority is allocated to mitigation efforts with a focus on energy systems. In 2019/20 (the most recent year for which global figures are available), support to adaptation accounted for only 7% of the total. Disaggregated data on support to shock responsive or adaptive SP systems is unavailable, but reported by KIs to represent only a very low proportion of funding for adaptation strategies. The proportion of UK climate financing allocated to adaptation is much higher, at 47% between 2016 and 2020. Opportunities do exist. Over the past year, there has been increased visibility in international dialogue on both adaptation and 'loss and damage', both of which have the potential to link climate and SP. This is reflected in high level (e.g. G7) political commitments, with National Disaster Risk finance strategies now devised to be inclusive of SP the sector. For BASIC specifically, there is an opportunity to generate on-the-ground evidence on how SP can deliver climate resilience to provide a basis for applications for climate finance, and to provide TA to in-country actors to enable them to access climate funds.

8.3.7 GESI considerations in design

The intersect between SP, climate, conflict-affected or fragile settings *and* inclusion has not been explored explicitly within BASIC so far, but entry points do exist. Addressing this four way intersect appears quite ambitious given the small size of the evidence base on that between SP, climate and conflict/fragility. The original ToR for the Pakistan PEA included a strong gender lens but, according to the delivery team, interest in this from the FCDO commissioner diminished over time. Nevertheless, as the

Pakistan report illustrates, in practice exploring relationships between resilience and SA, particularly in conflict-affected settings means engaging with vulnerabilities, household coping and management and, therefore, with women (though not necessarily broader inclusion). The Research concept on the politics of intersecting vulnerabilities – which falls under the climate and livelihoods theme – includes a research question focusing on the extent to which SA has addressed drivers of vulnerability ‘including factors of social difference’. Relevant work being carried out by GSP Research component could also help to identify relevant entry points for BASIC with UNICEF Innocenti shortly due publish a paper on climate, SP and gender/age. It is worth noting that the UK ICF is seeking to increase the proportion of funds allocated to programmes with clear GESI and human rights principles.

8.3.8 Contextual changes and adaptation

There has been no adaptation of BASIC’s climate-related activities to contextual changes given that relatively little relevant work has been undertaken to date; but changes in context continue to increase the prominence of climate, including linkages with SP, in public discourse. Increasing incidence of climate-related hazards and disasters, including in north America and western Europe, is pushing climate up the agenda globally. KIIs with stakeholders in Pakistan suggested that flooding has shifted public dialogue beyond whether climate change should be addressed through SP to *how* this can be done. KIIs with stakeholders in international policy or research roles also pointed to increased (recognition of the value of) SP responses during the COVID-19 pandemic and narratives around “building back better” as opportunities to promote linkages between SP and climate resilience. Other relevant agendas which are gaining momentum are adaptation (not only mitigation), addressing food insecurity and ‘loss and damage’.

8.4 Coherence

8.4.1 Internal coherence

There is very little direct coordination between TA and Research on climate-related issues. FCDO SPT has provided steer on, for example, the thematic focus of each component’s relevant work, but not how they expect them to interact. However, the Research team drew on TA outputs (particularly the relevant SPACE publications) in the design of Research workstreams, and were able to identify complementarities across the two components. In practice, cross-over between Research and TA on climate has mostly been facilitated by a small number of key consultants working across both.

8.4.2 External coherence

Within FCDO, there has been some, though again limited, interaction with other FCDO programmes. There is no other FCDO programmes interrogating the intersect between SP, climate change *and* FCAS contexts. And with the closure of MAINTAINS, there has also been a reduction in FCDO centrally-managed programming to support SRSP in non-FCAS settings. As above, there has been some overlap of individual consultants involved in both BASIC and other FCDO programmes (e.g. SPARC). And some country-specific engagement, with the Research team having mapped relevant FCDO programmes in primary research countries and, in Ethiopia, having met with FCDO to be brought up to speed on their portfolio. The SPT climate lead reports incipient interest from, though limited engagement so far with, FCDO colleagues working on other programmes, which may offer opportunities to apply learning from TA and, eventually, the findings of Research. Relevant areas and teams are: linking SP and early action,

through REAP; disaster risk financing; and narratives and approaches around loss and damage, led by the Climate and Environment team. The new FCDO-supported community of practice on SP and climate hosted by socialprotection.org also offers a useful entry point.

Beyond FCDO, there are considerable barriers to wider coordination, but also specific opportunities. So far there has been very little interaction between BASIC and other climate actors (including that which could be led by FCDO SPT). Obstacles include the structure of external coordination efforts. FCDO SPT has a particular interest in the World Bank, who at the end of September, published a new Social Protection and Jobs sector strategy (the ‘SPJ Compass’) which includes an increased focus on both FCAS contexts, shock responsive SP and other climate-SP linkages. (In the evaluation’s country case studies the World Bank was one of, if not the only, actor starting to explore these linkages.) Given the volume of SP funding being delivered through the WB at country level, the organisation should be a key target for influencing. Additionally, the SP-climate reference group USP2030 platform hosted by ILO and REAP working group provide specific opportunities to start developing coordination and coherence.

8.5 Effectiveness

8.5.1 Evidence of potential contribution to outcomes

At global level, there is strong evidence of uptake of climate focused SPACE publications by practitioners, as well as of the convening role played by an early STAAR assignment. At country level, implementation of the recommendations of climate-focused TA assignments has so far been limited, but strong potential exists. The case study has captured early evidence of the likely contribution of climate-focused BASIC outputs towards outcomes. Boxes 1-4 outline evidence gathered as to whether SPACE and STAAR assignments have so far contributed to bringing about outcome level change.

Box 1: The Pakistan political economy analysis has not yet informed the design of FCDO programming, but is intended to do so.

Assignment: PEA to inform BHC Pakistan’s current and future programmes on resilience building and climate adaptation

Relevant ToC pathway (output to outcome): ‘High quality advice provided for the design and delivery of country plans, policies, programmes and systems’ → ‘New or strengthened plans, programmes, policies and systems design and implemented’

Evidence of trajectory towards outcome(s)? Likely strength of uptake of the PEA report is unclear at this point. An earlier SPACE assignment informed the development of the ToR for a component of the BRAVE programme. With the BRAVE programme already in procurement at the time of the assignment’s completion, the FCDO commissioner anticipates that the PEA will feed into the detailed design of a specific programme component during the inception phase (though the STAAR delivery team were not sighted on this intention). However, at the time of data collection, programme mobilisation had been paused pending distribution of budget cuts.

Box 2: The Zambia evidence review is only now getting underway, but has strong potential to inform and influence government programming.

Assignment: Links between social protection and preventing deforestation/ protecting biodiversity, Zambia

Relevant ToC pathway (output to outcome): ‘Greater awareness, knowledge and learning generated’ and ‘High quality advice provided for the design and delivery of country plans, policies, programmes and systems’ → ‘Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and programmes’

Evidence of trajectory towards outcome(s)? Uptake of the Zambia assignment is likely to be enabled by strong and explicit demand from government for this evidence, as well as for FCDO support to progress related programming. The government is already invested in shock responsive SP, having taken out and used its own drought insurance policy. Envisaged outcomes are use of evidence to adapt existing government SP programming to strengthen linkages with sustainable climate smart agriculture and biodiversity protection. The ToR includes facilitation of a 2-3 day workshop with key donor and multilateral partners to position them to engage with government more effectively. The evidence could also feed into a business case for a future FCDO programme (though there is some uncertainty around this due to budget cuts).

Box 3: The main SPACE publication with an explicit climate focus has been used by external stakeholders, including some working on FCDO-funded initiatives

Assignment: SPACE publication, ‘Climate and Social Protection: Scaling up Ambitions’

Relevant ToC pathway (output to outcome): ‘Greater awareness, knowledge and learning generated’ → ‘Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and programmes’

Evidence of trajectory towards outcome(s)? Practitioners report having used the SPACE paper to train themselves on the linkages between SP and climate. Notably, this was reported most often by those working outside the FCDO. REAP secretariat staff reported that “the SPACE paper helped us to better formulate out position as a niche organisation” and that “BASIC products (especially those produced by SPACE) have been “instrumental” in where the REAP working group came from”.

Box 4: STAAR support to the REAP paper has helped convene stakeholders working across SP and early climate action

Assignment: Support to the Risk-Informed Early Action Partnership Paper ‘Early action and climate crisis: could social protection be a game-changer?’

Relevant ToC pathway (output to outcome): ‘Greater awareness, knowledge and learning generated’ → ‘Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and programmes’ and ‘Greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives’

Evidence of trajectory towards outcome(s)? The position paper has played an influencing and convening role, functioning as “a catalyst to get policy actors together” as the main activity undertaken by a newly established taskforce on early climate action and SP. Prepared for COP 26 (though in the event published slightly afterwards), according to FCDO SPT “the paper played an important role. We needed that external something to bring everyone (FCDO, REAP and others) together in the lead up to COP...we were able to seize a moment and get messages out. The paper played a good role in that.” Following the paper’s publication, REAP and its funders (including FCDO) decided there was value in continuing with and developing the taskforce to address silos within organisations. USAID was brought in as a co-chair (and has contributed funds to REAP) alongside FCDO earlier this year. The secretariat is also aiming to bring the Asian and African development banks on board.

8.5.2 Constrains on and opportunities to support the adoption of SP approaches to respond to climate related crises

Key informants identified two main barriers to supporting the adoption of SP approaches to respond to climate-related crises:

- The first, lack of financial resources, especially for the piloting of new approaches; and
- The second, siloed working between FCDO cadres (and similar structural siloes in other organisation) and, particularly, the resulting difficulty in applying learning from strong, practical TA and research pieces by designing and accessing funding for programmes in the absence of internal

linkages. That is, a lack of coherence within FCDO, as well as between the humanitarian, SP and climate sectors more broadly, creates barriers for operationalising TA and research findings.

Enablers and opportunities to support the adoption of SP approaches to respond to climate-related crises identified by key informants are:

- The existence of a tight knit and engaged SP community, in which FCDO is perceived to be an important player. This is strengthened by BASIC, which is seen as producing many of the important positions and evidence in this area.
- “Fairly non-fractious” collaboration between donors, including GIZ and USAID, in this area. The REAP secretariat’s experiences of managing the taskforce and preparing the position paper has been that *“it’s a small world but a breath of fresh air for coordination – people are keen to make things work”*, emphasising that this cannot be taken for granted.
- Increasing political space at international level with, for example, SP and climate on both the G7 and G20 agendas. Relatedly, FCDO identified internal opportunities to develop relationship and influence policy – for example, on DRF and to work with the Climate and Environment team on an approach to loss and damage.
- Potential to fund pilots, particularly by bringing in development banks as potential funders who already have a strong role in government financing. According to key informants, their investment could change the potential scale of ambition for operations and programming, particularly in a context of decreasing donor funding.

Additionally, the first implementation quarterly reports for both Research and STAAR are well set up to track the progress of climate-related work, containing, respectively dedicated sections for each of the core Research themes and ‘Thematic Learning for...strategic direction’.

8.6 Looking forward – entry points for BAISC

For STAAR:

- Task the new climate lead to develop an explicit strategy for climate-related work, informed by an understanding of the types of requests STAAR is likely to receive.
- Build on the momentum generated by SPACE publications, and strong demand for similar, by continuing to produce practical, action-oriented guidance .
- Crowd in funding from other donors e.g. GIZ and USAID, who have both expressed interest in STAAR and climate/SP.

For Research:

- As far as possible in the context of reduced resources, deliver on the ambition to generate empirical country level evidence on vulnerabilities and what works.
- Draw on partnership with the Red Cross Climate Centre to build in a longer-term view of the implications of climate impacts for understanding vulnerability and SP systems design.
- Review and make explicit the current research approach to climate mainstreaming.

For FCDO:

- Track the activities of the REAP working group and USP2030 Climate Change and Social Protection working group to encourage additionality and avoid duplication, promoting use of BASIC outputs.

- Draw on ongoing mapping and development of a typology of relevant bilateral programmes to identify opportunities to operationalise learning from TA and Research (e.g. Sahel adaptive SP programme) -- in the first instance by identifying opportunities for STAAR engagement.

Promising entry points for strategic engagement across the programme:

- Prioritising high risk contexts where humanitarian needs, disaster risk and climate risk overlap and accumulate for joint working (noting that generating demand in these contexts may require a higher level of effort).
- At the same time, allowing a degree of flexibility for BASIC in supporting climate activities outside FCAS settings, while managing the potential resource implications.
- Linking shock responsive SP to climate-related funding sources in FCAS settings, where uptake of climate adaptation funds is currently low.
- Encouraging humanitarian actors to consider climate as part of efforts to harmonise humanitarian and national SA/SP systems (particularly in contexts where national SP systems are insufficiently mature to be adapted to respond to climate risks).
- Engaging with and influencing the implementation of the new World Bank SPJ Compass.

9 Analytical scorecards

This section presents the scorecards we developed to underpin our cross-cutting analysis: our Gender- and inclusion-responsiveness and Value for Money scorecards.

9.1 Gender- and inclusion- responsiveness scorecard

The midline results of the GESI scorecard analysis is shown in the Table overleaf.

Table 9.1: Level of ambition on gender and social inclusion by case country

Country	Work-stream	GESI responsiveness			Supporting evidence	
		Baseline	Midline	Direction of travel	Baseline	Midline
Jordan	TA	GESI-sensitive (3), with some aspects GESI-responsive (4)	GESI-sensitive (3), with some aspects GESI-responsive (4)	→	A SPACE clinic discussion with FCDO Jordan included exploration of e.g. risk of exclusion of vulnerable groups from the government transfer programme including informal workers, urban populations, and PWD, that the the transfer level does not appear to consider intra-household variations, complementary interventions which would support gender equality or promote empowerment of vulnerable groups, and accountability to affected populations.	There have been no new TA assignments since baseline. All key changes observed at midline, to which BASIC has contributed, include improvements to equity in SP delivery:
					SPACE inputs to the Business Case for FCDO Emergency Social Protection in Jordan (ESPJ) programme included gender and social inclusion (GESI) analysis, as well as additional analysis on strengths, weaknesses and mitigation in relation to gendered vulnerabilities (e.g. gendered risks, coverage of and adequacy of the transfer for vulnerable households, communications to promote household conflict management and reduce risks of GBV, specific support needed by vulnerable groups to enrol etc.).	<i>Change 1: Rapid horizontal and vertical expansion of NAF Takaful programmes.</i> The National Aid Fund both increased the value of transfers and significantly expanded its caseload to include households who were newly vulnerable as a result of the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic (with two new emergency CTs reaching a total of 241,332 and 154,690 households respectively). BASIC TA contributed directly to the design of the ESPJ programme, which disbursed £34m to the NAF emergency CTs.
					Additionally, in September 2020, SPACE undertook an assessment of the social and gendered risks and impacts of the emergency Cash Transfer project to inform updated project protocols and operational manual.	<i>Change 2: Consolidation of NAF Takaful programmes into a single unified cash transfer programme.</i> Building on its expansion during the pandemic, the NAF has begun the process of consolidating its various programmes into a single, more cohesive Unified Cash Transfer Programme. Critically, the unified programme will adopt a more sophisticated targeting approach, which is better aligned with the proxy means testing (PMT) approaches used by UN agencies delivering humanitarian cash. Previously, inclusion in the NAF was based on membership of specific vulnerable groups, with different programmes operating different eligibility criteria, meaning that some poor households were overlooked. The NAF is providing a supplementary programme to ensure that groups originally selected based on lifecycle vulnerabilities are not excluded. BASIC's contribution to this change has been minor and indirect. An FCDO programme whose development was supported by SPACE part-funded the expanded NAF programming whose consolidation is now underway.

Country	Work-stream	GESI responsiveness			Supporting evidence	
		Baseline	Midline	Direction of travel	Baseline	Midline
					BASIC TAS consultation of SP stakeholders included consideration of (and report sections on) each of gender and social inclusion, and potential implications of findings for FCDO Jordan relating to inclusion and localisation. The options report for a five year programme to strengthen the National Aid Fund (now known as SSERJ) presented two main delivery options, advocating for that which was more expansive in its coverage of vulnerable groups, including addition of CTs targeted to lifecycle risks and inclusion, and TA to extend the coverage of the Social Security Corporation to older women and PWDs (i.e. intentional targeting of vulnerable groups). The business case for this programme is currently in development.	<i>Change 3: Shift towards more sustainable financing for social protection.</i> Donor interests and funding have shifted markedly towards more sustainable financing models for social protection, including through support to contributory SP (via the Social Security Corporation). FCDO's new SSERJ programme will support Estidama++, an SSC programme which aims to extend the coverage of contributory SP to informal workers by providing wage subsidies and income support. BASIC TA contributed directly to the design of the SSERJ programme and therefore to FCDO funding of Estidama++. Dutch Embassy staff report that they expect the FCDO contribution to enabling the programme to reach a higher number of beneficiaries and a greater number of sectors.
	Research	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Research country review for Jordan considers assistance available to refugees, but also their employment status and access (to informal work).	Jordan is not referenced in any of the Research concept notes produced during inception that form part of the 'inclusion' theme. It is, however, referenced extensively in one of the three working papers that fall under the 'inclusion theme': working paper 11, ' <i>The Effects of Social Assistance Interventions on Gender, Familial, and Household Relations Among Refugees and Displaced Populations: A Review of the Literature on Interventions in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.</i> ' However, no primary research is envisaged in Jordan under the related workstream. Further, following budget cuts, the inclusion workstream on SA in situations of mass displacement is no longer being taken forward.
Nigeria	TA	GESI-sensitive (3)	GESI-sensitive (3), with some aspects GESI-responsive (4)	↑	An initial TAS assignment – to map humanitarian CTs and SP programmes in the BAY States as a first step towards identifying potential linkages – did not significantly mainstream GESI-related issues, with the exception of references to the overall goal of the Nigerian SP policy (to establish a gender-sensitive and age-appropriate framework to ensure a minimum social [protection] floor' and directly relevant programming (e.g. funding of and actors involved in programming to tackle GBV).	Two of a total of nine TA assignments have been delivered in Nigeria since baseline. Of these, one is the nexus adviser role. The other has a core inclusion element: an ongoing assignment to inform development of a PMT approach for humanitarian cash aligned with that used by the government, to support the extension of the government system to harder-to-reach communities.
					Under SPACE, consideration of GESI-related issues has been variable – with most, but not all, deliverables demonstrating GESI-sensitivity. For example:	One of three key changes observed at midline, to which BASIC has contributed, has strengthened equity in SP delivery:

Country	Work-stream	GESI responsiveness			Supporting evidence	
		Baseline	Midline	Direction of travel	Baseline	Midline
					<p>An excel spreadsheet mapping the Covid-19 responses of partners and programme adaptations did not explore the adequacy of responses for specific vulnerable groups. Likewise, support to the Development Partner Group to set out policy response areas which should be taken forward in a High-Level Forum with the Vice President does not appear to considered funding, administrative or legislative needs pertaining specifically to inclusion (beyond general expansion of coverage).</p> <p>By contrast, deployment of central SPACE decision and delivery matrices (which themselves integrated inclusion considerations) meant that such issues were integrated into early discussion and deliberation around options for FCDO to respond to Covid-19 (e.g. gender and protection risks, involvement of local networks). The inappropriateness of existing targeting mechanisms for meeting the needs of those most affected (e.g. informal urban workers, the elderly) featured prominently.</p> <p>A subsequent assessment of the relative efficiency of humanitarian and government targeting approaches in the north east has related inherently to inclusion, seeking to encourage extension of support to cover groups not presently on the social register but in need of support.</p>	<p><i>Change 1: Development and validation of the National Social Protection Policy.</i> The revision and further validation of the National Social Protection Policy (NSPP), which builds on the 2017-2020 NSPP. The revised policy identified several areas that warranted improvement, including further consideration of inclusion. Government stakeholders suggest the policy may pass into law by the end of 2022. An operational framework is also being developed. As regards BASIC's contribution, the nexus adviser engaged directly in the validation of the new national SP policy, which builds on the 2017-2020 policy. This included advocating for explicit consideration of displaced persons, who had previously been excluded based on an erroneous assumption that all displaced households were being supported by humanitarian programmes. KIs suggested that this contributed to the strength of the final policy's potential to guide inclusive delivery through universal coverage.</p>
	Research	N/A	GESI-sensitive (3), with some aspects GESI-responsive (4)	N/A	<p>The programme of research scoped in Nigeria (as a focus country for BASIC Research) during the inception phase originally consisted of nine research concepts: seven global and two Nigeria-specific.</p> <p>Of the two planned country-level concepts, one focused on quantitative research into the lived experiences of navigating climate and conflict-related risks and experiences of social assistance, falling under the 'inclusion' theme. However, following budget cuts, this workstream has been discontinued.</p> <p>Of the global concepts, two fell under the 'inclusion' theme, one focusing on the implications for inclusion of the digitalisation of SA systems, and the other on local accountability in fragile contexts. However, following budget cuts, primary research in Nigeria will not be taken forward for either workstream.</p> <p>The Nigeria research workstreams have been disproportionately affected by the cuts, due to i) less progress having been made on country partnerships than in other countries, due in part to challenges around due diligence requirements, and ii) growing security concerns around planned fieldwork in the north east. The scaled back scope for research in Nigeria will be comprised of two qualitative case studies, one of which will focus on 'capacities' and fall under the 'inclusion' theme.</p>	
	TA	GESI-sensitive (3), with	GESI-sensitive (3)	↑	Two of three main deliverables included strong GESI-relevant components.	Neither of the two TA assignments carried out in Somalia since baseline have strong GESI elements.

Country	Work-stream	GESI responsiveness			Supporting evidence	
		Baseline	Midline	Direction of travel	Baseline	Midline
		some aspects GESI-responsive (4)			First, a note setting out some initial considerations for potential economic inclusion initiative in Somalia explicitly considered GESI issues with references to relevant work being carried mainly by local organisations (approx. half of analysis presented in the note).	The two key changes observed at midline, to which BASIC has contributed, do not integrate explicit inclusion elements. Whilst the recent emergence of a national social protection system enabled a huge increase in coverage of vulnerable populations, BASIC's contribution was very low.
					Second, a light touch review which sought to determine the impact of COVID-19 on specific elements of humanitarian cash and social protection programming, focused on three principles, one of which was accountability to Affected Populations / Localisation. 'Key messages' included that: local and national responders have been integral to the COVID-19 response through cash programming but the relationship between donors, international organisations and local and national responders remains uneven, and there is little evidence to suggest that COVID-19 had enhanced or accelerated a shift to a more localised response.	
					SPACE then developed a localisation framework which sought, in general, to enable a shift towards localisation (power, funding and process) within the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia programme and, in turn, improve programme effectiveness and inclusivity. Options presented related to varying degrees of responsibility which could be afforded to local partners – and included the possibility of using existing community self-help groups as platforms for cash delivery.	
					Other assignments and products (most notably, a case study on Covid response) mainstreamed GESI-related considerations, but to quite a limited extent.	
		N/A	N/A	N/A	The Research country review for Somalia considers the adequacy of and approaches to targeting and calculating transfer values, and the implications for vulnerable groups, including ethnic minorities.	Fieldwork in Somalia is envisaged in one of four concept notes produced during inception that form part of the 'inclusion' theme. Specifically, under the workstream focusing on local accountability in fragile contexts, fieldwork in Somalia is envisaged as part of a second phase of primary data collection. However, this workstream has been discontinued.

Country	Work-stream	GESI responsiveness			Supporting evidence	
		Baseline	Midline	Direction of travel	Baseline	Midline
						There are also several brief references to Somalia in one of the three working papers that fall under the 'inclusion theme': working paper 7, 'The risks and outcomes of getting help for marginalised people: navigating access to social assistance in crises.' However, no primary research is envisaged in Somalia under the related workstream.
Yemen	TA	GESI-sensitive (3)	GESI-sensitive (3)	→	GESI mainstreaming in early BASIC TA assignments was relatively weak. A review and analysis of identification and registration systems in protracted and recurrent crises – which drew on Yemen and South Sudan as case studies – did not explicitly consider the impact of targeting on gender, age and disability dimensions, although this was included within the scope of the original assignment ToR.	There have been no new TA assignments since baseline. None of the key changes observed at midline, to which BASIC has contributed, include explicit GESI-related outcomes. However, all have at least some potential to improve equity in SP delivery:
					Consideration of GESI-related issues improved in SPACE assignments, facilitated by the addition of a GESI expert in addition to the primary consultant. TA support to FCDO to facilitate an NGO roundtable to understand how humanitarian cash transfers could be linked to social protection programmes, integrated some, albeit limited, consideration of gender by challenging agencies to improve the gender-sensitivity of programming and programme more support directly to women. However, in the mapping document produced during the roundtable inclusion is referenced only in relation to women's participation in programming as an opportunity and not in relation to priority areas or risks (i.e. possible instrumentalisation of women's roles).	<i>Change 1: Development of the new FCDO Yemen Business Case.</i> Over the last year FCDO Yemen has received approval for the Yemen Food Security Safety Net Programme. This programme will provide cash transfers to up to 1.5 million of Yemen's most food insecure households, bringing together existing donor/multilateral programming and, in doing so, improving accountability.
					More encouragingly, a needs assessment and options paper to inform a cash/SP response to the Covid-19 pandemic integrated consideration of gendered and protection risks. And a subsequent evidence review of complementary livelihoods programming explored the impacts of cash plus interventions on gender-based / intimate partner violence risks.	<i>Change 2: Increased harmonisation and interoperability between the different humanitarian and social protection actors.</i> There is evidence of an increased awareness of, and action by, a range of stakeholders to improve the harmonisation and inter-operability of transfers. The significance of change is currently rated as low on the basis that there has been little concrete progress. However, the potential significance of change is high, in reducing inclusion and exclusion errors.
					A mapping exercise undertaken for the national Social Fund for Development explores key design features of SFD programming, including a strong focus on the implications of targeting and inclusion approaches for women, youth, PWDs and IDPs. Recommendations of the mapping exercise include: greater allocation of resources for the design, implementation and monitoring of GESI issues; related capacity strengthening efforts for SFD programme staff, and accountability for improved attention to GESI through incorporation into staff performance agreements; use of existing gender analyses to inform programming, and disaggregation by gender, age and disability of all data collected; consultation of participating women and girls on any unique challenges or risks they face as a result of their	<i>Change 3: Increased efficiency and effectiveness of national social protection institutions.</i> The cash transfers provided through SWF reach a large number of beneficiaries in Yemen. Transferring responsibility for the delivery of cash transfers from SWF to SFD should improve the targeting of these transfers

Country	Work-stream	GESI responsiveness			Supporting evidence	
		Baseline	Midline	Direction of travel	Baseline	Midline
					participation; and, finally, measures to mitigate risk of gendered violence and violence against children.	
	Research	N/A	GESI-sensitive (3), with some aspects GESI-responsive (4)	N/A	The Research country review for Yemen does not explicitly consider GESI-related issues.	The programme of research scoped in Yemen (as a focus country for BASIC Research) during the inception phase originally consisted of three work strands. Two of the three strands fall under the 'inclusion' theme. One explores targeting, with a particular focus on understanding needs, overlaps and exclusion. And the other on how national social protection programmes and systems that pre-exist a specific crisis can be sustained and maintain business continuity during or following a crisis (with 'capacities' highly gendered).

9.2 Value for Money scorecard

The table below presents the midline results of the VFM scorecard applied to BASIC TAS and Research.

Table 9.2: BASIC VFM scorecard

Scorecard component	Research	STAAR
1. Existence, relevance and robustness of Vfm measures (Vfm processes)	The Vfm framework was revised since baseline, following recruitment of a short-term Vfm expert in view of the challenges experienced by the supplier in meeting FCDO expectations concerning this deliverable. The revised Vfm framework has been approved by FCDO and is deemed to be of good quality, but has yet to be used. Some concerns were raised that budgetary constraints may limit its use in practice ¹⁵⁷ .	STAAR's VFM approach is set out in Monitoring Strategy based on the 5Es framework. While there are plans to submit an annual Vfm report providing an update on programme results against Vfm indicators, Vfm reporting has not yet started although the component is now in implementation.
2. Approach to procurement and cost containment (Economy)	The inception phase cost £1.6m (although some delivery was also included in costs), raising a question on Vfm ¹⁵⁸ , if unused budgetary resources from earlier years are not deferred to later years and a contract time extension is not granted to March 2025 ¹⁵⁹ . While management costs were assessed as appropriate (circa 20%), expectations of reduced use of in-country partners and experts may negatively impact on economy. There was evidence of consideration of cost containment in the management of the service.	There are economies in housing technical assistance and GSP components within BASIC as a result of shared management and oversight architecture. There was evidence that cost containment considerations being taken into account in the management of STAAR.
3. Efficient use of resources by BASIC interventions (Efficiency)	<p>Funding uncertainty and a longer than expected inception phase (18 months rather than 12) impacted on the efficient transition to and subsequently the pace of implementation</p> <p>Contract amendments, required when additional experts or partners need to be added to the contract, have proven to be very time consuming (more than five months) in terms of approval times. This has affected Research's ability to move forward as well as be flexible and adaptive in service delivery.</p>	<p>STAAR's inception phase was nine months (rather than envisaged three months) impacting on the efficient transition to implementation phase.</p> <p>The transition to a more flexible contracting mechanism has promoted economy and efficiency by allowing expansion of existing assignments to prepare for future work¹⁶⁰. The new contracting arrangement (with the supplier having one overall contract) reduces the transaction costs associated with use of a framework contract (EACDs) requiring separate contract approvals for each assignment.</p> <p>There are efficiencies from having a centrally managed programme, to service the needs of multiple users over a range of countries.</p>
4. Validation of ToC causal pathways for generating primary benefits (Effectiveness)	The validity of Research's ToC is a possible concern due to possibility of less in-country partner engagement and focus on smaller research pieces, which may affect ability to deliver the scale of contribution to outcome/impact level change.	ToR templates for assignments now includes a mapping of the requested services to the ToC to identify key areas of impact and uptake. ¹⁶¹ STAAR's ToC remains broadly valid although the contribution to change may be impacted by the move to servicing the needs of a greater range of users, rather than more focused on FCDO users, as well as a possible shift in emphasis to demand-led rather than strategic assignments ¹⁶² .
5. Sustainability of BASIC's results (Effectiveness)	Research has only recently started implementation, thereby limiting the assessment of effectiveness at Midline. However, the use of Payment by Results triggers attached to Research's outputs/KPIs incentivises effectiveness. Research also plans to assess the quality of research use, as well as capture	STAAR's pipeline was rated healthy in the QR and is expected to grow further with the formal launch of the service, although outreach activities were reduced from those envisaged. The mapping of expected outcomes of assignments to the ToC is hoped to support the assignments delivering envisaged results. Positive feedback was received on the service from users including Ukraine

¹⁵⁷ KIIs Supplier

¹⁵⁸ Although the spend on the inception phase - £1.6m – was less than the budget for this phase (£1.8m) due to reduced travel costs as a result of COVID-19 travel restrictions.

¹⁵⁹ KIIs FCDO, Suppliers

¹⁶⁰ DAI STAAR Quarterly Report April-July 2022.

¹⁶¹ DAI STAAR Quarterly Report April-July 2022.

¹⁶² DAI STAAR Quarterly Report April-July 2022.

Scorecard component	Research	STAAR
	the incidences of use, which will be useful in future assessments of effectiveness and VfM.	briefing ¹⁶³ although there was a lack of clarity on who was responsible for promoting uptake for this initial assignment (B022). Payment by results triggers attached to outputs and KPIs should incentivise effectiveness. Current approach of pausing strategic assignments could impact on effectiveness going forward, although evidence demonstrates that BASIC TAS and SPACE have proven to be effective in driving outcome level change.
6. Review of programme-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM - (VfM processes)	While management structures are in place, FCDO staff turnover and different expectations of the supplier and FCDO on the quality and requirements of deliverables affected timely approvals. Management of Research has proven to be more challenging at a time of funding uncertainty, with some activities (7) paused pending funding decisions, others continuing as planned (3) and some continuing with reduced budget (8). A lot of management time was needed to support budget revision and scenario planning processes.	Leadership and management structures are in place. Managing budget uncertainty was a challenge for the supplier, requiring changes to workplans. Staff changes in FCDO impacted on timely decision making and approval of inception deliverables. The TSLT was rated as an effective resource for management and delivery of the services, providing continuity (TSLT members get 2 days per month), with strong management rated by KIs ¹⁶⁴ as important for delivery multiple assignments across so many countries. Inclusion of management costs in assignments during the inception phase, supported management inputs to assignments during this time (once the provision for management in inception phase costs was exhausted).
7. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (Effectiveness)	Risk management processes are in place and appropriate mitigation measures defined. Scenario planning was the main tool used to manage risks associated with budget uncertainty. Risks were considered in devising the VfM framework including risks re research take up and engagement in FCAS.	Risks reviewed at a weekly meeting – key risks to achieving programme outcomes driven by delayed to budgetary decisions were noted. Measures to mitigate against risks are noted in quarterly progress reports to FCDO.
8. Equity of programme design and approach (Equity)	No specific metrics for consideration of equity are mentioned in Research's VfM framework, although equity considerations are included in the 5Es approach which is the conceptual framework underpinning Research's approach to VfM measurement.	STAAR's VfM approach is set out in Monitoring Strategy based on the 5Es framework. While there are plans to submit an annual VfM report providing an update on programme results against VfM indicators, VfM reporting has not yet started although the component is now in implementation.

¹⁶³ DAI STAAR Quarterly Report April-July 2022

¹⁶⁴ KIIs Supplier

10 Logframe review

The BASIC logframe was reviewed at baseline to assess how far the logframe sufficiently measures programme impact and outcomes over time. This produced recommendations which were implemented by FCDO, resulting in an updated logframe. However, no further review has been carried out since. As a result, it is necessary to re-assess whether the logframe is an appropriate results measurement framework. This will be done by considering the main changes and key trends identified between the baseline logframe results and midline results; looking at how the results are useful as well as identify some of issues experienced when using and updating the logframe.

The BASIC logframe is helpful in that indicates contextual and programmatic trends. The logframe usefully captures changes at the impact and outcome levels:

- At an impact level, while analysis cannot be produced for indicators 1 and 2 as midline data is not yet available, data from indicator 3 highlights that, as during baseline, social protection investment in 3 of 4 case study countries is almost exclusively funded by donors (data could not be sourced for Yemen).
- Indicators falling under outcome 1 effectively highlight the changes experienced across BASIC outcomes in the four case study countries between baseline and midline. Outcome 1.1 indicates a decrease of TA projects informing country plans, policies, programmes or systems, from 74% to 44%. Outcome 1.3 shows GESI score progression from 3.25 to 3.46. Similarly, outcome indicator 2.1 demonstrates progression between baseline and midline with the average Kirkpatrick score rising from 1 to 2.25 across the four case studies. This points to improvement of delivery against the BASIC ToC.

Overall, the BASIC logframe is useful in highlighting how the programme is progressing and meeting its objectives, as well as areas experiencing challenges which need further attention. Moreover, in providing examples from the case studies, the logframe contextualises achievements and shortcomings enabling direct and applicable learning.

The logframe suffers from a few challenges relating to the sourcing of external data. Firstly, delays or staggered publication timeline of data sources delays the updating impact indicators 1 and 2, and limits timely analysis. Secondly, identifying official records with complete data for national social protection spend (impact 3), has been challenging. Online budgetary information for some case countries is either unavailable, difficult to access, unclear or incomplete. As a result, data has been obtained from a variety of sources, such as through KIIs, and donor documentation.

Prior to starting the endline, the evaluation team thinks the following considerations for monitoring this type of programme would be beneficial.

1. **Use of external data:** reconsider the use of external data to measure impact. Delays or staggered publication timelines means data is not published in a timely enough fashion for a 5-year programme like BASIC. These publication timelines are well suited to longer-term programmes where data can be applied retrospectively.
2. **Revision of topic guides:** revise topic guides to include a specific question around national financing. This will increase chances of collecting robust data around social protection national spend.

Table 10.1 BASIC Lograme

IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	
Vulnerable people can cope better with crises and meet their basic needs	% of population in countries that have received at least one BASIC intervention effectively covered by one social protection benefit: a. world BASIC countries b. Contingency: Population covered by at least one social protection benefit c. Contingency: Women covered by at least one social protection benefit d. Contingency: Children/households receiving child/family cash benefits e. Contingency: Persons above retirement age receiving a pension f. Contingency: Persons with severe disabilities collecting disability social protection benefits	Planned a.	45%	45%	46%	47%	48%	49%	50%	
		Achieved a.	45.2% (2016)	Data not available	47%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned b.	NA	NA	NA	26%	28%	30%	32%	
		Achieved b.	40%	26%	24%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned c.	NA	NA	NA	24%	26%	28%	30%	
		Achieved c.	Data not available	Data not available	22%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned d.	NA	NA	NA	16%	18%	20%	22%	
		Achieved d.	20%	13%	14%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned e.	NA	NA	NA	42%	44%	46%	48%	
		Achieved e.	7%	45%	40%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned f.	NA	NA	NA	24%	26%	28%	30%	
		Achieved f.	23%	25%	22%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
	Impact Indicator 2		Source							
			International Labour Organisation Data on SDG 1.3.1; data imputed using mean data except for ind. Where there are data gaps, imputation was unfeasible due to large volume of missing data in source.							
	Efficient, effective, sustainable funding for social protection: a. UK social protection commitments - USD millions, constant 2019 prices b. Total donor commitments, Social Protection ODA, USD millions, constant 2019 prices	Planned a.	NA	NA	179.5	183.1	186.8	190.5	194.3	
		Achieved a.	33.2	176.0	160	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned b.	NA	2374	2582.3	2634.0	2686.7	2740.4	2795.2	
		Achieved b.	2470.0	2531.7	7435	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
			Source							
			OECD Creditor Reporting System - ODA social protection (Sector: 16010) commitments to developing countries							
	Impact Indicator 3		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	

	Average levels of national financing made available by public bodies to fund the design and delivery of social protection programmes in country-case study countries	Planned	NA	NA	NA	N/A	N/A	Data not yet available	Data not yet available			
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	Data available upon request	Data available upon request tab	Data not yet available	Data not yet available			
			Source									
			Evaluation evidence: case studies									
OUTCOME 1	Outcome Indicator 1.1		Baseline 2017	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021) Case countries only	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	Assumptions		
New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented (bilaterals, multilaterals, Governments, FCDO)	% of BASIC projects (excluding SPACE) and SPACE assignments that were suggested to have informed new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes or systems designed and implemented as a result of BASIC (FCDO, bilaterals, multilaterals, governments) (cumulative) a. TA b. Research	Planned a.	0	0	0	75%	75%	75%	75%	Evidence, expert advice, capacity building and sustained policy engagement are sufficient to generate changes in policies and practice.		
		Achieve a.	0	0	0	74%	44%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available			
		Planned b.	0	0	0	50%	50%	50%	50%			
		Achieved b.	NA	NA	NA	Implementation not started	Implementation not started	Data not yet available	Data not yet available			
		Source										
		Evaluation evidence: Calculated from KIIs that covered a representative number of assignments										
	Outcome Indicator 1.2		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	Assumptions		
	Evidence and advice used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies, practices and programmes (examples from evaluation case study countries)	Planned	0	0	0	0	1	2	4	Evidence, expert advice, capacity building and sustained policy engagement are sufficient to generate changes in policies and practice.		
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	Examples from 4 case studies. Data available upon request	Examples from 4 case studies. Data available upon request	NA	NA			
			Source									
			Evaluation evidence: Learning and country case study evidence; KII interviews with in-country FCDO advisers									
	Outcome Indicator 1.3		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)			
	Design and delivery of social assistance in crises is more inclusive (gender, age, disability and marginalised group): Average GESI scorecard score for case countries. Scoring relates to the aspiration to be GESI-responsive and inclusive, with 1 indicating low and 5 indicating high levels of responsiveness and inclusivity	Planned	0	0	2	3	3	3.5	3.5			
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	3.25	3.46	Data not yet available	Data not yet available			
			Source									
			Evaluation evidence: GESI aspirations score card applied to representative sample of case country assignments during each evaluation phase									
INPUTS (£)			Govt (£)	Other (£)	Total (£)				FCDO SHARE (%)			

INPUTS (HR)										
OUTCOME 2	Outcome Indicator 2.1		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	Assumptions
Improved cross-sector human and institutional capability and capacity (Governments, local actors, multilaterals, bilaterals, FCDO)	Country capability and capacity: Average Kirkpatrick score for case-countries.	Planned	NA	NA	2	2	3	3	3	Evidence, expert advice, capacity building and sustained policy engagement are sufficient to generate changes in policies and practice.
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	1	2.25	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Source								
	Outcome Indicator 2.2	Evaluation evidence: Kirkpatrick learning model applied to representative sample of case country assignments during each evaluation phase								
	3-point traffic light score based on triangulated evaluation evidence to answer EQ6.2 (high quality design links and coordination mechanisms in place - external coherence): Green = coherence realised as per the original Business Case with minor issues Orange = coherence partly realised as per the Business Case with residual issues Red = coherence not realised sufficiently and considerable challenges remain	Planned								
		Achieved					Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
			Source							
		Evaluation evidence: '3-point traffic light score (green; orange; red) based on triangulated evaluation evidence to answer EQ6.2 (external coherence)								
INPUTS (£)		Govt (£)		Other (£)	Total (£)				FCDO SHARE (%)	
Greater awareness, knowledge and learning generated across countries and agencies on social protection approaches in	Output Indicator 3.4		Baseline	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	
	Timely and high quality delivery of the evaluation of BASIC	Planned	0		Contract awarded and evaluation underway	4 detailed and 1 SPACE light touch case study report completed, in house survey completed,	Baseline report approved and midline report on track to be completed by December 2022 KPI measures on quality and	Baseline report recommendations on track to be delivered Midline report delivered and endline report underway to be	Midline report recommendations on track to be implemented. Endline report delivered by Feb 2024	

crises [weighting 20%]					document review and secondary data analysis completed	timeliness fulfil full payment	complete by March 2024.	KPI measures on quality and timeliness fulfil full payment		
					KPI measures on quality and timeliness fulfil full payment		KPI measures on quality and timeliness fulfil full payment			
	Achieved			Contract awarded in October 2020 and BASIC evaluation started.	Baseline approved as per timeline; scored EXCELLENT in EQuALS.	Midline delivery underway as planned and expected to be submitted by Dec 2022.				
	Source									
	Quarterly and annual reports from supplier									
	Output Indicator 3.5		Baseline	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	
	Strong coordination between BASIC suppliers	Planned	0	0	Coordination mechanisms agreed and functioning	Four qualitative examples where coordination has led to improved products or efficiencies with no examples of missed opportunities	Four qualitative examples where coordination has led to improved products or efficiencies with no examples of missed opportunities	To be updated through TAF	TBD	DFID resources are sufficient to set-up and manage the programme.
	Achieved				Data available upon request		Data available upon request			
	Source									
	BASIC TA feedback forms; programme documents									

Source: Adapted from FCDO (2022) BASIC Logframe. N.B. Requests for data should be made to FCDO SPT