

# BETTER ASSISTANCE IN CRISIS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Baseline Report Appendices

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# Contents

<b>Appendix 1. Background .....</b>	<b>4</b>
1.1 Description of the intervention and its context.....	4
<b>Appendix 2. Evaluation methodology and approach .....</b>	<b>15</b>
2.1 Principles underpinning our evaluation approach.....	15
2.2 Evaluation questions, approach, and data collection and analysis methods.....	15
2.3 Stakeholder participation and engagement.....	35
2.4 Consideration of the Paris Declaration.....	36
2.5 Limitations of the evaluation.....	37
2.6 Ethics and safeguarding principles.....	40
2.7 Inclusivity of evaluation design and analysis.....	40
2.8 Data collection procedures.....	40
2.9 Data protection, data security, and intellectual property.....	41
2.10 Evaluation team structure and management.....	43
2.11 Stakeholder engagement.....	46
2.12 Conflicts of interest.....	46
2.13 Quality assurance .....	46
2.14 Risk management .....	47
<b>Appendix 3. Use and influence plan .....</b>	<b>55</b>
3.1 Purpose and objectives.....	55
3.2 Mapping key audiences and uses.....	55
3.3 Evidence uptake challenges and enabling factors .....	56
3.4 Evaluation and learning products.....	57
<b>Appendix 4. BASIC Theory of Change and Logframe review .....</b>	<b>58</b>
4.1 Theory of change review.....	58
4.2 BASIC logframe review .....	66
<b>Appendix 5. Analysis.....</b>	<b>71</b>
5.1 Gender- and inclusion-responsiveness analysis .....	71
5.2 Value for Money analysis .....	74
5.3 Survey.....	77
5.4 Secondary data analysis .....	88
<b>Appendix 6. Case study reports .....</b>	<b>94</b>
6.1 Jordan.....	94
6.2 Nigeria.....	102
6.3 Somalia.....	113
6.4 Yemen.....	123

6.5	SPACE .....	133
<b>Appendix 7. Data collection tools .....</b>		<b>144</b>
7.1	Key Informant Interview topic guide – Academic Institutions.....	144
7.2	Key Informant Interview topic guide – FCDO and Suppliers .....	146
7.3	Key Informant Interview topic guide – Other donors and agencies .....	149
7.4	Key Informant Interview topic guide – Other FCDO complementary programmes.....	151
7.5	Survey questionnaire .....	154
<b>Appendix 8. Mapping findings, conclusions, and recommendations.....</b>		<b>163</b>
<b>Appendix 9. Mapping EQUALS criteria to report content .....</b>		<b>166</b>
<b>Appendix 10. BASIC programme evaluation Terms of Reference.....</b>		<b>169</b>
11.1	Terms of Reference .....	169
11.2	Departures from the Terms of Reference and inception phase.....	190
<b>Appendix 11. Endnotes .....</b>		<b>192</b>

## Appendix 1. Background

*This Appendix presents the background of the evaluation and the BASIC programme. It presents describes the aims and planned work of the BASIC programme, along with its local and international context, geographical coverage, approach to addressing issues of equity, poverty, and exclusion, and key stakeholders. A full overview of the BASIC Theory of Change is presented in Appendix 4.*

### 1.1 Description of the intervention and its context

#### 1.1.1 Delivery status

**TAS has delivered 28 projects to date, engaging with 45 countries** – 33 of them more than once – through 128 unique engagements.<sup>1</sup> FCDO spent £1.69m to 17 BASIC TAS projects (excluding HSOT projects) delivered by BASIC between March 2019 and June 2021 (Table 1.3).<sup>2</sup> Of these 12 were BASIC assignments, three of were related to SPACE, and two were related to Knowledge management and Learning (KML), and Reporting respectively (Table 1.1). SPACE spent just under two thirds of the sum of contract values, and three quarters more than the value spent by BASIC assignments. The average value spent to each BASIC project is also considerably lower than that assigned to SPACE. While this highlights the focus of the programme on the provision of short terms assistance to respond to the Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19), it also reflects the fact that multiple assignments were delivered under the three main SPACE projects, as discussed below.

**Table 1.1: BASIC TAS Project and funding overview (excluding HSOT projects)**

Project type	No. projects	Mean contract value (£m)	Total contract value (£m)	Contracted value (%)
BASIC	12	0.06	0.68	40
SPACE	3	0.33	0.98	58
KML and Reporting	2	0.01	0.10	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** BASIC project Tracker – last updated 22 June 2021. Total fees and claimed expenses.

**We found that most projects were focused on the harmonization of humanitarian and social protection systems explicitly** (Table 1.2). However, when we consider the contract values attached to each project, we found that most funding was allocated to responding to C-19 in a broad sense.

**Table 1.2: Project theme overview (excluding HSOT projects)**

Theme	No. projects	Contract value (£m)	Contract value (%)
C-19 response	3	0.98	58
Nexus	7	0.33	20
Advisor/coordinator	2	0.14	8
MIS	1	0.10	6
Coverage	1	0.08	5
SP strategy support	1	0.04	2
KML and Reporting	2	0.02	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** BASIC project Tracker – last updated 22 June 2021.

**Table 1.3: BASIC project overview**

#	Project	Country	Theme	Type	Start date	End date (as per last amendment or contract)	Spent (£m)
1	HSOT support to BASIC inception phase (part 2)	NA	Management	HSOT	Not reported	Not reported	0.01
2	HSOT support to BASIC inception phase (part 1)	NA	Management	HSOT	Not reported	Not reported	0.06
3	HSOT support to BASIC inception (part 3)	NA	Management	HSOT	Jul-19	Oct-19	0.02
4	BASIC Reporting	NA	Management	BASIC TAS	Jun-19	Jun-20	0.01
5	BASIC KML	NA	Management	BASIC TAS	Jun-19	Jun-20	0.01
6	Facilitation of a workshop on linking humanitarian cash transfers with social protection	Global	Nexus	BASIC TAS	Mar-19	Jun-19	0.02
7	Review of Cash Programming and Linkages to Social Protection in Lebanon	Lebanon	Nexus	BASIC TAS	Apr-19	May-19	0.02
8	Linking Social Protection Systems and Humanitarian Cash Transfers in Nigeria	Nigeria	Nexus	BASIC TAS	May-19	Jul-19	0.05
9	Framework Development for Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Yemen	Yemen	Nexus	BASIC TAS	Apr-19	Oct-19	0.04
10	Mozambique Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection Advisor	Mozambique	Advisor / coordinator	BASIC TAS	May-19	Jun-19	0.04
11	Review and Analysis of Identification and Registration systems in protracted and recurrent crises	South Sudan / Jordan	MIS	BASIC TAS	Oct-19	May-20	0.10
12	Grand-Bargain Sub-Group on Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection Facilitation	Global	Nexus	BASIC TAS	Feb-20	Nov-20	0.05
13	DRC surge	DRC	Not reported	HSOT	Oct-19	Mar-20	0.06
14	Support to Developing the Government of Sudan National Social Protection Strategy	Sudan	SP strategy support	BASIC TAS	Feb-20	Mar-20	0.04
15	Yemen Social Protection and Humanitarian Cash Linkages Donor Coordinator	Yemen	Advisor / coordinator	BASIC TAS	Mar-20	Dec-20	0.10
16	Strategic Advice to DFID to strengthen the reach of the social protection system in Jordan	Jordan	Coverage	BASIC TAS	Mar-20	Mar-21	0.08
17	Action Framework Development for DFID Afghanistan in the Humanitarian Aid and Social Protection Nexus	Afghanistan	Nexus	BASIC TAS	Feb-20	11-20	0.05
18	HSOT SPACE CO Engagement	Global	COVID-19 response	HSOT	Not reported	Not reported	0.09
19	SPACE	Global	COVID-19 response	BASIC TAS	Apr-20	Sep-20	0.26
20	SPACE H	Global	COVID-19 response	BASIC TAS	May-20	Sep-20	0.17
21	SPACE H Advisor	Global	COVID-19 response	HSOT	Apr-20	Oct-20	0.11
22	GB KML	Global	Nexus	BASIC TAS	May-20	Nov-20	0.10
23	SPACE HAO	Global	COVID-19 response	HSOT	Not reported	Not reported	0.07
24	Nigeria Nexus Advisor	Nigeria	Advisor / coordinator	HSOT	Not reported	Not reported	0.10
25	Part-Time Multi-Donor Cash Adviser for the WFP Multi-Purpose Cash Programme in Lebanon	Lebanon	Advisor / coordinator	BASIC TAS	Oct-21	Apr-22	0.06
26	SPACE 2	Global	COVID-19 response	BASIC TAS	Oct-20	May-21	0.79
27	Pakistan PEA	Pakistan	Nexus	BASIC TAS	Sep-21	Dec-21	0.07
28	Somalia Coordinator	Somalia	Advisor / coordinator	HSOT	Sep-21	Jan-22	0.04

**Source:** BASIC TAS project Tracker – last updated November 2021. N.B. Green and orange rows indicate completed and ongoing projects respectively, at the time of reporting.

**BASIC project duration ranged between one and six months, while SPACE projects ranged between four and seven** (Table 1.4). Again, this reflects that each SPACE project is comprised of multiple short term assignments as discussed below. We also found that projects typically took longer on average to complete, when compared to planned delivery dates – in the case of BASIC actual delivery took two months longer on average, and one month longer in the case of SPACE.

**Table 1.4: Project delivery – duration in months (excluding HSOT projects)**

Months	Measure	BASIC (months)	SPACE (months)	Overall (months)
Planned	Min	1	4	1
	Mean	4	5	4
	Max	6	7	7
Actual	Min	1	4	1
	Mean	6	6	6
	Max	16	10	16

Source: BASIC project Tracker – last updated 22 June 2021.

**Most spend was associated with global projects.** Beyond the funding allocated to projects marked as global (which includes SPACE) or open, we found that most BASIC funding to date was allocated to Yemen, followed by Jordan, South Sudan, and Afghanistan (Table 1.5). In fact, Yemen and Jordan were the only countries to receive support from two separate BASIC projects each.

**Table 1.5: Distribution of the BASIC portfolio by country (excluding HSOT projects)**

Country / focus	No. assignments	Contract value (£m)
Global	8	1.17
Yemen	2	0.14
South Sudan/Jordan	1	0.10
Jordan	1	0.08
Afghanistan	1	0.05
Sudan	1	0.05
Nigeria	1	0.04
Mozambique	1	0.04
Lebanon	1	0.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1.69</b>

Source: BASIC project Tracker – last updated 22 June 2021. N.B. Reporting and KML activities were defined as global.

**SPACE was a key focus of stakeholders consulted during inception.** When asked about BASIC TAS, stakeholders consulted during the inception phase for this evaluation often focused on SPACE, reflecting that the new model has quickly become central to programme delivery. However, the original TAS model remains critical for in-depth and longer-term engagement. Whilst the COVID-19 crisis resulted in a dramatic increase in requests for TAS, levels of demand appear to be regularising, offering an opportunity for the programme to become less reactive and more targeted in its country support, with sustained and more intense engagement needed to bring about transformational change. Box 1.1 provides a summary of the findings of the October 2020 Annual Review on programme performance.

**SPACE country engagement was wider than BASIC country engagement,** with 45 countries or regions associated with at least one SPACE output in the period (Table 1.7).<sup>3</sup> Overall, we found that Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey had the highest number of SPACE engagements in the period, and that

eight of the top 10 countries, in terms of total engagements, accessed SPACE services across both phases.<sup>4</sup> While this analysis provides an understanding of the breadth of engagement, it does provide a sense of the depth of engagement in each country.

### Box 1.1: Annual Review's assessment of BASIC performance to date

In the October 2020 Annual Review, BASIC's performance in meeting COVID-19-related needs was particularly praised by users. Whilst overall the programme scored an 'A' (meeting expectations), the TAS workstream was scored 'A+' (exceeding expectations) as it was able to scale up to meet crucial needs for technical support arising from increased interest in SP in crises catalysed by COVID-19. By implementing a new operating model for call downs and drawing on a pre-contracted team of experts, SPACE was able to meet a higher number of country requests, more quickly, drawing on higher quality expertise and with a lighter programme management burden than the previous TAS model.<sup>5</sup> The KML workstream scored an 'A+' (exceeding expectations), because of SPACE's generation of a range of high-quality guidance and analytical papers, as well as workshops and events, tailored to difference contexts and audiences, and produced rapidly to meet emerging needs and capture learning related to COVID-19 response.

**Short term advice provided directly to countries was the most common output produced by a considerable way.** [Table 1.6](#) below presents the top 10 most common outputs produced by SPACE, which account for 84 percent of all outputs produced in the period. A range of varied learning outputs were then produced with a global audience in mind.

**Table 1.6: Overview of top 10 SPACE outputs by type**

Rank	Output	No	No (%)
1	Short-term technical expert advice	80	39
2	Analytical Piece	26	13
3	Presentation (External Actors)	14	7
4	Learning Session and Brief	12	6
5	Blogs	9	4
6	Thematic Policy Briefing	8	4
7	Learning Session	7	3
8	Technical Team Monthly Meeting	7	3
9	Sustained Technical Expert Advice	5	2
10	Recommendations to FCDO for policy engagement with major actors	5	2

**Source:** SPACE Overview of the Service – last updated 18 June 2021. N.B. Outputs provided directly to countries are shown in green.

**Table 1.7: Overview of all completed SPACE engagements by country/region**

Country / region	Phase 1 engagements (May – Sep 2020)	Latest phase 2 engagements (Oct 20 – June 21)	Total engagements (May 20 – June 21)	Both Phases
Nigeria	3	4	7	1
Somalia	2	3	5	1
Turkey	3	2	5	1
Jordan	3	1	4	1
Kenya	1	3	4	1
South Sudan	2	2	4	1
Sudan	3	1	4	1
Afghanistan	3	0	3	0
Cambodia	0	3	3	0
DRC	2	1	3	1
Ghana	1	2	3	1
Indonesia	0	3	3	0
Lebanon	1	2	3	1
OPT	1	2	3	1
Pakistan	1	2	3	1
Peru	1	2	3	1
Uganda	2	1	3	1
Zimbabwe	3	0	3	0
Brazil	0	2	2	0
Ethiopia	2	0	2	0
Fiji	0	2	2	0
Iraq	2	0	2	0
Madagascar	2	0	2	0
Mozambique	2	0	2	0
Nepal	2	0	2	0
Sierra Leone	2	0	2	0
Tajikistan	1	1	2	1
Yemen	1	1	2	1
Zambia	2	0	2	0
Sahel	1	1	2	1
Cameroon	1	0	1	0
Colombia	1	0	1	0
Kiribati	0	1	1	0
Kyrgyzstan	0	1	1	0
Lesotho	1	0	1	0
Liberia	0	1	1	0
Mali	1	0	1	0
Mauritania	1	0	1	0
Niger	1	0	1	0
Papua New Guinea	0	1	1	0
Timor-Leste	0	1	1	0
Venezuela	1	0	1	0
Overseas Territories	0	1	1	0
Caribbean	0	1	1	0
Southern Africa	0	1	1	0

**Source:** SPACE Overview of the Service – last updated 18 June 2021.



**FCDO was identified as the main user of SPACE outputs** (of which 70 percent were short-term expert advice), with some, albeit limited government, donor and agency users identified ([Table 1.8](#)). In the case of global outputs, monitoring data indicated that outputs were public and open to all.

**Table 1.8: Distribution of SPACE outputs by known user**

User	Country-specific output	Global output	Total
FCDO	56	14	70
Global Good	2	53	55
SPACE	0	46	46
UNICEF	9	0	9
GIZ	3	2	5
Host government (with GIZ)	4	0	4
ODI and SPACE	0	2	2
IFRC	2	0	2
World Bank	0	1	1
FCDO (and WFP)	1	0	1
Host government & GIZ	2	0	2
Grand Bargain	0	1	1
FCDO & McKinsey	1	0	1
FCDO & GIZ	1	0	1
EPRI	0	1	1
DFAT	1	0	1
SPIAC-B	0	1	1
WFP	1	0	1
Cash Working Group	1	0	1
Donor Cash Forum	0	1	1
Host government	1	0	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>207</b>

Source: SPACE Overview of the Service – last updated 18 June 2021.

## 1.1.2 Description of BASIC implementation context

### Responding to poverty and fragility

**BASIC seeks to address varied forms of crises, and our evaluation will aim to examine these varied settings through our case study selection.** The underlying premise of the BASIC programme is that extreme poverty and fragility are closely interlinked but the humanitarian system is ill-suited to respond and, in a context of unprecedented need, severely overstretched. Crises are increasingly protracted or recurrent, with 86 percent of aid going to crises lasting three years or more; however, financing and delivery models are mainly short-term and reactive.<sup>6</sup> The programme aims to address the increasing need and specific challenges resulting from different types of crises – all of which jeopardise SDG 1 and its objective of ending poverty in all its forms, as well as the central promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to ‘leave no one behind’.<sup>7</sup>

- **Recurring climate-related shocks and natural disasters:** Climate-related shocks are set to become more frequent: they are a major impediment to development in many countries, setting back

poverty alleviation and leading to loss of lives and livelihoods. These trends are putting greater pressure on an overstretched humanitarian system. Types of disasters that generate most humanitarian need such as cyclones, floods, and droughts are predictable and yet international humanitarian aid often comes too little, too late. £5 million of BASIC funds are committed to climate-related spend, including £3 million for a workstream of BASIC Research which will focus on what works in social protection approaches in climate-related crises.<sup>8</sup>

- **Protracted conflict-related crisis in most fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS):** Most humanitarian aid is spent in conflict-related crises in a relatively small number of countries over long periods of time. FCAS have a percentage of people who are very poor, and routinely feature at the very low end of Human Development Index. As a result, there is considerable overlap between the map of fragile states and humanitarian caseload.<sup>9</sup>
- **Protracted displacement and refugees:** The number of forcibly displaced people is rising, and they are displaced for extended periods, with generational implications. More than 80 percent of refugee crises last for more than ten years, and two in five for more than twenty years. Despite the protracted nature of displacement, responses are often based on short-term planning with funding mostly allocated on a yearly basis.<sup>10</sup>

**Over the past year, existing drivers of fragility and poverty have been exacerbated by primary and secondary effects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.** Our evaluation will consider this driver explicitly, including how BASIC has responded to the needs of countries already experiencing humanitarian crises and with social protection systems of differing levels of maturity. C-19 has been a ‘game-changer’ for levels of interest in social assistance in crises, opening new opportunities to work on critical aspects of the humanitarian-social protection nexus with governments and other partners globally ([Box 1.2](#)).<sup>11</sup> To date, most BASIC engagement has been targeted towards country level support, most often through an FCDO entry point. However, in consultations carried out during the inception phase for this evaluation, stakeholders expressed an interest in expanding BASIC’s offer to a broader range of actors, both at country level and globally, and building strategic partnerships on key policy issues.<sup>12</sup>

#### **Box 1.2: Social protection and the COVID-19 pandemic**

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities (‘COVID-19-intensified’) and created new vulnerabilities (‘COVID-19-specific’) (Archibald et al., 2020), disproportionately affecting the poorest and most vulnerable. Populations who already faced elevated risks of destitution, malnutrition, and mortality pre-pandemic, may be at higher risk of infection and, especially, secondary impacts (SPACE, 2020). Vulnerabilities are produced by both context and identities (and related barriers), with groups who are particularly vulnerable to secondary economic impacts including: women, children, urban informal workers, rural agricultural households, migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and pastoralists.<sup>13, 14, 15</sup>

Social assistance measures are an indispensable part of COVID-19 response, ensuring that people can effectively access health care while supporting job and income security. At the same time, the pandemic has been, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2020) argues, “a wake-up call to strengthen social assistance systems”. It has thrown into sharp relief a familiar paradox – those countries with the greatest needs for social protection have the lowest capacity to address these needs.<sup>16</sup> Social assistance must meet immediate needs as well as respond to the pandemic’s long-term consequences. Social assistance systems face a triple challenge: ensuring continuity of existing social assistance services; immediate scale up of social assistance systems to provide health and economic protection to poor and vulnerable people, wherever possible; and in the medium to longer-term, accelerating progress towards building universal and shock-responsive social assistance systems to mitigate the impact of the economic downturn, and have better capability and resilience to future shocks.<sup>17</sup>

## Policy context and UK strategic priorities

**The rationale for intervention is underpinned by suboptimal use of social protection approaches.** The starting point of the BASIC programme is that social assistance can help address crises more effectively and efficiently, but is currently underutilised due to limited evidence, knowledge, and capacity to guide programme design and delivery, and political economy challenges to reform.<sup>18</sup> Programme documents argue that the delivery of humanitarian cash is often fragmented, weakly coordinated, short-term, and unpredictable even in protracted crises, leaving no sustainable systems behind. In addition, they contend that social assistance approaches can help address these weaknesses, and transcend the humanitarian-development divide, by bridging humanitarian cash transfers with longer-term social assistance and providing a medium-term exit strategy from humanitarian assistance to sustainable, national government-owned systems. A series of important policy commitments ([Box 1.3](#)) reflect a clear international consensus to maximise the use of social assistance systems and approaches in crises to help provide more effective, efficient, and sustainable responses to affected populations.

### **Box 1.3: Key policy commitments related to the use of social assistance in humanitarian response**

At the **2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS)** stakeholders called for crisis responses which more effectively meet immediate needs but also contribute to people's longer-term resilience, drawing on development approaches and financing – that is, for strengthening of the humanitarian-development nexus.

The **Grand Bargain**, launched at the WHS, committed donors (including the UK) and humanitarian organisations to improving the effectiveness of humanitarian action, including through increased use and coordination of cash programming, and more support for local and national responders (localisation). The FCDO is co-Chair of the Grand Bargain Sub-Group on Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection.

The **2016 Wilton Park Principles** commit key humanitarian actors, including the UK, to work more through national and local systems, support host communities and social cohesion, enable economic participation, and provide impactful and innovative financing.

The **2017 UK Humanitarian Reform Policy** outlines a commitment to: help countries prepare for crises by building resilience; strengthen linkages between humanitarian and development approaches; and reform the humanitarian system through innovation and greater efficiency. Social protection approaches can drive humanitarian reform.

Both tackling poverty (helping the bottom billion) and climate change are expected to feature prominently in the **forthcoming UK aid strategy**. 'Humanitarian preparedness and response' also forms one of the seven global challenges which will form the backbone of the strategy. This will include reforming the international humanitarian system to lead stronger collective international response to crises.

**FCDO SPT has three main policy priorities:** first, and overarchingly, increasing the coverage and adequacy of social protection in general; second, increasing use of social assistance in crises (with BASIC the centrepiece of this effort); and third, more inclusive social protection, with reference to gender and other dimensions of vulnerability, including disability. SPT seeks to influence the uptake of each of these agendas through its programmes.

### 1.1.3 Stakeholder analysis

#### Other relevant programming

**There are several other FCDO programmes which are working in the fields of humanitarian assistance and/or social protection** and have core research and/or TAS workstreams. Given BASIC's wider influencing aim of normalising the use of social assistance in crises and strengthening linkages between social and humanitarian assistance, other relevant donor and multilateral programmes were considered. An illustrative summary of these programmes is provided in [Table 1.9](#).

**Table 1.9: Other relevant FCDO and wider donor and agency programming**


Programme	Objective
<b>FCDO</b>	
<b>Gender-Responsive Social Protection (GSP)</b>	To enhance outcome for women and girls from social protection systems, through high quality research and evidence on what interventions are most effective, and provision of advisory services and resources to FCDO and partners to allow them to design, implement and monitor and evaluate social protection systems that deliver improved results for women and girls.
<b>Maintaining Essential Services after a Natural Disaster (MAINTAINS)</b>	To undertake multi-country research to generate operationally relevant evidence on how to design, fund and better deliver essential (education, health, social protection, nutrition, and water and sanitation) services that can respond to shocks in weak and fragile and conflict affected states.
<b>Supporting Pastoralism and Agriculture in Recurrent and Protracted Crises (SPARC)</b>	To generate evidence that will strengthen the effectiveness of agricultural programmes to support and rebuild agriculture during different types of protracted crises, including those in fragile and conflict-affected states.
<b>Centre for Global Disaster Protection (UK Prosperity Fund)</b>	To support developing countries to strengthen their pre-disaster planning and financial arrangements so they can respond more rapidly and effectively when a natural disaster strikes, thereby reducing the impact on people and helping to safeguard economic development.
<b>Humanitarian Global Services</b>	To improve the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of humanitarian responses, by providing financial support to five independent partners that produce global public goods on providing early warning, advice, and risk analysis to the international community, and safety and security advice to the NGO sector.
<b>Other illustrative donor and agency programming</b>	
<b>Pacific Partnerships for Social Protection (P4SP) (DFAT)</b>	A four-year AUD18 million initiative launched in 2021 to establish and strengthen social protection systems in Pacific Island Countries. The P4SP Initiative aims to provide catalytic technical assistance to establish and improve PIC social protection systems. It aims to support analysis for system and program development, facilitate cross country cooperation and learning and fund pilot programs, where required. It will be a scalable, flexible mechanism that allows bilateral programs to buy into the investment.
<b>World Bank Social Protection initiatives</b>	Delivery strategy on Social Protection to improve resilience, equity and opportunity for people in LMICs, with a focus on extending coverage, links with job creation programmes and availability of knowledge about what works in social protection. Implemented through large, multi-sector in-country social protection programming and complemented with global research support, especially in response to C-19.
<b>ECHO technical assistance facility (managed by WFP)</b>	Explore how social protection systems can be strengthened in fragile and forced displacement contexts, with a view to contributing to the global learning agenda on when and how these can be used to address humanitarian needs in a more cost-effective, efficient and predictable way. Short-term technical assistance was provided to improve programme design or implementation in nine countries facing protracted crises. Each assignment tackled a priority theme identified collectively by humanitarian and development partners, complementing and catalysing efforts by national governments and their partners to enhance the well-being of chronically poor or vulnerable populations, those affected by crises, those living in conflict situations and/or refugees.
<b>Social Protection (FAO)</b>	FAO provides policy support to countries, aims to generate evidence on the impact of social protection interventions, disseminate knowledge and promote knowledge exchange, develop capacity within governments, civil society and development partners and increases awareness of the effectiveness of social protection with a focus of agricultural infrastructure and programming.
<b>Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (ILO)</b>	The Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board is an inter-agency coordination mechanism—composed of representatives of international organizations and bilateral institutions – that aims to enhance global coordination and advocacy on social protection issues and to coordinate international cooperation in country demand-driven actions.
<b>Improving Social Protection for All (ISPA)</b>	A set of tools that aim to help countries improve their social protection system by analysing its strengths and weaknesses and offering options for further action. These assessments analyse the state of the country's social protection system, a particular programme, or delivery aspect.



## Overview of BASIC stakeholders

**BASIC seeks to influence a wide range of stakeholders to draw on social protection approaches in crisis response, through direct support and/or a range of wider influencing efforts.** Our understanding of who BASIC stakeholders are, and the nature of BASIC's engagement with them, will inform our design of data collection strategies. Stakeholder consultations indicated that whilst most early BASIC support was provided to FCDO Country Offices, the range of stakeholders being engaged by the programme has, and will continue to, expand over time. Figure 2 illustrates the main stakeholder groups the programme intends to engage, influence and/or benefit. It is expected the type and strength of these relationships will continue to evolve across the programme's lifetime; our stakeholder mapping will therefore be revisited at the beginning of each stage of the evaluation.

**Figure 1.1: Mapping of BASIC key stakeholders**



Source: Integrity (2021).

## Appendix 2. Evaluation methodology and approach

*This section presents our evaluation methodology and management approach, covering our:*

- **Overarching evaluation design**, as set out in Section 2 of our main report, covering the guiding principles of our evaluation, specification of EQs, our evaluation framework and approach, data collection and analysis methods used, sampling, data disaggregation, and triangulation (including inherent imbalances and biases), engagement with evaluation participants and stakeholders, and our application of the Paris Declaration principles.
- **Approach to ethics and safeguarding**. This includes an overview of our key guiding principles with respect to ethics, consideration of different groups in our design, adherence to international best practices and “Do No Harm”, stakeholder engagement, data protection and security, safeguarding and duty of care.
- **Approach to evaluation management**, which includes team and stakeholder management, risk management, use and influence plan, conflicts of interest, the ability of the team to work freely, and our commitments to monitoring use of evaluation products.

### 2.1 Principles underpinning our evaluation approach

The following key principles underpinned our evaluation approach:

- **Independence** is crucial to the credibility and integrity of evaluation findings. Independence was maintained by ensuring our team did not suffer from conflicts of interest in terms of BASIC's evaluation (see , and that feedback from a range of stakeholders and data sources are used, so findings were not overly in favour of a specific stakeholder group.
- **A utility-focused approach** was important to ensure optimal use of the evidence, findings, and lessons by programme stakeholders. A participatory approach was used to maximise engagement of the evaluation's target audiences in the evaluation process, engender ownership in its findings and secure buy-in to learning and recommendations.
- **Rigour in our methodological approach is critical to** generate defensible conclusions feeding into implementable, useful recommendations,
- **Minimisation of the burden of the evaluation process** by avoidance of duplication of evidence gathering being conducted by TAF and Research workstream suppliers. To streamline the process, the evaluation team will use the evidence and gathered by both suppliers in their KML activities to feed into the evidence base for the evaluation.
- **Adherence to high ethical standards** in our conduct, ensuring that the evaluation is inclusive, respectful of participant rights, and cognisant of confidentiality and privacy concerns of respondents.

### 2.2 Evaluation questions, approach, and data collection and analysis methods

#### 2.2.1 Refining the Evaluation Questions

During inception, we considered the questions set out in the ToR, consulted with stakeholders on their evaluation and learning needs. We then revised these questions using the following steps:

- Prioritisation of “mission critical” EQs for users by including questions/themes suggested by stakeholders during the inception phase consultation process.
- Revisions focused on refining the ToR questions to make them simpler and clearer.
- Division of questions into key research questions that are higher level and more strategically focused questions as well as sub-questions which will be used in data collection processes.
- Regrouping of the questions to better align with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) evaluation criteria.

- Streamlining the balance of coverage of accountability questions and learning themes, where performance questions focus on “what” has happened and learning themes examine “how” and “why” change may have occurred.
- Consideration of when to ask the different EQs (baseline, midline, endline) and to whom and how (using which data collection method).

During the data review and analysis tasks of the baseline phase, we further refined our questions to improve utility. These changes largely reorganised questions so that the same volume of evaluation evidence can be explored and discussed more efficiently and clearly in the report ([Table 2.1](#)).

**Table 2.1: Revised Evaluation Questions**

OECD-DAC Criteria	Previous Sub-Evaluation Question	Revised Sub-Evaluation Question	Rationale for revision
<b>Relevance</b>	1.1 Is BASIC aligned with FCDO priorities (relating to social protection, humanitarian, and climate change) and Grand Bargain commitments?	NA	No change
<b>Relevance</b>	1.2 Is BASIC responding to demand and meeting priority needs of immediate users at global and at country levels?	NA	No change
<b>Relevance</b>	1.3 Does the design of BASIC allow for an appropriate balance between strategic, and demand driven (responsive and flexible) support?	NA	No change
<b>Relevance</b>	1.4 Is BASIC's articulation of ToC sufficient and plausible and does it comprehensively capture in its assumptions blocking and enabling factors?	Removed	Removed and addressed in Appendix 5
<b>Relevance</b>	1.5 Is the logframe an appropriate results measurement framework?		
<b>Relevance</b>	1.6 To what extent do BASIC's interventions take GESI considerations into account?	1.5 To what extent do BASIC's interventions take GESI considerations into account?	Numbering change
<b>Relevance</b>	1.7 Have changes to the context impacted the relevance of BASIC and its workstreams?	1.6 Context and adaptation: Have change in context affected the relevance of BASIC, and has the programme adapted appropriately to these changes?	Merged context and adaptation to avoid duplication; numbering change
	1.8 Has BASIC adapted appropriately to contextual changes?		
<b>Coherence</b>	6.1 What are the linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and its workstreams?	2.1 Internal Coherence: What are the design linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and its workstreams?	Clarified distinction between “design links” and “coordination mechanisms” and focused on BASIC case countries.
<b>Coherence</b>	6.2 What are the linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and other relevant FCDO and development partner interventions in BASIC's deep engagement countries and globally?	2.2 External Coherence: What are the design linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and other relevant FCDO and development partner interventions in BASIC case countries and globally?	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	2.1 Has each workstream, and BASIC overall, achieved their intended outputs and contributed to outcomes?	3.1 Has each workstream, and BASIC overall, achieved their intended outputs?	Separated sub-EQs out to address outputs and outcomes separately, numbering change
<b>Effectiveness</b>	2.2 How effective are the different types of BASIC's interventions (e.g., smaller demand driven TAS versus longer-term deeper engagement)?	3.3 What factors have contributed to or hindered achievement of outputs and why?	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	2.3 To what extent has BASIC contributed to the development of gender-responsive and inclusive social protection policies, systems, and programmes (and programme outputs) in partner countries and globally?	3.3 Has each workstream, and BASIC overall, contributed to outcomes?	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	2.4 What factors have contributed to or hindered the achievement of results affecting the impact of TA / research on system level change (including gender responsive social protection systems).	3.4 To what extent has BASIC contributed to the development of gender-responsive and inclusive social protection policies, systems, and programmes (and programme outputs) in partner countries and globally?	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	2.5 How effective are BASIC's different intervention types at responding to the needs of vulnerable	3.5 What factors have contributed to or hindered achievement of outcomes and	




OECD-DAC Criteria	Previous Sub-Evaluation Question	Revised Sub- Evaluation Question	Rationale for revision
	groups and in ensuring politically sensitive delivery?	why? Have underpinning assumptions held?	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	2.6 Do the three workstream of BASIC synergize and together bring about changes in the use of SP approaches in crises?	3.6 Do the three workstream of BASIC synergize and together bring about changes in the use of SP approaches in crises?	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	2.7 Has BASIC succeeded in delivering change in accordance with envisaged causal impact pathways in its Theory of Change and have underpinning assumptions held?	NA	Dropped ToC effectiveness questions as it is covered in new #1.4; numbering change
<b>Impact</b>	4.1 Logframe: Has BASIC and its workstream achieved or likely to contribute to intended impacts per logframe and Business Case?	4.1 Has BASIC and its workstream achieved or likely to contribute to intended impacts per the theory of change and business case?	Simplified language
<b>Impact</b>	4.2 Systemic Change: What has been the impact of BASIC and its workstreams on policy, programme and system change in deep engagement countries? What complementary actions outside of BASIC are necessary to create impact?"	4.2 What has been the impact of BASIC and its workstreams on policy, programme and system change in countries with varying levels of engagement? What complementary actions outside of BASIC are necessary to create impact?	Clarified to focus on case-study countries
<b>Impact</b>	4.3 How have stakeholders responded outside of BASIC support to drive systemic change?	NA	
<b>Impact</b>	4.4 What has been the impact of BASIC and its workstreams on policy, programme and system change globally (including legacy impact of SPACE)?	4.3 What has been the impact of BASIC and its workstreams on policy, programme and system change globally (including legacy impact of SPACE)?	Numbering change
<b>Impact</b>	4.5 Synergistic impact: Does the combination of BASIC workstreams affect the level of impact achieved by BASIC?	NA	Content covered in new #4.1
<b>Efficiency</b>	3.1 Does BASIC, its workstreams and different types of intervention represent good value for money in terms of the 5Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness)?	5.1 Does BASIC, its workstreams and different types of intervention represent good value for money in terms of the 5Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness)?	Numbering change
<b>Efficiency</b>	3.2 Is BASIC managed to ensure delivery of VfM throughout the programme cycle (design, procurement, delivery and close of interventions)?	5.2 Is BASIC managed to ensure delivery of VfM throughout the programme cycle (design, procurement, delivery and close of interventions)?	Numbering change
<b>Efficiency</b>	3.3 Is BASIC responding to demand and needs in a timely way and in line with user expectations?	5.3 Is BASIC responding to demand and needs in a timely way and in line with user expectations?	Numbering change
<b>Sustainability</b>	5.1 What is the likelihood that the policy, programme and system changes supported by BASIC at global and country levels will be sustainable after the programme ends?	6.1 What is the likelihood that foundations for catalytic change or policy, programme and system changes at global or at country levels have been laid as a result of BASIC Support?	Merged previous 5.1 and 5.3 to avoid duplication
<b>Sustainability</b>	5.2 What are the factors likely to hinder/support sustainable outcome in terms of influencing global policy and influencing governments and partners?	6.2 What are the factors likely to hinder/support sustainable outcome in terms of influencing global policy and influencing governments and partners?	Numbering change
<b>Sustainability</b>	5.3 Have the foundations for catalytic change been established even if longer term change is not yet detectable?	NA	Merged previous 5.1 and 5.3 to avoid duplication
<b>Sustainability</b>	5.4 Has BASIC increased the uptake and institutional capabilities of FCDO and partners on gender responsive social protection approaches?	NA	Content addressed in new #3.3

## 2.2.2 Design of the evaluation

**Our approach was utilisation-focused and used multiple approaches.** We considered several methodologies before selecting the design for the evaluation of BASIC. It draws on a theory-based

approach, supplemented by a case-based approach, both of which are underpinned by mixed-methods and Contribution Analysis ([Figure 2.1](#): Overview of BASIC's Evaluation Design).

**Figure 2.1: Overview of BASIC's Evaluation Design**



**We selected a non-experimental design, given the challenges in selecting suitable comparators that have not received BASIC support.** BASIC seeks to change how multiple fragile states draw on social assistance approaches in times of crises. Because countries have already been selected for support, the interest of FCDO in understanding how BASIC was implemented in detail, and the various operating contexts of BASIC, we implemented a non-experimental design. We considered the additional effects of BASIC in targeted countries of support by considering what would have happened in the absence of support while collecting and reviewing data, i.e., assess the strength of self-reported counterfactual claims and alternative explanatory factors.

**Central to BASIC's evaluation design is the use of a theory-based approach.** Given the interest in understanding any effects of BASIC and how they arose, implementing a theory-based approach is appropriate. Using the existing ToC to assess BASIC provides a reasonably systematic framework for understanding whether the programme is working as intended ([Box 2.1](#)). In practice, we structured data collection and analysis to assess the validity of anticipated causal pathways depicted in the ToC and the assumptions underpinning them. This approach enabled us to draw conclusions about whether and how BASIC contributed to changes in the use of social assistance approaches during crises, gather early feedback about what is or is not working and identify any unintended effects of BASIC.

#### **Box 2.1: Strengths of a theory-based approach**

- Generates understanding of what types of intervention work in different contexts.
- Distils lessons which can allow generalisation beyond one project.
- Provides flexibility to combine different data collection approaches and is cost-effective.

**We updated the BASIC ToC to support the evaluation and programme management.** The quality of a theory-based approach depends largely on the depiction of the ToC. Theory-based evaluations require a predicted change to assess. During inception, we facilitated a participatory ToC workshop with the FCDO team and BASIC's suppliers. The workshop demonstrated the sufficiency of the articulation of the BASIC programme ToC, thus allowing an assessment on its basis. During the

baseline, we also undertook a focused review of the BASIC ToC to further understand and refine the causal pathways and assumptions underpinning it. These refinements informed the design of data collection tools and the lines of inquiry adopted during data collection. Further refinements are expected throughout the evaluation contract as evaluation evidence is produced.

**We supplemented a theory-based approach with a case-based approach.** A case-based approach considers a specific unit for systematic analysis where the use of theory is less pronounced.<sup>19</sup> We selected countries receiving BASIC support as the case unit.<sup>20</sup> We used this approach to enrich the theory-based approach by providing detailed illustrations and learning relating to how BASIC has been used in-country. This approach supported an in-depth assessment of BASIC's work in priority countries, allowing the team to examine over time, using a longitudinal approach, the extent to which BASIC engineered change, given the context of the specific country and the intervention modality and support provided. To support the implementation of this approach, and address the challenges outlined in Box 2.2, we used the following supporting frameworks in a light-touch manner:

- **Actor narrative interest model:** Related to political economy analysis, the actor, narrative, interest model considers how policy process are affected by their context. It assumes that the policy development process is non-linear and complex. In our case, it assumes the development of social assistance policy for use in times of crisis is not simply a translation of science to policy but more a function of the interplay between three key areas - social assistance policy narratives, actors and networks, and politics and interests.
- **Kirkpatrick model:** We will apply the Kirkpatrick model to assess the effects of TAS. The Kirkpatrick model is an approach used to assess learning effectiveness of training which has been applied to the delivery of TAS. We will use the model to assess the effects of providing TAS. It considers effective training to be comprised of four levels: immediate reaction, learning, behaviour change, and broader results.

We operationalised these approaches by 1) developing associated codes to use when reviewing documents, 2) including specific questions and prompts in interview topic guides, and 3) structured discussion during internal analysis sessions.

#### **Box 2.2: Challenges of evaluating capacity building and policy influence interventions**

- **Research and policy influence:** It can be challenging to determine the links between the outputs of the research and changes in policy as policy change is not linear and policy processes are shaped by a multitude of interacting forces and actors. Moreover, policy change tends to take place over long timeframes<sup>21</sup>.
- **Evaluating TAS:** Many of the results of capacity building activities are intangible and hard to measure. Capacity development is not a linear process and there are other factors at play in determining how technical assistance impacts on capacity and capability. Technical assistance can take time to deliver strengthened capacity.

**We used Contribution Analysis to distinguish between the contribution of BASIC to observed outcomes and impacts and alternative factors.** A well-established approach developed by John Mayne in the 2000s,<sup>22</sup> Contribution Analysis is designed to be used alongside theories of change to measure the contribution of a programme to results, considering alternative explanations. Six steps are used to apply this method as shown below ([Table 2.2: Using Contribution Analysis](#)), with data collection spanning the pre-intervention situation to allow comparison with what happened post intervention at end-line. We used this approach as it provides a useful means to appraise the effects of an intervention in the absences of an experimental or quasi-experimental design.

**We used mixed-methods to support our blended approach.** We operationalised our blended approach by collecting a range of quantitative and qualitative data (Subsections 2.2.3-4). Taking a

mixed-method approach enabled us to answer a more varied set of EQs. It also reduced the risk of biased findings because it permitted the triangulation or systematic comparison of evaluation evidence produced by different sources and researchers (Subsection 2.2.4).

**Table 2.2: Using Contribution Analysis**

#	Step description	Practical procedure to be followed
1	<b>Set out the attribution problem to be addressed</b>	Refine EQs during our inception phase to reflect FCDO priorities for the evaluation.
2	<b>Develop a ToC</b>	Analyse the existing ToC and build consensus on causal pathways and assumption of interest to test in each evaluation phase.
3	<b>Populate the ToC with existing data and evidence</b>	Collect case study data from the sources described below and map findings against the ToC using coding in MS Excel.
4	<b>Assemble and assess the ToC</b>	Test the ToC by analysing how far case study results evidence the theory works as intended. Where case study results do not support the theory, we will assess for 1) theory failure, 2) implementation failure or 3) context influence. Where the theory is supported, we will consider what facilitating factors might be present. This process will produce a performance story, or SoC and supporting commentary to disprove other possible stories of change.
5	<b>Seek out additional evidence</b>	If the analysis is inconclusive, review existing data to address weaknesses in the performance story or plan to collect it in the next phase.
6	<b>Revise and strengthen our understanding of the ToC</b>	Repeat steps 3-5 and during the midline and endline report to refine the contribution narrative and disprove other performance stories for each case.

**Source:** Integrity (2020). Adapted from Mayne (2001).



### 2.2.3 Evaluation framework

This section presents our detailed evaluation framework (Table 2.3). It clearly maps evaluation questions and learning themes to data collection and analytical methods. The programme logframe (as reviewed in Appendix 4) specifies a set of indicators for each impact, outcome and output statement, and these indicators have all been mapped to questions and data sources presented in this framework. This framework shows how the data collection and analytical methods (presented in below) were expected to be used to address evaluations questions as part of our evaluation design.

**Table 2.3: BASIC programme evaluation framework**

Sub-EQ Performance (what)	Learning Themes (why and how)	Data collection						Analysis methods			
		Doc. Rev.	Mon. data	Ex. data	Surv.	KII	CS	GESI	VFM	SoC	CA
EQ1 Relevance: To what extent do BASIC interventions, individually or in combination, suit the needs of target groups?											
1.1 Is BASIC aligned with FCDO priorities (relating to social protection, humanitarian, and climate change) and Grand Bargain commitments?	Meeting demand and needs										
1.2 Is BASIC responding to demand and meeting priority needs of immediate users at global and at country levels?	Adaptation and evolution of service offering										
1.3 Does the design of BASIC allow for an appropriate balance between strategic, and demand driven (responsive and flexible) support?											
1.4 Is BASIC's articulation of ToC sufficient and plausible and does it comprehensively capture in its assumptions blocking and enabling factors?											
1.5 Is the logframe an appropriate results measurement framework?											
1.6 To what extent do BASIC's interventions take GESI considerations into account?											
1.7 Have change in context affected the relevance of BASIC, and has the programme adapted appropriately to these changes?											
EQ2 Coherence: Are BASIC interventions internally coherent and do they work in harmony with the operations of other donors and actors in the same field?											
2.1 Internal Coherence: What are the design linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and its workstreams?	NA										
2.2 External Coherence: What are the design linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and other relevant FCDO and development partner interventions in BASIC case countries and globally?											

Sub-EQ Performance (what)	Learning Themes (why and how)	Data collection						Analysis methods			
		Doc. Rev.	Mon. data	Ex. data	Surv.	KII	CS	GESI	VFM	SoC	CA
EQ3: Effectiveness: To what extent are BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, attaining their objectives and why?											
3.1 Has each workstream, and BASIC overall, achieved their intended outputs?	Delivery of BASIC in different contexts										
3.3 What factors have contributed to or hindered achievement of outputs and why?	Improving effectiveness and maximising impact										
3.3 Has each workstream, and BASIC overall, contributed to outcomes?	Measurement of effectiveness of BASIC and its workstreams										
3.4 To what extent has BASIC contributed to the development of gender-responsive and inclusive social protection policies, systems, and programmes (and programme outputs) in partner countries and globally?											
3.5 What factors have contributed to or hindered achievement of outcomes and why? Have underpinning assumptions held?											
3.6 Do the three workstreams of BASIC synergize and together bring about changes in the use of SP approaches in crises?											
EQ4 Impact: What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended consequences of BASIC interventions, individually and in combination?											
4.1 Has BASIC and its workstreams achieved or likely to contribute to intended impacts per the theory of change and business case?	Outcomes of social protection approaches in crises versus humanitarian approaches										
4.2 What has been the impact of BASIC and its workstreams on policy, programme and system change in countries with varying levels of engagement? What complementary actions outside of BASIC are necessary to create impact?											
4.3 What has been the impact of BASIC and its workstreams on policy, programme and system change globally (including legacy impact of SPACE)?	Influencing behaviour change, policies and operations of national governments and other partners										
	Knowledge exchange and learning across the sector										
EQ5 Efficiency: Are BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, delivering in a timely and cost-efficient manner?											
5.1 Does BASIC, its workstreams and different types of intervention represent good value for money in terms of the 5Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness)?	Efficiency of central programme delivery (bringing delivery of the different TAS requests										


Sub-EQ Performance (what)	Learning Themes (why and how)	Data collection						Analysis methods			
		Doc. Rev.	Mon. data	Ex. data	Surv.	KII	CS	GESI	VFM	SoC	CA
5.2 Is BASIC managed to ensure delivery of Vfm throughout the programme cycle (design, procurement, delivery and close of interventions)?	together) through a single supplier?										
5.3 Is BASIC responding to demand and needs in a timely way and in line with user expectations?											
EQ6 Sustainability: To what extent are the benefits and activities associated with BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, likely to continue after funding ceases?											
6.1 What is the likelihood that foundations for catalytic change or policy, programme and system changes at global or at country levels have been laid as a result of BASIC Support?	Sustainable capacity building (FCDO, country governments and other development partners)										
6.2 What are the factors likely to hinder/support sustainable outcome in terms of influencing global policy and influencing governments and partners?											

**Source:** Integrity (2021). *N.B. Doc. Rev = Document review; Mon. data = Monitoring data; Ex. Data = External data; Surv. = Survey; KII = Key informant interview; CS = Case studies; GESI= Gender Equality and Social Inclusion scorecard analysis; VFM = Value for Money analysis; SoC = Learning case Stories of Change; CA = Contribution Analysis.*

## 2.2.4 Evaluation methods

This subsection describes all data collection activities undertaken in the baseline. In total, we engaged with 126 BASIC stakeholders against an original plan of up to 240 stakeholders (Figure 5). In line with our original plan, no primary research was undertaken with end-beneficiaries of BASIC (see the mapping of BASIC stakeholders in [Figure 2.2](#)).<sup>23</sup>

**Figure 2.2: Overview of baseline data collection and analysis**



**We drew on recognised data collection methods to evaluate BASIC.** The evaluation methods we used are described and justified in [Table 2.4](#) below, with a set of limitations discussed alongside strategies undertaken to mitigate these below.

**Access to analytical outputs is provided where appropriate but raw data is not provided to protect the anonymity of evaluation participants**, i.e., we want to prohibit the ability of evaluation users to link evaluation participants to report content. As such, analytical outputs from specific data collection tasks are provided in Appendix 5, and raw and coded data will be held securely, as per our data protection and information security policies (Appendix 2.8-2.9).



**Table 2.4: Overview of evaluation data collection and analysis methods**

Method description	Justification	Limitations	Mitigations
<b>Data collection methods</b>			
<b>Document review:</b> A qualitative review of key FCDO and donor and agency documents related to the evaluation. We implemented our review following Bowen (2009): A high-level review of documents was completed to determine their relevance, quality, and usefulness to the evaluation. All documents marked for detailed review were read thoroughly and coded against our EQs using MS Excel.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess questions related to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and impact.</li> <li>Gain useful programme context and background information.</li> <li>Track programme developments over time</li> <li>Refine the BASIC ToC and data collection tools</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Challenging to assess data completeness and the presence of underlying author biases.</li> <li>In-consistent reporting / discussion of key themes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early engagement with FCDO to collect documents</li> <li>High-level review of documents to determine usefulness before committing to detailed review</li> <li>Clear documentation of coding to link findings to documents using MS Excel.</li> <li>Annotation of coding to document coder views on bias and interpretation in MS Excel</li> </ul>
<b>Secondary data analysis (Monitoring data):</b> Monitoring data collected by suppliers to support programme management were analysed. This primarily focused on BASIC TAS given no main-stage BASIC Research implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess questions related to effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and changes in context.</li> <li>Gain understanding of programme delivery (translation of inputs into outputs)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited documentation explaining monitoring datasets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Make early data requests and identify clear cut-off point for data to be shared</li> </ul>
<b>Secondary data analysis (External data):</b> A range of open-source data were used to assess the maturity of social protection systems and the prevalence of different types of crises overtime for all BASIC countries and country case studies using mean values for indicators (see Appendix 5).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gain understanding of country performance</li> <li>Provide a global overview of current social protection systems and crises levels and how they are changing over time</li> <li>Cost-effective enables comparison across other programmes using common indicators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Challenging to make contribution claims to external indicators that could be influenced by a range of factors</li> <li>Data may be incomplete.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specification of pre-analysis plan to guide analysis prior to data access and processing, including processes for dealing with missing values (imputation)</li> <li>Highlight the contextual nature of data in reporting, i.e., make it clear the design is not attributing changes in external data indicators to BASIC</li> <li>Reporting confidence intervals and standard errors with mean values to indicate spread</li> </ul>
<b>In-house survey:</b> A focused online, routed census survey using MS Forms. The survey was structured against the ToC and collected both qualitative and quantitative data. The survey tool used is presented in Appendix 5. Our approach to sampling is presented below. The main output of the survey is a set of descriptive analyses mapped against the ToC (See Appendix 4).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Able to collect data from population within evaluation time and resource constraints.</li> <li>Collect representative views on BASIC relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability</li> <li>Appraise changes in capability and the influence of BASIC on country plans, policies, and systems</li> <li>Online surveys are cost-effective and permit a range of questioning styles</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In-country adviser time-constraints may limit responses</li> <li>Response rates associated with online surveys are usually lower than those achieved by other modes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Questionnaire length piloted, then subsequently revised and shortened.</li> <li>Targeted email communications shared by FCDO SPT with the population</li> <li>Questionnaire length shortened during mainstage delivery, and mainstage delivery period extended to improve response rate</li> <li>Report response rate to FCDO periodically to enable proactive management.</li> </ul>
<b>Key informant interviews:</b> We completed 42 semi-structured interviews, lasting 60-90 minutes. Interview guides were structured against the evaluation framework. Main questions were used to elicit general views about BASIC. Each main question included additional prompts to collect more detailed responses to substantiate interviewee answers – for example, to explain why a change happened, for whom or in what context. For each interview the following outputs were	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key method to engage FCDO SPT and supplier in detail as part of the evaluation.</li> <li>Collect strategic views on the performance of BASIC for central and global stakeholders</li> <li>Situate BASIC in its wider global context</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited engagement from informants</li> <li>Strategic responses by informants may produce biased data</li> <li>Topic guides not fit for purpose</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early requests for contact details to FCDO through the data sharing agreement of the contract, and desk research.</li> <li>Undertook five pilot interviews, co-lead by two evaluators, and refined guides based on feedback.</li> <li>Clear process and documentation procedures, including an interview recruitment log.</li> </ul>

Method description	Justification	Limitations	Mitigations
<p>produced: audio recording, summary note structured against the evaluation framework, coded interview data against the framework in MS Excel.</p> <p><b>Country case studies:</b> Four baseline case studies provided a detailed examination of the implementation and performance of BASIC activities, in combination and/or independently, in a range of diverse country contexts. These cases will be revisited in future evaluation phases to understand the long-term effects of BASIC intervention. Country sampling is discussed below. Case studies will be underpinned by a focused document review, secondary data analysis and country-level KIIs, following the approach specified in the relevant tasks above. Contribution Analysis will be used to consider the contribution of BASIC to any results observed. Key outputs of this task included: interview recordings, coded data against the evaluation matrix, and a summary report (See Appendix 6). Operational procedures used are specified in below).</p> <p><b>Learning case study:</b> Case study that explored the extent to which and how SPACE delivered change. This learning case took a Stories of Change (SoC) approach to capture important programme learning. The focus of future learning cases will be determined in advance of future evaluation phases. This learning case applied the same delivery model of, and produced the same outputs as, country case countries. Sampling is discussed below).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Case-based approach to exploring country-level effects in detail across all OECD-DAC criteria.</li> <li>Useful means to engage with wider BASIC stakeholders, especially primary users of BASIC outputs</li> <li>Generate evaluation evidence to explain wider changes reported in other data collection</li> <li>Understanding of the conditions to result in progression through the ToC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Findings not externally valid, i.e., findings are not generalisable across other contexts</li> <li>Challenges engaging with key stakeholders</li> <li>Limited access to key documents and monitoring data</li> <li>Challenges to evaluation findings from country stakeholders</li> <li>Challenges in understanding country context</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Joint drafting of recruitment communications with FCDO</li> <li>Multiple topic guides to cater to each group.</li> <li>Early engagement with FCDO through the specification of a country point of contact (PoC) for the evaluation</li> <li>Early document requests to FCDO SPT and country PoC</li> <li>Complete validation workshop with FCDO country PoC to test findings and provide opportunities for FCDO feedback on results</li> <li>Recruit local National Consultants to support delivery</li> <li>Clear operational procedures for face-to-face interviewing (see appendix 2.8-9) with a preference for remote delivery.</li> </ul>
Analytical methods			
<p><b>Contribution analysis:</b> Mixed-methods approach to understand whether the BASIC ToC holds true. Where it does, we assessed the strength of BASIC's contribution to any changes in outcomes observed. Where it does not, we considered if 1) the theory has failed, 2) implementation failed or 3) the context of BASIC significantly affected its ability to meet its objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide clear approach to assessing contribution</li> <li>Useful approach for evaluating impact when quantitative methods to appraise the additional effects of interventions are not feasible.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unclear use of data to substantiate contribution claims.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specified and piloted clear reporting conventions</li> <li>Internal and case study validation workshops to challenge the results of contribution analyses.</li> <li>Use of analytical frameworks in light-touch way to structure discussion of contribution claims.</li> </ul>
<p><b>GESI analysis:</b> To appraise GESI-responsiveness and inclusiveness of BASIC activities, we used mixed methods to assess GESI-related issues across multiple OECD-DAC EQs. For case countries we implemented a GESI score card (Appendix 5). GESI reporting was mainstreamed.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enables mainstreaming of GESI-related issues</li> <li>Use of externally developed scale to appraise BASIC in line with sector</li> <li>Enables consideration of multiple GESI-dimensions and data collection from multiple sources.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scorecard results not externally valid, i.e., findings not generalisable across other contexts</li> <li>Data not available to fully substantiate scoring</li> <li>Data may not be available or provided in a timely manner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early engagement with supplier to collect documents and data</li> <li>Early engagement with GESI FCDO adviser and FCDO BASIC Evaluation SRO during inception and delivery to review approach.</li> <li>Internal and case study validation workshops to challenge the results of scorecards</li> </ul>
<p><b>VfM analysis:</b> We assessed VfM of BASIC overall and the BASIC Research and TAS workstreams using a VfM scorecard that covers all 5E's of the FCDO 5e VfM framework. This assessment drew on both financial programme data, monitoring data and qualitative views from informants.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use of clear and transparent scorecard to appraise VfM</li> <li>Enables consideration of multiple VfM-dimensions and data collection from multiple sources.</li> </ul>		

## 2.2.5 Gender equality and social inclusion

**Risks and vulnerabilities are gendered and play out differently across the life course, as do coping strategies and mechanisms.**<sup>24</sup> Well-designed social assistance can make a difference for gender, age and other forms of social equality;<sup>25</sup> conversely, design features that do not take social dynamics into account can fail to appropriately mitigate risks faced by women and girls, and men and boys.<sup>26</sup> BASIC has begun to draw on and embed GESI expertise, in the form of a gender audit<sup>27</sup> and, most recently, the provision of gender and disability experts to SPACE assignment teams by GSP. It is anticipated that the new joint TAF delivery model, which will serve both the BASIC programme and GSP, will cement these nascent linkages.<sup>28</sup>

**The evaluation of BASIC was gender- and inclusion-responsive in that:**

- First, it will be inclusive and participatory of a wide range of stakeholders: whilst the evaluation will not engage end beneficiaries (vulnerable people) directly (in keeping with the evaluation ToR), as far as possible participation in evaluation processes will be gender-equitable, and inclusive of those of varied age, disability, and ethnicity.
- Second, it will assess whether, the extent to which and how the programme has promoted the development of GESI-responsive social assistance policies and systems (see Box 8 for key definitions). This involves exploring, for example, whether policies and programmes supported by BASIC address gendered and age-related needs and vulnerabilities, and the role played by (i.e., contribution of) BASIC interventions in their development.

### Box 2.3: Defining gender-responsive and inclusive social assistance

**Gender equality** refers to the full and equal exercise of rights by women and men, and equal access to socially, economically, and politically valued goods, resources, opportunities, benefits, and services. It also refers to the absence of any discrimination based on gender.

**Social exclusion** occurs when certain groups are systematically disadvantaged based on social characteristics, including gender, age, particular risk factors (e.g. (dis)ability, ethnicity, caste, migrant or refugee status, religion, sexual orientation), type of household (e.g., one-person, single parent, or skipped generation), levels of education and literacy, employment, or housing status. This results in social, political, and economic inequalities, and in individuals being discriminated against and denied resources.

**Social inclusion** refers to the process of removing barriers and improving incentives to increase access to opportunities for marginalised individuals and groups – essentially, making the ‘rules of the game’ fairer.

Gender equality and social inclusion are distinct but overlapping concepts. For most people, exclusion is based on several factors across both gender and other social dimensions, which shift in the context of different relationships and institutional settings.

**GESI-responsive social assistance** involves strengthening the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SA policies and systems so that they better respond to the differential needs and vulnerabilities facing girls and women, boys, and men across the lifecycle. It also means strengthening the linkages and coordination between SA, gender equality, inclusion and complementary services and interventions to address the barriers and exclusions faced by the poorest and most vulnerable.

**In doing so, the evaluation will hold the programme to account for its equity-related commitments** and produce GESI-related lessons and recommendations to inform and improve BASIC, as well as other relevant FCDO and donor programming. Since BASIC is designed to support more effective social assistance in crises, supporting poor and vulnerable people is central to the programme objectives. As such, GESI is a cross cutting theme of the evaluation that cuts across the different evaluation lines of inquiry. Consideration of GESI issues is mainstreamed across the EQs (set out in [section 3](#) above), as follows (GESI considerations will also be included in our exploration of learning themes):

- **Relevance:** To what extent do BASIC's interventions take GESI considerations into account?
- **Effectiveness:** To what extent has BASIC contributed to the development of GESI-responsive social assistance policies, systems, and programmes (and programme outputs)?
- **Efficiency:** Does BASIC, its workstreams and different types of intervention represent good value for money? (Gender and inclusion will be considered under 'Equity', as set out in [subsection 4.2.4](#))
- **Impact:** Has BASIC and its workstreams achieved/likely to achieve intended impacts per logframe and Business Case? This question will also be answered with reference to the ToC impact statement: "Vulnerable people cope better with crises and meet their basic needs".
- **Coherence:** Are BASIC interventions internally coherent and do they work in harmony with and reinforce the operations of other donors and actors working on G&I-related issues across the humanitarian-development nexus? This question will include consideration of linkages and synergies with GSP.

**We drew on qualitative and quantitative data to assess GESI-responsiveness.** To assess whether BASIC interventions are facilitating the development of social assistance policies and systems that are gender-responsive and inclusive, we analysed data from desk-based document review and programme and country-level KIs:

- At programme level, we explored how and to what extent GESI-related considerations have been integrated into decision making and management processes. These will include prioritisation of TAF requests, support to scope development, recruitment and deployment of relevant expertise, budgeting, monitoring, and reporting (including of sex and age-disaggregated data where appropriate).
- For BASIC TA, for each case study, we will analyse TAF assignment ToRs and deliverables to assess whether, for example, GESI-related needs and vulnerabilities have been considered in context analysis, and how effectively the solutions proposed respond to those needs and vulnerabilities. Analysis of KIs will explore similar issues, as well as whether GESI-related recommendations have been implemented, and whether and how support has been provided in such a way as to build beneficiary capacity to develop SP policies and programmes which are GESI responsive.
- For BASIC Research, we will explore how far consideration of gendered and other needs and vulnerabilities are integrated across the seven research themes (including that on 'principled and inclusive' social assistance), as well as whether Research is strengthening the evidence base on GESI considerations for social assistance in crisis contexts and influencing the uptake of GESI-related findings in policy and practice, at global level and in focus countries.
- For KML, we will explore the extent to which learning on gender-responsive, age-sensitive and inclusive social assistance is reflected in related products and events.

**GESI considerations will be reflected in dedicated analysis as well as mainstreamed throughout.**

The main analytical tool used will be a scorecard, which will be informed by the Gender Integration Continuum developed by UNICEF Innocenti for GSP. The scorecard will cover the dimensions mentioned above and be developed in such a way as to enable comparison across BASIC interventions, and their scoring on a scale from 'discriminatory' to 'transformative'. Table 26 sets out scoring assessment criteria, which expand commonly used methodologies focused on gender to integrate other key dimensions of vulnerability, including age and ability. The scorecard will be completed for individual interventions in case study countries, at each evaluation stage, based on data gathered from document review and key informant interviews. Intervention level scores will be aggregated to provide a view as to how well BASIC is integrating GESI considerations in each case study country, both by workstream and overall programme.

**Table 2.5: Gender and inclusion responsiveness assessment scale**

Level	Key characteristics
<b>1: GESI-discriminatory</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Perpetuates gender, age, and other forms of inequality by reinforcing unbalanced norms, roles and relations</li> <li>▪ Privileges one sex or age group over another</li> <li>▪ Often leads to one sex or age group enjoying more rights or opportunities than the other</li> </ul>
<b>2: GESI-neutral or blind</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ignores gender and age-related norms, roles and relations</li> <li>▪ Very often reinforces gender, age and ability-based discrimination</li> <li>▪ Ignores differences in opportunities and resource allocation by sex, age and ability</li> <li>▪ Often constructed based on the principle of being “fair” by treating everyone the same</li> </ul>
<b>3: GESI-sensitive</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Considers gender and age-related norms, roles and relations</li> <li>▪ Does not address inequality generated by unequal norms, roles or relations</li> <li>▪ Indicates gender, age, and ability awareness, although often no remedial action is developed</li> </ul>
<b>4: GESI-responsive</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Considers gender and age-related norms, roles, and relations and how they affect access to and control over resources</li> <li>▪ Considers the specific needs of different groups by sex, age and ability</li> <li>▪ Intentionally targets and benefits a specific group of women or men to achieve certain policy or programme goals or meet certain needs</li> <li>▪ Makes it easier for women and girls, and men and boys to fulfil duties and roles that are ascribed to them based on social norms</li> </ul>
<b>5: GESI-transformative</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Considers gender, age and ability-related norms, roles, and relations for different people and how these affect access to and control over resources</li> <li>▪ Considers the specific needs of different groups by sex, age and ability</li> <li>▪ Addresses the causes of gender, age and ability-based inequities</li> <li>▪ Includes ways to transform harmful social norms, roles and relations</li> <li>▪ Aims explicitly to promote gender and other forms of equality</li> <li>▪ Includes strategies to foster progressive changes in power relationships between different groups of women and girls, men, and boys.</li> </ul>

**Source:** Adapted from UNICEF (2020) *Gender-Responsive Age-Sensitive Social Protection: A conceptual framework* and WHO (n.d.) *Gender responsive assessment scale: criteria for assessing programmes and policies*. WHO Gender Mainstreaming Manual.

## 2.2.6 Value for money

**At baseline, VFM was assessed in two main ways.** First, whether BASIC, its workstreams, and different types of intervention being implemented through each of those workstreams, represent good VFM with reference to FCDO principles. Second, whether the BASIC programme is managing delivery of VFM at each stage in the programme’s cycle (design, procurement, implementation and close out). For the first VFM measurement, we assessed the VFM of each workstream, and the programme, with reference to the 5 ‘Es’ (see Box 8). Four ‘E’s were assessed at each evaluation point. However, it will only be possible to examine cost-effectiveness later as the programme matures. At midline we will assess the feasibility of measuring cost-effectiveness as part of the endline evaluation. The assessment of the implications for VFM of synergies and coordination between workstreams, at country level (particularly in deep engagement countries) and globally was a challenge at baseline due to the differing pace of delivery of the TAS and Research workstreams; VFM analysis on synergies and coordination will be explored at midline and endline when both workstreams are in delivery.



#### Box 2.4: The '5 Es' of Value for Money<sup>29</sup>

- **Economy (inputs):** Is the programme buying inputs of the appropriate quality at the right price?
- **Efficiency (inputs to outputs):** How well is the programme converting inputs into outputs? ('Spending well')
- **Effectiveness (outputs to outcomes):** Are the outputs produced by the programme having the intended effect? ('Spending wisely')
- **Equity (throughout the ToC):** To what extent will the programme reach marginalised groups? Is the programme gender and inclusion responsive, i.e., 'Spending fairly' (see section 4.2.3 above)?
- **Cost-effectiveness (inputs to impact):** What is the programme's ultimate impact on poverty reduction, relative to the inputs invested?

**Several indicators, including but not limited to supplier KPIs, were used to assess VFM across BASIC workstreams.** For BASIC TAS, 'economy' was measured with reference to extent cost containment measures and competitive procurement approaches were used by both TA and Research workstreams. Measurement of 'efficiency' included exploration of extent planned delivery was impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, whether responses to requests were timely, extent outputs and deliverables were submitted in accordance with pre-agreed timelines and the efficiency of the delivery models in use. The assessment of the responsiveness of BASIC to demands in a timely way in line with user expectations drew on evidence on several TAS KPIs (KPI 1 on speed of sourcing, KPI 3 on timely delivery of outputs, KPI 4 on the availability of expertise and KPI 5 on the approval of final outputs). Assessment of effectiveness focused on extent the programme was effective in achieving its targets at outcome level, noting that there were some evidence gaps in the assessment of effectiveness, notably the extent to which the evidence generated by the programme has so far been used to inform policy and practice. The assessment of the Equity criterion of the 5Es VFM framework drew on the GESI analysis conducted by the evaluation team. For BASIC Research the assessment of VFM in delivery was compromised by the delivery status of the programme which is still in inception phase, although the VFM assessment explored the economy, efficiency and equity dimensions of VFM. , .

**VFM management was assessed with reference to various VFM-related processes** including: financial management (including payment modalities and particularly payment by results elements), procurement and cost containment , as well as governance, wider programme management and risk management arrangements. The evaluation team used a bespoke VFM management scorecard to support the assessment. A list of criteria used in this scorecard assessment is provided below:

1. Relevance and robustness of Vfm measures in place
2. Approach to procurement and cost containment
3. Efficient use of resources and inputs by BASIC interventions
4. Validation of Theory of Change causal pathways
5. Sustainability of programme activities
6. Ability of leadership, management and oversight structures to support delivery
7. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk
8. Equity of programme design and approach

## 2.2.7 Sampling, data disaggregation, and triangulation

This subsection explains our approach to sampling, data disaggregation and triangulation.

### Sampling and data disaggregation

**We proposed reliable and valid sampling strategies based on the context of the evaluation and practical delivery considerations.** This section presents our sampling for each data collection

method. [Table 2.8](#) below summarises the sampling strategy adopted in each case and the key limitations and mitigating measures we took to minimise the effects of these limitations.

**Document review:** We considered sampling separately for FCDO BASIC documents and wider donor and agency documents. For FCDO documents, we reviewed all BASIC programme documents (census). The justification for this was that these documents provide a useful source of information about BASIC developments and provide a key means of validating qualitative data collected by the study, such as minimising the effects of strategic responses by informants. Where documents were relevant to a case study, these documents were reviewed by the case study lead in detail only. For donor and agency documents, we took a purposive sampling approach because we wanted to collect a diverse set of data across the following actors that were indicated to be key actors in this space during our inception phase: Care International, ECHO, European Commission, FAO, GIZ, ILO, ODI, Oxfam, Red Cross/Red Crescent, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, USAID, WFP, and World Bank.

The resources required to undertake a more detailed review of donor and agency documents would not have been proportionate to the resources made available to the evaluation. Documents from these organisations were identified by developing search strings for online searches using Google Scholar and requesting key informants to suggest citations. Search terms and suggested document by informants were documented to support research transparency. In total we reviewed 347 documents, of which 63 were sourced from external donors and agencies. These are listed in Appendix 8.

**Secondary data analysis:** We used a range of open-source data to assess the maturity of social protection systems and the prevalence of different types of crises overtime for all BASIC countries and country case studies using mean values for indicators. When estimating mean values for BASIC overall, we included all countries that had received at least one BASIC intervention in the analysis (census).

**In-house survey:** We aimed to survey all social development, humanitarian and climate in-country advisers based in countries targeted by BASIC as of June 2021. The full list of 130 advisers was provided to us by FCDO under the terms of the evaluation contract. Because we implemented an online survey, it was cost-effective to implement a census survey of the entire population. Based on a review of literature, we anticipated a response rate of 30 percent. In practice, we faced challenges in engaging with this group using this engagement mode, despite multiple mitigation efforts, as set out in Tables 12 and 13 and achieved a response rate of 13 percent (n=17). All survey results were triangulated with multiple data sources to minimise risk of bias and we have discussed alternative approaches of engaging with BASIC users in future phases with FCDO.

**Key Informant Interviews:** We defined the population of interest across three groups: a) FCDO internal stakeholders, b) BASIC suppliers, and c) external actors, including donors, agencies, academics, and research groups. To yield a variety of views about BASIC, we adopted a diverse, stratified, purposive sampling strategy<sup>30</sup>, by selecting interviewees across these groups (as listed in Appendix 8). We selected 30 interviews initially based on literature that suggested evidence saturation would be reached at this point. However, to respond to concerns raised by FCDO during inception about the ability of the study to assess the global effects of BASIC, we added an additional 10 interviews to group C ([Table 2.6](#)). We anticipate the distribution of interviews by category to stay broadly the same for the Midline.

**Additional data collection may have added additional nuance but would likely not have overcome all forms of bias present:** Our sampling approach reflects the evaluation purpose, BASIC programme and resources made available to support the evaluation. Additional case studies with more countries and/or interviews with more FCDO country posts would have been the most reasonable extensions of primary data collection. Both were limited by time and budget. Even if these limitations did not exist, we anticipate we would have struggled to engage countries that had not received BASIC support. Engaging this group may have led to more conservative estimates of the effect of the programme. Our findings thus mainly interrogate if BASIC can be effective once it is utilised, and how

it can be effective. More time and resources may have nonetheless allowed us to engage with a greater number of countries that did receive different forms and levels of BASIC support. Our results from our current purposive sample are illustrative, and in some ways also representative as they represent a diverse set of component configurations and settings. Nonetheless, adding more detailed cases may have allowed us to explore configurational approaches more thoroughly.

**Table 2.6: KII baseline sampling frame summary**

Sampling group	Type	Number of interviews	
		Planned at Inception	Actual Baseline
<b>A. FCDO internal stakeholders</b>	FCDO SPT	2	3
	FCDO complementary programme and policy leads	3	4
<b>B. BASIC suppliers</b>	BASIC supplier team - Research	5	7
	BASIC supplier team - TAS	3	3
	BASIC supplier team - TAS (SPACE)	2	2
<b>C. External stakeholders</b>	Donors and agencies	15	21
	Academic and research organisations	2	2
<b>Total</b>		<b>30</b>	<b>42</b>

Source: Integrity (2021).

**Table 2.7: Country case study selection**

Country	BASIC coverage			General context					SP systems		
	BASIC Res.	# past TAS assignments*	Likely future TAS priority	Reg.	Income Group	Type of crisis	Climate risk country index**	Access	CPIA score	Adequacy	Coverage
<b>Jordan</b>	Y	1	Y	Middle East	Upper middle	Forced displacement	130	Accessible		18	73
<b>Nigeria</b>	Y	1	Y	Sub-S. Africa	Lower middle	Protracted conflict; floods	104	Partly accessible	4	18	6
<b>Somalia</b>	N	1	Y	Sub-S. Africa	Low	Protracted conflict; food security	93	Accessible	1	2	6
<b>Yemen</b>	Y	2	Y	Middle East	Low	Protracted conflict; water scarcity	76	Limited access	3	9	21

Source: Integrity (2021). Adaption of FCDO and IDS programme documentation and World Bank Databank 2021. N.B. Income categories were defined using the Atlas Gross National Income approach. Accessibility refers to how easy it is expected to be to engage with country offices as part of this study, and is based on conversations with the BASIC programme team; CPIA SP score is a 1-6 score of a country's social protection system where 6 is the best score possible and forms part of the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index; Adequacy refers to the total amount of social protection received by beneficiary households as a proportion of total welfare; Coverage refers to the proportion of the population covered by social protection and labour programs; figures provided are for 2017 or the latest reporting year. \* Excluding SPACE \*\* A lower score refers to a higher level of climate related risk between 2000-2019.<sup>31</sup>

**Case studies:** To select the four country case studies, we adopted purposive sampling, aiming for diversity and coverage across key characteristics of the programme and the contexts it works in (Table 2.7). We also considered accessibility, including physical accessibility and responsiveness into account in our selection. This selection was discussed and approved with FCDO SPT during inception. The agreed that the focus of the learning case on SPACE deliberately with FCDO during inception. For the document review and KIIs conducted in support of case studies, we adopted the same sampling strategies as those specified above, where the focus was on the country or theme level. We additionally implemented a snowball sampling approach to collect relevant in-country stakeholder contacts for interview. Additional KII categories used to support purposive sampling for case studies were host government officials, research users, NGOs and CSOs.

**Table 2.8: Overview data collection sampling strategies limitations and mitigations**

Method	Sampling	Disaggregation (subgroups)	Limitations	Mitigations
<b>Document review</b>	<b>Census:</b> All BASIC FCDO documents <b>Purposive:</b> Policy documents from key actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FCDO versus external documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not all FCDO documents will be shared/available</li> <li>Search terms may not yield relevant documents</li> <li>Researchers may fail to code documents sufficiently against the evaluation framework</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Multiple document requests to FCDO and BASIC suppliers.</li> <li>Requests made early in evaluation process</li> <li>Clear documentation and coding using MS Excel to trace data back to documents.</li> <li>Evaluation team interrogate coding to check alignment with framework when completing EQ analysis</li> </ul>
<b>Secondary data analysis</b>	<b>Census:</b> All countries that received at least one BASIC intervention.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Data gaps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documented approach to fill data gaps using mean values (see Appendix 5)</li> </ul>
<b>Key informant interviews</b>	<b>Stratified, purposive:</b> Diverse set of stakeholder groups to maximise the range of views documented about BASIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sampling group</li> <li>Interviewee organisation</li> <li>Geography</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of sample may suffer from bias</li> <li>Provision of strategic views by participants knowing that the sampling is purposive</li> <li>Challenging to identify relevant participants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draw on FCDO ad team expertise to develop sampling frame</li> <li>Clear recruitment and engagement approach approved by FCDO</li> <li>Evidence triangulation and subgroup analysis to improve quality of findings.</li> </ul>
<b>In-house survey</b>	<b>Census:</b> All FCDO in-country advisers based in countries targeted by BASIC in 2021.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country / region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Response rate challenges as documented in Table 12</li> <li>Challenges accessing the sample</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Response rate mitigations identified in Table 12</li> <li>Early engagement with FCDO to collect sample</li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<b>Purposive:</b> Country cases selected to maximise variation in BASIC support and country context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviewee type</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Challenging to account for all context factors of interest</li> <li>Limited engagement from countries that received minimal or no BASIC support</li> <li>Operational/political challenges need to be considered</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early engagement with FCDO and country-coordinator staff to test sample frame</li> <li>Multiple sampling options produced for FCDO approval</li> <li>Clear presentation of the strengths and weaknesses of sampling options to FCDO</li> </ul>

Source: Integrity (2021).

## Triangulation

**We used triangulation to address imbalances and biases that may have been present in our data.** Triangulation refers to the process of combining results produced from different methods to produce overall findings that are not overly affected by biases that may be present in the results of one method.<sup>32</sup> In particular, it increases the trustworthiness of evaluation evidence and reduces threats to validity (i.e., reduces the chance our BASIC evaluation results do not reflect reality). We relied primarily

on data and methods triangulation by combining different data sources, analysis methods, and researcher perspectives. We followed a systematic approach to appraising and triangulating results from different sources. Data collection and analysis methods were implemented in parallel. One member of the evaluation team was responsible for at least one data collection and analysis method. To triangulate results from different methods, the following steps were executed sequentially:

- **Results from different methods were structured consistently:** The results produced by each method were transparently structured and coded against the EQs using a data aggregation tool in MS Excel and cross verified by multiple team members.
- **Bias and saturation appraisal:** Results produced by each method were reviewed for bias and saturation (i.e., the extent to which all possible results and codes have been identified). Sub-EQs answered using multiple data sources where saturation likelihood was considerable are more valid.
- **Internal analysis discussions:** We held several informal and formal analysis sessions to review data and generate findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Where conflicting or outlier results arise, we considered the bias and saturation of different methods and agreed to either: 1) investigate further or 2) halt the analysis and report conflicting results.
- **Reporting:** We reported results across all methods together, with separate annexes reporting the results of specific analyses as appropriate and clear summary tables to indicate what sources were used to address sub-EQs. Where results conflicted, we reported the most reasonable answer to EQs, and associated caveats as required.

**We are able to show what data sources were used to substantiate findings for each Sub-EQ.** [Table 2.9](#) below shows what data collection sources underpin each Sub-EQ. Where more data collection sources support a finding, we are more assured that the result is valid, i.e., the findings reflect reality. In the case of each EQ, we also provide a qualitative comment on the extent to which we think we hit evidence saturation, i.e., if we collected more data, we would not generate additional insights using a 3-point traffic light scale, where green indicates saturation was likely met and red indicates saturation was likely not met. This coding was developed deliberately through team consultation.

**Table 2.9: Summary of data sources used to answer Sub-Evaluation Questions**

EQ	Sub-EQ	1. KII	2. Doc Rev	3. Case Studies	4. Mon. & ext. data	5. Survey
Relevance	1.1					
	1.2					
	1.3					
	1.4					
	1.5					
	1.6					
	1.7					
Coherence	2.1					
	2.2					
Effectiveness	3.1					
	3.2					
	3.3					
	3.4					
	3.5					
	3.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Impact	4.1					



EQ	Sub-EQ	1. KII	2. Doc Rev	3. Case Studies	4. Mon. & ext. data	5. Survey
	4.2					
	4.3					
Efficiency	5.1					
	5.2					
	5.3					
Sustainability	6.1					
	6.2					

**N.B.** The colour coding in the first column provides a qualitative indication of evidence saturation using a 3-point traffic light scale. Green indicates saturation was likely met and red indicates saturation was likely not met. This coding was developed deliberately through team consultation.

## 2.2.8 Testing and validation of data collection instruments

We tested and validated all data collection instruments and tools across all methods prior to implementation, drawing on the team's and FCDO's expertise to ensure quality. For both primary and secondary data collection and analysis methods, we developed and piloted a range of instruments (Table 2.10). These were reviewed internally as a team and signed-off for quality by our Team Lead. We updated FCDO regularly on their development and created opportunities for FCDO to share feedback on data collection tools too. We then piloted tools and revised them as appropriate, drawing on cognitive testing approaches, i.e., including time during pilots to ask evaluation participants to reflect on the process and the tool being used.

**Table 2.10: Overview testing and validation of data collection instruments**

#	Data collection method	Tool / instrument	Testing and validation	Result
1	Document review	EQ coding tool	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Team Lead and Project Director review and sign-off</li> <li>Pilot of tool using 1-2 documents</li> <li>Team lead review with pilot lead</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Amended columns to make it easier to append coded data from different sources</li> </ul>
2	Secondary data analysis	NA	NA	NA
3	Key informant interviews	Topic guides EQ coding tool	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Team Lead and Project Director review and sign-off</li> <li>Five pilot interviews with two interviewers, covering all sampling groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revised topic guide to reorganise prompts and lines of questioning to improve flow</li> <li>Flagged which modules would be more relevant to each sampling group</li> </ul>
4	In-house survey	Questionnaire Online coded questionnaire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Team Lead and Project Director review and sign-off</li> <li>FCDO review</li> <li>Undertook 3 pilot survey responses and requested written or verbal feedback</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Removed questions to reduce response time and updated guidance with average time taken to complete</li> <li>Reframed content to better reflect humanitarian context and issues</li> </ul>
5	Case studies	Topic guides and EQ coding tool (see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of case study operational guide</li> <li>See above regarding document review and KII</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>See above regarding document review and KII</li> </ul>

Source: Integrity (2021).

## 2.3 Stakeholder participation and engagement

Stakeholder participation in the evaluation was prominent throughout the inception and delivery phases of the evaluation. Despite challenges faced in reaching participants through our online survey, we were able to reach the number of participants agreed during inception in all other primary data

collection modes. We also amended our design to include more global stakeholders, and worked with FCDO and/or carried out desk research to find replacements where required. Our analysis also suggested that we can be reasonably confident we came close to evidence saturation, i.e., more data collection would not have yielded significantly more insights. We substantiated data collection with secondary evidence from documents and open-source data and considered a broad range of organisations to complement primary data collection.

**We offered multiple opportunities for FCDO and BASIC suppliers to feedback on our results and progress.** During the implementation period, this included:

- **Contract management meetings (x3):** providing clear project management and delivery reporting to FCDO SPT in formats they can reuse to communicate updates to their stakeholders.
- **Results presentations to FCDO (x2):** Sharing and discussing preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations with FCDO prior to finalising report drafting
- **Coordination meetings with BASIC suppliers (x3):** Providing updates and collecting feedback on evaluation tasks from BASIC suppliers
- **Learning event with FCDO and BASIC suppliers:** To discuss the results of the evaluation and share learning from the baseline phase of the study.

**Our approach to stakeholder engagement from an ethics perspective is outlined below (2.6-2.9),** which covers design, implementation, feedback, dissemination, use, and confidentiality.

## 2.4 Consideration of the Paris Declaration

**The evaluation will consider the five key principles of the Paris Declaration.** The Paris Declaration lays out five principles which aim to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability.<sup>33</sup> [Table 2.11](#) shows how the evaluation will explore each of these principles as part of the study, as well as how the evaluation itself was delivered in line with these principles.

**Table 2.11: Approaches to exploring the Paris Declaration principles**

#	Principle	Approach to exploring the principle
1	<b>Ownership:</b> Developing countries set their own strategies, improve their institutions, and tackle corruption.	Through EQ1 we will consider how far activities are adapted to the needs of country offices, which in turn are responsive to the needs and priorities of country governments
2	<b>Alignment:</b> Donor countries and organisations bring their support in line with these strategies and use local systems.	Through EQ3 and EQ5, the evaluation will explore how far BASIC has resulted in more efficient and effective use of existing social protection systems to provide humanitarian support.
3	<b>Harmonisation:</b> Donor countries and organisations coordinate development efforts, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.	EQ2 directly considers the extent to which BASIC works in harmony with the effort of other donors in the sector, with an explicit focus on coordination at the global and country levels. Case studies will also consider how coordinated BASIC support has been with existing in-country efforts to respond to crises using social protection approaches.

#	Principle	Approach to exploring the principle
4	<b>Managing for results:</b> Developing countries and donors focus on producing – and measuring – results.	This evaluation provides a robust mechanism through which progress and results achieved are assessed.
5	<b>Mutual accountability:</b> Donors and developing countries are accountable for development results.	

**Source:** Adapted from OECD (2005). *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles for Smart Aid*.

## 2.5 Limitations of the evaluation

**We identified several key evaluation limitations and mitigating measures.** These limitations related to misalignment of delivery timelines, C-19, the strategic prioritisation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) resources and the ability to detect outcomes and impact within the timeline of the evaluation. These limitations, the potential impact on delivery and a set of mitigating measures we took to minimise their effect are described in Table 19 overleaf.

**Our risk management approach identifies additional risks aligned to FCDO risk categories and proposed mitigating measures.** This is presented in Appendix 2.14.

**Table 2.12: Overview of technical limitations of the evaluation**

Limitation	Potential impact	Mitigation measures
<b>Misalignment of BASIC's delivery with evaluation timelines</b>		
Procurement process for new TAS Supplier was not complete during the drafting of the Inception Report.	The ToC for the TAF workstream was not available. Priority countries for deep engagement not selected.	Since the design of the TAF workstream is not expected to change substantially (other than contracting arrangements) the current TAS supplier was consulted to define the ToC for that workstream. The inputs of both the current TAS supplier and the new research workstream supplier, along with key FCDO personnel was harnessed in a ToC workshop which supported the refresh of ToCs to ensure their articulation was sufficient for evaluation purposes. Consultations held with FCDO on expectations concerning list of priority countries allowing the formulation of an indicative list of countries for sample selection for case studies. Agreement with FCDO that the case study countries would be reviewed prior to the baseline to sense check the list.
Supplier for Research workstream was appointed during evaluation inception phase (October 2020).	ToC for Research workstream only available in draft form. Priority countries for deep engagement not finalised.	
Logframes for the TAF and Research workstreams not finalised during the evaluation's inception phase.	Outputs, outcomes, and impact of BASIC and associated indicators are still prone to change which may impact the evaluation's data collection plans.	The evaluation team reviewed the logframe and various results measurement tools in place by BASIC and commented on areas of improvement, allowing the evaluation team to modify data collection plans accordingly.
<b>Impact of Covid-19 and ODA reprioritisation on evaluation activities</b>		
Data collection process particularly at baseline is likely to be disrupted by COVID-19	Will limit face to face KII with stakeholders both in UK and in country during the baseline data collection.	The baseline data collection process successfully employed remote conference calls (using Microsoft Teams). Pilot testing of the tools and this approach ensured that the maximum value was extracted from this approach to consultations.
	Availability of stakeholders in UK and in countries selected for sampling may be impacted by the response to COVID-19.	We gave all requested interviewees sufficient advance notice to ensure their availability for consultation.
ODA reprioritisation (following the decision by HMG to reduce ODA spend from 0.7 percent Gross National Income to 0.5 percent)	Reduction in financial allocations to BASIC may alter the expected results of the programme and delay the start of the TAF workstream.	We liaised closely with the FCDO Social Protection Team to keep informed of changes because of ODA reprioritisation and consider the impact of any reported changes on the design and plans for the evaluation of BASIC. We received confirmation during implementation that the evaluation contract value would not be cut this financial year. As such we did not adjust our approach.
<b>Assessing impact of BASIC within the timeframe for the evaluation</b>		
Some of the impact from BASIC's interventions may be outside the evaluation's time horizon	As some interventions, particularly those delivered late on in the delivery timeframe for BASIC may not have matured into impact by the time the evaluation ends in 2024.	The evaluation team will assess results all along the causal pathways of BASIC's ToC at each stage in the evaluation lifecycle (baseline, midline and endline), ensuring maximum capture of results. Since the TAS workstream has been running for some time, it will afford an opportunity even at baseline of capture of any early emerging results.

Limitation	Potential impact	Mitigation measures
Since the TAS workstream has been running for some time, the timing of the baseline data collection comes after the initiation of implementation.	The baseline will not be a true baseline i.e., representing the pre-intervention situation.	The evaluation team sought to consider intervention contexts prior to BASIC delivery when delivering KIIs in the context of both global and country level data collection.
<b>Attribution of impact to BASIC</b>		
Since some of BASIC's interventions are short term and in view of the complexity of policy processes and non-linearity of capacity development processes, it will be challenging to attribute the impact of BASIC to these types of changes.	Attribution of impact of BASIC on capacity development and policy change will be a challenge.	Using our bespoke methodological approach, we will measure the plausible contribution of BASIC towards outcome and impact, rather than attribute results solely to BASIC. To specifically assess the policy influence of the research workstream in case study countries we propose to use the Actor, Narrative, Interest framework and the Kirkpatrick Model of evaluation to assess contributions to capacity and capability development. Contribution analysis will allow us to plausibly assess the overall contribution of BASIC to intended outcomes and impact in accordance with its ToC.
While the Kirkpatrick model of evaluation is a useful framework to assess technical assistance and capacity strengthening interventions, it does have some weaknesses. Gill <sup>34</sup> noted that the model suffers from several weaknesses: (1) reliance on self-reported data on the impact of the support (2) the proposed linear logic of the model, and (3) the model does not assess whether the capacity support provided was the right thing to be doing in the first place.	Measuring the contribution of BASIC to change because of its technical assistance and capacity support may be compromised.	The main mitigation measures to address these shortcomings are as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Triangulation of data from other sources to ensure all self-reported data is validated through sourcing additional evidence.</li> <li>- Reframing the first level in the model "reaction" to focus more on asking stakeholders whether the support provided addressed their needs and could be usefully applied in their work.</li> <li>- Using KIIs to explore whether the support provided was the right thing to do in the first place (for example questions on relevance of the modality of support).</li> </ul>
<b>Case study sampling</b>		
Not all deep engagement countries supported by BASIC will be covered in case study research.	Since not all deep engagement countries will be selected for case studies, there may be gaps in the assessment of the performance and lessons learned because of BASIC intervention.	A purposive stratified sampling approach will provide the evaluation team with evidence on BASIC's results and lessons learned from a combination of deep engagement countries, as well as countries which receive lighter touch support. This approach will also ensure coverage of results emerging from the global workstream of the research workstream through examining the results of its thematic work. An exploration of the monitoring data generated by the suppliers for the three workstreams, coupled with the findings from other data collection sources (notably KIIs) will provide an opportunity to capture results and lessons not captured by the case study research.

Source: Integrity (2021).



## 2.6 Ethics and safeguarding principles

**We recognise that BASIC operates in complex humanitarian and fragile contexts – which requires careful consideration of ethics, equity, safety, dignity, inclusion, privacy, consent, and accountability to affected populations.** At Integrity, we are led in all our work by our values; our commitments to inclusivity, diversity, sensitivity, and accountability all require us to consider the ethical implications of research we conduct. We have a zero-tolerance approach to exploitation and abuse, and we maintain comprehensive policies on conflict sensitivity, sexual exploitation, modern slavery, and preventing fraud and corruption. All our evaluations comply with UK Government Social Research Unit Professional Guidance for Ethical Assurance for Social Research, DAC principles and quality standards, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and UK Data Protection law.

**The evaluation upheld the FCDO Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation and be guided by the UK Evaluation Society Guidelines for Good Practice.** As the evaluation did not engage with end-beneficiaries directly or conduct large scale data collection exercises in BASIC-supported countries, compliance with national regulations around permissions and consent before any country level data collection is undertaken was not required. All Integrity staff and contractors are required to adhere to Integrity's Code of Conduct, Safeguarding, Anti-Fraud/Bribery and Corruption, GESI, Environmental and Social Impact, Information Security and Internet Use policies which set out in detail expected behaviours to ensure that we continue to deliver quality work in a safe manner. To that end, team members were provided training on key ethical protocols during the inception phase and at the beginning of each phase of the evaluation.

**Our safeguarding policy goes beyond 'do no harm' and covers anyone we interact with professionally.** We are signatories to the Safeguarding Leads Network "Putting People First" commitments and work collaboratively with the Network to help prevent sexual exploitation, sexual harassment, and abuse in the delivery of UKaid. We have two designated Safeguarding Officers in the London Office and a permanent reporting line. Our Safeguarding Policy requires all personnel to:

- Go beyond 'do no harm' to ensure that existing risks to vulnerable people are understood and no additional risks are introduced.
- Work in a conflict-sensitive manner and respect cultural sensitivities.
- Identify other potential sources of risks, including those arising from other actors or existing structural or normative factors.
- Integrity's full Safeguarding Policy can be shared upon request.
- Proactively manage ethics and safeguarding risk, as shown later in this Appendix.

## 2.7 Inclusivity of evaluation design and analysis

**The evaluation was inclusive and promoted the participation of a wide range of stakeholders.** Whilst the evaluation did not engage end-beneficiaries (i.e., vulnerable people) directly, participation in evaluation processes was gender-equitable (58 percent of evaluation global and case study KII participants were female), and inclusive of those of varied age, disability, and ethnicity. In addition, our analysis, including case study analysis, considered GESI-related issues and broader power dynamics, and assessed whether, the extent to which, and how, BASIC promoted the development of equitable policies and systems for social assistance.

## 2.8 Data collection procedures

**Informed consent was obtained from all baseline participants.** Before participating in interviews, participants were informed of the purpose of the interview, that their participation was voluntary, and how findings were used and will be presented. Informed consent was sought and recorded at the

beginning of all interviews. Participants were made aware of their right not to answer any questions they may be uncomfortable with and to withdraw from the process at any time.

**No reward or compensation structure was implemented but data collection and review processes accounted for research burden.** All team members that conducted primary research with stakeholders were required to document their views on any underlying bias present in the data collected - this included bias linked to potential research burden. These views were added when data was coded against the evaluation framework, meaning evidence triangulation directly considered reported biases.

**Participants were assured of privacy and confidentiality as appropriate.** The content of all interviews was assumed confidential unless explicitly agreed, with steps taken to ensure the anonymity of data in both oral and written presentation of findings. Respondents were entitled to see transcripts of their own interviews, as well as evaluation outputs, and were provided with a contact person if they have questions or concerns. All evaluation outputs will anonymise respondent perspectives.

**All data collection instruments were reviewed for ethical issues by the Team Lead and Project Director.** Our data collection and analysis tools were developed in line with the values, policies and practices specified above, and reviewed using our Quality Management System (Appendix 2.13) by the team's senior leadership prior to use. These tools are presented below.

## 2.9 Data protection, data security, and intellectual property

**We employed legally compliant data protection and security protocols.** Integrity is obliged to abide by all relevant UK and European Union legislation including General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and UK Data Protection Act 1998. We have procedures to support the safe collection, management, analysis, dissemination, and destruction of information collected throughout the contract. The remainder of this subsection details our approach to data protection and security as part of this contract. We can provide copied of our data protection and security policies upon request.

**We did not develop any digital tools for the purposes of this evaluation** and as such the need to adhere to the Principles for Digital Development was not applicable.<sup>xxxv</sup> We have shared our survey questionnaire that was implemented using a pre-existing digital survey tool, MS Forms, in Appendix 5.4, which aligns to the open and collaborative working principle.

### 2.9.1 Data protection

**We followed compliant and transparent practices to safeguard against personal data breaches.** Through our work collecting data in FCAS environments and other contexts, we understand the importance of beneficiary data protection and building respondent trust through the provision of anonymity. We anticipate the need to access and process personal data through our programme of primary research. To safeguard against data breaches, we adhered to the Data Protection Principles<sup>xxxvi</sup> during baseline by implementing the following practices:

- **Development of data flows:** For each primary research method involving the access and processing of personal and/or sensitive data, we developed a data flow that explicitly states how this information will move through our organisation. This will cover the identification of data subjects, controllers, and processors, as well as when data is accessed and securely destroyed.
- **Use of premium survey tool:** To deliver the online survey, we used MS Forms, a premium survey software tool that enables anonymity and provides a range of information protection and security measures.
- **Data protection training:** We briefed all team members and supporting staff on the relevant areas of the project that require data protection considerations – This will include training on relevant Integrity policies prior to every evaluation implementation phase, and data protection modules will

be included in all training provided to fieldwork staff prior to the implementation of virtual and physical fieldwork.

- **Appropriate storage and sharing of information:** All primary data collected was stored securely in the project's dedicated SharePoint folder. We coded and stored respondent information separately from response data so that respondents can be identified via a multi-stage process, should FCDO request data for accountability purposes, as stated in Annex 4 of the ToR.
- **Data and knowledge management support:** We have a specialist data and knowledge management team that is responsible for maintaining Integrity's General Data Protection Regulation compliant data privacy posture and undertaking organisation-wide data audits.

## 2.9.2 Data security

**Our information security policy safeguarded against information incidents.** Our Information Security Policy outlines procedures to manage and protect sensitive information held by Integrity. These procedures also extended to FCDO documents shared with Integrity under the terms of this contract:

- All Integrity contracted staff have access to IT infrastructure with multiple layers of protection.
- Access to Integrity systems is severely restricted on non-Integrity devices.
- All Integrity staff follow clear procedures on the use of communications software and communications procedures.
- SharePoint and Podio, two knowledge management systems, are the only file storage locations for the evaluation and access to evaluation documents is restricted to our team.
- Sensitive information is only shared electronically with evaluation team members via SharePoint links, i.e., not email attachments.
- A range of security procedures are in place for the use of hardware, that cover passwords, physical access control practices and disposal.
- Integrity staff have clear procedures for reporting IT, software, or hardware incidents, including loss, damage, and theft.
- Clear employee guidance and code of conduct on the use of IT software and hardware, covering general security practices, prohibited uses, and use of personal devices.

## 2.9.3 Duty of Care

**There are clear risks associated with providing sufficient duty of care when undertaking the proposed case study research in-country given their nature and context.** This is because risky events may arise in locations we expect to visit, such as natural disasters or instances of civil unrest. Considering the on-going global pandemic, most of the research was conducted remotely, except in the case of face-to-face interviews. We developed a case study implementation plan and guidance note for all teams to follow (see below). National consultants were trained in this guidance by the core team. All face-to-face interviews were identified to the core team prior to their delivery using a pre-approval form on our project management tool, Podio. The form included key logistical details and listed any pre-arranged travel information and was signed-off by the project management unit. Before leaving, upon arrival and when arriving home after an interview, consultants sent What's-app messages to their case lead and the project manager to keep us informed of their whereabouts.

Finally, we did not undertake any international travel for the baseline, but this may change in the future. We will periodically review how far these risks are relevant to the evaluation – for example, the duty of care for staff completing desk-based case study research is likely to hold a lower risk.

**Integrity accepts responsibility for Duty of Care throughout the lifetime of the contract.** We accept the moral, ethical, and legal obligation to ensure the safety and wellbeing of all team members and stakeholders at the specific points at which they interact with the evaluation. This responsibility will last for the entire length of the contract. We have developed the following set of procedures to provide adequate Duty of Care to all evaluation team members:

- Use of organisation insurance and security policy.
- Review FCDO Duty of Care policies to check how far our existing policies align with practices expected by FCDO.
- Periodic discussion of Duty of Care as a team, and with FCDO and other stakeholders as required.
- Agreement and confirmation of Duty of Care roles responsibilities with team members prior to all implementation phases.
- Specification of country fieldwork implementation plans, which covered appropriate corporate and contingency planning, standard, emergency, and incident procedures, and physical security measures as required.
- Implementation of pre-deployment briefings, mobilisation support (including HEAT training where necessary) and de-briefings.
- Maintenance of a Duty of Care Tracker on Podio to monitor fieldwork in real-time.

All our policies and procedures in place to provide adequate duty of care to temporary and full-time staff and research participants were shared with the client during inception.

## 2.10 Evaluation team structure and management

### 2.10.1 Team structure and composition

**The team is comprised of four key units to enable fluid management and high-quality delivery.**


Figure 6 below shows that our team was comprised of four distinct units: Project Management, Technical Delivery, Project Support, and Quality Assurance. This structure enabled: (a) an accountable point-of-contact system to FCDO; (b) clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and reporting lines; (c) team-wide responsibilities for effective stakeholder engagement, field management and operations, and communications and learning; and (d) regular reporting and communications on decision making.

**The team brings extensive thematic, methodological, and project management experience suited to the evaluation's demands.** Our technical team was comprised of experienced and skilled evaluators with a combination of management, methodological and subject matter expertise:

- **Dr. Anila Channa (Project Director)** – Anila holds 20 years' experience in client advisory/engagement, contract and team management, and the technical design and delivery of evaluations and currently directs two FCDO MEL projects relating to disaster resilience, and climate finance. She was a Director for FCDO's £1.2 bn Prosperity Fund evaluation and learning service.
- **Nick Maunder (Team Leader)** – Nick Maunder is an experienced evaluator of social protection and humanitarian assistance programmes with 30 years of experience in over 30 countries and expertise in assessing programmes that seek to build resilience to crises. He has been the Team Lead on 12 complex programme evaluations and employed a range of evaluation and research methods to answer client-focused questions.
- **Valerie McDonnell-Lenoach (Deputy Team Leader)** – Valerie is a multi-sectoral evaluation expert with 30 years' experience directing and quality assuring independent evaluations for UK Government, including FCDO. This includes evaluations of projects with TAS, research and knowledge management and learning workstreams.

- **Tasmin Ayliffe (Quality Director)** – Tamsin Ayliffe is a social protection specialist with 25 years' experience who has worked on a range of FCDO's social protection interventions globally.
- **Georgia Plank (Evaluation Expert)** – Georgia is an evaluation expert and former FCDO advisor, with expertise in programme implementation and mixed-methods evaluation. She has proven prowess working across a range of social protection topics including gender equality, social protection and inclusion, governance, and adaptive programming.
- **Nick Moore (Project Manager/Evaluator)** – Nick Moore is an evaluator with a background in economics and six years' experience in the application of quasi- and non-experimental evaluation methods. Nick has managed a portfolio of mixed-method evaluation contracts for a range of UK Government clients.
- **Lucien Begault (Junior Evaluator)** – Lucien is a junior evaluator with a background in delivering research and evaluation contracts in FCAS. He has expertise in the delivery of case-based research and political economy analyses.
- **Local evaluation consultants** – We recruited National Evaluation Consultants with evaluation and/or social protection expertise to support the delivery of country case studies: Oluwatosin Abayomi (Nigeria), Deema Al-Hamdan (Jordan), Badra Yusuf Ali (Somalia), Anis Noaman (Yemen).

**Figure 2.3: Evaluation team structure**



Source: Integrity (2021).

## 2.10.2 Team accountabilities, and lines of reporting and communication

**Reporting lines and processes have been set up and clearly articulated to each team unit.** The following overall accountabilities, responsibilities, and lines of communication within the team and between the evaluation team and the FCDO Client Group were defined:

- **FCDO Client Group:** The FCDO Client Group was led by the BASIC evaluation SRO, India Perry, who will be the main FCDO point of contact for technical and contract management discussions. Technical and operational support was provided to India by Syma Shah, the Programme Manager.
- **Project Management Unit:** The project was managed on a day-to-day basis by the Team Lead, Nick Maunder, and Project Manager, Nick Moore. The Team Lead and Project Manager reported to the Project Director, Dr Anila Channa, who held ultimate responsibility for the successful delivery of the evaluation and was accountable to FCDO. The Team Lead was the key FCDO contact for technical discussions and the Project Director and Project Manager were the key FCDO contacts for contract management discussions. An Integrity Internal Steering Committee comprised of Integrity's Services, Operations, and Finance Directors provided further senior technical and commercial oversight. The Project Director reported into this group periodically to request input.
- **Technical Delivery Unit:** The Deputy Team Lead and Evaluation Experts reported into the Team Lead and were responsible for the delivery of technical outputs. The Team Lead was accountable for the satisfactory and timely production of technical outputs. Each workplan task was assigned a lead and supporting team member. Task leads were responsible for the satisfactory and timely production of task-related outputs (as shown in [Table 2.13: Mapping team responsibilities and accountabilities to evaluation tasks](#) below). Each task lead reported into the Deputy Team Lead. In the context of case research, each case study lead was supported by one locally based researcher. Case researchers reported into their respective case lead. Case Leads were accountable for the satisfactory and timely production of case study outputs.

**Table 2.13: Mapping team responsibilities and accountabilities to evaluation tasks**

Task		Name Role	NMo PM	NMa TL	VML DTL	TA QD	ND Eval	GP Eval	TBC Con.
Mgt & QA	Management		L	S					
	Reporting		S	L	S		S	S	
	Quality assurance		S	S		L			
Technical delivery	Document review		S					L	
	Secondary data analysis		S		S		L		
	In-house survey		S				L		
	Key informant interviews			S	L		S	S	
	Case studies		S	S	S		S	L	S
	VFM analysis				L		S		
	GESI assessment							L	
	Triangulation, synthesis, and reporting		S	L	S		S	S	
	Learning and dissemination			S	S		L		

**Source:** Integrity (2020). N.B. L = technical task lead, S = supporting task delivery.

- **Quality Assurance Unit:** This group, comprised of the team Quality Director, was responsible for quality assuring all FCDO evaluation outputs produced by the contract. The Quality Director reported into the Team Lead, and the Project Director was ultimately responsible for all FCDO outputs, as described above.



- **Project Support Unit:** This unit was comprised of back-office support functions to support the operational delivery of the evaluation, including operations, risk and security management, finance, IT, Human Resources and Graphics and project learning functions. This group was coordinated by the BASIC evaluation Operations Officer, who reported into the Project Manager. The Project Manager was accountable for the effective and timely use of back-office support for the evaluation. A senior operations manager reported directly into the Team Lead and led on in-country risk management.

**We use a series of management, accounting, and control procedures during the lifetime of all programmes.** Our financial systems provide a coherent and robust approach to managing the financial performance of the BASIC evaluation. Our finance and compliance department, led by the Finance Manager, implements transaction reconciliation and processing, cash flow analysis, client invoicing, and budget utilisation and burn rate reports throughout the project cycle.

Differences of opinion (within the evaluation team, or amongst stakeholders consulted) are fully acknowledged in the report.

## 2.11 Stakeholder engagement

**Internal and external management processes were used to support contract delivery.** Following the inception period, FCDO were engaged on a quarterly basis to manage contract performance and updated monthly on project finances. FCDO were also engaged monthly to discuss technical performance during the evaluation. Internal evaluation team meetings were held to review progress and support delivery. Finally, the quarterly BASIC Coordination Group meeting – comprised of FCDO and BASIC suppliers – was attended to share updates and results from the evaluation.

**Stakeholders and end-users were given opportunities to comment on the draft findings, recommendations and lessons.** As discussed in the main report and above, evaluation progress was shared at least monthly with FCDO SPT and BASIC suppliers, and FCDO SPT and suppliers had the opportunity to comment on findings prior to final publication.

## 2.12 Conflicts of interest

**We implemented a four pillar approach to managing Conflicts of Interest.** This included building contractual obligations into Integrity staff and consultant contracts, the provision of policy and training to team members, the use of firewalls and permission so only relevant team members access specific documents, and early report and proactive management of any alerts.

**Our team did not experience actual or potential conflicts of interest affecting during delivery.** The Team Leader and Project Director have not worked for DFID since 2013 and 2017 respectively and have no current direct involvement with the BASIC programme. While the team have all worked on FCDO programming in the past, a key requirement of the TOR was for our team to have “knowledge and expertise of working with DFID, developing country governments, development and humanitarian partners, other donors and civil society”. Finally, Integrity is currently a subcontractor on Lot B of DFID’s Expert Advisory Call Down Service. However, we have never delivered anything through this framework, and we conflict ourselves out of any opportunities on this framework.

**The evaluation team was able to work freely and without interference.** During the baseline planning stages, all team members approved the level of effort in days assigned to them during the study period and confirmed they did not suffer from any conflicts of interest. Clear escalation procedures were developed to let team members inform the project management unit of any changes in their ability to work on the project.

## 2.13 Quality assurance

**Quality assurance is key to effective evidence use.** The timely production and dissemination of high-quality BASIC evaluation evidence products can help FCDO take the following actions with confidence:

- Make BASIC programme design and implementations decisions.
- Inform current and future policy decisions.
- Demonstrate accountability of the BASIC programme.

To make taking these actions straightforward FCDO, we follow a set of organisational quality assurance practices to make sure that BASIC evaluation products are as valid and reliable as possible.

**We will use a comprehensive Quality Management System at the project and organisational level to deliver BASIC evaluation outputs products.** Our Quality Management System (QMS) consists of transparent quality assurance and quality control mechanisms to make evaluation products robust, timely, useful, and ethical. These procedures are built around best practices in the industry and the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Quality Standards for Development Evaluation. Our QMS is implemented at both the project and the organisational level (see Appendix I for an overview of these procedures). The Project Director and Project Manager are responsible for implementing the QMS and the Team Lead is responsible for collating feedback from the Quality Director.

## 2.14 Risk management

**Optimal risk management is essential in supporting high quality delivery.** We will complete proper risk management throughout the project cycle. This will enable us to deliver evaluation outputs safely, efficiently, and effectively. To manage risk on this project, the following steps, will/have been taken:

- Review the risks identified in the ToR.
- Test the likelihood and impact of documented risks and identify new risks during inception.
- Periodically monitor and report risks and mitigating strategies using a risk register.
- Escalate risks through the evaluation governance structure as required.

**We will use a risk register to record, monitor and report project related risks.** We recognise the challenges outlined in the ToR including discontinuity, shifts in policy, difficulties accessing policy makers, and ensuring duty of care. We have created a risk register ([Table 2.24: BASIC Evaluation Risk Register](#) – last updated October 2021 overleaf) aligned to FCDO's six key risk categories (context, delivery, fiduciary, operational, reputational, and safeguarding) to manage the risks that could affect project delivery. This register categorises each risk across several dimensions, including type of risk, the probability of the risk occurring, and the impact this risk will have on project delivery. Each risk is assigned a set of mitigating strategies and the residual risk to the project is determined.

**This register will be kept up to date throughout the project cycle.** As our understanding of the programme improved during the inception phase, we updated the register and reported changed to FCDO monthly. The Project Manager will monitor risks periodically with input from the evaluation team and will be responsible for keeping it up to date. As new risks arise, or changes in context affect existing risks, we will update the risk register and report any changes to FCDO as part of our quarterly reporting process.


**There was some change in risk across the period and appropriate measures were taken by the team.** While average levels of fiduciary, reputational and safeguarding residual risk remained stable, as shown in [Figure 2.4](#), risk elsewhere on the contract changed:

- **Context risk:** Average residual context risk decreased in the period. This was largely because the FY2020/21 ODA reprioritisation exercise completed, and a revised BASIC programme budget was confirmed. This enabled confirmed the baseline phase of the evaluation, BASIC Research inception phase, and procurement of the BASIC TAF could be completed as planned, despite slight delays in the latter two cases. Key mitigations put in place by the evaluation to

negate these risks included regular requests for updates from FCDO, and contingency planning relating to how we might need to adapt the evaluation design based on different budget outcome scenarios.

- **Operational risk:** Residual operational risk decreased on average in the reporting period as we were able to close a risk after the successful recruitment of National Consultants to assist case study research. We mitigated this risk by drawing on the Integrity's consultant network and professional connections in the evaluation team early on to recruit consultants. While we faced some delay due to case selection uncertainties described above, the ability to draw on large networks was a key mitigation measure.
- **Delivery risk:** Residual delivery risk increased on average in the reporting period due to several factors. First, we faced challenges in getting survey responses from FCDO country offices despite introducing the mitigations described above. Given the challenges engaging this group in a survey tool, but the relative ease in engaging them through an online key informant interview, it may be beneficial to consider revising the method to conduct semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of in-country advisers that include structured, survey-style questions that can generate statistics. Second, our case selection was amended to reflect operational engagement challenges and there is a risk of introducing self-selection bias into findings, whereby data collected does not systematically represent all BASIC-targeted countries. Our evaluation approach deals with this issue through triangulating the results of multiple data sources to inform findings. Finally, there is a risk that the early stage of BASIC Research makes it challenging for the evaluation to provide meaningful insights, especially on the interactions between workstreams. To mitigate this, we sought to collect a wider range of views from interview and documentations relating to BASIC plans to date, as well as expectations on the demands and challenges the service might face.

**Figure 2.4:** Average residual risk over time



**Source:** Integrity (2021). *BASIC Evaluation Contract Management Meeting 2. August 2021*. **N.B.** Fiduciary and reputational residual risk was 4 on average for all periods.

**Table 2.24: BASIC Evaluation Risk Register – last updated October 2021**

Risk ID	Area	Risk	Risk description	Prob.	Impact	Score	Mitigant	Mitigant description	Revised prob.	Revised impact	Residual risk
1	Context	Changes in scope or timelines due to context	If the administration or delivery of BASIC id affecting unexpectedly by its operational or political context, there is a risk that the evaluation may face unanticipated changes in scope or timelines for delivery. This could impact the project by causing delays and/or increasing resource requirements through the need to reformulate the evaluation workplan.	2	4	8	Regular engagement with FCDO, use of adaptive management principles	We will treat this risk by planning regular meeting points to discuss contract management and technical matters with FCDO, including reviewing and updating this risk register. Prior to each evaluation phase starting the team will review the proposed workplan and adapt the focus and timeline in agreement with FCDO, to reflect any changes in context. Regular internal management meetings will also be held to make decisions on how the project should proceed given any changes in context.	1	4	4
2	Context	Cancellation of contract due to FCDO priorities	Because of wider uncertainties relating to the resources made available to FCDO, there is a risk the contract may be cancelled or scaled back in size, which would minimise or prevent the ability of FCDO to collect performance evaluation evidence to support future decision making.	2	5	10	Regular engagement with FCDO	We will tolerate this risk given that we have limited control of its underlying cause. However, the evaluation team will use our proposed management arrangements to regularly discuss this risk with FCDO, such that the team can prepare for multiple scenarios.	1	5	5
3	Delivery	Quality of data compromised due to inability to travel	COVID-19 has removed our ability to travel as part of this evaluation. Because case research will be completed remotely, at least during the baseline, there is a risk the quality of data collected will be comprised, which could result in future FCDO decision making being based on invalid conclusions.	3	3	9	Strong remote data collection capabilities, use of triangulation, use of established local networks	We will treat this risk through the development of clear primary research guidance documents for the evaluation and training of consultants in evaluation protocols prior to each evaluation cycle. We will also triangulate findings from multiple sources to reduce the risk of bias and draw on local research networks to facilitate physical data collection as far as it is legal and safe to do so.	1	3	3
4	Delivery	Sampling inappropriate	The is a risk that evaluation evidence produced is biased due to the use of inappropriate sampling approaches. This could result in policy decisions being based on biased evaluation evidence. This is further compounded by challenges in engaging FCDO staff with limited or no involvement in the BASIC programme.	3	4	12	Regular engagement with FCDO, use of adaptive management principles	We have treated this risk through the specification of an evaluation design based on the perspectives and views on multiple stakeholders, review of programme documents and our teams sector knowledge and expertise. We will use our proposed management approach to engage regularly as a team, and with FCDO to discuss the evaluation design. The appropriateness of sampling used will be reviewed after and before every evaluation phase. We have also sought further support from FCDO to send targeted communications to in-country staff to increase our survey response rate.	3	4	12

Risk ID	Area	Risk	Risk description	Prob.	Impact	Score	Mitigant	Mitigant description	Revised prob.	Revised impact	Residual risk
5	Delivery	Deadlines not met	The is a risk that contractually agreed d deadlines are not met which will affect the ability of FCDO to make use of evaluation evidence produced when it is needed to support decision making.	2	4	8	Strong team, active project management, proactive engagement, regular reporting, clear deadlines	We have treated these risks by recruiting a strong team and implementing excellent project management practices. Our team was selected to offer expertise in evaluation and subject knowledge in the application of social protection approaches in times of crises. The team is well versed in working on evaluation contracts for FCDO and a range of other donors, including implementing task-based workplans, meeting deadlines and reporting updates periodically. Along with our QMS, clearly defined team structure and lines of reporting, and our proposed submission of all technical outputs to EQUALS, the above treatments greatly reduce the likelihood of these risks occurring.	1	4	4
6	Delivery	Team and consultant output quality inadequate	There is a risk that evaluation products produced by the team are not of a sufficient quality. This will prevent the FCDO to use these products to support decision-making to improve BASIC or other similar programmes.	3	5	15	Strong team, use of QA system, early findings meetings, benchmarking against EQUALS	We have treated these risks by recruiting a strong team and implementing excellent project management practices. Our team was selected to offer expertise in evaluation and subject knowledge in the application of social protection approaches in times of crises. The team is well versed in working on evaluation contracts for FCDO and a range of other donors, including implementing task-based workplans, meeting deadlines and reporting updates periodically. Along with our QMS, clearly defined team structure and lines of reporting, and our proposed submission of all technical outputs to EQUALS, the above treatments greatly reduce the likelihood of these risks occurring.	1	5	5
7	Delivery	Coordination across stakeholders inadequate	The is a risk the evaluation fails to sufficiently coordination with all relevant stakeholders as part of the evaluation process. This could mean the evaluation does not collect all relevant perspectives through phases and limit the extent to which evidence uptake occurs.	2	4	8	Proactive stakeholder engagement across all phases	We will treat this risk by proactively agreeing sampling approaches with FCDO that meet EQUALS standards, regularly reporting on communication with key stakeholders as part of our contract management and evaluation KPI reporting processes. These steps will reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	1	4	4
8	Delivery	Low survey response rate	The is a risk that the global survey of country offices yields a low response rate, which could lead to a misrepresentation of views by the evaluation, which would result in the evaluation evidence produced not being valid.	4	3	12	Early engagement with sample, 2-month survey window, periodic reminders to sample, reporting of survey response rate to FCDO and project team, Reduced length of survey to	We will treat this risk through planned coordination and delivery of a focused survey. We will work with FCDO to compile the survey sample in advance of the evaluation periods and alert the population of interest to the aims and benefits of the evaluation, as well as the requirements of the study in terms of responding. The survey will be designed to not last longer than 20 minutes. During the survey field period, we will request FCDO to share the survey link with the population of interest and draft updates for FCDO to send to this group. The evaluation team will also periodically report KPIs relating to the performance of the survey to FCDO, which can support us to share targeted reminders and make decisions about when to close the survey. These	3	3	9

Risk ID	Area	Risk	Risk description	Prob.	Impact	Score	Mitigant	Mitigant description	Revised prob.	Revised impact	Residual risk
							minimise length; requested targeted engagement from FCDO SPT.	steps will minimise the likelihood of this risk occurring.			
9	Delivery	Challenges accessing programme documents and data	The is a risk that the evaluation team face challenges in accessing programme documents and data. This could delay the evaluation, increase the level of resources required to access documents and challenge the validity of evaluation evidence produced.	2	4	8	Early engagement to request documents, data sharing processes in place, dataflow developed for each data collection task	We will treat this risk by requesting documents prior to the start of each evaluation phase from FCDO. We have an established means of securely sharing documents with FCDO using MS Teams which makes sharing documents secure and quick. These measures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	1	4	4
10	Delivery	Limited engagement in KII interviews	There is a risk that we fail to effectively engage proposed participants effectively in the programme of KIIs. This may affect our ability to collect broader perspectives about the context of BASIC and its external coherence, with a focus at the global level. This risk is especially acute where external organisations have been targeted for interview where the evaluation team does not have existing personal relationships.	3	4	12	Early engagement central SPT team, clear communication protocols, proposed introductions by FCDO SPT team, clear follow-up and non-contact escalation procedures	We will treat this risk by engaging with FCDO to review the proposed composition of the KII sampling frame prior to each evaluation phase to assess its suitability and assess how changes in context may affect our ability to engage with proposed interviewees. We have also confirmed that FCDO will provide the evaluation team with formal introductions to all interviewees, and the evaluation team has developed clear escalation and follow-up procedures to maximise interviewee responses. The above measures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk materialising.	1	4	4
11	Delivery	Limited in-country engagement on case studies	There is a risk that the evaluation team faces limited in-country engagement when delivering case studies. This could limit our ability to effectively understand the effects of BASIC at a country level in detail. This could severely limit our ability to draw conclusions about how BASIC works at a national level, meaning the evaluation cannot meet its full purpose.	4	5	20	Early engagement with country offices, test for receptiveness with central SPT team, clear communication protocols and escalation procedures for non-contact	We will treat this risk by engaging early with FCDO central and country office teams about our plans for engaging with country offices, and to test receptiveness of country offices to participate in the evaluation. We will also develop clear guidance on how to operationalise this inception report for case studies, which will include procedures for non-contact. These procedures are expected the reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	2	4	8
12	Delivery	Covid-19 affects negatively affects stakeholder engagement	There is a risk that COVID-19 negatively affects our ability to engage with stakeholders due to safety of logistical reasons. This may delay the delivery of the evaluation and affect our ability to collect data on all proposed stakeholder groups.	3	4	12	No international travel, limited or no travel for in-country research support, increased use	We will terminate this risk by avoiding all travel for the purpose of the evaluation, instead relying on IT solutions like video conferencing to support engagement where it is not safe and legal to convene groups physically. These procedures are expected the reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	1	4	4



Risk ID	Area	Risk	Risk description	Prob.	Impact	Score	Mitigant	Mitigant description	Revised prob.	Revised impact	Residual risk
							of remote working.				
24	Delivery	Challenges in evaluating BASIC Research	There is a risk that the evaluation will not be able to sufficiently evaluate BASIC Research due to delays in the implementation of the workstream, especially during early stages of the contract. This may affect the evaluation team's ability to answer all specified evaluation questions. In particular, those relating to the performance of BASIC Research and its links with other programme workstreams.	3	4	12	Request updates from FCDO about BASIC Research delivery; flag any concerns early on to SRO; and report any relevant limitations in evaluation outputs in line with EQUALS standards.	We will treat this risk by requesting updates from FCDO about the progress of BASIC Research delivery during quarterly contract management meetings, highlighting early on to the evaluation FCDO SRO when the evaluation team have concerns about the ability of the study to fully evaluate BASIC Research, and report any relevant limitations in evaluation outputs in line with EQUALS standards.	2	3	6
13	Fiduciary	Over or under spend	There is a risk that the evaluation will suffer an over or under spend while the contract is delivered. This may affect our ability to produce timely evaluation evidence or produce evaluation products to a sufficient quality, which could hinder FCDO decision-making.	3	4	12	Active project management, proactive engagement, regular reporting	Integrity adheres to company-wide financial management practices which require weekly review and monthly reporting to senior management and FCDO of a project's financial performance. These procedures will treat these risks by enabling us to identify early-signs of financial misconduct, and when an over or underspend might occur early – such that the team can make corrective and proportionate actions in a timely manner. These points are expected to reduce the likelihood of these fiduciary risks occurring. Where any form of unlawful financial misconduct arises, FCDO will be alerted immediately.	1	4	4
14	Fiduciary	Financial misconduct	There is a risk that the evaluation will suffer from financial misconduct in some way, which will compromise the validity of any results produced by the study and minimise evidence uptake.	2	4	8	Strong financial reporting protocols, trained team, use of early flag system	Integrity adheres to company-wide financial management practices which require weekly review and monthly reporting to senior management and FCDO of a project's financial performance. These procedures will treat these risks by enabling us to identify early-signs of financial misconduct, and when an over or underspend might occur early – such that the team can make corrective and proportionate actions in a timely manner. These points are expected to reduce the likelihood of these fiduciary risks occurring. Where any form of unlawful financial misconduct arises, FCDO will be alerted immediately.	1	4	4
15	Operational	Integrity team becomes unavailable	There is a risk that, due to changes in the timeline of the project, or changes in personal circumstances, that the proposed Integrity team becomes unavailable to	3	5	15	Depth in team, proactive engagement, extensive backstopping	We will treat this risk by fielding multiple team members with clear and distinct responsibilities as part of the evaluation. We will proactively engage with the team to identify any possible resource issues early on. If any issues arising of this nature cannot be resolved, Integrity has extensive	1	5	5

Risk ID	Area	Risk	Risk description	Prob.	Impact	Score	Mitigant	Mitigant description	Revised prob.	Revised impact	Residual risk
			delivery the contract. These could delay the delivery of the evaluation and affect its quality through impacting stakeholder relationships developed by the team.				support from Integrity	backstopping capabilities – either through Integrity staff evaluation professionals, or our consultant bench. These procedures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.			
16	Operational	Changes in FCDO team resulting in delays/changes in decision-making	There is a risk that changes in the FCDO team managing the evaluation cause delays in the evaluation process and require additional resources to induct new FCDO staff onto the project.	3	3	9	Regular engagement with FCDO, documentation of agreed approaches	We will treat this risk through regular FCDO engagement as part of our proposed evaluation management procedures, and by clearly documenting and sharing meeting agreements and actions with FCDO. These procedures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	2	3	6
17	Operational	Delays in contracting suppliers	There is a risk that FCDO face delays in contracting suppliers to deliver the programme. This could cause delays as more time is required for BASIC implementation and require additional resources to adjust the timeline of the evaluation.	2	4	8	Regular engagement with FCDO, use of adaptive management principles	We will treat this risk through regular engagement with FCDO as part of our proposed evaluation management procedures. We will review the extent of implementation prior to each evaluation phase with FCDO to determine whether the evaluation needs to be adapted in any way. These procedures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	1	4	4
18	Operational	Delays in recruiting in-country research staff	The evaluation team may face delays in recruiting in-country research staff to support case study research. This could affect the timely submission of evaluation products, which could affect the ability of FCDO to make decisions when it needs to.	1	3	3	Early engagement with Integrity business team; preferred use of known consultants with proven track record working for Integrity	We will treat this risk through early engagement with the Integrity business team to confirm the requirements for the evaluation and prioritise the use of known consultants with a proven track record working for Integrity to avoid the risk of any delays. These procedures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	1	3	3
19	Reputational	Ethical policies violated	There is a risk that our ethics policies fail and the evaluation is delivered in an unethical manner. This could negatively affect the reputation of FCDO and compromise the validity of any evaluation findings.	2	4	8	Trained team, strong policies in place, use of early flag system	This risk will be treated in several ways. First, we have fielded an evaluation team well trained in the delivery of evaluations in development contexts. Second, Integrity has established policies that support the ethical delivery of evaluations services that the team will be trained on prior to every evaluation phase – this includes those relating to codes of conduct, safeguarding, anti-corruption and fraud, and whistleblowing, among others. These procedures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	1	4	4
20	Reputational	Conflict of interest	There is a risk that a Conflict of interest could arise within the team. Should this not be dealt with in a timely manner, the evaluation findings could become compromised which will negatively affect FCDO's ability to use them to support decision making.	2	4	8	Disclosure of any conflicts early	We will treat this risk through regular engagement with FCDO as part of our proposed evaluation management procedures. We will review potential conflicts of interest prior to each evaluation phase, and jointly determine corrective action with FCDO should any conflicts of interest arise. These procedures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.	1	4	4

Risk ID	Area	Risk	Risk description	Prob.	Impact	Score	Mitigant	Mitigant description	Revised prob.	Revised impact	Residual risk
21	Safeguarding	Safety of staff compromised	There is a risk that the safety of staff is compromised through the delivery of the evaluation. This may affect FCDO's reputation as well as the timeliness of evaluation products.	1	5	5	Strong safety protocols, trained team, use of early flag system	<p>These safeguarding risks will be treated through the specification and use of organisation and project-specific policies and protocols.</p> <p>At the organisational level, Integrity has clear policies relating to safeguarding and duty of care which all project team members will be training on prior to all evaluations phases.</p> <p>At the project level, the delivery of primary field research will be supported by the delivery of focused training and the provision of clear guidance, that both operationalise this inception report. This training and guidance will include content on periodic operations reporting, our approach to gender and social inclusion, both in terms of BASIC and the delivery of the evaluation, and escalation protocols. Regular internal and FCDO meetings throughout the contract will facilitate regular discussion and reporting of safeguarding risks. These procedures are expected to reduce the likelihood of this risk occurring.</p>	1	5	5
22	Safeguarding	Safety and rights of respondents or beneficiaries compromised	There is a risk that the safety and rights of respondents or beneficiaries is compromised through the delivery of the evaluation. This may affect FCDO's reputation as well as the timeliness of evaluation products.	2	5	10	No access to beneficiaries, trained team, strong consent and conduct policies in place, use of early flag system, GESI built into design	<p>The team will not engage with end beneficiaries of BASIC and safeguarding risks associated with engagement with end beneficiaries are terminated as a result.</p>	1	5	5
23	Safeguarding	Physical safety and wider safeguarding risks for in-country researchers	There is a risk that the physical and wider safety and rights of in-country researchers is compromised through the delivery of the evaluation. This risk is especially acute given FCDO's commitment to building the capacity of local evaluators. This may affect FCDO's reputation as well as the timeliness of evaluation products.	3	4	12	Case mobilisation training, regular check-ins with in-country staff, clear escalation protocols	<p>The team will not engage with end beneficiaries of BASIC and safeguarding risks associated with engagement with end beneficiaries are terminated as a result.</p>	2	4	8

## Appendix 3. Use and influence plan

*In this Appendix, we present the use and influence plan for the BASIC evaluation. The plan outlines the key audience groups and their anticipated uses of the evaluation; the major challenges and enabling factors each group has with regards to using the evaluation products, and the communications products that the evaluation will employ, and the timeline of communication activities.*

### 3.1 Purpose and objectives

**We developed a plan by mapping out key stakeholders, and assessing their learning needs and evidence uptake challenges.** Tailoring information products for the diversity of BASIC's primary, secondary, and tertiary stakeholder groups is a critical part of the evaluation's ability to increase evidence uptake and learning about the BASIC programme. This influence and use plan aims to provide a clear and strategic approach to reaching these diverse audience groups with evidence and learning associated with the BASIC evaluation. The strategy specifically seeks to:

1. Identify the key evaluation users, their anticipated uses of the evaluation and the key needs and constraints that each user group has regarding evidence uptake and learning from the evaluation.
2. Outline the major challenges and enabling factors for each user group in this regard.
3. Present a set of communications products tailored to the needs of each user group.
4. Identify the periodicity and timeline for communications product launches, mapped against the evaluation lifecycle.

### 3.2 Mapping key audiences and uses

The communications strategy has been designed around the key evaluation audience groups, their anticipated uses for the evaluation, and their specific communications needs and constraints:

- **Stakeholder:** category of evaluation user as defined by organisational context and role.
- **Evaluation use:** anticipated use of the evaluation.
- **Needs and constraints:** communication needs and & constraints of the stakeholder group.

**The stakeholder categorisations presented in the table below serve as a means to consider the breadth of user groups and their differing communication needs.** However, significant variance within each category – particularly in terms of levels of engagement with BASIC – should not be excluded at this stage. Thus, whilst many stakeholders within the academic/think tank grouping will have relatively minimal engagement with BASIC, others may have very high levels of interaction with the programme and its activities. Likewise, FCDO social development advisors and other cadres can be expected to vary considerably in their involvement in BASIC during its implementation cycle. For this reason, the communication strategy will deploy a broad-scope approach, with communication products being designed with stakeholder categories in mind and include all evaluation participants.

**Table 3.1: Overview of key target audiences and evaluation uses**

Level	Stakeholder	Improved evaluation use	Needs & constraints
Primary	BASIC team members – both FCDO and suppliers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme adaptation within and across country contexts</li> <li>• Cross-country learning and evidence gaps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular access to evaluation findings, to support evidence-based programme adaptation during implementation.</li> <li>• Programme-specific lessons, with potential for learning across country contexts.</li> </ul>
	FCDO country offices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme adaptation within country</li> <li>• Government engagement</li> <li>• Evidence gaps on what works</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country-specific learning</li> <li>• Limited bandwidth for BASIC communication products</li> </ul>
Secondary	Government partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence on how BASIC can support coordination, advocacy and system-level change within their specific country and crisis contexts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country-specific learning</li> <li>• Limited bandwidth for BASIC communication products</li> </ul>
	FCDO cadres & relevant departments, inc. policy leads, e.g., humanitarian cash, displacement, resilience, climate etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cross-country learning</li> <li>• Generalisable learning for other social protection programmes, policy and advocacy</li> <li>• Upwards accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited bandwidth for BASIC communication products</li> <li>• Lower engagement with BASIC programme</li> </ul>
Tertiary	In-country and global donors, World Bank and UN agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence on how BASIC can support coordination, advocacy and system-level change within their specific country and crisis contexts; and more broadly through humanitarian system reform agendas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country-specific learning</li> <li>• Limited bandwidth for BASIC communication products</li> </ul>
	Academia, think tanks, NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generalisable learning for other social protection, and policy and advocacy</li> <li>• Accountability to countries &amp; populations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transparent evidence standards</li> <li>• Learning that reaches beyond BASIC programme context</li> <li>• Low engagement with BASIC programme</li> </ul>

Source: Integrity (2021).

### 3.3 Evidence uptake challenges and enabling factors

In line with the needs and constraints outlined in the table above, the following challenges and enabling factors can be identified regarding evidence uptake for the BASIC programme:

**Stakeholder buy-in:** One key driving factor behind evidence uptake is anticipated to be the degree of buy-in and engagement of the stakeholder to the BASIC programme. BASIC programme staff, FCDO country offices and partner governments that have been directly involved in BASIC activities are likely to have significantly more interest in its evidence products, than those who have not. For this reason, the communications strategy will cater for a range of levels of interest and involvement in the BASIC programme, including full reports for those stakeholders with the closest interaction with the programme, and shorter summary versions for those with less involvement.

**Time and bandwidth for evidence uptake:** The available time and bandwidth for evidence uptake around BASIC is likely to vary depending on the stakeholder's degree of involvement with the programme. Subsequently, stakeholders within related FCDO cadres beyond social development and

humanitarian, may have interest in BASIC evidence products, but little time to consume them in full. Brief evidence summaries and accessible formats are therefore likely to best serve these groups.

**Evidence scope:** Some BASIC stakeholders are likely to require country-specific evidence and learning from the BASIC programme, most notably those involved in BASIC programmes within FCDO country offices or partner governments. Other stakeholders, such as BASIC programme staff and academic researchers, are more likely to make use of evidence with a wider scope than single-country contexts. The communications strategy will seek to package evidence and learning from the evaluation along country-specific or multi-country themes, to best serve the full range of stakeholders.

### 3.4 Evaluation and learning products

**Our evaluation and learning products suite includes reports, visual media and participatory sessions.** Considering the uses and uptake challenges identified above, we identified the following set of learning products to communicate the results of the evaluation.

- **Evaluation Reports:** Full in-depth reports to high EQUALS standards at baseline, midline and endline, presenting robust evidence-based conclusions informing implementable recommendations. Thematic appendices where relevant. Online publication at gov.uk and communities of practice
- **Report Summaries:** Concise summary findings, conclusions and recommendations that can serve as standalone products. Online publication at gov.uk and communities of practice
- **Webinars:** Online sessions to present and discuss learning from the evaluation with the wider social assistance policy audience.
- **External events:** Where feasible and timely, the evaluation team will seek to leverage existing external events as forums for maximizing the evidence uptake from the BASIC evaluation across the wider community, as well as leveraging BASIC TAS, Research and KML activities in this vein.

**These products will periodically present the results of our study in written, visual, and participatory formats and appeal to different stakeholders.** The characteristics of each product will cater to the range of primary, secondary, and tertiary stakeholders identified in above, and a mapping of learning products to stakeholders is shown in [Figure 3.1: Mapping learning products to key stakeholders](#). The communications strategy will deploy a range of product launch cycles and throughout the evaluation process Evaluation reports and summaries will be published at the milestone points of baseline, midline and endline completion. Webinars will follow these product launches to continue building interest and engagement among the widest community groups. Lastly, the evaluation team will seek to leverage ad-hoc external events on a rolling basis throughout the evaluation cycle.

**Figure 3.1: Mapping learning products to key stakeholders**

Stakeholder	 Reports	 Summaries	 Webinars	 External events
BASIC team members	✓	✓		
FCDO country offices	✓	✓	✓	
In-country donors, World Bank and UN agencies		✓	✓	✓
Government partners		✓		✓
FCDO cadres & relevant departments		✓	✓	
Academia, thinktanks, NGOs, donors	✓		✓	✓

Source: Integrity (2021).



## Appendix 4. BASIC Theory of Change and Logframe review

*This Appendix presents a summary of the results of our Theory of Change and logframe review, which sought to answer sub-EQs 1.4 and 1.5. It includes an overview of the Theory of Change, as well as the methods taken to deliver the reviews and a narrative summary of their results.*

### 4.1 Theory of change review

#### 4.1.1 Overview of existing programme theory of change

A high level ToC was developed by FCDO during the specification of BASIC's business case, and revised in May 2021 with support from Integrity (and informed by a ToC workshop with FCDO and suppliers held earlier in the year).

The core rationale underpinning the BASIC ToC can be understood as follows: providing high quality advice for the design and delivery of country plans, policies, programmes, and systems, building the capacities of FCDO, agencies, governments, donors and local actors, generating and disseminating learning and policy relevant research on what works in different contexts, and building relationships across the humanitarian-development-climate nexus will, taken together, bring about more efficient, effective and equitable social assistance in crises, enabled by diversified and more sustainable funding. The ultimate impact of these outcomes will be that vulnerable people are able to cope better with crises and meet their basic needs, in anticipation of or following shocks, including climate-related crises, armed conflict and forcible displacement.

Issues identified, and changes made, during the ToC review earlier this year included clarifications to improve the communication of the ToC, as well as more substantive questions on the scope of the ToC (key changes made during the review are set out in [Table 4.1](#)):

- The exercise identified the opportunity to make explicit broadly agreed elements of the ToC which currently lack sufficient visibility.
- Based on experience of implementation, opportunities for refining the scope and flow of the workstreams within the ToC were identified. This included both potential additions and reductions.
- The key assumptions underpinning the ToC were reviewed and adjusted in line with stakeholder comments and elaborated to correspond to the specific linkages between levels in the ToC.

**Table 4.1: Key changes made to the BASIC ToC during May 2021 review**

Issue identified	Modification made to ToC
A central objective of BASIC is developing the nexus between humanitarian assistance and social assistance / social protection systems. However, there was no specific reference to defining why and how these two systems will be integrated under BASIC in the ToC.	Cross cutting vertical box was added to the ToC indicating the three main pathways of convergence between humanitarian assistance and social protection: i) progressive convergence between humanitarian and existing SP systems ; ii) where no SP system exists using humanitarian assistance to lay the foundations for a SP system; and iii) direct integration of a shock responsive element / humanitarian caseloads into an existing SP system.
There is a potential tension between objectives to support national ownership on one hand, and humanitarian principles on the other.	Assumption added that humanitarian assistance is an appropriate entry point for building a social assistance system.
The ToC lacked reference to how to climate change will be integrated.	Additional box was added at the output level: "New or strengthened relationships and strategic partnerships across the humanitarian,

Issue identified	Modification made to ToC
	climate resilience and SP sectors". This recognises the objective of working across all three actors, as well as relationship building as a discrete output, which resonates with the BASIC Research ToC.
There was a need for improved clarity on who BASIC's beneficiaries are.	Where appropriate, more consistent reference was made to different stakeholder groups within the output and outcome boxes – both by stakeholder type and identifying global and country pathways.
There was scope for the programme to make expectations around the level of ambition regarding inclusion results more explicit.	Additional impact statement was added: "Design and delivery of social assistance in crises is more inclusive (gender, age, disability and marginalised groups)".
The sufficiency of outputs to deliver on the outcome of increased political commitment was queried.	Assumption was added in relation to complementary activities helping to deliver on political commitment.
The sufficiency of outputs to deliver on the outcome of increased human and institutional capability and capacity was queried.	Assumption was added in relation to complementary activities helping to deliver on capacity strengthening – including developing strategic partnerships to leverage the programmes of existing capacity building organisations to help overcome this limitation.
There was scope to improve the presentation of the programme inputs.	Inputs have been reformulated in relation to the constituent BASIC workstreams (TAS, SPACE and Research) and FCDO (HQ and country posts)
There was scope to better define the context for BASIC operations.	Reference to recurrent crises with 'climate change'. This highlights that natural disasters and other shocks (one off and not necessarily recurrent) would be in scope but specifically in FCAS.
The six assumptions identified were broad, mainly related to external contextual or risk factors (rather than causality) and not associated with specific causal pathways or linkages.	Assumptions were rewritten and reorganised the correspond to the linkages between the various levels in the ToC.

#### 4.1.2 Assessment of validity of the ToC using baseline evidence

Baseline evidence continues to support the conclusion in the inception report and ToC review that the overall logic of the ToC holds.

Evidence from evaluation case studies suggests that, at country level, the most plausible ToC impact pathway is for:

*'High quality advice' provided by TA to combine with 'greater awareness, knowledge and learning' and 'new or strengthened relationships' (outputs) to bring about 'new or strengthened country...policies or programmes', 'greater coherence, coordination and synergies' and 'increased political commitment' (with the caveat that achieving this last outcome may be particularly challenging in some country contexts or amongst specific stakeholder groups, particularly government). And, in turn, more effective, efficient and/or inclusive SA in crises (impact).*


**Whilst evidence of trajectory towards impact is more limited at global level, the most plausible ToC impact pathway is, similarly, for:**

*'High quality advice' provided by TA to combine with 'greater awareness, knowledge and learning' and 'new or strengthened relationships' (outputs) to bring about 'greater coherence, coordination and synergies' and 'increased political commitment' (though, as above, achieving this last outcome may be particularly challenging in some institutional contexts). And, in turn, more effective, efficient and/or inclusive SA in crises (impact).*

And that the least plausible impact pathway, at both country and global level, is for:

*‘Targeted [BASIC] capacity building support’ to bring about ‘Improved...institutional capability and capacity’ and, in turn and in combination with other outcomes, more effective, efficient or inclusive SA in crises. That said, there is potential for the programme to help build political commitment within some governments and, in turn, possibly contribute to diversified and sustained domestic sources of financing.*

**Figure 4.1**



[Table 4.2](#) assesses the validity of each of the ToC assumptions with reference to baseline evidence and, where needed, suggests how any assumptions which may not be holding might be considered more fully in programme design.

**Table 4.2: Assessment of validity of ToC assumptions**

	Holding	Partly holding / case-by-case	Not holding	As yet unknown	Supporting evidence
<b>Inputs → outputs</b>					
BASIC has the flexibility to adapt to major contextual changes including new shocks and the FCDO reprioritisation exercise.	X				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BASIC demonstrated its ability to respond and adapt to changing circumstances through the rapid creation of SPACE in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. BASIC received widespread recognition across internal and external stakeholders for the rapidity and effectiveness with which it pivoted to provide a strong pool of expertise to respond to this emerging priority.</li> <li>Reprioritisation of ODA spending resulted a prolonged period of uncertainty around programme budgets for country offices, resulting in several planned assignments being put on hold or cancelled. Budget cuts also curtailed uptake of the outputs of some assignments which had already been undertaken. Nevertheless, BASIC remains relevant in the light of the FCDO reprioritisation exercise to date, specifically in relation to the retained priorities of humanitarian reform and climate change.</li> </ul>
FCDO posts are sufficiently engaged to identify windows of opportunity for reform and draw on BASIC TA strategically to promote use of SP approaches in crises.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Receiving a clear steer from in-country clients was essential to enable the TA delivery team to provide high quality support. Initial scoping calls generally supported the development of a clear ask. ToRs aimed to clearly define expected outputs of assignments, whilst retaining flexibility to adapt through contract breakpoints for review and revision (first piloted in Yemen). However, in cases where BASIC did not receive a clearly defined request in spite of these efforts, it was challenging for BASIC to offer useful support (e.g. as in the case of some assignments in Somalia).</li> <li>In some cases, in-country users lacked sufficient bandwidth to develop and draw on BASIC (e.g. Syria, Iraq) or, for those which had already drawn on BASIC support, to request further assistance which was desired (e.g. Pakistan, Yemen case study). Further, some in-country advisers felt that they could have drawn more effectively on TA had they had more time to engage with other Embassy colleagues across siloed programme portfolios (e.g. humanitarian, social development and/or climate resilience). Capacity limitations could also be substantive; in the case of Sudan, the Project Management Unit of the Family Support Programme lacked a gender lead to commission and act as the contact point for a related assignment which they had identified as a need.</li> </ul>
There is sufficient technical expertise and capacity to deliver high quality advice and robust research in these contexts.	X				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BASIC TA has provided high quality, diverse and impartial advice for the design and delivery of, mainly FCDO and to a lesser extent, government and agency, programmes. 88% of baseline survey respondents reported that TA received from BASIC was, or will be, very effective (35%) of effective (53%) in supporting them to make better use of SP approaches in times of crisis.</li> <li>Both users and experts themselves emphasised the high calibre of experts on the roster – with several pointing to the stellar reputations, and high level of influence with donors and agencies, of senior experts.</li> </ul>

					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SPACE and, to a lesser extent, BASIC TAS deployed multidisciplinary teams comprised of members with complementary skillsets. Users emphasised that this was unusual for a call-down facility and improved the overall quality of advice provided by integrating different perspectives and providing an internal source of challenge.</li> </ul>
<b>Outputs → outcomes</b>					
International consultants and researchers delivering BASIC provide advice which is relevant and appropriate.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Jordan, whilst some FCDO staff reported that BASIC consultants had a good understanding of the national and wider Middle Eastern context, others observed that they could have placed more emphasis on political dynamics within and between government institutions involved in delivering SP. In Somalia, users reported that support would have been more effective had experts been better able to absorb and take into account the complexity of the nascent SP system.</li> </ul>
There is adequate commitment, and financial and human resource at country level (in FCDO, governments or agencies) to implement new or strengthened plans, policies and programmes.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In some instances, limitations on client bandwidth and staff turnover affect uptake of TA outputs – as in Nigeria where staff turnover has undermined TA team follow up and FCDO's use of BASIC outputs in support of its advocacy and influencing goals.</li> </ul>
FCDO posts have the absorptive capacity to utilise BASIC outputs and link to their influencing work.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some users, such as FCDO Yemen, actively used BASIC to support their influencing goals and inform engagement with external stakeholders. In Jordan BASIC supported FCDO to position itself as a thought leader in a crowded donor environment – advisers were able to draw on evidence produced by BASIC to inform their negotiations with NAF and donors as Jordan was developing the NSPS.</li> <li>Others deployed BASIC as an independent broker, as in DRC where SPACE hosted stakeholder workshops convened by UNICEF and WFP to influence and build consensus around the design of a new World Bank-funded cash transfer programme.</li> </ul>
BASIC collaborates effectively with other stakeholders to achieve capacity strengthening and influencing outcomes.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the baseline survey, 27% of respondents strongly agreed and 27% agreed that TA resulted in improved collaboration between Humanitarian and SDA advisors within FCDO – though evidence as to how this translates into improved outcomes is limited.</li> <li>Whilst too early to assess Research-related outputs, 'strengthening networks and linkages' between the humanitarian, climate resilience and SP sectors, both nationally and internationally, is expected to form a 'domain of change' for Research.</li> <li>Areas which have received limited attention so far include building strategic partnerships at global level (as distinct from support to coordination mechanisms), as well as building relationships between HA/SP and <i>climate</i> actors</li> </ul>
Buy in from senior FCDO personnel is sufficient to support high level influencing agenda				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluation evidence suggests that translating TA outputs into outcomes requires active engagement from users, underpinned, in the case of FCDO posts, by a shared vision across the country team and senior management support. However, at baseline evidence identified of active buy in from senior FCDO personnel was limited.</li> </ul>

BASIC workstreams collaborate effectively to maximise cross-programme linkages, coordination and synergies.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BASIC Research is operating on a different timeframe from rest of programme, meaning that use of research by governments, donors and agencies is unlikely to combine with other outcomes to generate impact within, or immediately beyond, the lifetime of the programme.</li> <li>Nevertheless, key informants indicated that Research differs qualitatively from analysis and evidence synthesis undertaken by TA, and has the potential to interact with and support the TA workstream (and vice versa), adding value by establishing long-term presence and engagement, building local capacities and collecting much-needed primary data in FCAS contexts.</li> </ul>
<b>Outcomes → impact</b>					
Conflict and security do not prevent country level research, technical assistance or capacity building support or subsequent implementation of plans.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Yemen, the assignment team (and commissioner) were restricted in their understanding of institutional capabilities and ability to talk to a variety of national authorities by limited in-country access. And in Jordan, BASIC TA deployed a Jordanian based outside of the country which – had Covid not required a shift to virtual stakeholder engagement – would have meant missing an opportunity for the FCDO to involve the consultant in meetings with government counterparts.</li> </ul>
Stakeholders are willing to contribute potentially increased levels of funding to support the establishment (in this case strengthening and expansion) of SP systems.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Within FCDO, the reprioritisation of ODA spending resulted a prolonged period of uncertainty around programme budgets for country offices, resulting in several planned assignments being put on hold or cancelled. Budget cuts also curtailed uptake of the outputs of some assignments which had already been undertaken (as in Liberia and Zimbabwe).</li> <li>More widely, decreasing levels of international humanitarian funding following the pandemic are resulting in shortfalls for meeting the needs of existing caseloads.</li> <li>Nevertheless, there are opportunities for the programme to engage with actors who have not traditionally committed significant funds to SA, most notably the World Bank and EU, is increasing. Whilst there is some case evidence that BASIC has supported FCDO to respond to changing funding dynamics, engagement with key (emerging) partners could be more strategic.</li> </ul>
Humanitarian assistance is an appropriate entry point for building a social assistance system.		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Whilst cash programming can provide an appropriate entry point, in Yemen KIs expressed the need for debate to move beyond cash as an entry point for harmonisation, and to avoid the unintended de-prioritisation of other sectors and instruments.</li> </ul>
The benefits of reduced fragmentation in assistance outweigh the benefits of maintaining intentional overlaps and redundancies that may be desirable in FCAS.				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The baseline did not yield evidence as to the benefits and costs of streamlining SA (mainly because there has not yet been significant progress towards defragmentation), except to identify as a potential unintended consequence that more efficient SA which consolidates and reduces delivery channels may increase the fragility of systems, as well as risk of exclusion of vulnerable populations.</li> </ul>



### 4.1.3 Expanding the Theory of Change

Based on evidence gathered at baseline, we suggest that specific casual linkages be elaborated between the output and outcome levels of the ToC, as set out in figure 4.2. Arrows reflect stakeholder views as to how they expect BASIC to bring about change.

**Figure 4.2: Suggested causal linkages between the output and outcome levels of the BASIC ToC**





Figure 4.3 pilots the addition of intermediate outcomes between the output and outcome levels of the ToC for those causal linkages, for which we have been able to gather most evidence at baseline.

**Figure 4.3: Possible intermediate outcomes to add to the BASIC ToC (related to TA, learning and relationships)**



## 4.2 BASIC logframe review

### 4.2.1 Context, aims and method

FCDO SPT undertook a review of the BASIC programme logframe as part of the 2021 BASIC Annual Review process. This review aims to assess how far the logframe sufficiently measures programme performance over time. As the evaluation supplier to the contract, we were asked to support this review by considering how the existing impact and outcome statements, and their respective measures, could be enhanced. As such, our review has the following aims:

- Conduct a rapid appraisal of existing impact and outcome indicator statements and measures.
- Consider the use of more effective alternative statements and indicators to assess performance.
- Consider opportunities for harmonising indicators to enable cross-programme comparisons.

To meet these aims, we implemented a desk-based review across five modules ([Table 4.3](#)) to answer assess whether the logframe is an appropriate results measurement framework.

**Table 4.3: Logframe review desk-based review modules**

#	Module	Rationale
1	Review the logframe against the TOC	Assess alignment and gaps
2	Review the quality of existing indicators using FCDO checklist provided in logframe guidance	Identify key improvement areas
3	Consider how far the logframe aligns to the FCDO Outcome Delivery Plan	Appraise political alignment of logframe
4	Consider learning and approach from other FCDO programmes and the sector more broadly	Consider logframe alignment opportunities
5	Triangulate results across modules	Provide actionable guidance to revise logframe to better serve SPT needs

### 4.2.2 Review findings and revised logframe

A summary of the findings and recommendations arising from the review are presented in Table 12 overleaf. FCDO was provided an opportunity to feedback on the results in September 2021. All recommendations were accepted by FCDO. The revised logframe is presented in Table 24 below and a revised logframe template was shared with FCDO in October 2021.

**Table 4.4: Logframe review results and recommendations**

Indicator #	Findings	Recommendations
<b>Impact: Vulnerable people can cope better with crises and meet their basic needs</b>		
1: % of global population effectively covered by one social protection benefit, in crisis contexts (disaggregated by gender, disability, age)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Impact statement and indicators sufficiently align to the ToC impact and sub-impacts</li> <li>Missing baseline values and indicators for all sub-workstreams of #2</li> <li>Ambition for #1 appears reasonable; ambition of #2 unclear</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Baseline year for all indicators should be 2017 and average value for BASIC countries should be provided</li> <li>ILO indicators sufficient for #1. WB coverage indicator also useful but not disaggregated. Both suffer from data completeness issues – imputation required.</li> <li>Consider OECD ODA spend for social protection overall and for UK for #2, although does not consider private finance</li> </ul>
2: Efficient, effective, sustainable funding for social protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aligns to FCDO ODP</li> <li>Broader considerations around climate and food insecurity not addressed but not directly relevant to the ToC (can cover in evaluation if useful)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New indicators: In the future, consider alignment to resilience work and broader resilience indicator development, e.g. FAO RIMA. Indicator on efficiency also needed, e.g. cost per person. Limited previous attempts to provide time series data for this, e.g. World Bank</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 1: New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented (bilaterals, multilaterals, Governments, FCDO)</b>		
1.1: Examples of new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes or systems designed and implemented as a result of BASIC (FCDO, bilaterals, multilaterals, governments)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>These indicators also address ToC outcome on evidence use and increased political commitment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revise statement to make the link to multiple ToC outcomes clear</li> </ul>
1.2: Evidence and advice used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies, practices and programmes (examples from evaluation case study countries)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Opportunities to tie in evaluation data more explicitly. #1.1 was intended to be addressed using survey data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transition to representative sample of in-country advisers structured KIIs. Revise #1.1 to % of assignments for countries included in sampling that resulted in new or strengthened plans, policies, programmes, or systems</li> </ul>
1.3: Design and delivery of social assistance in crises is more inclusive (gender, age, disability, and marginalised group)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More focused consideration of WB projects and KAP assessments on other programmes not relevant to BASIC ToC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider the average GESI scorecard score for case-countries over time to make #1.3 explicit</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2: Improved cross-sector human and institutional capability and capacity (Governments, local actors, multilaterals, bilaterals, FCDO)</b>		
2: Examples of improved actor coordination because of BASIC support (cumulative): a. TA; b. research	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Misalignment of statement to indicator, i.e., #2 is more concerned with coherence and coordination</li> <li>Again, opportunities to tie in evaluation data more explicitly. Again, #2 was intended to be addressed using survey data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Make use of 4-point Kirkpatrick to construct average score for case countries and track overtime (reaction, learning, behaviour, result)</li> <li>Consider additional indicator to address coherence and coordination, based on a 3-point traffic light system, where triangulated evaluation evidence underpinning Sub-EQ6.2 is used to inform the scoring system</li> </ul>

**Table 4.5: Revised logframe indicators**

IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	
Vulnerable people can cope better with crises and meet their basic needs	% of population in countries that have received at least one BASIC intervention effectively covered by one social protection benefit:  a. world  BASIC countries b. Contingency: Population covered by at least one social protection benefit c. Contingency: Women covered by at least one social protection benefit d. Contingency: Children/households receiving child/family cash benefits e. Contingency: Persons above retirement age receiving a pension f. Contingency: Persons with severe disabilities collecting disability social protection benefits	Planned a.	45%	45%	46%	47%	48%	49%	50%	
		Achieved a.	45.2% (2016)	Data not available	47%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned b.	NA	NA	NA	26%	28%	30%	32%	
		Achieved b.	40%	26%	24%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned c.	NA	NA	NA	24%	26%	28%	30%	
		Achieved c.	Data not available	Data not available	22%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned d.	NA	NA	NA	16%	18%	20%	22%	
		Achieved d.	20%	13%	14%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned e.	NA	NA	NA	42%	44%	46%	48%	
		Achieved e.	7%	45%	40%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned f.	NA	NA	NA	24%	26%	28%	30%	
		Achieved f.	23%	25%	22%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
			Source							
			<a href="#">International Labour Organisation Data on SDG 1.3.1: data imputed using mean data except for ind. Where there are data gaps, imputation was unfeasible due to large volume of missing data in source.</a>							
	Impact Indicator 2		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	
	Efficient, effective, sustainable funding for social protection:  a. UK social protection commitments - USD millions, constant 2019 prices b. Total donor commitments, Social Protection ODA, USD millions, constant 2019 prices	Planned a.	NA	NA	214.0	218.3	222.6	227.1	231.6	
		Achieved a.	32.0	209.8	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Planned b.	NA	NA	2582.3	2634.0	2686.7	2740.4	2795.2	
		Achieved b.	2579.6	2531.7	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
			Source							
			<a href="#">OECD Creditor Reporting System - ODA social protection (Sector: 16010) commitments to developing countries</a>							
	Impact Indicator 3		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	
	Average levels of national financing made available by public bodies to fund the design and delivery of social	Planned	NA	NA	NA	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	See country data tab	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	
			Source							

	protection programmes in country-case study countries		Evaluation evidence: case studies								
OUTCOME 1	Outcome Indicator 1.1		Baseline 2017	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021) Case countries only	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	Assumptions	
New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented (bilaterals, multilaterals, Governments, FCDO)	% of BASIC projects (excluding SPACE) and SPACE assignments that were suggested to have informed new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes or systems designed and implemented as a result of BASIC (FCDO, bilaterals, multilaterals, governments) (cumulative) a. TA b. Research	Planned a.	0	0	0	75%	75%	75%	75%	Evidence, expert advice, capacity building and sustained policy engagement are sufficient to generate changes in policies and practice.	
		Achieve a.	0	0	0	74%	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available		
		Planned b.	0	0	0	50%	50%	50%	50%		
		Achieved b.	NA	NA	NA	NA	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available		
			Source								
		Evaluation evidence: Calculated from KIIs that covered a representative number of assignments									
	Outcome Indicator 1.2		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	Assumptions	
	Evidence and advice used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies, practices and programmes (examples from evaluation case study countries)	Planned	0	0	0	0	1	2	4	Evidence, expert advice, capacity building and sustained policy engagement are sufficient to generate changes in policies and practice.	
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	See country data tab	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available		
			Source								
		Evaluation evidence: Learning and country case study evidence; KII interviews with in-country FCDO advisers									
	Outcome Indicator 1.3		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)		
	Design and delivery of social assistance in crises is more inclusive (gender, age, disability and marginalised group): Average GESI scorecard score for case countries. Scoring relates to the aspiration to be GESI-responsive and inclusive, with 1 indicating low and 5 indicating high levels of responsiveness and inclusivity	Planned	0	0	2	3	3	3.5	3.5		
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	3	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available		
			Source								
		Evaluation evidence: GESI aspirations score card applied to representative sample of case country assignments during each evaluation phase									
INPUTS (£)			Govt (£)	Other (£)	Total (£)				FCDO SHARE (%)		
INPUTS (HR)											



OUTCOME 2	Outcome Indicator 2.1		Baseline (2017)	Milestone 1 (2019)	Milestone 2 (2020)	Milestone 3 (2021)	Milestone 4 (2022)	Milestone 5 (2023)	Target (2024)	Assumptions	
Improved cross-sector human and institutional capability and capacity (Governments, local actors, multilaterals, bilaterals, FCDO)	Country capability and capacity: Average Kirkpatrick score for case-countries.	Planned	NA	NA	2	2	3	3	3	Evidence, expert advice, capacity building and sustained policy engagement are sufficient to generate changes in policies and practice.	
		Achieved	NA	NA	NA	1	Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available		
		Source									
	Outcome Indicator 2.2		Evaluation evidence: Kirkpatrick learning model applied to representative sample of case country assignments during each evaluation phase								
	3-point traffic light score based on triangulated evaluation evidence to answer EQ6.2 (high quality design links and coordination mechanisms in place - external coherence):  Green = coherence realised as per the original Business Case with minor issues Orange = coherence partly realised as per the Business Case with residual issues Red = coherence not realised sufficiently and considerable challenges remain	Planned									
		Achieved					Data not yet available	Data not yet available	Data not yet available		
			Source								
		Evaluation evidence: '3-point traffic light score (green; orange; red) based on triangulated evaluation evidence to answer EQ6.2 (external coherence)									
INPUTS (£)			Govt (£)	Other (£)	Total (£)				FCDO SHARE (%)		
INPUTS (HR)											

## Appendix 5. Analysis

*This Appendix presents specific analyses that were undertaken as part of the evaluation, including Gender- and inclusion-responsiveness analysis, Value for Money analysis, our survey questionnaire and descriptive analysis, and an analysis of secondary data at the level of BASIC.*

### 5.1 Gender- and inclusion-responsiveness analysis

#### 5.1.1 GESI scorecard results

The baseline results of the GESI scorecard analysis is shown in the Table overleaf.

**Table 5.1: Level of ambition on gender and social inclusion by case country**

Country	GESI responsiveness	Supporting evidence
Jordan	GESI-sensitive (3), with some aspects GESI-responsive (4)	<p>A SPACE clinic discussion with FCDO Jordan included exploration of e.g. risk of exclusion of vulnerable groups from the government transfer programme including informal workers, urban populations, and PWD, that the the transfer level does not appear to consider intra-household variations, complementary interventions which would support gender equality or promote empowerment of vulnerable groups, and accountability to affected populations.</p> <p>SPACE inputs to the Business Case for FCDO Emergency Social Protection in Jordan (ESPJ) programme included gender and social inclusion (GESI) analysis, as well as additional analysis on strengths, weaknesses and mitigation in relation to gendered vulnerabilities (e.g. gendered risks, coverage of and adequacy of the transfer for vulnerable households, communications to promote household conflict management and reduce risks of GBV, specific support needed by vulnerable groups to enrol etc.).</p> <p>Additionally, in September 2020, SPACE undertook an assessment of the social and gendered risks and impacts of the emergency Cash Transfer project to inform updated project protocols and operational manual.</p> <p>BASIC TAS consultation of SP stakeholders included consideration of (and report sections on) each of gender and social inclusion, and potential implications of findings for FCDO Jordan relating to inclusion and localisation. The options report for a five-year programme to strengthen the National Aid Fund presented two main delivery options, advocating for that which was more expansive in its coverage of vulnerable groups, including addition of CTs targeted to lifecycle risks and inclusion, and TA to extend the coverage of the Social Security Corporation to older women and PWDs (i.e. intentional targeting of vulnerable groups). The business case for this programme is currently in development.</p> <p>The Research country review for Jordan naturally considers assistance available to refugees, but also their employment status and access (to informal work).</p>
Nigeria	GESI-sensitive (3)	<p>An initial TAS assignment – to map humanitarian CTs and SP programmes in the BAY States as a first step towards identifying potential linkages – did not significantly mainstream GESI-related issues, with the exception of references to the overall goal of the Nigerian SP policy (to establish a gender-sensitive and age-appropriate framework to ensure a minimum social [protection] floor’ and directly relevant programming (e.g. funding of and actors involved in programming to tackle GBV).</p> <p>Under SPACE, consideration of GESI-related issues has been variable – with most, but not all, deliverables demonstrating GESI-sensitivity. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ An excel spreadsheet mapping the Covid-19 responses of partners and programme adaptations did not explore the adequacy of responses for specific vulnerable groups.</li> <li>▪ Likewise, support to the Development Partner Group to set out policy response areas which should be taken forward in a High-Level Forum with the Vice President does not appear to considered funding, administrative or legislative needs pertaining specifically to inclusion (beyond general expansion of coverage).</li> <li>▪ By contrast, deployment of central SPACE decision and delivery matrices (which themselves integrated inclusion considerations) meant that such issues were integrated into early discussion and deliberation around options for FCDO to respond to Covid-19 (e.g. gender and protection risks, involvement of local networks). The inappropriateness of existing targeting mechanisms for meeting the needs of those most affected (e.g. informal urban workers, the elderly) featured prominently.</li> <li>▪ A subsequent assessment of the relative efficiency of humanitarian and government targeting approaches in the north east has related inherently to inclusion, seeking to encourage extension of support to cover groups not presently on the social register but in need of support.</li> </ul> <p>The Research review for northern Nigeria explored some GESI-related issues: the potential negative impact of poor service quality on outcomes of CCTs such as education attainment, or child and maternal health; inadequate transfer amounts (though not the differential impacts of this within households); and barriers to access for IDPs.</p>

<b>Somalia</b>	<b>GESI-sensitive (3), with some aspects GESI-responsive (4)</b>	<p>Two of three main deliverables included strong GESI-relevant workstreams.</p> <p>First, a note setting out some initial considerations for potential economic inclusion initiative in Somalia explicitly considered GESI issues with references to relevant work being carried mainly by local organisations (approx. half of analysis presented in the note).</p> <p>Second, a light touch review which sought to determine the impact of COVID-19 on specific elements of humanitarian cash and social protection programming, focused on three principles, one of which was accountability to Affected Populations / Localisation. 'Key messages' included that: local and national responders have been integral to the COVID-19 response through cash programming but the relationship between donors, international organisations and local and national responders remains uneven, and there is little evidence to suggest that COVID-19 had enhanced or accelerated a shift to a more localised response.</p> <p>SPACE then developed a localisation framework which sought, in general, to enable a shift towards localisation (power, funding and process) within the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia programme and, in turn, improve programme effectiveness and inclusivity. Options presented related to varying degrees of responsibility which could be afforded to local partners – and included the possibility of using existing community self-help groups as platforms for cash delivery.</p> <p>Other assignments and products (most notably, a case study on Covid response) mainstreamed GESI-related considerations, but to quite a limited extent.</p> <p>The Research country review for Somalia considers the adequacy of and approaches to targeting and calculating transfer values, and the implications for vulnerable groups, including ethnic minorities.</p>
<b>Yemen</b>	<b>GESI-sensitive (3)</b>	<p>GESI mainstreaming in early BASIC TA assignments was relatively weak. A review and analysis of identification and registration systems in protracted and recurrent crises – which drew on Yemen and South Sudan as case studies – did not explicitly consider the impact of targeting on gender, age and disability dimensions, although this was included within the scope of the original assignment ToR.</p> <p>Consideration of GESI-related issues improved in SPACE assignments, facilitated by the addition of a GESI expert in addition to the primary consultant. TA support to FCDO to facilitate an NGO roundtable to understand how humanitarian cash transfers could be linked to social protection programmes, integrated some, albeit limited, consideration of gender by challenging agencies to improve the gender-sensitivity of programming and programme more support directly to women. However, in the mapping document produced during the roundtable inclusion is referenced only in relation to women's participation in programming as an opportunity and not in relation to priority areas or risks (i.e. possible instrumentalisation of women's roles).</p> <p>More encouragingly, a needs assessment and options paper to inform a cash/SP response to the Covid-19 pandemic integrated consideration of gendered and protection risks. And a subsequent evidence review of complementary livelihoods programming explored the impacts of cash plus interventions on gender-based / intimate partner violence risks.</p> <p>A mapping exercise undertaken for the national Social Fund for Development explores key design features of SFD programming, including a strong focus on the implications of targeting and inclusion approaches for women, youth, PWDs and IDPs. Recommendations of the mapping exercise include: greater allocation of resources for the design, implementation and monitoring of GESI issues; related capacity strengthening efforts for SFD programme staff, and accountability for improved attention to GESI through incorporation into staff performance agreements; use of existing gender analyses to inform programming, and disaggregation by gender, age and disability of all data collected; consultation of participating women and girls on any unique challenges or risks they face as a result of their participation; and, finally, measures to mitigate risk of gendered violence and violence against children.</p> <p>The Research country review for Yemen does not explicitly consider GESI-related issues.</p>

## 5.2 Value for Money analysis

### 5.2.1 Value for Money scorecard results

The table overleaf present the baseline results of the VFM scorecard applied to BASIC TAS and Research. The reason the score card does not contain any scores is because 1) the rating (amber, red, green) tends to dominate the whole discussion if a programme is scored, 2) with the research workstream only just having started delivery it is too early to score management of VFM.

**Table 5.2: TAS and Research VFM Scorecard summary**

Scorecard element	Research	TAS
<b>1. Existence, relevance and robustness of Vfm measures (Vfm processes)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Set of VFM measures aligned to logframe indicator and the 4Es.</li> <li>100% output-based payments for inception phase and hybrid payment model thereafter</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Menu of 11 KPIs which include VFM measures such as client satisfaction, timely delivery of outputs, forecast accuracy, etc.</li> </ul>
<b>2. Approach to procurement and cost containment (Economy)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Competitive procurement using a framework contract mechanism</li> <li>Cost containment measures in place.</li> <li>Central delivery model results in savings.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Competitive procurement using a framework contract mechanism and benchmarking of fees with other suppliers</li> <li>Mini competitions for each assignment, although some sole sourced</li> <li>Use of National experts fell short of target (45% vs 50%)</li> <li>Central delivery model has allowed access to excellent advisors but has led to difficulties in the tracking of impact due to the absence of in-country presence.</li> <li>Cost saving from reduced travel because of COVID-19 travel restrictions ensured more fee days to provide advice.</li> </ul>
<b>3. Efficient use of resources by BASIC interventions (Efficiency)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inefficient procurement and delayed inception phase due to funding uncertainty because of the 2020 Spending Review has resulted in some inefficiency in delivery</li> <li>Delays in the finalisation of Research deliverables during the inception phase</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highly efficient launch of SPACE</li> <li>Highly responsive service although timely delivery of outputs has not met expectations specified in original contracts in a significant number of cases – (38% of outputs delivered on time)</li> <li>COVID-19 resulted in new ways of working and impacted on efficient delivery of assignments underway/about to start at the beginning of the pandemic</li> <li>PFP was a highly efficient approach to driving demand for TAS support.</li> <li>Efficient use of a number of mechanisms to generate access to a wider pool of experts e.g. HSOT, GIZ, HEART Programme, etc.</li> </ul>
<b>4. Validation of ToC causal pathways for generating results (Effectiveness)</b>	Research Workstream is still in inception phase and therefore there is no evidence yet on effectiveness.	Evidence on effectiveness is not extensive at this stage, there are grounds for cautious optimism that the support provided through the TA workstream thus far will feed into future SP policy, programme and system change.
<b>5. Sustainability of BASIC's results (Effectiveness)</b>	Likely sustainability of Research Workstream cannot be assessed as programme not yet in delivery.	Evidence indicates that some outputs from BASIC TAS will have sustainable impact on SP policies, programmes and systems given time. COVID-19 has provided an opportunity for greater interest and engagement on SP approaches in crises and come of the assignments are influencing programme, policy and legislation changes which given interest of partner governments and donors could make a sustainable impact on SP systems. However, several factors may limit sustainability of BASIC's support, most notably access to financial resources to implement supported reforms, capacity constraints on the part of national governments, the readiness of national systems to change and challenges to advocacy and influencing activities.
<b>6. Review of programme-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver Vfm (Vfm processes)</b>	<p>Core management structures in place. There is also a coordination structure to ensure cross fertilisation of ideas with TAS Workstream.</p> <p>Capacity constraints and FCDO staff turnover impacted on efficiency of ongoing management although measures have been put in place to address these issues – including additional staff.</p>	<p>Core management structures are in place and VFM considerations are taken into account in decision making such as close tracking of expert days and outputs and allocation of resources to assignments.</p> <p>A Management Board and governance mechanisms set up under SPACE brought together the main stakeholders (FCDO, GIZ, DAI).</p> <p>FCDO capacity constraints and staff turnover similarly impacted efficient management of the TAS workstream although these issues have been addressed.</p>



Scorecard element	Research	TAS
	Evidence that VFM considerations are considered in decision making.	
<b>7. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (Effectiveness)</b>	Detailed risk matrices have been developed by the Research workstream and risks are monitored and reported on in quarterly reporting. The high number of major risks associated with travel in the focus research countries resulted in the Research consortium's decision to contract a specialist security firm. (Research QR # 2).	Similarly, the TAS workstream monitors and reports on risks in its quarterly reporting (TAS QRs) demonstrating ongoing attention to risks that may impact on delivery and therefore VFM. There is evidence of good management of risks and appropriate escalation routes (to Ministers if necessary) within the FCDO (KII FCDO).
<b>8. Equity of programme design and approach (Equity)</b>	IDS has included for the Research workstream an indicator on the relevance of the research to populations severely vulnerable in crises. IDS also plan to produce a G&I strategy in 2021. (AR 2021).	Gender and inclusion considerations are reflected in BASIC's TA delivery (particularly under SPACE) with each assignment having access to specialist G&I expertise. However, there is paucity of evidence on the extent BASIC TAS has increased reach of SP programmes in terms of coverage to different vulnerable groups or has impacted on development of gender responsive and inclusive SP programmes and policies.

*N.B. CI= confidence interval. Island states are grouped into their respective collective nation state.*

## 5.3 Survey

*This Appendix presents the questionnaire used to implement the evaluation survey of in-country FCDO advisers and the descriptive results of survey data.*

### 5.3.1 Survey results

This section presents a full descriptive analysis of the survey results by question. Given the number of responses, confidence intervals have not been calculated and survey results have only been considered in the evaluation in conjunction with evaluation evidence derived from other sources. To improve the response rate, several questions were cut from the survey during mainstage implementation. Questions that were cut are identified in the previous subsection.

**Table 5.3: A1 - What is your current role?**

Role	Country worked in
Social Development Adviser	7
Humanitarian Adviser	4
Programme Manager	1
Team Leader	1
Cash and Social Protection Nexus Adviser	1
Advisor	1
Head of Social Protection and Social Development Advisor FCDO Jordan	1
Livelihoods and Humanitarian Advisor	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>

**Table 5.4: A4 - Since the start of 2018, which country have you mainly been working in?**

Country	N	%
Nigeria	3	18%
Yemen	2	12%
Jordan	2	12%
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	2	12%
Mali	1	6%
Uganda	1	6%
Somalia	1	6%
Zambia	1	6%
Lebanon	1	6%
Ethiopia	1	6%
Pakistan	1	6%
Mozambique	1	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 5.5: A5 - In this country, what types of crises have been experienced (frequency distribution)?**

Crisis type	N	%
Crises caused by conflict and fragility	17	29%
Crises caused by infectious diseases	14	24%
Displacement crises	11	19%
Crises caused by natural hazards (excluding infectious disease)	9	16%
Complex crises (caused by overlapping natural and man-made factors)	6	10%
Protracted crisis in part caused by crisis occurring in neighbouring countries	1	2%

**Table 5.5: A6 - Thinking about the country you have mainly worked in, what are the strategic development and humanitarian priorities of FCDO in this country with respect to the use of social assistance – delivered through humanitarian channels and national social protection systems - in times of crisis (frequency distribution)?**

Priority	N	%
Improved social assistance modalities (e.g., use of cash), mechanisms (e.g., electronic transfers) or processes (e.g. improved registration and targeting of beneficiaries) through humanitarian or national social protection systems	15	21%
Inclusion of shock responsive workstream in national social protection systems	13	18%
Improved coordination in the financing and delivery of social assistance - within and between - humanitarian and national systems	11	15%
Establishing or strengthening nationally led social assistance systems	10	14%
Delivering social transfers	8	11%
Adapting social assistance to address climate change	6	8%
Enhancing early and anticipatory action to crises	5	7%
Inclusion of refugees in the scope of national social protection systems	4	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 5.6: B1 - How familiar are you with the BASIC programme and its specific workstreams (percent)?**

Responses	Fully aware	Aware	Neither aware or not aware	Unaware	Grand Total
Research conducted by BASIC to strengthen evidence on using social protection approaches to respond to crises	35%	41%	18%	6%	100.00%
Technical advisory services provided by BASIC for country support, capacity building, learning, and policy-influencing	35%	59%	6%	0%	100.00%
Technical advisory services provided by SPACE for country support, capacity building, learning, and policy-influencing	47%	47%	0%	6%	100.00%
The overall BASIC programme	29%	65%	6%	0%	100.00%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>36.76%</b>	<b>52.94%</b>	<b>7.35%</b>	<b>2.94%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.7: B1 - How familiar are you with the BASIC programme and its specific workstreams (frequency distribution)?**

Responses	Fully aware	Aware	Neither aware or not aware	Unaware	Grand Total
Research conducted by BASIC to strengthen evidence on using social protection approaches to respond to crises	6	7	3	1	17
Technical advisory services provided by BASIC for country support, capacity building, learning, and policy-influencing	6	10	1		17
Technical advisory services provided by SPACE for country support, capacity building, learning, and policy-influencing	8	8		1	17
The overall BASIC programme	5	11	1		17
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>68</b>

**Table 5.8: B2 - Have you accessed BASIC services to support your work (frequency distribution and percent)?**

BASIC services	N	%
Mapping the current state of social protection systems	8	20%
Expert advisory clinics	7	17%
Medium term advisory support (less than 6 months but more than 1 months duration)	7	17%
Short term advisory support (less than 1 month)	5	12%
Research and analysis products produced by BASIC (which you have commissioned yourself)	5	12%
Long term remote advisory support (more than 6 months duration)	4	10%
Research and analysis products produced by BASIC (which you have not commissioned yourself)	3	7%
SPACE consultants supported us in our engagement with WFP and UNHCR on a specific technical question i.e. moving from status-based to vulnerability-based prioritisation of refugee food assistance	1	2%
Long term in-country advisory support (more than 6 months duration)	1	2%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 5.9: B3 - If you have accessed BASIC services to support your work, to what degree do you agree with the following statements (percent).**

Response	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Not applicable	Grand Total
It was simple and straightforward for me to access and make use of BASIC services	59%	29%	6%	6%	100%
The services were delivered in a timely manner for my needs	41%	53%	0%	6%	100%

**Table 5.10: B3 - If you have accessed BASIC services to support your work, to what degree do you agree with the following statements (frequency distribution).**

Response	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Not applicable	Grand Total
It was simple and straightforward for me to access and make use of BASIC services	10	5	1	1	17
The services were delivered in a timely manner for my needs	7	9		1	17

**Table 5.11: B4 - If not, can you tell us why you have not accessed BASIC services in your work?**

Response	N
Not applicable	16
Not necessary for current role	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>



**Table 5.12: B5 - When thinking about the wider objective of building “better assistance in crises”, which of the following areas would you like BASIC to help you achieve (frequency distribution and percent)?**

Response	N	%
Improving the linkages between the humanitarian system and social protection approaches	15	42%
Encouraging a transition towards social protection as a crisis response mechanism	10	28%
Improving the quality of social protection systems in their own right	6	17%
Improving anticipatory action	3	8%
Improving the quality and reach of humanitarian response	2	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 5.13: C2 - On the relevance and value-add of BASIC, please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements (percent)**

Response	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Don't know	Not applicable	Grand Total
BASIC provides relevant research and evidence for me and/or my team	24%	47%	12%	6%	12%	100%
BASIC provides relevant technical assistance and advisory services for me and/or my team	35%	59%	0%	0%	6%	100%
BASIC provides technical assistance and advisory services that are not readily available from other sources	24%	35%	29%	12%	0%	100%
The type of research and evidence that BASIC will provide is not readily available from other sources	12%	41%	29%	12%	6%	100%

**Table 5.14: C2 - On the relevance and value-add of BASIC, please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements (frequency distribution)**

Response	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Don't know	Not applicable	Grand Total
BASIC provides relevant research and evidence for me and/or my team	4	8	2	1	2	17
BASIC provides relevant technical assistance and advisory services for me and/or my team	6	10	0	0	1	17
BASIC provides technical assistance and advisory services that are not readily available from other sources	4	6	5	2	0	17
The type of research and evidence that BASIC will provide is not readily available from other sources	2	7	5	2	1	17

**Table 5.15: D1 - Did you receive BASIC technical assistance in your country office?**

Response	N	%
Yes	15	88%
No	1	6%
Not applicable	1	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 5.16: D2 - Regarding the technical assistance you received, to what extent do you think it was, or will be, effective in supporting you to make better use of social protection approaches in times of crisis in your country?**

Response	N	%
0. Very effective	6	35%
1. Effective	9	53%
2. Neither effective or ineffective	1	6%
4. Ineffective	1	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 5.17: D3 - And regarding specific technical activities you engaged in, can you indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements (percent)?**

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Not applicable
I found the BASIC technical assistance my office received to be helpful and relevant to the needs of my office	53%	40%	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%
Specific changes in country strategies, plans, programmes or business cases have taken place in my office because of the assistance received	27%	20%	27%	7%	7%	7%	7%
The assistance my office received was worth the time and resources required	40%	53%	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%
The assistance provided by BASIC resulted in improved collaboration between FCDO Humanitarian and SDA advisors	27%	27%	20%	7%	7%	7%	7%
The assistance provided by BASIC resulted in the specification of new and/or improved social protection approaches by my team	13%	27%	20%	7%	7%	13%	13%
The assistance provided is likely to result in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by the government	7%	33%	33%	13%	7%	0%	7%
The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by relevant multilateral agencies and international finance institutions	7%	7%	40%	20%	7%	13%	7%
The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by relevant NGOs	0%	7%	40%	13%	7%	20%	13%
The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by the government	7%	20%	27%	20%	7%	7%	13%
The technical assistance integrated consideration of issues relating to gender and social inclusion.	20%	60%	7%	0%	0%	0%	13%
The technical assistance provided met its intended learning aims	27%	53%	7%	0%	7%	0%	7%

**Table 5.18: D3 - And regarding specific technical activities you engaged in, can you indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements (frequency distribution)?**

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Not applicable	Grand Total
I found the BASIC technical assistance my office received to be helpful and relevant to the needs of my office	8	6			1			15
Specific changes in country strategies, plans, programmes or business cases have taken place in my office because of the assistance received	4	3	4	1	1	1	1	15
The assistance my office received was worth the time and resources required	6	8			1			15
The assistance provided by BASIC resulted in improved collaboration between FCDO Humanitarian and SDA advisors	4	4	3	1	1	1	1	15
The assistance provided by BASIC resulted in the specification of new and/or improved social protection approaches by my team	2	4	3	1	1	2	2	15
The assistance provided is likely to result in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by the government	1	5	5	2	1		1	15
The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by relevant multilateral agencies and international finance institutions	1	1	6	3	1	2	1	15
The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by relevant NGOs		1	6	2	1	3	2	15
The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by the government	1	3	4	3	1	1	2	15
The technical assistance integrated consideration of issues relating to gender and social inclusion.	3	9	1				2	15
The technical assistance provided met its intended learning aims	4	8	1		1		1	15

**Table 5.19: D5 - Do you intend to make use of BASIC research services in your country office (frequency distribution and percent)?**

Response	N	%
1. Yes	8	47%
2. No	3	18%
3. Don't know	5	29%
4. Not applicable	1	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100%</b>

**D6 - Redacted due to the ability to identify respondents from responses**

**Table 5.20: E1 - To what extent do you agree with the following statements (percent)**

Statement	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Not applicable	Don't know	Grand Total
In the period since BASIC began operating in the country I selected, public financing of social protection approaches has become more flexible	0%	29%	29%	24%	18%	100%
In the period since BASIC began operating in the country I selected, public financing of social protection approaches has become more sufficient (increased financing with respect to need)	18%	24%	24%	24%	12%	100%
In the period since BASIC began operating in the country I selected, public financing of social protection approaches has become more timely	12%	18%	29%	24%	18%	100%
The changes supported by BASIC are likely to be sustained after the programme ends	47%	41%	0%	6%	6%	100%

**Table 5.21: E1 - To what extent do you agree with the following statements (frequency distribution)**

Statement	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Not applicable	Don't know	Grand Total
In the period since BASIC began operating in the country I selected, public financing of social protection approaches has become more flexible		5	5	4	3	17
In the period since BASIC began operating in the country I selected, public financing of social protection approaches has become more sufficient (increased financing with respect to need)	3	4	4	4	2	17
In the period since BASIC began operating in the country I selected, public financing of social protection approaches has become more timely	2	3	5	4	3	17
The changes supported by BASIC are likely to be sustained after the programme ends	8	7		1	1	17

**F1 – Redacted due to the ability to identify respondents from responses**



## 5.4 Secondary data analysis

As part of the baseline the evaluation team conducted secondary data analysis to build quantitative understanding of country contexts, existing social protection programming and donor financing. The analysis consisted of the indicators outlined in Table 24 below. Data was collected for all BASIC countries as well as LMICs. This was done to assess BASIC's country selection and compare to other LMICs. The analysis was implemented using R and Microsoft Excel. Missing data was filled by taking the average value for a given variable in a country, then by the average value for a variable for all countries. Analysis of indicators was also carried out at the country level to support with the four case studies delivered.

### 5.4.1 Secondary data analysis results

A high-level analysis of secondary data was conducted to inform and understanding of BASIC's programme level operational context prior to and during BASIC implementation (2015-2020). This analysis is summarised below:

- BASIC targeted countries that are like LMICs on average and have suffered from a range of crises over time
- While BASIC countries were slightly worse off than LMICs on average most differences were not significant
- However, BASIC countries had significantly lower GDP per capita than LMICs, and received more UK ODA disbursements than LMICs on average
- There were no significant differences between BASIC and SPACE countries (mainly because all BASIC countries are space countries)

The series of charts below visualise some of the indicators used in the secondary data analysis. These charts supported understanding of BASIC programme level context (including national level SP programming and donor financing ) during design (in the 4-5 years leading up to the start of BASIC) and BASIC's first 1-2 years of implementation.

**Table 5.22 Overview of secondary indicator used to appraise BASIC countries**


Indicator	Source	Definition
Count of Complex crisis	ACAPS	The number of crises of this variety recorded in a given year.
International displacement	ACAPS	The count of specific general incident of international displacement in a given year. This does not refer to the unique number of people affected but a record of specific events which resulted in international displacement.
Total UK commitments - USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of commitments made by the UK across all aid sectors. A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.
Total UK disbursements - USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of disbursements provided by the UK across all aid sectors. A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a recipient country or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector.
Total UK humanitarian aid disbursements - USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of humanitarian aid disbursements provided by the UK (700 VIII Humanitarian Aid, Total). A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a recipient country or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector.
Total UK Humanitarian aid commitments - USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of humanitarian aid commitments made by the UK (700 VIII Humanitarian Aid, Total). A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.
UK social protection commitments - USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of social protection commitments made by the UK (16010: Social Protection). A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.
UK social protection disbursements - USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of social protection disbursements provided by the UK (16010: Social Protection). A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a recipient country or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector.
Total disbursements, Social Protection ODA, USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of social protection disbursements provided by all bilateral and multilateral donors to that country (16010: Social Protection). A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a recipient country or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector.
Total commitments, Social Protection ODA, USD millions, constant 2019 prices	OECD	The financial value of social protection commitments made by all bilateral and multilateral donors to that country (16010: Social Protection). A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.
Asylum-seekers	UNHCR	Count of asylum-seekers - individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined.
IDPs of concern to UNHCR	UNHCR	Count of Internally displaced persons (IDPs) - persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population includes only conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. The IDP population also includes people in an IDP-like situation.
Others of concern	UNHCR	Count of Other groups or persons of concern - refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of these groups above but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.
Refugees under UNHCR's mandate	UNHCR	Count of Refugees - includes individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees as incorporated into national laws, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary protection. The refugee population also includes people in refugee-like situations.

Stateless persons	UNHCR	Count of individuals under UNHCR's statelessness mandate - defined under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons as those not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. In other words, they do not possess the nationality of any State. UNHCR statistics refer to people who fall under the organization's statelessness mandate as those who are stateless according to this international definition. Data from some countries may also include people with undetermined nationality. These are people who lack proof of possession of any nationality and at the same time have or are regarded as having important links to more than one State. UNHCR also works with populations at risk of statelessness, but persons at risk of statelessness are not reported on under the statistical category of individuals under UNHCR's statelessness mandate.
Total country humanitarian assistance funding (incoming-outgoing funding) - \$ millions	UNOCHA - Financial Tracking Service	The total value of humanitarian assistance funding provided to a country. This is calculated by taking the difference between all incoming and outgoing humanitarian assistance financial resources within a given country.
FFP US - Fragile States Index	US FFP	The Fragile States Index (FSI) score. A composite index that defines the fragility status of a country. The higher the score, the more fragile the context.
GDP (current US\$)	World Bank	GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.
GDP per capita (current US\$)	World Bank	GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of... See More
Population, total	World Bank	Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates.
Population, female (% of total population)	World Bank	Female population is the percentage of the population that is female. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.
Rural population (% of total population)	World Bank	Rural population refers to people living in rural areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated as the difference between total population and urban population.
CPIA economic management cluster average (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.  The economic management cluster includes macroeconomic management, fiscal policy, and debt policy.  All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).
CPIA gender equality rating (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.  Gender equality assesses the extent to which the country has installed institutions and programs to enforce laws and policies that promote equal access for men and women in education, health, the economy, and protection under law.  All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).
CPIA quality of public administration rating (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.  Quality of public administration assesses the extent to which civilian central government staff is structured to design and implement government policy and deliver services effectively.  All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).

CPIA equity of public resource use rating (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	<p>The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.</p> <p>Equity of public resource use assesses the extent to which the pattern of public expenditures and revenue collection affects the poor and is consistent with national poverty reduction priorities.</p> <p>All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).</p>
CPIA social protection rating (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	<p>The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.</p> <p>Social protection and labor assess government policies in social protection and labor market regulations that reduce the risk of becoming poor, assist those who are poor to better manage further risks, and ensure a minimal level of welfare to all people.</p> <p>All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).</p>
CPIA public sector management and institutions cluster average (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	<p>The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.</p> <p>The public sector management and institutions cluster includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector.</p> <p>All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).</p>
CPIA policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	<p>The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.</p> <p>The policies for social inclusion and equity cluster includes gender equality, equity of public resource use, building human resources, social protection and labor, and policies and institutions for environmental sustainability.</p> <p>All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).</p>
CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1=low to 6=high)	World Bank	<p>The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process.</p> <p>Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector assess the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and for the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and results obtained. The three main dimensions assessed here are the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow vested interests.</p> <p>All scores range between 1 (very weak) and 6 (very strong).</p>
Internally displaced persons, new displacement associated with conflict and violence (number of cases)	World Bank	<p>Internally displaced persons are defined according to the 1998 Guiding Principles (<a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/1998/ocha-guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement">http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/1998/ocha-guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement</a>) as people or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of armed conflict, or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an international border. "New Displacement" refers to the number of new cases or incidents of displacement recorded over the specified year, rather than the number of people displaced. This is done because people may have been displaced more than once.</p>
Internally displaced persons, new displacement associated	World Bank	<p>Internally displaced persons are defined according to the 1998 Guiding Principles (<a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/1998/ocha-guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement">http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/1998/ocha-guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement</a>) as people or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of armed conflict, or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and</p>

with disasters (number of cases)		who have not crossed an international border. "New Displacement" refers to the number of new cases or incidents of displacement recorded over the specified year, rather than the number of people displaced. This is done because people may have been displaced more than once.
Internally displaced persons, total displaced by conflict and violence (number of people)	World Bank	Internally displaced persons are defined according to the 1998 Guiding Principles ( <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/1998/ocha-guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement">http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/1998/ocha-guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement</a> ) as people or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of armed conflict, or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an international border. "People displaced" refers to the number of people living in displacement as of the end of each year, and reflects the stock of people displaced at the end of the previous year, plus inflows of new cases arriving over the year as well as births over the year to those displaced, minus outflows which may include returnees, those who settled elsewhere, those who integrated locally, those who travelled over borders, and deaths.
Adequacy of social protection and labor programs (% of total welfare of beneficiary households)	World Bank	Adequacy of social protection and labor programs (SPL) is measured by the total transfer amount received by the population participating in social insurance, social safety net, and unemployment benefits and active labor market programs as a share of their total welfare. Welfare is defined as the total income or total expenditure of beneficiary households. Estimates include both direct and indirect beneficiaries.
Benefit incidence of social protection and labor programs to poorest quintile (% of total SPL benefits)	World Bank	Benefit incidence of social protection and labor programs (SPL) to poorest quintile shows the percentage of total social protection and labor programs benefits received by the poorest 20% of the population. Social protection and labor programs include social insurance, social safety nets, and unemployment benefits and active labor market programs. Estimates include both direct and indirect beneficiaries.
Count of UK Gov official buildings	FCDO	The count of buildings hosting FCDO supported staff and activities in a given country and year - this indicator acts as a proxy measure for FCDO in-country presence.
Coverage of social protection and labor programs (% of population)	World Bank	Coverage of social protection and labor programs (SPL) shows the percentage of population participating in social insurance, social safety net, and unemployment benefits and active labor market programs. Estimates include both direct and indirect beneficiaries.
Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population (%)	World Bank	The percentage of people in the population who live in households classified as moderately or severely food insecure. A household is classified as moderately or severely food insecure when at least one adult in the household has reported to have been exposed, at times during the year, to low quality diets and might have been forced to also reduce the quantity of food they would normally eat because of a lack of money or other resources.
Prevalence of severe food insecurity in the population (%)	World Bank	The percentage of people in the population who live in households classified as severely food insecure. A household is classified as severely food insecure when at least one adult in the household has reported to have been exposed, at times during the year, to several of the most severe experiences described in the FIES questions, such as to have been forced to reduce the quantity of the food, to have skipped meals, having gone hungry, or having to go for a whole day without eating because of a lack of money or other resources.

**Figure 5.1: Illustrative overview of mean BASIC performance between 2015-2020**



## Appendix 6. Case study reports

*This Appendix presents our summary case study reports for each country case (Jordan, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen) and the learning case study for SPACE. These reports are broadly structured against the theory of change. Findings from each of the case studies were compared and contrasted through cross case analysis as well as with data collected for the baseline report. Data gathered through the case studies fed into the overall baseline findings.*

*Compared and contrasted through cross case analysis as well as with other data collected through KIIs during data collection.*

### 6.1 Jordan

#### 6.1.1 Context

Jordan has the second highest refugee population per capita in the world.<sup>37</sup> In a context of pre-existing economic vulnerability and, recently, the C-19 pandemic, this has placed considerable strain on overstretched services, with competition for scarce jobs and housing resulting in tensions between refugees and host communities.<sup>38</sup>

*“The social protection and humanitarian assistance landscape in Jordan is characterised by the co-existence of a relatively mature government-operated social protection system, mostly accessible only to Jordanian nationals, and a series of humanitarian agency- and NGO-delivered interventions that target refugees.”<sup>39</sup>*

*Röth et al. (2017)*

#### The national social protection system

The main national social protection (SP) programme in Jordan is the National Aid Fund (NAF), a comprehensive scheme, including regular CTs, that operates as a semi-autonomous arm of the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD).<sup>40</sup>

Another important social protection programme is run by the Zakat Fund, which delivers cash and in-kind assistance through individual programmes, funded by donations, and organised through regional committees.<sup>41</sup>

Key recent developments in the national social protection system are as follows:<sup>42</sup>

- **2018 to 2021 – Horizontal expansion of the National Aid Fund** to approximately double the number of beneficiaries through the three-year Takmeely Support Programme (Takaful). This included extension of coverage to the working poor in the informal sector or in temporary irregular jobs, to the relatively poor, and to Gazan refugees. Originally planned to increase coverage from 92,000 households in 2018 to 177,000 in 2021, an extra 290,000 households were rapidly added to the programme in response to the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.
- **2019 – Operationalisation of National Unified Registry**, an electronic database and management system designed to improve the efficiency and accuracy of targeting mechanisms and drawing on data from 120 agencies. The database was critical to the NAF’s rapid response to the impacts of Covid-19.
- **2019 – Adoption of a National Social Protection Strategy** for 2019-2025, which provided for the first time an overarching framework for the country’s SP sector, structured around three pillars: social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services. A fourth chapter focusing on shock-responsive SP is currently in development.

#### Humanitarian social transfers



**Transfer programmes provided for Syrian refugees by UN agencies and INGOs take the form of cash and vouchers, including winterisation assistance.** The largest programmes in terms of coverage are interlinked: WFP food vouchers, UNHCR unrestricted cash assistance, and the UNICEF Child Cash Grant. The Government of Jordan (GoJ) requires agencies to make Jordanian citizens eligible for these programmes, with nationals accounting for 30 percent of beneficiaries in some cases.<sup>43</sup> More than ten further schemes are in operation, with many providing ad hoc and one-off support.<sup>44</sup> Jordan is often held up as an example of a country in which humanitarian transfers are delivered through sophisticated systems, including electronic registration, e-wallets and iris recognition software.<sup>45</sup>

**Both the nexus and refugee integration agendas are increasingly prominent amongst agencies and donors.** This includes considerable interest in, first, improving access to social security and insurance through supporting the national Social Security Corporation and its alignment with social assistance (NAF) systems. And, second, in supporting incremental steps towards greater alignment between the NAF and humanitarian system.<sup>46</sup>

### **6.1.2 Origins and scope of BASIC support**

**SP emerged as a priority for FCDO Jordan during its 2019 business planning,** in the context of increasing poverty rates as the government attempted to meet IMF reform requirements around subsidies.<sup>47</sup>

**Initial investments aimed to support the reform of the national system.** The Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund provided £0.5m through UNICEF to examine NAF targeting criteria and contribute to establishing the management information system (MIS) system mentioned above.<sup>48</sup>

**In late 2019, the Social Development Adviser (SDA) at the time approached SPT for support on the design of a £100m five year programme focused on cash transfers (CTs) and systems strengthening.** He had already developed a concept note for the programme, which received ministerial approval in early 2020, but sought support due to constraints on his own time and the need to address specific evidence gaps to build the business case for the programme. SPT directed him to BASIC TA.<sup>49</sup> The programme focuses on support to the national SP system, but has a longer-term aim to support integration between humanitarian and government systems.

**There was some frustration around the BASIC TA scoping process,** on the part of both the SDA and consultants assigned by BASIC, which experienced some delays and during which initial calls focused, they felt, slightly too heavily on the administrative set up and not enough on substantive technical issues. Both, however, acknowledged that the speed of scoping appears to have improved since (with the advent of SPACE). The SDA also observed that navigating the scoping process might have been challenging for advisers who, unlike himself, did not already have a firm grounding in SP, and might have needed more guidance.<sup>50</sup>

**In April 2020, BASIC TA support to the five year programme was put on hold, and shorter-term support sought from SPACE, as FCDO pivoted to support the government with its Covid-19 response.** SPACE support focused on the design of an emergency CT programme to cater to immediate needs of vulnerable Jordanians. From autumn 2020, FCDO and BASIC TA returned to, and built on preliminary work already undertaken on, the design of the longer-term SP programme – as well as support to FCDO's leadership of an SP donor group which seeks to strengthen coordination amongst actors across the humanitarian-development nexus.

**Despite interest from FCDO staff in-country, Jordan has not been selected as a focus country for BASIC Research.** This is viewed as a missed opportunity by FCDO Jordan, whose planned five

year programme will include a policy and evidence sub-workstream, to address key data gaps – around vulnerability, for instance.

### 6.1.3 BASIC support provided and activities undertaken

Five main pieces of support have been provided to FCDO Jordan by BASIC TA and SPACE, as outlined in Table 1 below.

**Table 6.1: Overview of BASIC TA and SPACE support to FCDO Jordan**

#	Date(s)	BASIC TA or SPACE?	Summary	Deliverables
1	Dec 2019 – April 2020	BASIC TA	Terms of Reference (ToR) issued in December 2019 for the development of an overarching framework to guide FCDO's involvement in social assistance in Jordan for the next 5 years. Planned March 2021 BASIC TA mission cancelled due to travel restrictions and pivot to Covid-19 response.	Interim product: working <b>Summary Document</b> outlining the main technical, policy, and political economy issues related to strengthening the social protection system in Jordan.
2	April 2020 – May 2020	SPACE	Clinic discussion – centred on key issues arising from analysis by the SPACE team of documentation relating to proposed FCDO support to the Government of Jordan's Emergency Cash Transfer initiative in response to Covid-19, to be implemented through the NAF.  Support to development of Business Case for FCDO Emergency Social Protection in Jordan (ESPJ) programme.	<b>Business case inputs:</b> appraisal case, including proposed VFM measures, theory of change and logframe narrative and structure, gender and social inclusion (GESI) analysis, as well as additional analysis.
3	Sep-20	SPACE	Assessment of the social and gendered risks and impacts of the emergency Cash Transfer project to inform updated project protocols and operational manual.	<b>Rapid social and GESI assessment</b> of Jordan's Emergency Cash Transfer Project.
4	Sep-20	SPACE	Return to longer-term planning. Analysis setting out the value for money (VFM) case for greater integration of the social transfer system in Jordan.	<b>VFM note</b> covering: potential areas of integration, benefits, political economy, recommended next steps.
5	Jan – July 2021	BASIC TA	Return to and updating of December 2019 ToRs for developing an overarching framework to guide FCDO's longer-term involvement in social assistance. Including stakeholder consultation exercise, and consideration of the ways in which a new programme could strengthen NAF and then, over time, facilitate and encourage the eventual alignment of the humanitarian cash with public sector social assistance in Jordan.	<b>Synthesis report on stakeholder engagements and potential implications for FCDO Jordan.</b> Two versions, one internal and one for sharing with external stakeholders.  <b>Options report</b> for 5 year programme.  Sessions with ambassador and x-embassy to sensitise on options, as well as session on key findings from stakeholder interviews with int donor community.

## 6.1.4 Response to support provided

### What worked

**BASIC support and deliverables have generally been well received by FCDO Jordan.** The following key themes emerged from key informant interviews:<sup>51</sup>

- **High quality of advice:** BASIC TA and SPACE experts were variously described as “very knowledgeable”, “of excellent calibre” and “fantastic”. FCDO staff valued both written inputs and a series of “very helpful” discussions which informed negotiations with potential delivery partners. They also particularly appreciated that the service provided a source of challenge, grounded by in-depth analysis. As one adviser put it:  
*“They allowed us to think much more deeply and creatively around where we could and couldn’t add value. I have nothing but praise for their work.”*
- **Rapid and flexible delivery:** FCDO staff described support provided by BASIC TA and SPACE as “agile and responsive” and “flexible in a complex context”. The support provided enabled FCDO to move quickly into the SP sector in the context of timebound commitments made at the London Jordan conference. FCDO staff also observed that in the most recent phase of support in particular, SPACE consultants were generous with their time, going beyond their contracted days.  
*“SPACE is a fantastic resource...a great platform for advisors who are under pressure.”*
- **Facilitating cross-country learning:** One adviser pointed to BASIC’s ability to facilitate cross-country learning, with reference to the VFM paper (entry #4 in table 1, above) which provided a well-evidenced argument for the integration of humanitarian caseloads into national systems, drawing on good practices from around the world.
- **Positive reception by external stakeholders of the findings of stakeholder consultations,** as set out in the written report and presentation to the SP donor group co-chaired by FCDO. Donors and agencies generally agreed with the findings presented.
- **Effective gender and inclusion mainstreaming:** SPACE differs from many advisory services in that it mainstreams GESI-related considerations without the client having to request it explicitly. SPACE (via the Gender-responsive Social Protection programme) provided access to a multidisciplinary team that integrated strong GESI expertise.

### Challenges and limitations

Challenges encountered during, and limitations of, the support provided by BASIC related to:<sup>52</sup>

- **Understanding of the political economy of SP in Jordan:** FCDO staff had mixed views as to whether BASIC support sufficiently integrated political economy (PE) considerations. Whilst some reported that BASIC consultants had a good understanding of both the Jordan and wider Middle Eastern context, one observed that they could have placed more emphasis on political dynamics within and between government institutions involved in delivering SP.
- **Relatedly, there were differences of opinion between the commissioner and consultants around timescales for building the humanitarian-development nexus,** and the implications for the framing of the longer-term programme. Specifically, the commissioner was concerned that placing too great an emphasis on refugee integration upfront would, firstly, be unpalatable to the Jordanian government and, secondly, affect the relevance to the business case of the evidence synthesised by the consultants (e.g. coverage of humanitarian caseloads when the Business Case needed to be supported by analysis focused on vulnerable Jordanians).
- **Lack of on-the-ground support:** BASIC TA deployed two consultants, one international and the other Jordanian but based elsewhere. One member of FCDO staff thought that not recruiting an expert based in Amman was a missed opportunity, as it meant that he could not involve the

consultant in in-person meetings with government counterparts. However, in the event, many activities had to be conducted virtually due to Covid-related restrictions, minimising the impact of this limitation.

- **Less positive reception by MoSD in particular of the findings of stakeholder consultations:** overall, MoSD felt that the findings reflected the perspectives of the international community more strongly than that of government institutions. Specifically, they argued that more emphasis should be placed on elements of SP other than cash assistance. However, with the new FCDO programme seeking to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus by working with the Social Security Corporation to improve access to social insurance, this may be primarily a communications issue. At time of interview, other government stakeholders (NAF and SSC) had not yet been sighted on the report.

### 6.1.5 BASIC's contribution to change

[Figure 6.1](#) overleaf indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which are most relevant to BASIC's support to FCDO Jordan. Statements in boxes shaded in blue are directly relevant. This section explores BASIC's contribution to changes in Jordan, with reference to, for sections 5.1 and 5.2 on FCDO's use of BASIC support and indirect results, ToC output and outcome statements and, for section 5.3 on enablers and constraints, ToC assumptions.

#### FCDO Jordan's use of technical assistance provided by BASIC

**Support provided by both BASIC TA and SPACE has fed directly into the design of FCDO programmes** – *that is, provision of high quality advice (1, in figure 1 above) translated into the design the implementation of new country programmes (4).* SPACE deliverables fed directly into the development of the Business Case for the £25m ESPJ programme, including FCDO's decision to use two parallel delivery mechanisms – £20m through a World Bank (WB) Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and £5m through a USAID Joint Funding Agreement (JFA) – both of which were implemented. FCDO staff reported that without SPACE's support they would not have been able to gather the necessary evidence and prepare the business case in the short time available. BASIC TA has since provided options for a new five-year programme, for which the business case is currently in development.<sup>53</sup>


**BASIC support also informed internal and external communications, supporting FCDO to position itself as a thought leader in a crowded donor environment** – *FCDO drew on high quality advice provided by BASIC (1) in support of efforts to build commitment amongst donors, agencies and government to using SP approaches and take steps towards integration across the humanitarian-development nexus (5).* Advisers drew on evidence produced by BASIC in submissions to ministers and the ambassador, and informed negotiations with NAF and donors as Jordan developed the NSPS.<sup>54</sup>

**Additionally, key informant interviews suggested some limited awareness and use of centrally-produced SPACE publications beyond the FCDO** (*output statement 2 on greater awareness, knowledge and learning*), though the outcomes of this are unclear. For example, WFP staff reported using SPACE resources to inform their programming and that they had flagged SPACE as a useful resource to the NAF in the context of the Covid-19 response.<sup>55</sup>

#### Results supported by BASIC

**The ESPJ programme has supported vulnerable Jordanians through the NAF's flagship cash transfer programme, Takaful.** It has, along with other donors, enabled the provision of emergency financial assistance to 293,000 households impacted by the economic shocks caused by the COVID-19 crisis, including informal workers who had lost livelihoods.<sup>56</sup> *That is, the new FCDO programme (4) supported by SPACE enabled government social assistance to meet household needs more effectively (8).*

Figure 6.1: Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Jordan





**Use of the two funding modalities recommended by SPACE enabled the FCDO to unlock international financing for Jordan** – the new FCDO programme (4) resulted, at least temporarily, in diversified funding for social assistance. By being the first donor to contribute to, and activate, the MDTF, FCDO enabled the WB to channel other funding into it, unlocking USD 300m of concessional financing for Jordan. Blending UK financial support with a loan from the World Bank also made it more affordable for GoJ by reducing interest on the WB loan. The USAID JFA established with FCDO support has since expanded to a total of six donors. Finally, parallel funding to the JFA balanced risk, as it was able to disburse funds to GoJ more swiftly than the MDTF.<sup>57</sup>

**Both ESPJ modalities allowed the UK to maximise leverage on other donors and the WB.** Combining donor financing under a single results framework encouraged donors to coordinate advocacy messages to GoJ, including focus on areas important to FCDO, such as equity.<sup>58</sup>

**Similarly, the stakeholder consultations carried out by BASIC TA earlier this year is helping to build consensus across the international community around the importance of building the humanitarian-development nexus for SP**, and options for doing so. Donors and agencies reported that the consultations have helped them to find an avenue for establishing partnerships and working towards more coordinated support to and influencing of government institutions.<sup>59</sup> *In this way, advice and support provided by BASIC TA (4) is being used to help build coherence and coordination across actors and initiatives (6).*

## Enablers and constraints

BASIC's contributions are indirect and, alone, insufficient to bring about outcome and impact level change. Factors which have enabled the achievement of results in Jordan point to the importance of role of in-country staff:

- **FCDO Jordan has drawn on BASIC strategically, in combination with other sources of support:** FCDO has made clear 'asks' of BASIC and simultaneously used other sources of support (from the K4D Helpdesk, as well as a member of the economist cadre), drawing these together in support of its objectives. *This supports the validity of a ToC assumption linking inputs to outputs (A): FCDO posts are sufficiently engaged to identify windows of opportunity for reform and draw on BASIC TA strategically to promote use of SP approaches in crises.*
- **FCDO Jordan has actively used BASIC to support its influencing goals**, particularly by developing evidence and options to share with the donor SP group, which it co-chairs. *This supports the validity of an assumption linking outputs to outcomes (B): FCDO posts have the absorptive capacity to utilise BASIC outputs and link to their influencing work.*

There are two major constraints on BASIC's ability to bring about outcome level change in Jordan:

- **Decreasing political space for integration of refugees into national systems**, in a context of increasing vulnerability of Jordanians due to the economic impacts of the pandemic. Additionally, when compared to other contexts, the crowded donor environment in Jordan limits the level of influence donors can exert over government. *This indicates significant barriers to achieving the outcome increased political commitment (5).*
- **Decreasing levels of international humanitarian funding, since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and anticipated shortfalls in funding needs for meeting existing caseloads.** This, in turn, further exacerbates the government's reluctance to integrate humanitarian caseloads into the national system. *This challenges the validity of an assumption linking outcomes to impact: Stakeholders are willing to contribute potentially increased levels of funding to support the establishment (in this case strengthening and expansion) of SP systems.*

### 6.1.6 Closing reflections

FCDO Jordan have expressed interest in receiving continued support from BASIC TA; for example, in providing TA to government and carrying out reviews during implementation to inform programme adaptations and the detailed design of the outer years of the proposed five-year programme. More broadly, FCDO staff observed that there is likely to be continued demand for internal advisory support to embassies on emergency SP in future due to climate change, and related shocks/displacement.

Lines of enquiry to explore in future rounds of the case study include:

- How BASIC support is drawn upon to support delivery of FCDO Jordan's new SP programme.
- How BASIC can support better coordinated and more effective engagement with government amongst donors and agencies.
- Whether BASIC Research ultimately engages in Jordan, and the results of the evidence sub-workstream of the new FCDO Jordan SP programme.



## 6.2 Nigeria

### 6.2.1 Context

**The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the largest economy and most populous nation in Africa with a population of approximately 206 million<sup>60</sup>.** Nigeria is home to the largest number of multi-dimensionally poor in the world, and ranks 158 out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI).<sup>61</sup>

**Four out of ten Nigerians (82.9 million) live below the poverty line (NLSS 2019), with COVID-19 pandemic likely to push another 10 million into poverty by 2022 (UNDP)<sup>62</sup>.** Poverty rates vary strongly between regions with a distinct divide between North and South, as well as between urban and rural areas. In 2018-19, more than 60 per cent of the population were below the poverty line (National Bureau of Statistics 2019) while southern regions have relatively low poverty rates and 18% of the urban population live in poverty compared with 52 percent living in poverty in rural areas<sup>63</sup>. Unemployment rate increased to 33% in the last quarter of 2020 and with a Gini coefficient of 35.1 Nigeria is in the top eight countries with the highest inequality in income distribution in the world. The country also has a high public debt profile and the second highest burden of stunted children in the world<sup>64</sup>.

*Characterisation of types of crises faced their effects and particularly vulnerable populations*

**Nigeria is highly vulnerable to natural hazards, conflict and economic shocks which combined with a lack of livelihood opportunities puts large portions of the population at risk of poverty.**

Conflict and insurgencies continue to aggravate poverty, with the northeast severely affected. Boko Haram<sup>65</sup> has led an insurgency for over a decade with the insecurity centred in Borno state, spilling into Yobe and Adamawa states. There are 1.8 million displaced people in those states (Ground Truth Solutions 2020), with many more displaced in Niger and Chad<sup>66</sup>. The deteriorating security situation has increasingly restricted access to affected populations and camp closures and forced returns in Borno State has also impacted cooperation between humanitarian actors and government. The dramatic funding shortfall is another major challenge, further reinforcing the importance of enabling more shock responsive and inclusive social protection.

**Analysis of ACAPS<sup>67</sup> Severity Index data indicates that Nigeria suffered 12 crises or shocks between 2019 and 2021 including regional crises, food insecurity, conflict and complex crises.**

In addition, there were some 60 climate related crises spanning the period 2009-2019 showing the climate vulnerability of the country to flooding in particular and storms. In all, almost 6 million people are estimated to have been displaced as a result of these climate related crises providing an indication of the scale of these climate related crises. The risk of famine (IPC Phase 5) persists where populations are cut off from food and income sources and humanitarian assistance for a prolonged period.

### 6.2.2 Key policy / institutional landscape

**The Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD) was created in 2019 to lead on implementation of social protection programmes at federal level.** Its mandate is to develop humanitarian policies and provide effective coordination of National and International humanitarian interventions; ensure strategic disaster mitigation, preparedness, and response; and manage the formulation and implementation of fair focused social inclusion and protection programmes in Nigeria.<sup>68</sup> The new Ministry created an explicit linkage between social protection and humanitarian responsibilities of government. and implements policies and programmes set by the Social Development Department in the Budget and National Planning Arm of the Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning.

**The Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning led on the development of the previous National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) for Nigeria (2017) which is presently being reviewed (its development was supported by the Child Development Grant Programme – CGDP - funded by FCDO).** The new policy was regarded by some interviewees as a significant step forward from the predecessor plan in terms of targeting, advancement of social registers, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. In addition to the NSPP, states have started to develop their own social protection policies with 14 of the 36 states having adopted or in the process of developing a state level social protection policy<sup>69</sup>. The President of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari's 2021 Democracy Day speech (12 June 2021) emphasised his vision to pull 100 million Nigerians out of poverty in the next 10 years. With this in mind, the President approved in 2021 a National Poverty and Growth Plan (and an associated Poverty and Economic Growth Fund).

*“There is a big boom on social protection especially social assistance despite that the only significant fund the government has put into social protection is the Abacha loot. However, there has been increasing commitment as there is acceptance to include financing in the upcoming legislature.”*

*KII, July 2021*

**Nigeria's spend on social protection is very low compared to countries of similar economic status with 2.6% of GDP on social protection and 0.3% on safety nets covering between 1.6% and 3.3% of the population between 2011 and 2016** (WB, 2019).<sup>70</sup> Social assistance schemes make up the largest share of Social Protection programmes at state level, while at federal level the National Social Investment Programme (NSIP) is the main instrument and includes four main programmes<sup>71</sup> including the National Cash Transfer Programme (NCTP). Launched in October 2016, NCTP is a Federal-Government led project supported by the World Bank's National Social Safety Nets Project (NASSP) and led by National Social Safety Nets Coordinating Office (NASSCO). The NASSP also includes a project to build the National Social Registry (NSR) which seeks to introduce a single registry for all social assistance interventions in the country.

**Coverage of social protection and labour programmes has expanded over time with further expansion taking place as a result of the government's COVID-19 response.** Social protection has been a major part of the Federal government's response to COVID-19 and among the commitments made were a rapid expansion of the NCTP (via fast tracking registration processes) and creation of a new Programme known as the COVID-19 Urban Cash Transfer Programme.

**Two key coordination mechanisms are the Abuja-based Cash Working Group (CWG)<sup>72</sup> and the Development Partners Group (DPG).** The former is focused on strategic engagement between humanitarian actors on cash transfer programming. The DPG is composed of representatives of the United Nations and its agencies, donors and INGOs. DPG's Key Political Partners Group seeks to connect donors with the Nigerian Government to drive forward critical agendas and influence government policy, in a coordinated way. In addition, there is a Technical Working Group on Social Protection (TWG on SP) which involves a number of Nigerian Ministries, departments and agencies, as well as international donors and partners. This TWG is focused on the review of the National SP policy.

Key milestones in social protection in Nigeria are set out in Figure 1.

**Figure 6.2: Timeline of key milestones in social protection Nigeria**



## 1.2 Donor support

**Data on social protection spend by donor in Nigeria shows that the UK ranks as the second highest, after the World Bank**, in terms of disbursements over the period 2010-19. UK disbursements to Nigeria in 2019 (constant prices USD million) amounted to 3543.15 in total with disbursements to the humanitarian sector amounting to 352.83 and social protection 19.69. Relevant FCDO programmes include **the Child Development Grant Programme (CDGP)** which is a flagship 57m GBP UKAID<sup>73</sup> and the more humanitarian focused is **FCDO's North East Nigeria Transition to Development programme (NENTAD)** which runs from 2017 to 2022 with a budget of GBP 411.6 million<sup>74</sup>. The World Bank supported **NASSP** (2016-2022) with a budget of USD 183m aims to provide access to targeted transfers for poor and vulnerable households under an expanded national social safety nets system. The World Bank supported **Nigeria Covid-19 Action Recovery and Economic Stimulus - Program for Results (Nigeria CARES)** 2021-2023 will help increase access of the poor to social transfers and basic services. The EU is one of the leading contributors of humanitarian aid in Nigeria. Since 2014, the EU has provided more than €340 million to help people in need in Nigeria (with €52 m funding for 2021).

### 6.2.3 Origins and scope of BASIC support

**IDS leads the consortium delivering the Research workstream of BASIC and is presently defining plans for Nigeria which has been classified as a deep engagement country. To date, there have been nine technical assistance assignments supported by BASIC relating to Nigeria – one supported by BASIC TAS in 2019 and seven assignments supported by SPACE 1 and 2 in 2020 and 2021.** Terms of Reference were available for two of these assignments – the Linking Social Protection Systems and Humanitarian Cash Transfers and the Nexus Advisor role. For the other requests (for SPACE) there were scoping calls to define the assignment's objectives and approach. As notes from these calls were unavailable to the Evaluation Team, details on the background to these requests was limited and was also compromised by FCDO staff turnover.

**Requests for BASIC support came through DFID and later FCDO staff, the assignments were designed to support the needs of two groups in particular** – namely the CWG and DPG and were commissioned on their behalf and expressed need. The Risk Analysis work for the CWG was requested by UNOCHA and the “How SP fits into the National Development Plan” was through DPG.

### 6.2.4 BASIC support provided and activities undertaken

An overview of the assignments supported by BASIC TAS is presented in Table 1 below.

**Table 6.2: Overview of BASIC/SPACE's assignments relating to Nigeria**

Date	Workstream	Beneficiary of support	Name of Assignment	Description
Oct 2019	TAS	Cash Working Group (CWG)	Linking Social Protection Systems and Humanitarian Cash Transfers in Nigeria	Mapping of ongoing humanitarian cash transfers and social protection programmes in the BAY States as a first step towards identifying potential linkages.
Dec 2020	SPACE	Development Partners Group (DPG)	Linking to the Cash Working Group.	Excel spreadsheet setting out COVID-19 responses of partners - mapping SP programme adaptations and responses to COVID-19 by Nigerian Government and donors, NGOs etc.
May 2020	SPACE	DPG	Strategy Decision Matrix and Evaluation Matrix	This work focused on options/strategies to COVID-19 response via adapting existing social protection programmes or leveraging social protection delivery systems /capacity.
Sept 2020	SPACE	DPG	How social protection fits into the national development plan	Support to the DPG to set out policy response areas which should be taken forward in a High-Level Forum for Development Partners with the Vice President of Nigeria.
Not dated	SPACE	FCDO	Support to CDGP	A consultant was commissioned to review the FCDO Children Development Grant Programme in order to explore the feasibility of a possible extension.
Dec 2020	SPACE	CWG	Risk analysis - Cash Working Group	Identification of risks associated with the impact of COVID-19 on members' cash and voucher assistance operations in the northeast (BAY States) in order to inform mitigation measures.
Jan 2021 – to date	SPACE	FCDO, CWG and DPG	Nexus Advisor	The main aim of this role was to drive coherence between humanitarian cash, social protection cash programmes and systems at operational and policy levels focusing on strengthening coordination mechanisms, relationship building and technical inputs. The role evolved with delivery, to focus more on humanitarian actors to promote more cohesive use of cash modalities in particular a modality shift from vouchers to cash (Cash Common Donors Approach).
April 2021 - draft	SPACE	SPACE led request	Case Study: Nigeria	This case study documents experiences from the government of Nigeria and partners' social protection and humanitarian responses to COVID-19. It aims to contribute knowledge and learning to inform both the direction of social protection in Nigeria, as well as global debates on shock responsive social protection (SRSP) and linking humanitarian action and social protection (HA-SP).
May 2021 - draft	SPACE	WFP and CWG	Proxy Means Testing	This assignment is presently underway to inform targeting for humanitarian cash assistance for non-camp based Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and host communities, using an approach to prioritization that is methodologically aligned with the government. It aims to help enable the humanitarian community to inform and support the extension of the government system into areas where coverage is currently limited.

**The nine TAS assignments (eight supported by SPACE, and one by BASIC) included one embedded advisor role, with the remainder short-term consultancies.** Stakeholders reported it was good to have a range of different types of modalities for support – not useful to take a “*one size fits all approach*”. While an embedded role can be more internal (FCDO) facing, the short-term assignments delivered by consultants can be more external oriented allowing more critical views to be expressed.

**Stakeholders interviewed indicated that the various assignments supported by BASIC/SPACE were connected and were strategically pointing in the same direction** – namely supporting transition along the humanitarian-development nexus. The linkages study was viewed as foundational, paving the way for further assignments which built on this initial output. SPACE assignments were also incremental – building on each other, while the nexus role supports ongoing engagement.

**Across the assignments, there are a number of common threads to activities.** Most notably the need to support the linking of social protection and humanitarian actors, at national and at state levels in order to bridge the gap between humanitarian cash transfers and social protection systems and transform the way humanitarian and social protection actors operate to improve humanitarian response and to initiate, or strengthen social protection programmes to make them more shock responsive. Another key theme of the Nigeria supported assignments has been analyses of the situation with existing humanitarian and SP programmes to better inform programming, including COVID-19 response.

*“In Nigeria, there is not good visibility of what is going on – it is hard to get an overview. While some of the pieces of research supported by BASIC were not joined up from the start, they are all pieces of the jigsaw and add value”*

*KII, July 2021*

**Several of the assignments (notably the linkages study and the embedded advisory role) placed an emphasis on North East Nigeria reflecting the need to support greater alignment between humanitarian cash programming and social protection programmes and systems.** While the work of BASIC on the social protection system had a national focus, the humanitarian portfolio focuses on the BAY states. Interviewees reported that there was an explicit focus in all SPACE assignments on gender and inclusion (G&I) considerations and that there was a pool of G&I experts which consultants could access for support.

**Interviewed stakeholders were unanimous in their view that there was a strong positive momentum behind social protection in Nigeria at this time.** This is reflected in the new policy and plans on SP as well the engagement of the Nigerian government on this agenda. The new Ministry (FMHADMSD) has a strong mandate to tackle humanitarian, disaster, and insecurity issues, although it does not yet have a strategic plan setting out the Ministry’s aspirations.

**The support to Nigeria also contributes to global learning.** The April 2021 (draft) case study on Using Social Protection to Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria aims to contribute knowledge and learning to inform both the direction of social protection in Nigeria, as well as global debates on shock responsive social protection (SRSP) and linking humanitarian action and SP.

**As noted earlier the planning of the scope and activities of the Research workstream in Nigeria was underway at the time of preparation of this Case Study.** As such there is not yet clarity on activities that will be delivered in Nigeria as a deep engagement country. The planning phase was somewhat disrupted due to uncertainty re the budget allocated to the Research workstream which led the consortium, on FCDO advice, to temporarily pause their engagement with Nigeria.

**In terms of delivery of activities, the following worked well: remote working (reducing international travel costs), FCDO support to consultants (e.g., stakeholder introductions), longer**

**engagements which facilitated the building of trust with stakeholders and partners in-country, as well as SPACE's strong visibility were all noted by interviewees.** Factors which worked less well included the following: time constraints for the conduct of assignments, low awareness of BASIC as a programme and remote working which compromised capacity building objectives were noted. Funding uncertainty during the Spending Review (Summer 2020) was seen as hampering planning and engagement activities. BASIC's objectives in terms of capacity building aspirations were also rated as somewhat unclear. More time should be allowed to progress the PMT work as the allocated 10 days was insufficient.

## 6.2.5 Response to support provided

### Use of BASIC's outputs

**Awareness of BASIC as a brand was low although when probed the majority of interviewees had heard of SPACE, or indeed the assignments or the consultants who conducted them.** Some of the deliverables (such as the Nigeria Case Study on response to COVID-19 and the PMT work) were in draft form at the time of preparation of this case study so information on their use and response to support provided was not available. Stakeholders viewed BASIC outputs to be of very high quality.

Stakeholder feedback indicated that the most impactful work generated by BASIC/SPACE were the result of the following TAS assignments:

**How SP fits in the National Development Plan assignment succeeded in engaging with key influencers and decision makers at the top of the Nigerian Government (e.g., Vice President) through providing support to the DPG in shaping government SP priorities going forward.** Four policy actions were defined in the assignment's output, with stakeholder feedback indicating that three of the policy proposals are being taken forward by Nigerian Government stakeholders:

- Policy Action 2 - Design and put in place a social protection fund (some measures being taken forward drawn from this policy action)
- Policy Action 3 – Develop and put in place the necessary tools and processes to plan, track and report on social protection expenditures, across programmes and MBAs (part of new National SP Policy).
- Policy Action 4 - Amend the SP legislative framework accordingly (legal drafters have been recruited and amendments are underway).

**The Nexus Advisor role was rated by interviewees as very valuable for coordination of humanitarian actors, shift of humanitarian actors towards cash, bridging the gap between theory and practice, informing FCDO policy on the nexus and in taking a longer-term perspective.** The Nexus Advisor also developed an action plan on the Cash Common Donor Approach which is with donors for review at present; if agreed it should serve as a valuable tool to take forward the transition to cash and a more cohesive humanitarian approach to using cash. This work was rated by a member of the DPG as a key activity in spelling out linkages between humanitarian and SP actors. The Nexus Advisor role has helped a lot in relation to the CWG struggles with multipurpose cash and in making the linkages between humanitarian action and SP.

*“She (the Nexus Advisor) is a key driver on how the nexus can be done in a practical way.”*

*KII, July 2021*

The Nexus Advisor was able to influence DPG work on the development of the government's multidimensional poverty index (survey tool and methodology, pre-nationwide launch) by influencing



the national bureau of statistics (in partnership with UNDP) to include movement status and people in displacement (as well as several questions around food insecurity etc.). This was a critical win helping make the government's evidence base (and the wealth of policy it will inform) more inclusive of shock/crisis-affected people.

**COVID-19 focused SPACE assignments** – Interviewees noted that the mapping work conducted in the context of COVID-19 responses was catalytic in informing planning of DPG members responses to the pandemic. SPACE provided a platform for donors and government agencies to identify the shape of their response to the pandemic in relation to the social protection space. One of the SPACE assignments was viewed as useful in framing of the new phase of FCDO's CGDP in terms of its priorities and themes going forward.

**Other BASIC/SPACE assignments were also rated as useful by those interviewed.** The Mapping Linkages (October 2019) study which had the greatest awareness among interviewees was viewed as very useful for induction of new staff into roles in the FCDO Nigeria team and also for preparatory review by consultants engaged in later SPACE assignments<sup>1</sup>. The mapping study was designed to identify ways to coordinate the implementation of cash programming including linkages with social protection emergencies and it was clear from consultations with key government stakeholders that it was used as such, with some of its recommendations on the harmonisation of cash and vouchers and the targeting of social registers underway. One government stakeholder also noted that there has been a clear follow up use of the report with meetings in North East Nigeria with the EU on the harmonisation of registers and greater interest in targeting by the Donor Group. The Nexus Advisor also used the linkages study, in particular its coverage on targeting, and is taking forward with other actors (NVCA) the use of multipurpose cash assistance modality.

**The Risk Analysis work and the work on Proxy Means Testing were rated as *potentially very useful*.** The PMT assignment has huge potential given the work underway on a new business case and the need to define approaches to create a more multi-purpose cash and social protection system and better consider targeting issues. FCDO's NENTAD programme is coming to an end and a new business case is being prepared for the follow-on programme. The risk analysis work in relation to COVID-19 response is being taken forward by Nigerian Government stakeholders. One stakeholder reported that they used the risk analysis work to negotiate with the Government and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on the movement of cash to BAY States in order to prevent insurgents from getting hold of the cash and ensure humanitarian actors comply with financial inclusion laws of the country. It also helped in engagement with Borno State during COVID-19, to lobby the Government to relax lockdown rules so humanitarian actors could provide cash and voucher assistance especially for interventions critical to lifesaving, such as food and medical assistance.

## **Enablers and constraints**

Key factors enabling or constraining use of outputs are set out below.

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<sup>1</sup> Although it is worth noting that there have been changes to system since this report was prepared, for example the closure of the WB-financed Nigeria Youth Employment and Social Support Operation (YESSO) programme means there is very limited (if any) social assistance for people currently in displacement.



**Table 6.3: Factors supporting or hindering use of BASIC/SPACE's outputs**


Supporting use	Hindering use
Valuable when support includes help at FCDO Post on translating the findings into practical action, Presentations of findings to stakeholders also promotes use.	Knowledge sharing not structured within FCDO – some studies can fall between the cracks. Some of the contextual shifts and social protection system changes have reduced the relevance of findings for humanitarian actors.
Engaging the right partners – CWG and DPG - seen as good mechanisms to support to ensure use of outputs.	Staff transfer and lack of systematic follow up by those commissioning the research can limit use of outputs.
High quality evidence and research addressing gaps in the available pool of evidence supports use.	Greater engagement with Nigerian Government and local partners would promote more uptake of recommendations etc.
Strong convening power of the programme to engage multiple stakeholders and actors	Improved coordination of assignments is needed including contractors supported in navigating complex FCDO structures, interpretation of their ToR, creating step by step road maps on the support (line of sight).
Sequencing of assignments – incremental approach allowed a building blocks approach promoting ongoing momentum behind use of outputs.	TA support if accompanied by a funding stream can be more impactful.

## 6.2.6 BASIC's Contribution to Changes (or expected changes) in outcomes

**BASIC's support to Nigeria is aligned to its Theory of Change (see Figure 2 below), with the proviso that the Research workstream of the programme has not yet started implementation. However, at baseline, there are challenges to measuring the contribution of BASIC to change.**

While it is likely that BASIC's outputs, will, with time, contribute to outcomes (in particular the outcomes on improved coordination and improved policies, programmes and plans) supporting the adoption of social protection approaches in crises in Nigeria, it is challenging at this point to measure the extent of BASIC/SPACE's contribution to change for the following reasons. Some outputs were preliminary pieces of analysis used to inform programming (for example, COVID-19 responses of Nigerian Government and Development Partners) which are still evolving and not yet fully defined. Some outputs (Case Study and Proxy Means Testing) are still in draft stage and not yet finalised. Staff turnover in FCDO and lack of systemic follow up on the outputs from the various assignments has meant that it was not always possible to form a clear view on take-up. Some of the ambitions – better coordination or coherence amongst humanitarian and SP actors – were rated by interviewees as longer-term goals that require more time to be achieved.

Figure 6.3: BASIC's Theory of Change and Relevance to Assignments in Nigeria



**The key pathways mentioned by interviewees in relation to the technical assistance support related principally to the following outcomes (colour coded in blue in Figure 6.3):**

- Greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives
- New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented;
- Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice;

### **Coherence, coordination, and synergies**

**Coordination was identified by almost all stakeholders interviewed as a key problem and some indicated that the Nigerian Government should play a bigger role in this area.** The linkages study (2019) on ongoing humanitarian cash transfer and social protection programmes in the BAY States was seen as a useful coordination activity, as was the mapping of programmes responses by the Nigerian Government and Development Partners to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Nexus Advisor' work should, given time, lead to positive progress with coordination of humanitarian actors on use of cash modalities and the nexus, contributing to greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors.

**However, interviewees also noted that there is a crowded landscape of humanitarian and social protection actors in Nigeria** and therefore hard to discern the precise contribution of one programme providing technical assistance, to change, also noting that coordination requires behaviour changes by some actors (e.g., humanitarian actors) who are used to working in a specific way<sup>2</sup>. Nonetheless, BASIC's support to drive improved coordination was rated as useful and beneficial, particularly by improving coordination of humanitarian actors on the Cash Common Donor Approach as a first step.

### **New or improved country plans, policies, programmes and systems & evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice**

**There is some evidence that SPACE support was catalytic in shaping donor responses and a platform for Nigerian stakeholders to also consider and shape their responses to the pandemic** thereby feeding into the outcomes on new or improved country plans, policies, programmes or systems and evidence used by governments, etc. to inform policies and practice. As noted above, advice to the Vice-President through the DPG is shaping SP policy and action by the Nigerian Government. Contribution of BASIC to FCDO business cases and programmes (e.g. CDGP) supports use of evidence to inform policy and practice.

### **Other outcomes – Increased political commitment and capability development**

**BASIC's contribution to these outcomes was assessed as less significant.** The outcome relating to increased political commitment to and use of social protection approaches in crises was seen as less relevant due to the positive political economy around social protection at this time in Nigeria. The outcome on "improved human and institutional capability and capacity" was seen as important although there was a lack of clarity on how the assignments could build capacity particularly when delivered remotely and there was a need for this dimension be made more explicit in the delivery of the assignments. One interviewee noted the need for an action plan on capacity building which set out BASIC's objectives in this area and types of capacity development it supports. However other interviewees noted that there was a significant capacity building element to BASIC's work in Nigeria – in particular through the support provided by the Nexus Advisor - which was helping develop internal

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<sup>2</sup> Moreover, development actors and the government need to try to understand/tackle some of the perceived/real risks to humanitarian principles, and humanitarian imperatives, that prevent engagement.

FCDO capacity, as well as capacity of Nigerian and other partners (e.g., humanitarian actors on cash approaches).

*“To build capacity, you need to understand the capacity gaps and short-term pieces can help with this initial stage e.g., scoping pieces”.*

*KII, July 2021*

### **Likely sustainability**

**Sustainability of the support provided is rated as likely at this point in terms of the contribution to improved policies, plans, systems designed and implemented given the favourable environment towards social protection in the aftermath of COVID-19.** The sustainability of the efforts designed to improve coordination between actors and initiatives is at this point hard to determine although initiatives such as the setting up of the National Cash Voucher Assistance Policy Task Team represents a positive step towards improved coordination on the use of cash and voucher modalities. The sustainability of capacity building to FCDO internal teams may be eroded by staff turnover although the wider dissemination of some of SPACE’s outputs does bode well in terms of strengthening capacity among donors and stakeholders in the sector. No negative or unintended consequences from BASIC’s work in Nigeria were identified by interviewees.

## **6.2.7 Conclusions and issues for further consideration**

### **Conclusions**

**BASIC support has been very important to Nigeria and it is clear that it has been useful to both the Abuja-based CWG and DPG in particular addressing needs for technical support, tools and analysis requested by these groups.** While nine assignments focused on Nigeria, BASIC’s visibility is rather low although SPACE is better known and has had broader dissemination of its outputs.

**BASIC/SPACE support is clearly making a contribution most notably to two outcomes of BASIC – around strengthening of national plans, policies and programmes and improved coordination.** However, BASIC’s contribution is alongside a range of other actors (e.g. World Bank, EU and others) and on their own, small scale assignments, are not sufficient to generate substantial change, although remain valuable nonetheless in filling capacity and research gaps. There is an ongoing need to promote greater cohesion within the humanitarian sector on use of cash modalities and capacity development of Nigerian Government stakeholders.

**Several factors enable or constrain BASIC’s contribution to outcome or impact level change.** Factors supporting BASIC’s aspirations include engagement with the right structures to drive change (CWG, DPG), building stakeholders trust via ongoing support and its strong convening power and identification of gaps in evidence and where capacity needs to be built. Factors hindering take up of support provided include insufficient engagement with Nigerian stakeholders, insufficient structured follow up on use of outputs, with challenges to dissemination within FCDO following DFID and FCO merger and non-systematic knowledge sharing within FCDO structures.

**Stakeholders were clear providing TA without a parallel funding stream does make exerting influence harder.** However, TA can work if programmes like BASIC commit to building trust and engage other actors and leverage other departments in FCDO and other donors.

## 6.3 Somalia

### 6.3.1 Context

Somalia faces a multitude of different crises, including recurrent climate shocks, such as seasonal flooding, severe droughts<sup>3</sup>, and locust infestations<sup>4</sup> as well as protracted conflict in southern and central regions of the country<sup>5</sup>. This complex context has contributed to chronic food insecurity, with a major famine taking place in 2011 and another narrowly averted in 2017 and forced displacement. These issues are exacerbated by lack of basic infrastructure and inadequate investments and limited access to basic services, including health and education, creating a situation of extreme vulnerability. Rural households and displaced communities living in settlements in urban and semi-urban areas are most vulnerable.

#### Social Protection in Somalia

**While informal social assistance built around remittances from diaspora have existed in Somalia for some time, formal support has historically come through short-term humanitarian crisis response.**<sup>6</sup> Recognising the unsustainable nature of the humanitarian model in a context of recurrent crises, donors and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), have, over the past four to five years, explored long-term development led social protection approaches to responding to crises<sup>7</sup>.

**It is within this context that in 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) developed a landmark Social Protection Policy (SSPP) through The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA).** The policy envisions strengthening all workstreams of a social protection system and working towards transitional safety nets before moving to comprehensive social protection programmes. The FGS intends to work with different actors, including development partners, CSOs, and encourages private-public partnerships to develop products that increase the participation of the informal sector and transfer risk from the poorest households.<sup>8</sup>

**MoLSA assumes the responsibility to lead the implementation of the policy framework, setting standards for implementation of programmes and designing the interventions with donors and partners with other line Ministries and Federal Member States.** The FGS recognises in the SP Implementation Framework that the decentralized actions are essential in the provision of social protection actions.<sup>9</sup> The main challenge in pursuing this policy is the capacity and resource gap within local and national government institutions.<sup>10</sup>

There are two large social protection programmes currently running in Somalia. These are:

- The BAXNAANO National Safety Net Programme managed by MoLSA and funded through the IDA of the World Bank. Launched in 2019, the programme targets 1.2 million chronically poor people in rural areas across 21 districts with monthly cash provisions.<sup>11</sup>
- SAGAL, which was launched in early 2021 and is funded by the EU, supports over 44,000 households respond to climate and conflict related shocks and disasters.<sup>12</sup>

**The implementation of the programs is supported by both development and humanitarian partners, including UNICEF, World Food Programme, and the Somalia Cash Consortium.** Funds are mainly channelled through agencies due to government systems not yet being in place. However,

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<sup>3</sup> Since 2015 there have been 25 severe weather related crises, including 16 floods, 5 cyclones, 3 droughts and one wildfire. (Climate crisis index, Global Internal Displacement Database. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>).

<sup>4</sup> IRC, 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-new-swarms-desert-locusts-pose-threat-farmlands>

<sup>5</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia>

<sup>6</sup> According to UNOCHA's Humanitarian Actors data, since 2012, over 111 international organisations have been involved in providing humanitarian support to Somalia, spending a combined total of 3.64 billion USD.

<sup>7</sup> Capacity4Dev, EU, 2017. <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/articles/ground-long-road-social-protection-somalia>

<sup>8</sup> FGS, 2019. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-social-protection-policy-march-2019>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> KII Group 3: other in-country stakeholders, Aug 2021.

<sup>11</sup> FGS, 2021. <https://baxnaano.so/about-baxnaano/>

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, 2021. <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/9576/>

a key element of the BAXNAANO is the provision a project management Unit within MoLSA to build capacity and enable operational independence within the government in the future<sup>75</sup>.

While both BAXNAANO and SAGAL grew out of a system built around humanitarian cash assistance architecture, they illustrate the emerging shift of policy and programming towards social protection. Other smaller scale social protection programmes, include:

- BRCiS, a safety net programme funded by ECHO and FCDO and launched in 2013. It is led by NRC and a consortium of five other partners<sup>76</sup>
- WFP's Urban Safety Net programme, launched in 2018<sup>77</sup>
- EU funded Somali Cash Consortium 6.5m euro mobile cash transfer programme launched in July 2021<sup>78</sup>

## Coordination mechanisms

There are several SP and humanitarian coordination mechanisms, some more established than others, operating in Somalia.

**Table 6.4: SP and humanitarian coordination mechanisms in Somalia**

Name	Description	Sector
Donor Working Group (DWG)	The EU established a Donor Working Group (DWG) in 2017–18 to initiate the process of bringing the donor community together to initiate policy discussions on a longer-term safety net approach. The DWG was instrumental in the design and development of BAXNAANO and SAGAL.	Social Protection
Social Protection Group	There is a newly established Social Protection Group led by MoLSA and co-chaired by the World Bank	Social Protection
The Somalia Cash Consortium	Brings together key international organisations implementing cash transfers across Somalia	Nexus
Cash Working Group	Supports humanitarian cash transfers and is co-led by the WFP and Concern Worldwide.	Nexus
OCHA led cluster system	Multi-donor country-based pooled mechanism created in 2010 to allocate funding for the most urgent life-saving interventions in Somalia.	Humanitarian

## Evidence Gaps

**A number of important challenges and evidence gaps were identified through the data collection process.** These included:

- There are no common agreed protocols on when to activate the shock responsive safety net and there is lack of granular and timely data to inform vertical or horizontal expansion of responses.<sup>79</sup>
- Lack of clarity of the targeting methods adopted by the ongoing BAXNAANO and SAGAL safety net projects. Continued risk of inclusion and exclusion errors from the government led SP programs. It is also not clear how the safety net programs ensure most vulnerable populations are effectively targeted and reached.<sup>80</sup>
  - Lack of interoperability of systems used by humanitarian cash transfer programs and the systems used by SP programs is a common concern.<sup>81</sup>

## 6.3.2 Origins of BASIC support

**BASIC contacted FCDO Somalia in April 2020.** Initial outreach was made by the BASIC team informing FCDO Somalia of the support available through SPACE facility. Contact was also made to FGS and other local partners, including civil society organisations, on the possibility working together to explore social protection responses to Covid-19. However, this wider outreach did not generate follow up engagements<sup>82</sup>.



**FCDO request for TA was made because of an identified need for dedicated support on the emerging shock responsive SP agenda in Somalia.** The support focused on mapping of cash programs and reviewing donor cash approaches to help better articulate FCDO's current interventions and develop FCDO's coordination strategy. The suggestion originally came from colleagues in the Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) who had identified that, externally, this was seen as something the UK was leading on globally.<sup>83</sup>

**The scope of SPACE's engagements was discussed and defined informally through conversation between SPACE consultants and FCDO.** For example, the idea of the localisation<sup>84</sup> framework was born out of conversation between SPACE and FCDO who identified crossover between SPACE's existing work around localisation and opportunities through the BRCiS programme and its localisation agenda<sup>85</sup>. Likewise, the idea of the Light Touch Review emerged out of conversations with FCDO, USAID and ECHO. These conversations identified a need for comprehensive review of Cash responses in Somalia and sustained engagement with donor. However, a lack of time on SPACE side (the consultant only had 6 days) meant that the scope needed to be reduced<sup>86</sup>.

**Overall, the process of requesting support was good,** suiting FCDO's way of working and offering enough flexibility to respond to changing needs and provide some input around scope of work. That said, the main challenge was that SPACE was geared towards providing support in ways to use Social Protection to respond to the impact of Covid-19 which was not applicable to the Somalia context.<sup>87</sup>

### 6.3.3 BASIC support provided and activities undertaken

Between May 2020 and June 2021, Somalia engaged with SPACE five times to produce various outputs as shown in Table 6.5:

**Table 6.5: Overview of Somalia SPACE outputs**

#	Modality	Engagement summary	Deliverables	Completion date
1	Short-term	<p>Providing core questions and areas of focus for the existing technical assistance facility and providing additional review of documents. This engagement provided FCDO with two matrices to support integration of COVID-19 in country programming.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Strategy Decision Matrix helped structure an independent and unbiased analysis of COVID-19 response options.</li> <li>The Delivery Systems Matrix helped SP teams think through potential COVID-19 response options/strategies via existing social protection programmes, or through leveraging social protection delivery systems and capacity.</li> </ul>	Decision Matrix Somalia; Delivery Matrix Somalia	May 20
2	Short-term	<b>Assessing Four Donor Cash Countries against donor cash principles.</b> This engagement included scoping conversations around donor cash principles with other donor agencies and ultimately focussed around delivering the Light Touch Review. The Light-Touch Review sought to determine the impact of COVID-19 on specific elements of humanitarian cash and social protection programming. It focused on three principles: i) Accountability to Affected Populations/ Localisation; ii) Coordination and iii) Alignment of Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection programmes.'	Somalia Selective Light Touch Review – Donor Cash Principles	March 21
3	Short-term	<b>Economic Inclusion Programming.</b> This engagement focussed on delivering the Economic Inclusion Programming document. The note considers lessons learned from economic inclusion programming globally, outlines several key considerations for implementing such an approach in Somalia and discusses GESI considerations.	Economic Inclusion in Somalia	Nov 20



#	Modality	Engagement summary	Deliverables	Completion date
4	Short-term	<b>Applying Donor Cash Principles, Cash Localisation and BRCiS.</b> This engagement was aligned to recommendations coming out of the BRCiS programme. It delivered analysis for the Somalia BRCiS programme to support a greater shift in power, funding and process to support localisation	Somalia BRCiS – Framework for a Localisation Shift	May 21
5	Short-term	<b>SPACE Somalia Case Study.</b> This engagement focussed on the delivery of the SPACE Somalia Case Study. The purpose of the case study was to document the scaling up of shock-responsive safety nets in Somalia during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. While overall there was a limited response to the pandemic itself, the main scale ups over this period focussed on additional needs caused by floods and locust infestation, of arguable greater importance, especially in rural areas.	SPACE Somalia Case Study 04 06 2021	In process

Source: SPACE programme documents and deliverables

### 6.3.4 Response to support provided

#### What worked

**SPACE support and deliverables were overall well received by FCDO Somalia.** Below is a summary of the key findings which emerged out of the key informant interviews (KIIs).

- **Outputs were targeted, responsive and useful,** responding to FCDO needs and in line with SP priorities in Somalia. Delivery from SPACE was timely and met FCDO expectations and the SPACE team was easy to work with and overall, the fluid way of working suited the FCDO.<sup>88</sup>
- **Some other stakeholders are also benefiting from outputs.** Even if engagement from stakeholders with SPACE outputs was limited, some positive feedback was collected, specifically around outputs providing Covid-19 context in Somalia. It was useful for partners/agencies to understand the potential impact of COVID-19 on programming.
- **Consultations during data collection processes generated important conversations around localisation.** Consultations gave SP sector workers an opportunity to discuss localisation openly in a safe space, which brought out some important findings. For instance, that some of the push back around localisation comes down to sector workers wanting to protect their jobs.<sup>89</sup>

#### Challenges and limitations

- **SPACE's lack of contextual understanding:** Data collected through KIIs indicated that some of SPACE's support was lacking contextual understanding. For example, the localisation framework was not effectively rooted in Somali operational reality as understood by the implementing partner, that is, challenges around capabilities of local actors. As explained through the Actor, Narrative, Interest framework, BASIC's ability to influence country policy depends on its capacity to develop context relevant social assistance policy narratives that are supported by enough actors and align with or sufficiently challenge prevailing political interests at multiple levels. While the work on localisation delivered through SPACE was aligned with certain political interests (FCDO, local stakeholders) it did not adequately account for interests or support of other partners involved in the delivery of the BRCiS programme.
- On a more general level, SPACE's Covid-19 lens was not appropriate for the Somalia context<sup>90</sup>. As mentioned by multiple respondents and reflected in SPACE's pivot away from using a Covid only lens, Covid is largely a secondary issue to other crises and where SP system is only emerging.<sup>91</sup>
- **Length of engagements:** Other stakeholders reported the need for more sustained engagement to deliver more comprehensive and useful outputs, especially in the complicated


context of nascent social protection system in Somalia. Limited days allocated to SPACE consultants meant limited availability, which resulted in stakeholder disengagement. For example, there was an expectation that support provided by SPACE on cash programmes would be more sustained. When it was understood that only a few days of technical assistance could be provided some stakeholders felt that this could not respond to the needs discussed. On the other hand, one respondent reported having the sense that they were being tasked because a resource (albeit limited) was available, rather than because they were addressing a specific need.<sup>92</sup>

- **Limited reach:** While majority of interviewees had heard of SPACE/TA facility, majority had not engaged with outputs. In addition, there has been little to no engagement with Federal government of Somalia.<sup>93</sup> Given coordination efforts/needs, this felt like a limitation. Moreover, FGS counterparts highlighted history of excluding FGS in design of programmes and decision-making processes<sup>94</sup>. It is worth making the caveat at this stage that a lot of respondents had little to say about BASIC/SPACE/TA facility because they had not engaged with outputs. Accordingly, the responses outlined above are only representative of those who engaged with SPACE, which represents a minority of respondents.

### 6.3.5 BASIC's contribution to change

Figure 1 illustrates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which are directly relevant (highlighted in blue) to SPACE's support to FCDO Somalia. BASIC's direct contribution to change in Somalia has, until now, been limited to the output level, focussing advice and research related results. Referring to the Kirkpatrick model<sup>95</sup> discussed in the BASIC Evaluation inception report, BASIC's inputs in Somalia reached the reaction level, providing engaging and relevant outputs and meeting client expectations. Lack of capacity building means that the going beyond the Kirkpatrick's Reaction level is not applicable in this context.

Figure 6.4: BASIC's Theory of Change and Relevance to Assignments in Somalia



Source: BASIC programme document

## Results supported through BASIC

This section focusses on investigating SPACE's contribution to changes in Somalia, looking at FCDO's use of SPACE, potential indirect results and how these are reflected in output statements. This section will also consider the validity of the ToC's assumptions within the Somalia context and consider other enablers and constraints.

**SPACE's contribution to changes in Somalia are largely limited to FCDO and reflected in specific outputs.** The localisation framework represents *high quality advice and research provided for the design and delivery of country plans, policies and programmes*. Aligned with the BRCiS April 2021 vision statement, outlining the need for localisation to improve programme impact and sustainability, it provides evidence and approaches on which FCDO can draw on to design, develop or contribute to programming with a stronger localisation focus. That said, there is no evidence to date to indicate that has already been done.

Although there is no evidence to date to indicate this has been done, there will be plenty of opportunities to as FCDO continues to push the localisation agenda in line with its strategy and international commitments.

**Future engagement around localisation could deliver outcomes.** There is an expectation that the localisation framework will be used to inform FCDO Somalia country plans and policies around localisation in alignment with FCDO SP strategy and key international policy commitments. With BRCiS II running until March 2022<sup>13</sup> and BASIC increasing its engagements in Somalia<sup>14, 15</sup> there may be opportunities for BASIC to provide technical assistance supporting localisation agenda within the BRCiS programme. This would have the potential to contribute towards the *design and implementation of new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems*.

**The Light Touch Review (LTR) of Donor Cash Principles signifies another result,** where SPACE has delivered *high quality policy relevant research and advice, informing the design and delivery of country plans, policies and programmes*. The LTR and its scoping discussions with donors supported the development of the FCDO's cash programming strategy<sup>16</sup>, focussing on existing modalities and reinforcing the government's social protection mechanisms, as well as supporting the agenda of shock responsive approaches to safety net programming. A similar assessment can be made of the Somalia case study, representing a key bit of evidence that can inform future FCDO planning and programming. With the purpose of the case study to "document the scaling up of shock-responsive safety nets in Somalia during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic"<sup>17</sup>, it offers in-depth contextual analysis around needs caused by climate shocks, such as flooding and locust infestations (most severe), as well as the pandemic itself. As such, once finished, it will enable FCDO to situate and adjust its plans to respond most effectively to changes in context.

**The LTR also highlights SPACE's responsiveness to user needs and adapting to contextual changes.** The LTR provides a good example where SPACE pivoted slightly away from a COVID-19 only lens (although still providing useful evidence and analysis on that front) and supported FCDO to develop better understanding of emerging SP landscape in Somalia. That being said, one might question why, after realising that SPACE's COVID-19 lens wasn't well suited to the Somalia context and would benefit more from BASIC's more general TA, a BASIC TA project wasn't brought in to replace SPACE's services.

**Reach of SPACE outputs beyond FCDO is hard to determine.** For instance, while the LTR was shared across the donor group, the extent to which it was engaged with is unclear. While some respondents had mentioned seeing it, it wasn't referenced on its own or brought up as a key output from SPACE. This lack of reach combined with limited engagement with other SP stakeholders previously outlined in section 4.2 means that externally facing outputs and outcomes within the BASIC ToC have, until now, not been explored or tested in the Somalia case.

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<sup>13</sup> FCDO Devtracker, 2021. <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-CHC-1092236-BG190/transactions>

<sup>14</sup> FCDO Cash and Social Protection Adviser SoW, 2021

<sup>15</sup> KII Group 1 & 2: FCDO, Aug 2021

<sup>16</sup> Ibid

<sup>17</sup> SPACE Somalia Case Study, June 2021.

However, this highlights potential opportunities – around research dissemination, stakeholder engagement, and coordination - for BASIC to explore during future engagements. With well-established Social Protection coordination mechanisms operating in Somalia there are openings for BASIC to contribute towards new or strengthened relationships and strategic partnerships across the humanitarian, climate resilience and SP sectors and supporting greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives.

## Validity of assumptions

Table 6.6 outlines assumptions from the BASIC ToC. An assessment of the validity of each assumption at the input to output and output to outcome levels is made in the third column. Assumptions linking outcomes to impact have been removed because it is too early to comment on these considering the still very early level of contribution that has been identified within the Somalia case so far.

**Table 6.6: Assessment of relevance of BASIC ToC assumptions within Somalia case**

ToC Linkages	Assumptions	Validity
Assumptions linking inputs to outputs:	FCDO posts are sufficiently engaged to identify windows of opportunity for reform and draw on BASIC TA strategically to promote use of SP approaches in crises.	Valid
	BASIC has the flexibility to adapt to major contextual changes including new shocks and the FCDO reprioritisation exercise.	Valid
	There is sufficient technical expertise and capacity to deliver high quality advice and robust research in these contexts	These three assumptions can largely be grouped around context, and in the case of Somalia, not holding because of a lack of contextual understanding from the technical expertise. For instance, the need for or lack of local expertise was cited during KII and the appropriateness of advice was questioned around the Localisation Framework. Moreover, both SPACE team members and stakeholders explained that lack of time available to researchers for delivery meant that they were unable to provide sustained support or comprehensive outputs (as required) and more generally lacked capacity.
Assumptions linking outputs to outcomes:	International consultants and researchers delivering BASIC provide advice which is relevant and appropriate. There is adequate commitment, and financial and human resource at country level (in FCDO, governments or agencies) to implement new or strengthened plans, policies and programmes	
	International consultants and researchers delivering BASIC generate evidence which is relevant and appropriate. In-country researchers have sufficient networks and capacity to engage key stakeholders and promote uptake of research. Users are able to access evidence and understand its applicability to their own contexts. Staff turnover amongst users and policymakers does not prevent uptake of research and evidence.	
	FCDO posts have the absorptive capacity to utilise BASIC outputs and link to their influencing work. Buy in from senior FCDO personnel is sufficient to support high level influencing agenda.	Does not hold, largely due to FCDO Somalia being in a transitional phase which has reduced absorptive capacity.
	BASIC workstreams collaborate effectively to maximise cross-programme linkages, coordination and synergies.	Does not hold because SPACE was the only BASIC workstream to engage in Somalia and there was no collaboration with other workstreams during delivery
	BASIC collaborates effectively with other stakeholders to achieve capacity strengthening and influencing outcomes.	Does not hold. There was limited collaboration with stakeholders – mainly around localization – and the effectiveness was mitigated and outputs had limited reach

## Enablers and constraints

SPACE's contributions, alone, are insufficient to bring about outcome and impact level change. Some factors been identified as key enablers to achieving results in Somalia include:

- **Working within the existing (albeit still nascent) Social Protection space in Somalia.** Collaborating with other donors by sharing research and learning and working closely with the FGS who are looking to develop capacity and take ownership over the development and delivery of its social protection programmes<sup>96</sup>. The SP system in Somalia is still in its early days, which means there are opportunities to support its growth and development
- **Long-term BASIC engagements with FCDO Somalia.** Short-termism of SPACE's support to FCDO Somalia was cited as an important issue inhibiting SPACE's ability to deliver results against the ToC<sup>97</sup>. Accordingly, FCDO Somalia's request for long-term Cash and Social Protection Adviser<sup>98</sup> to support the design of FCDO's approach to humanitarian and safety net cash programming, policy development and systems strengthening through its next humanitarian and resilience programme signifies a key step towards long-term BASIC support.
- **Engaged and well-resourced FCDO team.** As per the assumption, *FCDO posts are sufficiently engaged to identify windows of opportunity for reform and draw on BASIC TA strategically to promote use of SP approaches in crises*, a well engaged and resourced FCDO team at post is a key enabler. While to date, the FCDO team has been more engaged than well-resourced, this has changed with the introduction of a new SDA at FCDO Somalia<sup>99</sup>.

On the other hand, there are some important constraints on BASIC's ability to bring about outcome level change in Somalia, which include:

- **Lack of local expertise integrated within BASIC delivery.** BASIC has to date not prioritised the use of local expertise to provide support to country offices. This was the case in Somalia, and it affected the relevance of some of the delivery and may have constrained SPACE's ability to have wider reach beyond FCDO and to some degree, other international donor agencies.<sup>100</sup>
- **Challenging and uncertain context.** Political instability and continued threat from Al-Shabab complicates the roll out of national and government led SP system.

### 6.3.6 Conclusions and issues for further consideration

Overall SPACE inputs in Somalia have been well received and proved useful in informing FCDO Somalia strategy and programming. The targeted and responsive elements of SPACE's service were well suited to FCDO Somalia's needs and outputs met user expectations. That said, the short-term modality of SPACE's engagements meant that more in-depth delivery, sustained support, and wider reach beyond FCDO users was out of scope. The request for long-term support through the Cash and Social Protection Adviser offers a good opportunity to address this constraint.

The need to integrate context into BASIC delivery in Somalia is something which should be considered carefully. This support could materialise through the use of Somali experts to support delivery.

FCDO's engagement with SPACE was good, albeit limited by lack of capacity due to a team in transition. Increasing capacity through positions with scope to focus on SP in Somalia is key to making the most of BASIC's technical assistance and FCDO Somalia priorities with Somalia's emerging SP system and the wider policy commitments.

Considering the evidence gaps outlined in section 1 and the nascent quality of the SP system in Somalia, there are opportunities for BASIC Research to contribute to the growth and development of SP in Somalia. Targeted research could allow FCDO to increase its influencing capabilities across the busy donor network in Somalia.

Impending sustained support from the TA workstream can support FCDO develop its role and relations within SP coordination mechanisms. This would also enable BASIC's engagements to reach beyond FCDO, supporting the needs of other immediate users at a local, government and donor level.

Lines of enquiry to explore in future rounds of the case study include:



- Impact of the new long-term Cash and Social Protection Adviser
- How BASIC contributes to coordination and government level engagement around social protection in Somalia.
- Whether BASIC Research ultimately engages in Somalia and evaluating contributions or determining where contributions might have been made.
- Whether BASIC can increase its reach to other stakeholders and national government and consider impact.
- Efforts BASIC has made to contextualise its work in Somalia.



## 6.4 Yemen

### 6.4.1 Context

Prior to the current conflict, Yemen was already one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa region with widespread food insecurity, malnutrition, and poor health, exacerbated by structural underdevelopment and widespread poverty.

Six years of conflict have displaced over 4 million people. Most IDPs have been displaced for two years or longer. It is estimated that 20.7 million people need some form of humanitarian and protection assistance. The humanitarian situation was aggravated in 2020 by escalating conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, disease outbreaks, torrential rains and flooding, a desert locust plague, economic collapse, a fuel crisis across northern governorates and reduced humanitarian aid. The size of Yemen's economy has shrunk by more than half since the conflict began and public services have been decimated. The operating environment is extremely restricted, characterized by extensive access challenges and insecurity.<sup>101</sup>

Efforts to implement the Stockholm Agreement of 2018, which established a ceasefire and introduced other measures intended to pave the way for a wider political solution, are ongoing. However, confrontations involving the Government of Yemen, supported by the Saudi-led coalition, and the Ansar Allah authorities continue and a comprehensive political settlement remains elusive.

#### **The national Social Protection system**

Prior to the war there were several established social assistance mechanisms – although of debateable effectiveness.<sup>102</sup>

- **The Social Welfare Fund (SWF) was the single largest social assistance program in Yemen.** In 2014 cash transfers under the SWF covered 1.5 million beneficiary households, representing 29.1% of the population. The impact of the SWF was limited by the low adequacy of its transfer value, targeting errors (both of inclusion and exclusion), and the weakness of delivery systems for payments, grievance redress and monitoring. The SWF suspended payments to beneficiaries in 2015.
- **The Cash for Work program, one of the largest operated under the Social Fund for Development (SFD)** was launched in 2008 following the global food crisis, as a shock-responsive instrument to supplement the SWF program by addressing temporary (rather than chronic) poverty. Despite its adoption as a safety net program, its coverage remained relatively low (at 2 percent of the national and 3 percent of the rural population in 2014).

Informal transfers were another important source of assistance to households and included remittances (11 percent coverage), zakat (10 percent), and other charitable transfers (8 percent).

**The World Bank has sought to maintain and sustain key national social protection institutions through the period of conflict.** In 2017, the World Bank launched the IDA funded Emergency Crisis response Project (ECRP). Under this it partnered with UNICEF, to launch the Emergency Cash Transfer (ECT) program to resume cash transfer payments to SWF beneficiaries. The ECT retained the SWF beneficiary list and transfer values. However, implementation was managed by UNICEF with private banks responsible for payments rather than through post offices and in practice a limited role for the SWF.<sup>103</sup> In addition, the ECRP partnered with UNDP to sustain the SFD programs.

**The strategy for maintaining state institutions is evolving as the conflict has become protracted.** The initial strategy of maintaining the key national institutions was predicated on the hope that the

conflict would be quickly resolved.<sup>104</sup> As the conflict has become protracted this strategy has been reviewed and adapted. The strategic decision to maintain distributions based on the 2014 beneficiary lists and transfer values has proved harder to justify. Equally the marginalisation of SWF from the direct management has reduced Yemeni participation and ownership. Consequently, a decision has been taken to transition the management of the ECT to the SFD.<sup>105</sup> As the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) is the legally mandated entity for the implementation of the UCT, the long-term goal is to eventually transition the program back to the SWF, once the conditions permit.

### **Humanitarian social transfers**

The Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan has three strategic objectives: (1) Preventing disease outbreaks and reducing morbidity and mortality (2) Preventing famine, malnutrition and restoring livelihoods, and (3) Protecting and assisting civilians. The second objective, which encompasses the provision of social transfers, targets the largest number of beneficiaries and represents the bulk of the humanitarian appeal. This includes emergency food assistance – in the form of food commodities, cash and vouchers, and improving access to livelihood opportunities, increasing household incomes, and rehabilitating food security assets and infrastructure.

**The humanitarian food assistance response is fragmented amongst a large number of partners, with challenges to coherence and coordination.** Assistance is provided by 90 operational partners in 2021 coordinated under the Food and Agriculture Security Cluster – including UN agencies and INGOs. While there has been some progress towards ensuring coordinated actions amongst these actors significant challenges remain in terms of establishing standardised targeting criteria, consistent transfer amounts, coordinated payment mechanisms and common complaints and feedback mechanisms. Coordination and information sharing amongst agencies was noted to be weak, including data exchange. In practice it is noted that the provision of humanitarian food assistance is effectively dominated by the World Food Programme whose operations dwarf the contributions of other humanitarian actors.

**There has been a progressive push towards the increased use and coordination of cash-based programming.** This is grounded in commitments in the 2016 Grand Bargain and the UN Common Cash Statement. The use of cash and voucher programmes began in Yemen before the current crisis, mainly delivered through the Social Welfare Fund, however the collapse of the Post Office system used for transfers raised questions on its continued viability. Humanitarian partners have committed to the increasing use of (multi-purpose) cash assistance as an emergency response tool and made progress with implementation, however, cash still only represents a fraction of the assistance provided. The Cash and Markets Working Group supports partners to plan and deliver cash and voucher programming including MPCA programmes.

**The Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus is an increasingly prominent part of the international response.** There is a huge humanitarian caseload and a growing recognition that beneficiaries need to transition to longer-term development support. There is a reinvigorated interest in working on development issues now rather than waiting for the war to end. This was articulated by several key humanitarian actors in terms of working on “more sustainable livelihoods” rather than engaging in support to improving social protection systems, which kept the response within their direct responsibility for implementation. The potential of using cash as an entry point to enhance social protection linkages is widely acknowledged. In practical terms significant challenges to operationalising the nexus were noted, with a growing consensus on the need to build referral mechanisms to transition beneficiaries of emergency assistance to longer-term livelihoods assistance. An illustrative stakeholder comment was that *“We would like to make connections between the same list of beneficiaries in the*

database of SWF, from one hand to our existing programs working in other sectors, such as livelihoods or nutrition projects.”

## 6.4.2 Origins and scope of BASIC support

**The first round of BASIC TA support to FCDO (DFID) in Yemen was a study on ‘Linking humanitarian cash and social protection’ conducted in 2019.** The purpose of this analysis was to contribute to and support improved outcomes of humanitarian cash and social assistance in Yemen. This was a broadly framed initial study that included: a mapping of existing social protection and humanitarian cash programmes in Yemen, a review of the capacity, complementarity and limitations of existing mechanisms to advise on strengthening a future transition to government ownership and increase the capacity to achieve humanitarian and resilience objectives, and political economy analysis to identify drivers of change.

**Following from one of the key recommendations of the initial study a second round of BASIC support was commissioned in early 2020 to provide a Social Protection and Humanitarian Cash Linkages Donor Coordinator based half time in Amman.** However, in the light of the Covid-19 pandemic it became impractical to proceed with this placement – with both travel curtailed and it being superseded by the immediate priority of Covid-19 response.

**The resources allocated for a donor coordinator were flexibly repurposed. The original position was redesigned into four discrete pieces of work.** The first analysed Covid-19 impacts on vulnerable populations and advised on appropriate responses. Following this there was a shift to supporting the development of an FCDO business case and strategy to build food security in Yemen. This included an analysis of the effectiveness of “cash plus” and livelihood approaches, an analysis of the barriers and incentives to drawing together humanitarian and social protection systems in Yemen and an assessment of the feasibility of the ambition of building a social protection system. Finally, there was a shift back towards the original design intent with an analysis of coordination mechanisms and the establishment of a donor cash and social protection working group.

**SPACE resources were used to continue supporting the development and rollout of the FCDO strategy in Yemen.** An initial short SPACE assignment was used to conduct an early market engagement with NGOs in Yemen to understand lessons learnt on the effectiveness of cash programming and coordination and gauge NGOs/UN agencies appetite in harmonising cash programmes as a step towards a social protection system. A second SPACE assignment was provided to support SFD’s approach to targeting and evidence-based programming.

The main support provided to FCDO Yemen by BASIC TA and SPACE, as outlined in Table 6.7 below.

**Table 6.7: Overview of BASIC TA and SPACE support to FCDO Yemen**

#	Date(s)	BASIC TA or SPACE?	Summary	Deliverables
1	2019	BASIC TA	Framework Development for Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Yemen  Initial scoping and mapping exercise followed by conversations with partners on the way forward	Internal reports produced for Inception Phase and two Phases of implementation.  Only last report available for review by the evaluation team.
2	2020	BASIC TA	Yemen Social Protection and Humanitarian Cash Linkages Donor Coordinator	N/A

#	Date(s)	BASIC TA or SPACE?	Summary	Deliverables
			Original ToR were reworked in light of Covid-19 pandemic	
2A	March - April 2020		Needs assessment and options paper for potential cash and/or social protection response to COVID-19 pandemic	Report covering situational analysis and needs assessment, vulnerability analysis, a risk analysis and scenario planning and programming options.
2B	May – June 2020		Evidence review, gap analysis and value-for-money & risk assessment of cash-plus and complementary livelihoods programming in Yemen	Report providing a definition of cash plus programming, an evidence and VfM review and a gap analysis.
2C	July – August 2020		Action plan of technical priorities, informed by political economy analysis, to support cash harmonisation	Report on (a) the political economy analysis of the barriers and incentives of key stakeholders (UN agencies, SFD, NGOs, de facto authorities, GOY) to engage with cash harmonisation and coordination and (b) an assessment of the feasibility and desirability of priorities and social protection system building ambition.
2D	September – December 2020		Cash Reform Strategy	Report presenting a vision, stakeholder analysis, mapping of harmonisation efforts on-going, a workplan and a rolling engagement strategy.  External paper on Donor Cash and Social Protection Working Group Workplan.
3	2020	SPACE	Roundtable Meeting on NGO Cash Programming in Yemen	Mindmap summarising the workshop outcomes.
4	2020/21	SPACE	Mapping and review of prioritisation: Social Fund for Development, Yemen	Analysis of current SFD approaches to programme and project prioritization and followed by conclusions and recommendations.

It was also noted that a global level “Review and Analysis of Identification and Registration systems in protracted and recurrent crises (MIS in Crises)” was commissioned by BASIC in 2019 that included a substantive case study of Yemen. The case study of Yemen (together with South Sudan) was presented as part of internal report, but not the external report.

**The design of the Research workstream was on-going at the time of the case study.** Stakeholder consultations had been conducted with a range of individuals and organisations and a background position paper had been prepared by IDS on social protection and cash programmes in Yemen. Based on this an initial concept note on research themes had been prepared and shared with FCDO for comment.

### 6.4.3 BASIC Delivery

#### What worked

BASIC support and deliverables have generally been well received by FCDO. The following key themes emerged from key informant interviews:

**The clear definition of deliverables by FCDO Yemen was important in ensuring the utility of products.** The case study emphasised that the opportunities were highly context specific. The high level of engagement of FCDO Yemen posts in defining the BASIC and SPACE deliverables was critical to the effective use of BASIC resources. There was a learning from the initial TA assignment – by both

FCDO and consultants – on the importance of a clearer articulation of the scope of the assignments and a more collaborative relationship. The second TA assignment was broken down into numerous smaller sub-assignments with a clear purpose and audience. Having FCDO Yemen in control of the process also facilitated internal coherence across BASIC providers. There are clear signs that the BASIC TA & Research inputs are being synergised at the level of the FCDO Business Case.

**BASIC displayed a high degree of flexibility and adaptability to evolving needs and a changing context.** Strong flexibility and adaptability were demonstrated at multiple levels. The initial BASIC assignment included a contract break and was one of the first contracts to do this. This allowed adjustment for subsequent phases. The second assignment was adapted rapidly and appropriately to the impacts of Covid-19. DAI was also noted to be accommodating to the consequences of the FCDO re-prioritisation exercise. In practice BASIC TA and SPACE resources were used interchangeably – as TA resources were used to respond rapidly to Covid-19 related needs and SPACE resources used to maintain momentum on the business case development.

**High quality and experienced consultants were provided in a timely way.** There is a strong appreciation of the high quality and experience of consultants provided. These were seen to do more than simply compensate for inadequate advisor time and complemented FCDO posts by adding value in technical areas and by bringing in cross country learning. TAs were also seen by some – but not all stakeholders – as able to project a distinct identity from FCDO posts – for example this was important in coordination role.

**Contextual knowledge and understanding of the consultants was mixed and the value of local consultants was highlighted.** However, the use of same consultants for repeated assignments helped to overcome this constraint and was important in driving efficiency. A sufficient length of consultancy was important in building understanding and relationships.

**The initial round of recruitments was noted to be somewhat cumbersome, taking three months.** However, this was reduced to a month in subsequent rounds as recruitment procedures were streamlined. A smooth recruitment was reported from the consultant's point of view, even during the Covid-19 crisis. A proportionate allocation of time to deliver outputs under BASIC TA, although SPACE was noted to be higher pressure and quite erratic – with intensive short-term work.

**TA consultants operated effectively to promote coherence and coordination.** Strong partnerships in implementation were noted, for example, the partnership of the TA with the CaLP consultant on a concurrent study.<sup>106</sup> The use of BASIC TA consultants to help develop BASIC research plan also promoted coherence and synergies between these workstreams.

## **Challenges and limitations**

Several challenges were also noted in the delivery of BASIC services. These included:

**Constrained access by the consultants to key stakeholders.** Significant access constraints were in place to Yemen related to both the conflict and Covid-19 which compromised direct access to stakeholders. International consultants felt that the inability to develop direct relationships and to make full use of national consultants compromised the ability to appreciate the situation on the ground. There was a particular constraint in terms of working with national authorities and engaging them and other national partners in the process, which was compounded by the limited political engagement by FCDO with the authorities in the north. In theory, national consultants could meet with Government but also faced travel restrictions and limited time. It was argued that in 2019 access for international consultants would have been possible, capitalising on UN agency access, but was not considered for budgetary reasons.

Stakeholder access was also compromised by the dispersed location of international actors – the FCDO Yemen team alone was spread across three locations making it hard to engage with the office as a whole. Staff turnover was a further complication and challenge. This has been particularly problematic when several key actors have departed simultaneously.

**There was a significant degree of overlap and replication of studies of the social protection and humanitarian nexus in Yemen.** There was a significant overlap of a number of similar studies of cash reform and the nexus conducted over a similar period by BASIC with CaLP, the World Bank, the EU and UNDP. Each study had a somewhat distinct purpose and was important in building institutional ownership and there was some collaboration amongst the authors. However, there was a sense that the core analysis could have been done more efficiently, with a consensus established on the context.

This overlap was compounded by the fact that the BASIC reports were predominantly developed purely for an internal FCDO audience. There was extremely limited leveraging of outputs as a public good. Reporting was often strictly to FCDO, and the findings were not disseminated widely beyond a small number of wrap-up workshops. While the sensitive political context in Yemen did not encourage open sharing of information, it was argued that more could have been done to publicly share revised versions.

**There was limited evidence of BASIC exploiting global-country synergies.** Cross country learning drawing on BASIC experience appeared largely dependent on individual consultants. There was not a clear mechanism apparent to either share relevant global experiences down to the country, or draw from the country experience to inform global workstreams. There appeared to be limited capacity or empowerment of the TA provider to add value across country assignments. The BASIC MIS study was commissioned globally with global interviews with two detailed country case studies including Yemen. The findings of the study had potentially significant implications. However, it took 6 months for FCDO to agree to an edited version to be published and this did not include the country case studies. There appeared to have been little use or follow-up of this study within Yemen by FCDO or others.

#### **6.4.4 BASIC's contribution to change**

Figure 1 shows the BASIC theory of change (ToC). The elements of the ToC which are most relevant to BASIC's support to FCDO Yemen are explored in this section.


##### **Direct results of BASIC assignments**

**The main direct result of BASIC TA has been in supporting the development of FCDO business case and other internal decision-making processes.** Stakeholders were clear that the primary direct use of BASIC and SPACE outputs was by FCDO Yemen itself. The various outputs had been heavily drawn on by posts to support all stages of the business case development including the pre-concept note decision making and support to development of concept note and related business case, through both input to the technical content and evidence for submission to Ministers. BASIC provided posts with an important challenge function prior to turning outward to engage with other stakeholders.

**Critically, this confirmed that while the overall vision remained a shock responsive national social protection system, an incremental strategy was required for achieving this.** The immediate strategy focussed on reforming the humanitarian system, while at the same time social protection systems are kept on the agenda and to be brought into the conversation progressively. At this point it was not judged realistic to move directly to embedding crisis response in Government systems. The BASIC analysis helped to illustrate how poorly coordinated and incoherent the current humanitarian response is. It also pointed to important evidence gaps on the effectiveness of livelihood interventions to complement cash transfers.



Figure 6.5: Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Yemen



Source: BASIC programme documents



**In addition, BASIC products guided the spending of C-19 crisis reserve.** This provided help in thinking through impacts of COVID and mapping of response architecture and supported decisions on additional funding to SWF, WFP and NGOs.

**Going beyond the business case, BASIC was also credited with helping FCDO to develop an influencing strategy and push forward on improved coordination.** The BASIC analysis highlighted how to progress with the agenda of reforming humanitarian cash assistance there needed to be a coalition to make this work. Within this area BASIC played an important role in the establishment of donor social protection and cash working group. A framework and workplan for the group was established where different donors took responsibility for leading on different areas of cash reform. This WG was positively received by members as a useful addition to established coordination forums. It was seen to effectively bring together key humanitarian and development donors – including the World Bank – and provide a forum for interesting discussions. However, specific progress against the workplan objectives was difficult to track and stakeholders cautioned that progress is necessarily slow and incremental. The lack of a dedicated coordinator risks a loss of momentum and donors pursuing diverse priorities.

**In parallel, FCDO has had a strategy of building up the Cash and Markets Working Group (CMWG) in parallel to donor WG.** An early BASIC recommendation was for FCDO to fund a CashCap advisor to the CMWG. They have reportedly been effective in motivating this group and donors have encouraged a stronger involvement of development actors including UNICEF, UNDP, UNOPS and NGOs. The CMWG and Donor WG workplans were harmonised with BASIC support.

**Technical support was provided by BASIC to inform the targeting approaches used by SFD but the impact of this remains uncertain.** A SPACE assignment mapped SFD's approach to targeting and evidence-based programming at the portfolio and program levels and draw some key conclusions on potential improvements which can be taken forward through the development of the new Crisis Response Plan (CRP) 2021-2023. This accompanied the shift in responsibilities for distributing cash assistance from UNICEF/SWF to SFD. However, the preliminary feedback suggested that this assignment in itself had limited results. It was primarily viewed as an opportunity for FCDO to learn about SFD processes. Work on transforming their systems was understood to already be in-process and led internally.

**While yet to established, there was significant interest in added value that BASIC research could offer.** There was significant interest in the potential added value of the BASIC research workstream. This was rooted in various considerations of how research differs from – and adds value to – the contribution of TA. Firstly, and critically, there are large knowledge gaps evident in Yemen. With limited field access there is little information and there is clearly an appetite for BASIC to fill a primary data gap. Secondly, there was an appreciation of the benefits of longer-term engagement by the research team. The prospect of a three-year consistent presence was valued in contrast to intermittent and short-term TA assignments.

**The sequencing of starting the research after the TA may have (unintended) benefits.** Some stakeholders argued that the groundwork done by TA could help to set the research agenda. However, there was no immediate consensus on what the priorities for research should be. Numerous gaps were identified ranging from livelihood and resilience building opportunities to climate change, political economy analysis to how to empower communities.

#### **6.4.5 Contribution to other results**

**While BASIC evidence contributed to influencing donors there was less evidence that it contributed to building political will in national authorities.** There was little immediate evidence of

BASIC in contributing to advocacy efforts amongst stakeholders as it had very limited direct visibility. Few outputs were shared with the wider community and stakeholders commented that if advocacy was a goal, then it could have projected its own outputs better. However, FCDO has been an important player in consistently pushing messages on using cash, the nexus linkages and the use of national institutions to UN agencies. These messages were in turn underpinned by the work of BASIC.

**However, there was little evidence of even any indirect pathways to influencing national institutions. There is no established donor presence in Yemen apart from ECHO.** Some stakeholders referenced a desire to normalise relationships with the authorities in both the north and the south, as there is current minimal direct engagement by donors who rely on UN agencies as interlocutors. Even the objective of engagement of quasi-governmental institutions of SWF and SFD is unclear – whether this was in fact about building a national system or building something in parallel. Some stakeholders perceived that the position of FCDO in supporting national institutions was compromised as it was not seen as a humanitarian agency but as interested political actor with regional allegiances. Nor was it clear that the starting point should be “influencing” national institutions as opposed to supporting them in their own strategic priorities. The agenda remains driven by international actors – and the relevance to priorities of national authorities uncertain.

**The added value of BASIC in individual and institutional capacity building appears to reside at the strategic rather than technical level.** While part of the BASIC ToC, in practice the comparative advantage and role of BASIC in capacity building efforts remains uncertain. It was clear that technical knowledge and skills – for example in relation to the use of cash – are available from a variety of other sources including UN agencies, CaLP and the Cash CAP. The depth and breadth of experience in these agencies was generally perceived to exceed what was available through BASIC. The initial experience of supporting SFD in targeting and prioritisation points to the need for a sustained partnership in building capacity and the limitations of using short-term technical assistance.

**Stakeholders pointed to quite distinct and complementary roles for BASIC and other agency provided assistance** – with the former providing more strategic role and the latter more technical assistance. This is aligned with the observation that BASIC benefits from not being tied to any implementing agency agendas.

**Basic demonstrated limited progress towards integrating cross-cutting issues including GESI, climate change and conflict sensitivity.** The inclusion of GESI perspectives within the BASIC reports is still developing. It was acknowledged that the first rounds of BASIC assignments did not include a strong GESI perspective and had a relatively light GESI analysis. For example, there was no reference to a gender situational analysis in relation to the provision of social assistance. Interestingly, stakeholders were unclear how a GESI perspective could have benefitted these initial studies given the strong institutional focus. With the introduction of SPACE, GESI expertise was assigned to each specific assignment and reports tended to include a dedicated gender section. However, it was unclear the extent to which these contributions helped to shape a strategic approach to GESI in the business case. It was however reported that the last SPACE report had triggered a request from SFD to FCDO for further gender support.

**Progress on integrating other cross-cutting issues was even less developed.** Climate change was acknowledged as an important but under-developed issue in Yemen so the potential consideration of linkages to social protection was welcomed in principle. However, in practice only a few and somewhat tangential entry points had been identified such as consideration of water management in livelihood options. Despite being firmly rooted in a conflict driven crisis, there was little evidence of the links between social protection and social cohesion or conflict mitigation being considered.

#### 6.4.6 Enablers and constraints

**The role of FCDO posts and programmes in driving forward change is central.** FCDO posts are clearly critical in linking BASIC outputs to making change happen. As one stakeholder said *“Change ultimately depends on willingness and capacities of FCDO team on the ground. Consultants generate a wealth of knowledge which is fine. But what is often lacking is the willingness to put in the hours at the level of the country teams.”* Longer-term BASIC assignments are helpful but not a substitute for the active engagement of FCDO posts.

**As a complement to this the importance of a shared vision across the FCDO country team, including senior management support, was critical.** This is seen as important for both sustained commitment to support for this agenda within FCDO and for capitalising on political channels for advocacy. Unfortunately the case study was not able to interview senior FCDO staff in-country to determine how effective BASIC had been in influencing throughout the Yemen team.

**Important synergies between FCDO advocacy and programming were also identified.** An important influencing channel lies in tying funding to a strategic vision – such as influencing key UN actors. Relying on influencing through good ideas alone was seen to be far less effective given the array of countervailing agency agendas.

**Coordinated action by donors and implementing agencies is critical to making change happen – but challenging to achieve.** Implementing agencies were found to be focussed on their own programmes and priorities rather than sector wider challenges and opportunities. Competition within the sector was also noted as an inhibitor to collaboration. Consequently, change was acknowledged to depend on a push from donors and the key is to build donor coordination and coherence around a common agenda.

**However, building donor coherence has not been straightforward.** The bifurcation of humanitarian and development donors is challenging – with the mandates of specific agencies pushing against coordination across the nexus. As one humanitarian donor said *“We want to improve national systems but not reasonable to expect humanitarians to assume this responsibility given other immediate demands in Yemen.”* Many donors have strict limits imposed on their ability to partner with the various authorities in Yemen which further constrains a nexus approach. Nor do all donors engage in these discussions. Limited technical capacity amongst many donors was noted – with only a small subset actively driving this agenda. Within this group a lot depends on personalities and progress is vulnerable to the rotation of key staff. There is a lack of engagement of important Gulf States donors in humanitarian and development coordination structures.

**While funding is more diversified – and includes development financing from the World Bank – overall availability of financing is diminishing.** The operating context overall is one of diminishing resources against continuing needs. This places significant stress on the response and an emphasis on cost savings. There is an evident tension between impacts of more “effective assistance” and “lower cost”. Nor is there the fiscal space to experiment with innovative and inclusive approaches.

#### 6.4.7 Closing reflections

Issues to follow-up in future rounds of the case study:

- What is the future role for BASIC given the emergence of the Business Case?
- What role will research play in complementing TA assistance?
- How can engagement with national authorities be strengthened?

## 6.5 SPACE

### 6.5.1 Background

#### Scope of the learning case study

**Learning case studies carried out by the evaluation are one-off studies which seek to explore whether and how engagements by individual BASIC workstreams deliver change.** This learning case study focuses on the Social Protection Approaches to Covid-19 (SPACE) service, which accounted for over half of BASIC spending between April 2020 and August 2021.

#### The SPACE service

**SPACE is a joint facility initiated by the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)** in April 2020 in response to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, with funding from both UKAid and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. From December 2020, SPACE was also supported by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). FCDO funding to SPACE came to an end on 31 August 2021. Just over £1 million to SPACE; activities were co-financed by donors.

**Services and products provided by the SPACE programme include direct support, publications and learning sessions.** The service evolved considerably over time. The first phase of SPACE (April – September 2020) focused on immediate support to country level decisionmakers with thinking through how to establish, maintain or adapt systems and programmes to meet rapidly growing needs. The second phase (October 2020 – August 2021, including a costed extension) provided for more sustained country engagements where needed and introduced a focus on global level learning for audiences working on policy and operations.

### 6.5.2 SPACE in the BASIC Theory of Change

Figure 1 overleaf indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which are most relevant to support provided by SPACE. Statements in boxes shaded in blue are directly relevant. Core activities undertaken by SPACE – *and relevant ToC causal pathways* – are:

- **Direct country engagement** when users engage directly with SPACE experts to obtain advice and assistance based on specific needs or issues. Support may be in the form of remote consultations through calls; document review (e.g. of proposals or reports); consolidated evidence around specific needs or knowledge gaps; or mapping in-country stakeholders and programmes engaged in the Covid-19 response. From the start of phase 2, direct support could be provided as short-term assistance (up to 5 days) or slightly longer technical support (up to 20 days).

*For technical assistance (TA) activities the directly relevant ToC step is: provision of high quality advice (1, in figure 1 below) → new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented (4). Also relevant to some country engagements is the ToC step: new or strengthened relationships and strategic partnerships → greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives.*


- **SPACE publications**, in the form of framing documents, thematic overviews, policy papers and documents to support implementation, are intended to assist users who are engaged in direct support, as well as a wider community of social protection (SP) and humanitarian cash implementers, in designing and delivering Covid-19 response programmes.

- SPACE experts also organise and participate in **learning events** including webinars and trainings, in order to share and discuss learning from social protection approaches to Covid-19 recovery and improve preparedness for future emergencies.

For both knowledge management and learning (KML) activities the directly relevant ToC step is: greater awareness, knowledge and learning generated across countries and agencies on social protection approaches in crises (2) → evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practices (5).

Whilst ToC outputs include targeted capacity building support, this has not formed a major part of SPACE delivery, except through learning events for FCDO and GIZ staff.

Figure 6.6: Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to SPACE



Source: BASIC programme documents



### 6.5.3 SPACE coverage and users

**SPACE has supported 44 countries across sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific.** More than half of country level engagements have been with African countries, with relatively fewer in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, reflecting the existing structure of DFID and GIZ funding. The geographical coverage of the service was expanded to include the Pacific region with the onboarding of DFAT funding in December 2020. SPACE programme management has also actively sought to ensure representation across different types of contexts vis-à-vis humanitarian and national SP infrastructure (as set out in figure 1) by actively generating demand (several of the FCDO users interviewed indicated that they had received a direct offer of support from SPACE).

**TA users are mostly FCDO and GiZ country offices, with some limited use of SPACE TA by multilateral agencies and country governments.** Around half of country engagements have originated with requests from FCDO country offices, a third from those of GIZ or DFAT and a small number from agencies, most notably, UNICEF or WFP. FCDO requests were often related to addressing evidence needs to build and argue a case for policies and programming – most often but not limited to business case development. Requests were driven by a need not only for expert advice, but also to address the bandwidth limitations of in-country advisers, particularly during the initial pivot to Covid-19 response. FCDO staff interviewed during the course of this case study also indicated that they valued SPACE as a quasi-in-house source of rapid technical support, given the costly and time-consuming alternative of procuring and contracting expertise directly.

**The SPACE TA model was not well suited to supporting country governments, except indirectly.**

A handful of engagements involved direct support to country governments, usually facilitated by country offices or, in some instances, UNICEF. Being able to secure these kinds of requests has been a benefit of GIZ's involvement, with GIZ tending to work more directly with and through country governments than FCDO (see also section 5.1 below). Nevertheless, direct engagement with governments has been necessarily limited by the short timeframes for and remote nature of support offered by SPACE. Key informants (KIs) also observed that country offices were better placed than government counterparts to develop clear and well-defined requests for support.

**KML publications targeted humanitarian and SP practitioners:** FCDO and GIZ advisers and programme staff in country offices and central policy teams, national governments, other donors and UN agencies at both country and headquarters level, regional and thematic bodies, and the wider humanitarian and social protection communities of practice. In practice, evidence collected during baseline suggests that SPACE has built a strong brand at global level, with the most enthusiastic users policy or research organisations, but that awareness of SPACE publications in-country is relatively low (with some notable exceptions).

### 6.5.4 Composition and supply of expertise

#### Strengths

**SPACE was characterised by the provision of high quality, diverse and impartial advice.** Both users and SPACE experts themselves emphasised the high calibre of experts on the SPACE roster, with several pointing to the stellar reputations, and high level of influence with donors and agencies, of senior members of the SPACE team. They also observed that support was *practical* – targeted at the 'how' of responding to Covid-19 through SP approaches.

**SPACE routinely deployed multidisciplinary teams,** comprised of members with complementary skillsets. KIs emphasised that this was unusual for a call-down facility and improved the overall quality



of advice provided by integrating different perspectives and providing an internal source of challenge. The diversity of expertise on offer was facilitated, during the first phase, by parallel 'SPACE' and 'SPACE-H' contracts, which ensured access to both SP and humanitarian expertise (with these rosters subsequently integrated under SPACE 2).

**The multi-donor funding structure ensured that SPACE did not – and, crucially, was not perceived to – drive any single donor agenda too concertedly.** That users tended to view SPACE as an impartial source of advice enabled experts to build open and effective working relationships with in-country users and, in some instances, to facilitate policy dialogue between stakeholders. At the same time, where experts had previous experience of working in or with FCDO or GIZ, in addition to substantive expertise, this was perceived by users to be an added benefit which enabled support to feed directly into internal programme design and approval processes.

**SPACE experts were well-placed to facilitate cross-country learning.** SPACE experts found that having a view across different contexts, and from global policy to local implementation, was particularly beneficial during the initial response to the onset of Covid-19 (i.e. the first few months of the service) when they were primarily advising on options for horizontal and/or vertical expansion. Several users also pointed to the opportunity to learn from other country contexts as a benefit of SPACE support. Examples cited included: linking FCDO programmes across countries including Palestine and Zimbabwe to explore alternative delivery models for cash programming; providing examples to inform the evaluation of an emergency cash transfer (CT) seeking to support girl's education in South Sudan; and, in Jordan, synthesising evidence on the value for money of integrating refugee caseloads into national SP systems. Cross-country learning was facilitated by three waves of a cross-country synthesis document.

*"SPACE operated as a multi-donor, globally-facing TA facility, with a really impressive range of experts, on demand and with an open client list – that hasn't really been done before. [SPACE teams] worked from the minutiae all the way up to global issues."*

*KII interviewee*

**SPACE adapted successfully as user needs evolved.** At the beginning of phase 1 short-term support of up to 5 days was sufficient for exploring delivery options for adapting existing social safety nets (SSNs), risks and mitigations, and enabled SPACE to respond to a large volume of country requests within a short period of time. After the first three months, the preponderance of requests and support shifted towards exploring specific operational issues such as registration, caseload expansion and Covid-safe payment mechanisms (i.e., from the 'what' to the 'how'). And, in phase 2, SPACE introduced medium-term assignments of up to 20 days to be able respond to country demand for more in-depth support, increasingly relating to developing strategies and laying the groundwork for Covid-19 recovery. KIs indicated that there were a few instances in which the maximum level of effort on offer was insufficient to respond to countries' needs; however, these larger requests appear increasingly to have been referred to BASIC TA during the last few months of the SPACE contract, which seems appropriate. Throughout, users reported that remote support was sufficient to meet their needs.

**KIs consistently pointed to SPACE's integration of gender and inclusion expertise as a key strength of its delivery model.** SPACE adopted a two-pronged approach, mainstreaming GESI, as well as undertaking targeted support (see table 1 below). These efforts related to both country and global level work and were enabled by funding from FCDO SPT's Gender-Responsive Social Protection (GSP) programme for a strong six person sub-team of GESI experts, led by a SPACE Deputy Team Leader specialised in gender, social protection and livelihoods (and in the context of a relatively weak market for consultants with expertise in both social protection and gender or social inclusion expertise).

**Table 6.8: GESI in SPACE delivery**

Area	Mainstreaming	Targeted activities
<b>TA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All call down teams included a GESI expert, from the initial scoping call onwards.</li> <li>There was some variation in the level of input of GESI experts in assignments and, in turn, the value they were able to add – though experts and users report the quality of advice to be very good overall.</li> <li>SPACE overcame some minor management challenges relating to the GESI sub-team, who were deployed by DAI, but contracted by OPM.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12 call downs across 11 countries had a GESI focus. This number suggests that specific demand for and interest in support on gender-responsive and inclusive social protection is quite low.</li> <li>However, other key themes across SPACE assignments relate strongly to inclusion – e.g. expansion of safety nets to cover informal workers in response to Covid, and localisation (i.e. improved participation of local actors in SP design and implementation).</li> </ul>
<b>Tools, products and events</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>GESI matrices were developed to complement core strategy and decision matrices, which themselves integrated relevant issues across SP design and delivery considerations (e.g. targeting, transfer amounts, accountability mechanisms, and GBV prevention and response) and were deployed systematically, particularly in early assignments.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A significant proportion of publications and blogs focused on GESI issues, including disability in targeting and identification, inclusive MIS, and practical tips for linking GBV and SP.</li> <li>Two GESI-focused internal FCDO events covering, respectively, Covid-19 and inclusive economic recovery.</li> <li>GESI clinics at socialprotection.org conference.</li> </ul>

## Limitations

**An important, and growing, challenge has been securing the availability of SPACE experts** who had not been asked to commit regular days to SPACE. Experts pointed to challenges they had encountered in managing the flow of SPACE assignments, and their time, in a context where requests were unpredictable but required very quick turnarounds. They also felt that the level of effort allocated was sometimes insufficient, and that the quality assurance process – whilst important – was disproportionate. Experts assessed that these factors had negatively affected the quality of outputs, required them to work significantly beyond their allotted days and/or incentivised them to deprioritise taking on SPACE assignments. Constraints on consultant availability have become more pronounced over time. This is perhaps the inevitable consequence of the SPACE service having recruited most of the foremost experts from a relatively small pool of international consultants: it is simply not feasible to maintain such a roster indefinitely, with consultants needing to service other clients or, in the case of academics, return to research they had put on hold, and therefore unable to continue to engage with SPACE at the same level. It is worth noting, however, that these challenges did not apply to the core team, all of whom had dedicated regular days to SPACE (see section 5 below).

**SPACE made only limited use of local experts.** The SPACE roster contained relatively little regional expertise on south-east Asia and the Pacific, which presented a challenge to providing a timely and effective service following the geographical expansion of the service with the addition of DFAT funding. More broadly, with most SPACE consultants northern European or northern American, the service has made very limited use of regional and national experts. Where local consultants have been involved in country assignments through other means (contracted directly by country offices, for instances) SPACE consultants emphasised the value added by their in-depth understanding of context and political economy as well as the opportunity for sustained engagement beyond the conclusion of assignments.

### 6.5.5 Institutional arrangements

## Strengths

**The initial institutional arrangements for SPACE were put in place extremely quickly – within approximately three weeks** – in response to a surge in demand for support from country offices following the onset of the pandemic.

**The multi-donor funding arrangement added considerable value**, improving the accessibility, quality and efficiency of support provided:

- GIZ had originally been considering a smaller scale advisory service, but were able to increase their ambitions by working with FCDO, who had a sizeable existing delivery structure in place under BASIC. An auxiliary benefit of the resulting level of SPACE output was increased visibility for the donors involved, particularly GIZ, in the SP sector.
- The multi-donor approach also expanded the range of users: as noted above, whereas FCDO SPT's natural constituency was FCDO country offices, GIZ works more directly through country governments. DFAT coming on board expanded the geographical scope of the service (though note the limitations referenced in section 4.2 above).
- SPACE provided joint access to a limited pool of top experts (with each donor funding specific experts, whose time was then pooled). At the time of SPACE's inception, the Team Leader was under contract with GIZ. Reallocating some of her contracted days to SPACE enabled two donors to benefit from her expertise at the onset of the crisis.
- As noted in section 4.1 above, the joint facility strengthened the impartiality of advice provided.
- Joint outputs between donors strengthened their collaboration beyond SPACE – on policy issues being discussed in the sector, for instance.

**An adaptive management approach – within the broad parameters of BASIC TAS – supported flexible and efficient delivery.** Key aspects of this approach were:

- Quick identification of emerging needs by the SPACE team. By comparison, the BASIC TAS process would have required the joint development of ToRs by DAI and FCDO with a greater emphasis on specified objectives than needs.
- Flexible contracting arrangements (ToRs only) with countries which did not narrowly pre-define the parameters of assignments.
- Flexible key performance indicators (KPIs) whereby DAI was required to meet only half of specified targets, allowing for shifts in focus as needed.
- Regular process learning sessions (weekly for first three months, then bi-monthly and later monthly) to test and adapt delivery processes. Examples cited related to governance arrangements for donor engagement, as well as technical delivery (e.g how publications were scoped, resourced and quality assured).

**SPACE differed from most call down services in that it had a core team, which allowed it to become more than the sum of its parts.** The in-depth engagement of members of this core team across SPACE activities and over a longer period of time, helped build effective working relationships between experts, facilitated use of a set of core guidance documents to inform advice, and encouraged learning across assignments. The team included thematic and country leads, responsible for developing approaches and relationships.

*“SPACE isn’t a traditional call down, but a cohesive team of people working together over time, using similar framing and tools, and engaging repeatedly in countries...Trust between team members has made a difference.”*

**Programme funded posts (PfPs) were essential to identifying needs and maintaining strategic focus.** PfP postholders who intersected with SPT and the relevant FCDO cadres, enabled the team to develop the SPACE ToR quickly, engage with countries and develop a pipeline of support needs informed by wider planning processes. The SPACE team perceived the SPT-funded post embedded within the delivery team to be particularly important for maintaining alignment with FCDO priorities in

the absence of a written social protection policy (examples cited included increasing a focus on climate in work in the Sahel).

**A weekly coordination and management board enabled effective decision making**, with donors describing it as a useful forum for feeding into strategy – including, for example, selection of topics for publications – and the SPACE delivery team as a means to ensure continuous alignment with donor priorities.

## Limitations

**The intersect between SPACE and BASIC TAS was somewhat unclear in practice.** This can be ascribed in part to the evolution and protraction of the Covid-19 crisis; what began as a service providing discrete advice on rapidly adapting existing SSNs, broadened its scope over time as Covid-19 responses and recovery became intertwined with longer-term planning. In practice, some later assignments have not been directly related to Covid-19, as in Sudan, where SPACE supported the government's Family Support Programme cash transfer.<sup>18</sup> It is also challenging, again in the later stages of SPACE, to discern a qualitative difference between support provided by the two services, especially in countries where the same experts have worked under both SPACE and BASIC TAS contracts (e.g. Yemen). This supports the decision to conclude funding to SPACE and shift focus to the new Technical Assistance Facility. Nevertheless, there is evidence of countries drawing strategically and effectively on both SPACE and BASIC TA. In Jordan, for example, BASIC TA support to the design of a five year programme was put on hold, and shorter-term support sought from SPACE, as FCDO pivoted to support the government with its Covid-19 response – and picked back up in autumn 2020.

**Key informants pointed to some, manageable commercial challenges.** These included, for DAI, differences in the contracting requirements of FCDO and GIZ. And, for some countries, unmet needs for support when requests were made at times when the overall SPACE contract was due to come to an end (and an extension had not yet been put in place).

## 6.5.6 Results

### Output level

**Key informants involved in delivery saw SPACE's ability to respond quickly to all requests – early on, within 36 hours, despite a surge in demand – as a key achievement.** Users reiterated that SPACE was responsive, easy to use and able to provide the right resources at the right time (emphasising that this cannot always be taken for granted with TA facilities).

**User feedback suggests that SPACE support generally met or exceeded expectations.** Between the start of SPACE and the end of June 2021, the average client satisfaction score for SPACE assignments based on feedback forms was 4.19 (against a target of 3 and compared to an overall score for BASIC TA of 3.9).<sup>107</sup> SPACE personnel also point to repeat requests from several SPACE users as an indication that support is meeting user's needs and expectations.<sup>108</sup> Some key informants who were FCDO users (e.g. Pakistan) indicated that they had re-engaged SPACE for precisely that reason, whilst a government user in Sudan reported trying to maximise use of a particular expert before the service came to an end in August.

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<sup>18</sup> The Sudan Family Support Programme is a temporary cash transfer established to cushion the population against impacts of economic reforms undertaken as part of post-revolution debt relief.

## Outcome level

**Uptake of SPACE outputs is more challenging to gauge**, despite considerable efforts on the part of the delivery team to monitor their use. Examples of uptake set out in quarterly reporting relate mainly to BASIC TAS assignments, possibly due to the shorter timeframes for SPACE assignments.<sup>109</sup> How exactly the type of support provided during the earliest stages – mapping actors / programming and exploring (and discarding) options for the initial Covid-19 response to inform decision making – translated (or not) into improved social protection responses is particularly challenging to capture.

**The most tangible examples of SPACE support being implemented were where TA outputs fed directly into programme design.** Most often, examples cited related to business cases for new or expanded programmes, which were subsequently implemented – as in Jordan and Pakistan. In Sudan, a government user reported having directly implemented improvements recommended by SPACE to the structure and content planned monitoring surveys for the government's Family Support Programme (*'New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented'*).

**There is also evidence of SPACE TA outputs being used to further FCDO's influencing objectives.** Users (again, examples include both Jordan and Pakistan) reported having used SPACE outputs to make a case for policies or programmes internally (e.g., in submissions), as well as to inform negotiations with government and other partners. In DRC, SPACE supported FCDO to influence the government to implement a two-phased approach to determining eligibility for its new cash transfer (which meant that initial transfers could be paid far more quickly), by providing evidence-based feedback on design and facilitating stakeholder meetings. (*'Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice'* in support of *'More efficient social assistance in crises'*). At global level, SPACE has prepared briefs on key multilaterals to inform FCDO, GIZ and DFAT engagements (although how this support will be drawn on by the donors remains to be seen).

**It is unclear whether the uptake of SPACE publications matches the volume of output.** Users reported that SPACE had distinguished itself – and built a strong brand – through the high quality and practical orientation of its learning products, as well as the speed with which these were published compared to other sources. However, some SPACE experts questioned whether levels of uptake were sufficient to justify the quantity of outputs. SPACE is monitoring how many times specific publications are viewed, but not who exactly is accessing them, and to what end. That said, the evaluation did identify select instances of country-based staff and partners drawing on SPACE publications to inform policy and programme development. For example, WFP staff in Jordan reported using SPACE resources to inform their programming and that they had flagged SPACE as a useful resource to the government in the context of the Covid-19 response.<sup>110</sup> And, in Latin America, UNICEF translated some publications into Spanish for use in workshops with governments and agencies. (*'Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice'*).

**There is some limited evidence that SPACE learning events have built the capacity of FCDO and GIZ staff.** Learning events appear to have been most beneficial for personnel who already had a solid grounding in humanitarian cash transfers or social protection, and were interested in building their understanding of specific technical issues (e.g. improving the interoperability of humanitarian and social protection systems). One staff member reported having deployed concepts and terminology learnt from SPACE events during country level discussions with the World Bank. Additionally, SPACE has supported WFP headquarters to identify areas for internal capacity building based on SPACE's experience engaging with WFP country offices (although the results of this engagement are not yet known). (*'Improved human and institutional capability and capacity'*).

## Unintended results



**An important auxiliary benefit of the SPACE model has been that it has directly facilitated coordination and learning between experts across the humanitarian-development nexus.**

SPACE experts indicated that working in mixed teams, as well as regular technical team catch ups, had enabled them to engage meaningfully with and learn from experts with different specialisms, better understand different perspectives and build knowledge on specific substantive areas (e.g., determining transfer values) or cross-cutting areas (e.g. disability inclusion). However, it is unclear whether learning amongst the delivery team has translated into improved coordination between initiatives. (*'New or strengthened relationships and strategic partnerships across the humanitarian, climate resilience and SP sectors'*.)

### 6.5.7 Enablers and constraints

SPACE's contributions are indirect and, alone, insufficient to bring about outcome and impact level change. Factors which have enabled or constrained the achievement of results include:

#### Demand side

- **Clarity of user requests:** The SPACE delivery team emphasised that receiving a clear steer from in-country clients was essential (examples cited of countries from which SPACE received a strong steer included Afghanistan. Initial scoping calls generally supported the development of a clear ask. However, in cases where a clearly defined request was not received despite these efforts it was challenging for SPACE to offer useful support (e.g., as was the case with a particular assignment in Somalia).
- **Sufficiency of user bandwidth for engagement:** Engaging TA support necessarily requires time to engage on the part of users. In some cases, in-country users lacked sufficient bandwidth to draw on SPACE (e.g., Syria, Iraq) or, for those which had already drawn on the service, to request further support desired (e.g. Pakistan, Yemen case study). Some in-country advisers felt that they could have made more of SPACE support had they had more time to engage with other Embassy colleagues across siloed programme portfolios (e.g., humanitarian, social development and/or climate resilience). Capacity limitations could also be substantive; in the case of Sudan, the Project Management Unit of the Family Support Programme lacked a gender lead to act as the contact point and take on recommendations from a related assignment which they had identified as a need.
- **Whether users drew strategically on SPACE in support of their objectives:** As noted in section 5.2 above, social development advisers in Jordan drew effectively on a continuum of support from BASIC TAS and SPACE. SPACE could also be drawn on effectively in conjunction with other sources of support, as in Pakistan where GIZ requested support to build on a previous piece of work which they had procured independently. Or as an independent broker, as in DRC where SPACE hosted stakeholder workshops convened by UNICEF and WFP to influence and build consensus around the design World Bank-funded cash transfer programme.
- **ODA reprioritisation process (and other changes in user priorities):** From phase 2, the reprioritisation of ODA spending resulted in a prolonged period of uncertainty around programme budgets for country offices, resulting in several planned SPACE assignments being put on hold (e.g. design support to a new climate resilience programme in Pakistan) or, eventually, cancelled altogether. Budget cuts also curtailed uptake of the outputs of some assignments which had already been undertaken (e.g. in Liberia and Zimbabwe). Broader changes in user priorities also affected use of the SPACE service and uptake of its recommendations: in Sudan, these resulted in a pending request from the World Bank on improving their focus on GESI not being taken forward, as well as specific design aspects (recommended by SPACE) for a new FCDO programme not being taken forward.
- **Political economy of social assistance provision:** SPACE has responded to dramatically increased appetite for social protection policy and programming as a tool for responding to crises in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Several KIs indicated that demand is likely to continue, with

increasing focus in future on climate-related displacement. At the same time, important political barriers remain – for example, to integrating humanitarian caseloads into national systems where countries are hosting large refugee populations, or to developing sustainable international financing mechanisms.

### **Supply side**

- **(Perceived) quality of expertise provided:** This has encouraged uptake of options and recommendations.
- **Length and depth of engagement:** Where SPACE has undertaken multi-stage engagements – most often characterised by an initial short engagement to explore options and entry points, followed by a medium-term, ‘deeper dive’ to explore a specific issue in detail – this has produced particularly useful and actionable advice. Examples cited included the Sahel and DRC. The length of engagement also affected the extent to which SPACE experts were able to take the bigger picture into account in shaping assignments, and not only provide relatively narrow advice on specific technical issues.
- **Level of engagement with FCDO in-country (where the direct beneficiary is not FCDO):** As noted in section 3, the SPACE operating model did not lend itself well to direct engagement with country governments, unless situated within a broader programmes of support from country offices or partners. Some FCDO staff reported that they had facilitated introductions and support to government counterparts, but that in the absence of continued communications with SPACE, they were unable to gauge whether support had furthered the FCDO’s strategic objectives, suggesting that opportunities to support FCDO’s influencing aims have been missed.



## Appendix 7. Data collection tools

This Appendix presents the set of topic guides used to implement semi-structured interviews as part of the global and country-case study KII data collection tasks. Each subsection presents a topic guide. The data collection task and the stakeholder group for whom the guide was used is denoted in each subtitle.

### 7.1 Key Informant Interview topic guide – Academic Institutions

#### Opening preamble to interviews

**About the evaluation:** Integrity Global were commissioned by FCDO in October 2020 to conduct an evaluation of the BASIC programme. The implementation period of the evaluation runs to March 2024 with three evaluation points – baseline, midline and endline. We are presently gathering the baseline data with the baseline report due to be submitted to FCDO in October 2021.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess programme effectiveness in achieving outputs and contributions to outcomes and impact, improve BASIC programme processes, ways of working and knowledge and lessons on what works and provide evidence to the FCDO/HMG and partners on how technical assistance & research can contribute to greater use of SP approaches in crises.

**The purpose of this interview:** is to gather baseline data to assess the relevance of BASIC in terms of its design given the context and priority needs in the SP space, explore, likely impact and sustainability. In addition, the baseline evaluation will explore coherence with other development programmes in the SP space including those delivered by other development organisations and partners.

#### Open interviews by:

- Requesting informed consent – ask interviewees are they happy to participate in the interview. Explain that their responses will be treated as strictly confidential and while a list of interviewees will be provided in the baseline report, the sources of specific findings will not be named.
- Ask interviewees about their roles and responsibilities, length of time in position.
- Ask interviewees about their familiarity/engagement with BASIC thus far? (Note: GIZ was involved in funding SPACE)

Main questions are in **bold** below, with additional probing questions in *italics* which time permitting can be posed.

**RELEVANCE: To what extent do BASIC interventions individually or in combination suit the needs of target groups?**

- 1. What is the focus of your organisation in relation to research and evidence on what works in relation to the use of SP approaches in crises?**
- 2. What do they see as the biggest challenges / opportunities in this space**
  - A. What are the main issues hindering the adoption of SP approaches in crises in partner countries in your opinion?*
  - B. To what extent are evidence gaps and capability weaknesses the main constraining factors?*
  - C. What other factors constrain progress?*
  - D. How have these changed in relation to recent contextual changes (Covid, other)*
- 3. Are you aware of BASIC or SPACE? How? What has been your interaction with the programme thus far? BASIC seeks to address the bottlenecks at global and country level that prevent greater use of social protection approaches in crises, through expert advisory services for country support, capacity building, learning, coordination and high-level policy influencing, and high-quality research that strengthens the evidence on what works in different contexts.**

**COHERENCE: Are BASIC interventions internally coherent and do they work in harmony with the operations of other donors and actors in the same field?**

- **Has their organisation collaborated with BASIC or SPACE?**
  5. *Are you aware of BASIC? How? What has been your interaction with the programme thus far?*
- **To what extent do they collaborate/coordinate with FCDO on this agenda?**
  6. *What are the mechanisms/platforms they use for collaboration?*
- **Is BASIC research/capacity building on SP approaches duplicating the work of any other donors/development actors in your opinion?**
  7. *Do you implement any similar programmes to BASIC?*
- **How fragmented are actors/initiatives in the humanitarian-development nexus and SP space?**
  8. *What are the factors supporting/hindering greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives in the SP space – globally and within countries?*
  9. *Are lessons/research/evidence shared between programmes? How? How has this impacted on effectiveness of programmes?*
  10. *Is BASIC sufficiently known and engaging sufficiently with external stakeholders and actors in the humanitarian-development space?*
  11. *Are there any stakeholders that BASIC should engage with more?*

**IMPACT: What are the likely positive and negative, intended and unintended consequences of BASIC interventions individually and in combination?**

- **What are the factors likely to drive /hinder systemic change in the adoption of SP approaches in crises in your opinion?**
  12. *What do you think are the time horizons to generate systemic change in terms of adoption of SP approaches in crises?*
  13. *What do you expect is the likely impact of BASIC on greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives in the SP space?*
  14. *Are you aware of any successes from BASIC/SPACE delivery thus far?*
- **Can you think of any possible unintended (positive or negative) consequences of the technical assistance/research support provided by BASIC (including on women and vulnerable groups)?**

**SUSTAINABILITY: EQ5 To what extent are the benefits and activities associated with BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, likely to continue after funding ceases?**

- **What are the lessons for BASIC based your research/experience in relation to generating sustainable change?**
  15. *Sustainable capacity building (FCDO, country governments and other development partners)*
  16. *Sustainable policy and programme influence on governments and partners*

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

17. *Are there any suggestions/lessons you would like to make for BASIC going forward?*
18. *Are there any relevant documents that would be useful for our evaluation that you could kindly share?*
19. *Any other stakeholders that would be useful for us to consult with?*

## 7.2 Key Informant Interview topic guide – FCDO and Suppliers

### Opening preamble to interviews

**About the evaluation:** Integrity Global were commissioned by FCDO in October 2020 to conduct an evaluation of the BASIC programme. The implementation period of the evaluation runs to March 2024 with three evaluation points – baseline, midline and endline. We are presently gathering the baseline data with the baseline report due to be submitted to FCDO in October 2021.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess programme effectiveness in achieving outputs and contributions to outcomes and impact, improve BASIC programme processes, ways of working and knowledge and lessons on what works and provide evidence to the FCDO/HMG and partners on how technical assistance & research can contribute to greater use of SP approaches in crises.

**The purpose of this interview:** is to gather baseline data to assess the relevance of BASIC in terms of its design given the context and priorities of FCDO in the SP space, explore extent BASIC's approach to delivery is efficient, assess early results, likely impact, and sustainability. In addition, the baseline evaluation will explore coherence with other development programmes in the SP space including those delivered by FCDO and other development organisations and partners.

### Open interviews by:

- Requesting informed consent – ask interviewees are they happy to participate in the interview. Explain that their responses will be treated as strictly confidential and while a list of interviewees will be provided in the baseline report, the sources of specific findings will not be named.
- Ask interviewees about their roles and responsibilities, length of time in position.

Main questions are in **bold** below, with additional probing questions in *italics* which time permitting can be posed. Remember to include coverage of space in the interview questions.

### **RELEVANCE: To what extent do BASIC interventions individually or in combination suit the needs of target groups?**

- **How well is BASIC aligned to FCDO Strategy and Priorities?**<sup>19</sup>
  - 20. Why is BASIC important to HMG engagement in the SP space in partner countries and globally?*
  - 21. How important is BASIC in terms of supporting commitments made in Grand Bargain in particular the sub-group on linking humanitarian cash and social protection?*
  - 22. How do you view the relevance of BASIC in relation to the growing prominence of the climate change agenda?*
  - 23. In your view, what are the biggest challenges/opportunities in this space?*
  - 24. Is BASIC meeting the priority needs of immediate users at global and country levels?*
- **Have changes to the context impacted the relevance of BASIC and its workstreams? How adaptable has the design of BASIC been to these contextual changes?**
  - 25. How has the demand for BASIC TA changed over time/will change going forward?*
  - 26. To the Covid-19 pandemic?*
  - 27. To the ODA Reprioritisation in April 2021?*
- **Is the design of BASIC clear and appropriate?**
  - 28. Is BASIC's level of ambition appropriate? Why/why not?*

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<sup>19</sup> Seven priorities of FCDO are: climate and biodiversity, global health security, girls' education, humanitarian preparedness and response, science and technology, open societies and conflict resolution and economic development and trade.

29. Does the design of BASIC allow for an appropriate balance between strategic, responsive, and flexible support?
30. How do you expect BASIC will lead to change? What assumptions are key to the realisation of change? Is the approach to selecting a small number of countries for deep engagement the right one – why/why not?
31. How do you think the TA and Research Workstreams can reinforce each other to amplify results?
32. To what extent do BASIC's interventions take G&I considerations into account? Is the design of BASIC sufficient to drive the embedding of G&I considerations in SP approaches in crises? (Prompt: Ref inclusion and intersectionality if responses relate only to women or gender. Clarify what interviewees understand is BASIC's coverage of vulnerable groups)

**EFFECTIVENESS: To what extent are BASIC interventions individually and in combination, attaining their objectives and why?**

**A. What are the key achievements of BASIC TA (including SPACE) to date?**

33. How effective have the different TA support activities been; capacity strengthening, coordination, knowledge management, other?
34. Can you say which type of intervention have made a difference: smaller TAS versus longer-term deeper engagement? Why?
35. To what extent has BASIC contributed to the development of gender responsive and inclusive social protection policies, systems, and programmes (and programme outputs) in partner countries and globally?
36. Has BASIC increased the uptake and institutional capabilities of FCDO and partners on gender responsive social protection approaches? Prompts:
  - A. Are G&I-related recommendations being implemented?
  - B. Has support has been provided in a way that builds beneficiary capacity to develop SP policies and programmes which are G&I responsive?
  - C. How challenging is it to embed gender and inclusion considerations in social protection approaches in crises? What are the challenges?

**B. What factors have contributed to or hindered results affecting the impact of the TA on system level change (including gender responsive social protection systems)?**

37. Are the programme's delivery models effective in responding to the needs of vulnerable groups?
38. Are the delivery models politically sensitive / politically smart?
39. What could be done differently to improve effectiveness?

**EFFICIENCY: Are BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, delivering in a timely and cost-efficient manner?**

9. Does BASIC, its workstreams and different types of intervention represent good value for money? This is a general question – we plan to conduct separate interviews on VfM scorecard with BASIC Suppliers.
  40. Is BASIC managed in line with VfM principles? Meaning VfM is maximised in design, procurement, delivery and close out of interventions.
  41. To what extent does management decision-making reflect VfM considerations?
  42. A considerable proportion of BASIC's TA budget was allocated to SPACE (>£1M) – was this good VfM – why/why not?
  43. Is the year-long inception phase for the Research Workstream good VfM?
  44. What are the pros/cons of a centralised delivery model?
  45. Is the deep engagement approach in selected partner countries VfM – why/why not?
10. Is BASIC responding to demand and needs in a timely and efficient way and in line with user expectations?
  46. What is timeliness in response to demand? If not, why not? How could timeliness be improved?

47. Are the processes in place/planned to generate demand for BASIC services adequate/fit for purpose?
48. BASIC is keen to support a wider group of stakeholders going forward – which stakeholders are particularly important to support in your opinion?
49. What lessons are there in terms of the efficiency of central programme delivery (bringing delivery of the different TAS requests together) through a single supplier versus delivery of TA procured separately by country offices for example?

**IMPACT: What are the likely positive and negative, intended, and unintended consequences of BASIC interventions individually and in combination?**

- What do you expect the likely impact of BASIC and its workstreams on policy, programme and system change in deep engagement countries?
50. Has the TA workstream thus far impacted on policy, programme and system change globally (including legacy impact of SPACE)? Why/why not?
  51. What are the factors likely to drive /hinder systemic change in the adoption of SP approaches in crises in your opinion?
  52. What complementary actions outside of BASIC are necessary to create change?
  53. What do you think are the time horizons to generate systemic change in terms of adoption of SP approaches in crises?
- Can you think of any possible unintended (positive or negative) consequences of BASIC support, including unintended consequences on women and vulnerable groups?
  - What are the lessons from BASIC on promoting the use of social protection approaches to respond to the needs of crises-affected populations?
54. What lessons are there from BASIC on knowledge exchange and learning across the sector?
  55. What lessons are there from BASIC on influencing behaviour change, policies and operations of national governments and other partners?

**SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent are the benefits and activities associated with BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, likely to continue after funding ceases?**

- What is the likelihood that the policy, programme and system changes supported by BASIC, at global and country levels, will be sustainable after programme ends?
56. Have the foundations for sustainable change been established by BASIC? If not, why not?
  57. What are the factors likely to hinder/support sustainable outcome in terms of influencing global policy and influencing governments and partners?
  58. What the emerging lessons from BASIC in relation to sustainability (of capacities and policies)?

**COHERENCE: Are BASIC interventions internally coherent and do they work in harmony with the operations of other donors and actors in the same field?**

- What are the linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and its workstreams?
59. Are BASIC's workstreams joined up? How? What are the synergies between workstreams (TAS and Research) in terms of amplifying results relating to global influence or country level adoption of SP approaches in crises?
- What are the linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and other relevant FCDO/development partner programmes in BASIC's deep engagement countries and globally?
60. What are the factors supporting/hindering greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives in the SP space – globally and within countries?

61. *Are lessons shared between FCDO complementary programmes? How? How has this impacted on effectiveness of programmes?*
62. *Is BASIC engaging sufficiently with external stakeholders and actors in the humanitarian-SP space?*
63. *Are there any stakeholders that BASIC should engage with more – climate for example?*

#### Close

64. *Any closing remarks or suggestions for recommendations for the programme going forward.*
65. *Any suggestions on documentation that would be useful for the evaluation that you could kindly share.*
66. *Would you like to make any suggestions concerning stakeholders we should consult?*

### 7.3 Key Informant Interview topic guide – Other donors and agencies

#### Opening preamble to interviews

**About the evaluation:** Integrity Global were commissioned by FCDO in October 2020 to conduct an evaluation of the BASIC programme. The implementation period of the evaluation runs to March 2024 with three evaluation points – baseline, midline and endline. We are presently gathering the baseline data with the baseline report due to be submitted to FCDO in October 2021.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess programme effectiveness in achieving outputs and contributions to outcomes and impact, improve BASIC programme processes, ways of working and knowledge and lessons on what works and provide evidence to the FCDO/HMG and partners on how technical assistance & research can contribute to greater use of SP approaches in crises.

**The purpose of this interview:** is to gather baseline data to assess the relevance of BASIC in terms of its design given the context and priority needs in the SP space, explore, likely impact and sustainability. In addition, the baseline evaluation will explore coherence with other development programmes in the SP space including those delivered by other development organisations and partners.

#### Open interviews by:

- Requesting informed consent – ask interviewees are they happy to participate in the interview. Explain that their responses will be treated as strictly confidential and while a list of interviewees will be provided in the baseline report, the sources of specific findings will not be named.
- Ask interviewees about their roles and responsibilities, length of time in position.
- Ask interviewees about their familiarity/engagement with BASIC thus far? (Note: GIZ was involved in funding SPACE)

Main questions are in **bold** below, with additional probing questions in *italics* which time permitting can be posed.

#### **RELEVANCE: To what extent do BASIC interventions individually or in combination suit the needs of target groups?**

- **What do they see as the biggest challenges / opportunities in supporting adoption of SP approaches in crises?**

67. *What are the main issues hindering the adoption of SP approaches in crises in partner countries in your opinion?*
68. *To what extent are evidence gaps and capability weaknesses the main constraining factors?*
69. *What other factors constrain progress?*
70. *How have these changed in relation to recent contextual changes (Covid, other)*



- **What are they/their organisation doing to address these challenges / opportunities?**

- 71. *How effective have these interventions been?*
- 72. *What lessons have been learnt on how to work in this space?*
- 73. *What do you plan to do differently in future?*

**COHERENCE: Are BASIC interventions internally coherent and do they work in harmony with the operations of other donors and actors in the same field?**

*BASIC seeks to address the bottlenecks at global and country level that prevent greater use of social protection approaches in crises, through expert advisory services for country support, capacity building, learning, coordination, and high-level policy influencing, and high-quality research that strengthens the evidence on what works in different contexts.*

**A. To what extent do they collaborate/coordinate with FCDO on this agenda?**

- 74. *Are you aware of BASIC/SPACE? How?*
- 75. *Has their organisation collaborated with BASIC?*
- 76. *What has been your interaction with the programme thus far?*
- 77. *What are the mechanisms/platforms they use for collaboration?*

**B. Is BASIC research/capacity building on SP approaches (including SPACE) duplicating the work of any other donors/development actors in your opinion?**

- 78. *Do you implement any similar programmes to BASIC?*

**C. How fragmented are actors/initiatives in the humanitarian-development nexus and SP space?**

- 79. *What are the factors supporting/hindering greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives in the SP space – globally and within countries?*
- 80. *Are lessons/research/evidence shared between programmes? How? How has this impacted on effectiveness of programmes?*
- 81. *Is BASIC sufficiently known and engaging sufficiently with external stakeholders and actors in the humanitarian-development space?*
- 82. *Are there any stakeholders that BASIC should engage with more – climate for example?*

**EFFECTIVENESS: To what extent are BASIC interventions individually and in combination, attaining their objectives and why?**

**A. What is their perception of BASIC activities and its results?**

- 83. *What is the comparative advantage of FCDO's contribution?*
- 84. *Why is BASIC important and useful for other donors and multilateral organisations do you think?*

**B. Can you say which type of intervention are most likely to make a difference?**

- 85. *capacity strengthening, coordination, policy and programme development, knowledge management*
- 86. *smaller demand driven TA versus longer-term deeper engagement? Why?*

**C. Have you used any resources / research developed by BASIC (including SPACE) and if so, how useful were they?**

- 87. *How effective do you think BASIC (including SPACE) has been in disseminating evidence on what works in terms of SP approaches in crisis? E.g. SPACE has produced > 20 publications including reference documents, operational guidance, policy briefs on SP approaches to Covid-19 – have you accessed and used these resources? If so, were they useful?*
- 88. *What more could BASIC do to improve the effectiveness of its knowledge dissemination and sharing of evidence?*



**IMPACT: What are the likely positive and negative, intended, and unintended consequences of BASIC interventions individually and in combination?**

**A. What are the factors likely to drive /hinder systemic change in the adoption of SP approaches in crises in your opinion?**

*89. What do you think are the time horizons to generate systemic change in terms of adoption of SP approaches in crises?*

*90. What do you expect is the likely impact of BASIC on greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives in the SP space?*

*91. Are you aware of any successes from BASIC/SPACE delivery thus far?*

**B. Can you think of any possible unintended (positive or negative) consequences of the technical assistance/research support provided by BASIC (including on women and vulnerable groups)?**

**SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent are the benefits and activities associated with BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, likely to continue after funding ceases?**

**A. What are the lessons for BASIC based your experience in relation to generating sustainable change?**

*92. Sustainable capacity building (FCDO, country governments and other development partners)*

*93. Sustainable policy and programme influence on governments and partners*

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

*94. Are there any suggestions/lessons you would like to make for BASIC going forward?*

*95. Are there any relevant documents that would be useful for our evaluation that you could kindly share?*

*96. Any other stakeholders that would be useful for us to consult with?*

**7.4 Key Informant Interview topic guide – Other FCDO complementary programmes**

**Opening preamble to interviews**

**About the evaluation:** Integrity Global were commissioned by FCDO in October 2020 to conduct an evaluation of the BASIC programme. The implementation period of the evaluation runs to March 2024 with three evaluation points – baseline, midline and endline. We are presently gathering the baseline data with the baseline report due to be submitted to FCDO in October 2021.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess programme effectiveness in achieving outputs and contributions to outcomes and impact, improve BASIC programme processes, ways of working and knowledge and lessons on what works and provide evidence to the FCDO/HMG and partners on how technical assistance and research can contribute to a greater use of social protection approaches in crises.

**The purpose of this interview:** is to gather baseline data to assess the relevance of BASIC in terms of its design given the context and priorities of FCDO in the SP space, explore extent BASIC's approach to delivery is efficient, assess likely impact and sustainability. In addition, the baseline evaluation will explore coherence with other development programmes in the SP space including those delivered by FCDO and other development organisations and partners – this will be the focus of this interview.

**Open interviews by:**

- A. Requesting informed consent** – ask interviewees are they happy to participate in the interview. Explain that their responses will be treated as strictly confidential and while a list of interviewees will be provided in the baseline report, the sources of specific findings will not be named.

- B. Ask interviewees about their roles and responsibilities, length of time in position.
- C. Ask interviewees about their familiarity/engagement with BASIC thus far?

Main questions are in **bold** below, with additional probing questions in *italics* which time permitting can be posed.

**RELEVANCE: To what extent do BASIC interventions individually or in combination suit the needs of target groups?**

- What are FCDO Strategic priorities in relation to SP and specifically supporting adoption of SP approaches in crises?
- 97. *How have these changed in relation to recent contextual changes (Covid, FCDO reprioritisation)*
- What do you see as the biggest challenges and opportunities in this space?
- For programmes like BASIC (and SPACE), how challenging is it to strike an appropriate balance between strategic, responsive, and flexible support and embed G&I considerations?

**COHERENCE: Are BASIC interventions internally coherent and do they work in harmony with the operations of other donors and actors in the same field?**

- A. How fragmented are actors/initiatives in the humanitarian assistance- SP space?
- 98. *Has their programme directly collaborated with BASIC?*
- 99. *What are the linkages and coordination mechanisms in place between BASIC and other relevant FCDO programmes?*
- 100. *Have instances of coordination included issues/topics directly relevant to making SP gender and age responsive / inclusive?*
- 101. *What are the factors supporting/hindering greater coherence, coordination and synergies between FCDO actors and initiatives in the SP space – globally and within countries?*
- 102. *Do you think BASIC (or SPACE) duplicates the work of any other FCDO programmes?*
- 103. *Are there significant gaps in the overall coverage of FCDO programmes in this space?*
- B. Are lessons shared between FCDO complementary programmes? How? How has this impacted on effectiveness of programmes?
- C. Is BASIC engaging sufficiently with external stakeholders and actors in the humanitarian-SP space in your opinion?
- 104. *To what extent does BASIC (including SPACE) duplicate or complement the programmes of other donors or agencies?*
- 105. *Which platforms/means of engagement have been most effective?*
- 106. *Are there any stakeholders that BASIC should engage with more – climate for example?*

**EFFECTIVENESS: To what extent are BASIC interventions individually and in combination, attaining their objectives and why?**

- A. What is their perception of BASIC and SPACE's activities and its results?
- 107. *What is the comparative advantage of FCDO's contribution?*
- B. Can you say which type of intervention are most likely to make a difference?
- 108. *Capacity strengthening, coordination, policy and programme development, knowledge management.*
- 109. *Smaller demand driven TA versus longer-term deeper engagement?*

**110. Why?**

**C. Have you used any resources / research developed by BASIC or SPACE and if so, how useful were they?**

- 111.** *How effective do you think BASIC (including SPACE) has been in disseminating evidence on what works in terms of SP approaches in crisis? E.g., SPACE has produced > 20 publications including reference documents, operational guidance, policy briefs on SP approaches to Covid-19 – have you accessed and used these resources? If so, were they useful?*
- 112.** *What more could BASIC do to improve the effectiveness of its knowledge dissemination and sharing of evidence?*

**EFFICIENCY: Are BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, delivering in a timely and cost-efficient manner?**

- A. BASIC is keen to support a wider group of stakeholders going forward – which stakeholders are particularly important to support in your opinion?**
- B. What lessons are there do you think in terms of the efficiency of central programme delivery (bringing delivery of the different TAS requests together) through a single supplier?**
- C. Can you share any lessons on improving VfM based on their experience with their own (related) programmes?**

**IMPACT: What are the likely positive and negative, intended and unintended consequences of BASIC interventions individually and in combination?**

- A. What are the factors likely to drive /hinder systemic change in the adoption of SP approaches in crises in your opinion?**
- 113.** *What do you think are the time horizons to generate systemic change in terms of adoption of SP approaches in crises?*
- 114.** *What do you expect is the likely impact of BASIC on greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives in the SP space?*
- 115.** *Are you aware of any successes from BASIC/SPACE delivery thus far?*
- 116.** *What complementary actions outside of BASIC are necessary to create change?*
- B. Can you think of any possible unintended (positive or negative) consequences of the technical assistance/research support provided by BASIC (including on women and vulnerable groups)?**

**SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent are the benefits and activities associated with BASIC interventions, individually and in combination, likely to continue after funding ceases?**

- A. What are the lessons for BASIC based your experience in relation to generating sustainable change?**
- 117.** *Sustainable capacity building (FCDO, country governments and other development partners).*
- 118.** *Sustainable policy and programme influence on governments and partners.*

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 119.** *Are there any suggestions/lessons you would like to make for BASIC going forward?*
- 120.** *Are there any relevant documents that would be useful for our evaluation that you could kindly share?*
- 121.** *Any other stakeholders that would be useful for us to consult with?*

## 7.5 Survey questionnaire

This subsection presents the questionnaire we implemented as part of the evaluation. It was delivered using Microsoft Forms. Questions that we removed during mainstage implementation to mitigate against response rate challenges are highlighted in yellow.

### Introduction

The following document presents the draft questions for the in-house survey as part of the evaluation of the Better Assistance in Crises (BASIC) programme, which encompasses activities funded by Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19 Expert advice helpline (SPACE). Delivered between 2018 and 2024 by the FCDO Social Protection Team, BASIC aims to help poor and vulnerable people cope better with crises by providing (1) technical assistance, (2) research, and (3) knowledge management and learning to FCDO country offices and partners. BASIC services are all aimed at supporting countries to shift along the spectrum towards strong social protection systems capable to supporting vulnerable people in crisis, and away from a context of having non-existent domestic social protection systems supplemented by humanitarian actors leading on crisis response. For more details on BASIC, please see <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300467>.

This survey is intended for dissemination by Microsoft Forms to FCDO staff in country offices targeted for BASIC support. Target participants in these offices include Social Protection and Assistance Advisors, Humanitarian Advisors, Climate Advisors. The anticipated sampling frame will be in the region of approximately 160 staff members.

The survey has been designed to be simple and time-efficient for respondents to complete. It provides short and easy-to-follow instructions on survey completion, the intended use of the survey responses, and the privacy policy deployed by the evaluation team. Questions are, wherever appropriate, closed, with multiple choice options presented for selection by the user. This both speeds up the response-time for participants and provides the evaluation team with quantifiable data for comparison across contexts and between evaluation phases.

By way of introduction, Integrity was commissioned by the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) to conduct an evaluation of the Better Assistance in Crises (BASIC) programme, which also encompasses support provided by the Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19 Expert advice helpline (SPACE).

Delivered between 2018 and 2024 by the FCDO Social Protection Team in the Gender and Equalities Department, BASIC aims to help poor and vulnerable people cope better with crises by providing:

1. Technical assistance - demand-driven country support through capacity building, learning and coordination
2. Research - to strengthen both global and country-specific evidence on using social assistance approaches
3. Knowledge management and learning to FCDO country offices and partners.

BASIC services are all aimed at supporting countries to shift along a spectrum towards strong social protection systems capable of supporting vulnerable people in crisis, and away from a context of having non-existent domestic social protection systems supplemented by humanitarian actors leading on crisis response.

For more details on BASIC, please see <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300467>.

The evaluation will run from October 2020 to March 2024, and has the following objectives:

- Assess programme effectiveness in achieving its intended outputs, and any contributions towards its intended outcomes and impact.
- Improve BASIC programme processes, ways of working and knowledge and lessons on what works. Provide evidence to the FCDO and its partners on how technical assistance and research can contribute to a greater use of social protection approaches in crisis.

Three findings reports will be produced by the evaluation, covering the three main implementation phases – baseline (2021), midline (2022) and endline (2024), as well as a series of learning products.

The purpose of this survey is to collect your views on your awareness of the BASIC programme and any changes that may have occurred to how you deliver and support social protection policies and programming in the country you are working in. The results of this survey will be used to inform the development of our baseline report which will be finalised and submitted to FCDO in November 2021.

**UPDATE AUGUST 2021:** The survey has been amended and is now expected to take you 10-15 minutes to complete, rather than 20-30 minutes. We thank you in advance for participating. The results of this survey will directly support FCDO to provide better support to country offices in the area of social protection in the context of a humanitarian response.

**Privacy notice:** FCDO shared the link to this survey on behalf of the evaluation team. Personal contact details were not shared with the evaluation supplier. All information that you provide in this survey will remain anonymous. All data will be analysed and reported on at an aggregate level such that it is not possible to identify individual responses. Survey data are stored on secure systems that comply with UK and EU legislation such as the UK Data Protection Act and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). They will be stored for the duration of the contract. Once the contract has been terminated, Integrity will destroy your data securely.

**Contact:** If you have any questions about our evaluation, this survey, or our data security and protection procedures, please contact Nick Moore by email (Nick.Moore@integrityglobal.com).

## A. Background & Context

Please tell us a little about the context you work in:

#	Logic	Question	Response type
A1	ALL	What is your current role?	Open text box
A2	ALL	Which sectors do you typically work in?	Multicode ok
		Social policy (social and political analysis)	
		Poverty and vulnerability analysis and monitoring	
		Gender equality and inclusion	
		Empowerment and accountability	
		Social protection and assistance	
		Humanitarian response	
		Climate and environment policy and programmes	
		Other - If other, please specify {open text box}	Open text box

A3		Which sectors do you currently have an active portfolio in?	Multicode ok
		Social policy (social and political analysis)	
		Poverty and vulnerability analysis and monitoring	
		Gender equality and inclusion	
		Empowerment and accountability	
		Social protection and assistance	
		Humanitarian response	
		Climate and environment policy and programmes	
		Other - If other, please specify {open text box}	Open text box
A4	ALL	Since the start of 2018, which country have you mainly been working in?	Dropdown list
A5	ALL	In this country, what types of crises have been experienced?	Multicode ok
		Crises caused by natural hazards (excluding infectious disease)	
		Crises caused by infectious diseases	
		Crises caused by conflict and fragility	
		Displacement crises	
		Complex crises (caused by overlapping natural and man-made factors)	
		Other - If other, please specify {open text box}	Open text box
A6	ALL	Thinking about the country you have mainly worked in, what are the strategic development and humanitarian priorities of FCDO in this country with respect to the use of social assistance – delivered through humanitarian channels and national social protection systems - in times of crisis?	Multicode ok
		Delivering social transfers	
		Improved social assistance modalities (e.g., use of cash), mechanisms (e.g., electronic transfers) or processes (e.g. improved registration and targeting of beneficiaries) through humanitarian or national social protection systems	
		Improved coordination in the financing and delivery of social assistance - within and between - humanitarian and national systems	
		Inclusion of shock responsive workstream in national social protection systems	
		Inclusion of refugees in the scope of national social protection systems	
		Establishing or strengthening nationally led social assistance systems	
		Adapting social assistance to address climate change	
		Enhancing early and anticipatory action to crises	
		Other - If other, please specify {open text box}	Open text box

## B. Familiarity with BASIC and initial experiences of it

Please tell us about your level of engagement with the BASIC programme and its workstreams.

#	Logic	Question	Response type
B1	ALL	How familiar are you with the BASIC programme and its specific workstreams?	5-point Likert scale: Not aware at all ... Very aware
		The overall BASIC programme	
		Technical advisory services provided by BASIC for country support, capacity building, learning, and policy-influencing	
		Technical advisory services provided by SPACE for country support, capacity building, learning, and policy-influencing	
		Research conducted by BASIC to strengthen evidence on using social protection approaches to respond to crises	
		Other workstreams {please specify}	Open text box
B2	ALL	Have you accessed BASIC services to support your work?	Multicode ok
		Mapping the current state of social protection systems	
		Long term in-country advisory support (more than 6 months duration)	
		Long term remote advisory support (more than 6 months duration)	
		Medium term advisory support (less than 6 months but more than 1 months duration)	
		Short term advisory support (less than 1 month)	
		Expert advisory clinics	
		Research and analysis products produced by BASIC (which you have commissioned yourself)	
		Research and analysis products produced by BASI (which you have not commissioned yourself)	
		Other services {please specify}	Open text box
B3	If one or more positive in B2	If you have accessed BASIC services to support your work, to what degree do you agree with the following statements:	5-point Likert scale Strongly disagree ... Strongly agree
		It was simple and straightforward for me to access and make use of BASIC services	
		The services were delivered in a timely manner for my needs	
B4	If none positive in B2	If not, can you tell us why you have not accessed BASIC services in your work?	Multicode ok
		I am not aware of BASIC or its services	
		The services it offers are not relevant to my work	
		I use other sources of social protection research and advisory support that are more useful to me in my context	



		Other reasons {please specify}	Open text box
B5	ALL	When thinking about the wider objective of building “better assistance in crises”, which of the following areas would you like BASIC to help you achieve?	Multicode ok
		Improving the quality and reach of humanitarian response	
		Improving the linkages between the humanitarian system and social protection approaches	
		Improving the quality of social protection systems in their own right	
		Encouraging a transition towards social protection as a crisis response mechanism	
		Improving anticipatory action	
		Other {please specify}	Open text box

### C. Relevance of BASIC

The following set of questions focus on the relevance and fit of the BASIC programme to your country context and strategic priorities:

#	Logic	Question	Response type
C1	If B1 resp. type = 4,5	On alignment to strategic priorities, please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements:	5-point Likert Strongly disagree ... Strongly agree
		BASIC is well-aligned to support the delivery of the strategic priorities of FCDO in the country I have mainly worked in since 2018.	
		BASIC can effectively respond to the specific humanitarian & social protection needs of the sector in this country.	
		BASIC can provide flexible and responsive support, adapting to evolving needs in this country.	
C2	If B1 resp. type = 4,5	On the relevance and value-add of BASIC, please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements:	5-point Likert Strongly disagree ... Strongly agree  Plus a don't know option
		BASIC provides relevant technical assistance and advisory services for me and/or my team	
		BASIC provides technical assistance and advisory services that are not readily available from other sources	
		BASIC provides relevant research and evidence for me and/or my team	
		The type of research and evidence that BASIC will provide is not readily available from other sources	
C3	If B1 resp. type = 4,5	On the role of BASIC in shaping the work of FCDO in the country you have mainly worked in since 2018, please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements:	5-point Likert Strongly disagree ... Strongly agree

			Plus a don't know option
		The technical assistance and advisory services that BASIC provides have contributed to changes and/or evolutions in the country strategy of FCDO.	
		The research and evidence that BASIC will provide is likely to contribute to changes and/or evolutions in the country strategy of FCDO.	

## D. Effectiveness

The following questions focus on the effectiveness of BASIC in supporting social protection approaches in your country.

#	Logic	Question	Response type
D1	ALL	Did you receive BASIC technical assistance in your country office?	Single code
		Yes	
		No	
D2	If D1 = Yes	Regarding the technical assistance you received, to what extent do you think it was, or will be, effective in supporting you to make better use of social protection approaches in times of crisis in your country?	5-point Likert Not at all effective .... Very effective
D2.1	If D1 = Yes	Can you briefly describe how, if at all, the technical assistance you received changed how you have, or will, make better use of social protection approaches in times of crisis, in your country?	Open text box
D3	If D1 = Yes	And regarding specific technical activities you engaged in, can you indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements?	5-point Likert Strongly disagree .... Strongly agree
		I found the BASIC technical assistance my office received to be helpful and relevant to the needs of my office	
		The assistance my office received was worth the time and resources required	
		The technical assistance provided met its intended learning aims	
		The technical assistance integrated consideration of issues relating to gender and social inclusion.	
		The assistance provided by BASIC resulted in improved collaboration between FCDO Humanitarian and SDA advisors	
		Specific changes in country strategies, plans, programmes or business cases have taken place in my office because of the assistance received	
		The assistance provided by BASIC resulted in the specification of new and/or improved social protection approaches by my team	

		The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by the government	
		The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by relevant multilateral agencies and international finance institutions	
		The assistance provided resulted in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by relevant NGOs	
		The assistance provided is likely to result in new and/or improved social protection approaches being adopted by the government	
D4	If D1 = Yes	Regarding gender equality and social inclusion, to what degree do you agree with the statement that BASIC services you have accessed have mainstreamed this issue?	5-point Likert Strongly disagree .... Strongly agree
D5	ALL	Do you intend to make use of BASIC research services in your country office?	Single code
		Yes	
		No	
D6	If D5 = Yes	Regarding the research services, what types of research are you hoping to access to support your work?	Open text box
D6.1	If D5= Yes	Can you briefly describe how research can be most useful for you to make better use of social protection approaches in times of crises in your country?	Open text box
D7	ALL	Thinking more broadly about social assistance in the country you work in, what are the most significant changes you have observed since 2018 in the social protection systems in this country (whether those systems are already well-established, nascent or non-existent), in each of the following areas (please indicate who changed what and where):	
		The human and institutional capability and capacity to deliver social protection approaches	Open text box
		The political commitment to and use of social protection approaches in crises	Open text box
		The coordination between different actors and initiatives in the social protection space	
		The quality and coverage of social protection policies, programmes or systems	Open text box
		The extent to which social protection policies, programmes or systems are gender responsive and/or inclusive	Open text box
		The use of evidence to inform social protection policies and practices by governments	Open text box
D8	ALL	What do you think are the top 3 factors that most contributed to these changes?	Multicode ok
		Specific advice provided by BASIC	
		Capacity development provided by BASIC	
		Advice or increased capacity developed through other means	
		Increased programme investment	
		Improved awareness of what works in social protection	

		Access to and use of evidence on social protection	
		Coordination of the main country actors in social protection	
		Political changes such as new governments	
		Other factors {please specify}	Open text box
D9	ALL	What do you think are the top 3 actors that most contributed to these changes?	Multicode ok
		BASIC	
		Other FCDO programmes	
		Other donor programmes	
		Other multilateral/UN agency programmes	
		Local or country governments	
		Civil society	
		Academic or policy researchers	
		Private sector	
		Other (please specify)	Open text box
D10	ALL	What do you think are the major barriers to change in the social protection systems, if any, in the country you work in?	Open text box

## E. Sustainability and coherence

The following question focuses on the sustainability and coherence of changes supported by BASIC in your country.

	Logic	Question	Response type
E1	If (D1 OR D5) = yes	To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Likert
		The changes supported by BASIC in my country are likely to be sustained after the programme ends	
		In the period since BASIC began operating in my country, public financing of social protection approaches has become more sufficient (increased financing with respect to need)	
		In the period since BASIC began operating in my country, public financing of social protection approaches has become more timely	
		In the period since BASIC began operating in my country, public financing of social protection approaches has become more flexible	
E2	ALL	To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	5-point Likert Strongly disagree .... Strongly agree
		I have been able to effectively build coherence between FCDO support for social protection and humanitarian systems, and other actors in my country	
		BASIC is well coordinated with other relevant FCDO programmes being delivered in the country I work in	

		BASIC is better coordinated with non-government actors delivering social protection and humanitarian assistance in the country I work in, compared to other programmes	
		BASIC is better coordinated with government departments delivering social protection and humanitarian policies in the country I work in, compared to other programmes	

## F. Close

#	Logic	Question	Response type
F1	ALL	Do you have any other views on BASIC or how it could better meet the needs of your country office?	Open text field.

## Closing text

Thank-you for completing this important survey. Your responses will directly contribute to the development of evaluation findings that will help FCDO learn from and improve the delivery of the BASIC programme to better suit your need.

As a reminder:

- Integrity Global was commissioned to undertake an evaluation of the BASIC programme by FCDO in October 2020, which will be delivered between October 2020 and March 2024.
- The purpose of this survey was to collect your views on the performance of the BASIC programme.
- The results of this survey will be used to inform the development of our first evaluation report which will be finalised and submitted to FCDO in November 2021.
- All information that you provide in this survey will remain anonymous. All data will be analysed and reported on at an aggregate level such that it is not possible to identify individual responses.
- Survey data are stored for the duration of the contract. Once the contract has been terminated, Integrity will destroy the data securely.
- If you have any questions about our evaluation, this survey, or our data security and protection procedures, please contact Nick Moore by email ([Nick.Moore@integrityglobal.com](mailto:Nick.Moore@integrityglobal.com)).

## Appendix 8. Mapping findings, conclusions, and recommendations

The table below indicates how findings informed our conclusions and subsequent recommendations.

**Table 9.1: Mapping of Baseline findings to conclusions and recommendations**

Recommendations	Supporting conclusions	Supporting findings
<b>1) Following the conclusion of SPACE, FCDO SPT in conjunction with the BASIC TAF and Research suppliers should clarify the future strategic priorities and scope of BASIC.</b>	<p>1: BASIC provides appropriate, efficient and effective demand driven support to FCDO country posts in supporting the development of new or strengthened country plans and programmes and supporting their decision making.</p> <p>3: The effectiveness of working through the pathway of change outlined above has significant synergies with the capacity of FCDO country posts to engage and synergies with programme funding.</p> <p>5: The role and contribution of BASIC towards improving human and institutional capabilities in using social protection approaches in crises has been both unclear and limited.</p> <p>6: The strategic focus on the use of social protection approaches in crises in FCAS is appropriate. However, the geographic focus on FCAS has not always been matched by progress on unpacking the specific challenges of using social protection in FCAS.</p> <p>7: The pace of change is necessarily slow and incremental. The expectations of stakeholders and timeframe for the programme need to be calibrated to this reality.</p>	<p>2: BASIC addresses an important gap by focussing on the use of Social Protection approaches in FCAS.</p> <p>3: BASIC is designed to contribute to reducing unsustainable pressures on humanitarian budgets. So far this is more clearly demonstrated through improving the efficiency of crisis assistance than directly increasing the diversity of funding sources.</p> <p>5: BASIC has been less responsive to the needs of other national level stakeholders or FCDO teams at the central level.</p> <p>6: There is little evidence to suggest BASIC has met priority needs of country governments.</p> <p>7: There is little evidence so far on how relevant the research is to meeting demand and the priority needs of users.</p> <p>29: BASIC has so far undertaken few dedicated capacity building activities.</p> <p>36: There is some evidence that BASIC has built individual, but not institutional, capabilities.</p> <p>38: Uptake of GESI-related TA outputs and recommendations has been strongest in cases where users specifically requested relevant expertise – reiterating the importance of building country demand for gender-responsive and inclusive SP.</p>
<b>2) The responsibilities for delivering on these strategic priorities should be clarified by FCDO SPT and supported through investment in the required capacities.</b>	<p>3: The effectiveness of working through the pathway of change outlined above has significant synergies with the capacity of FCDO country posts to engage and synergies with programme funding.</p> <p>4: BASIC technical assistance is less well adapted to directly servicing stakeholders, including other donors and local authorities, beyond FCDO country posts.</p>	<p>5: BASIC has been less responsive to the needs of other national level stakeholders or FCDO teams at the central level.</p> <p>19: However, a range of contextual and design factors prevented the optimal coordination between suppliers.</p> <p>54: VFM measures have been defined for both workstreams, management structures consider VFM in decision-making and risk management processes are fit for purpose. However, the sufficiency of FCDO management capacity has been an issue. This has now been addressed through the injection of more resources including a programme manager and a couple of additional short-term positions resourced via HSOT.</p>

Recommendations	Supporting conclusions	Supporting findings
<p><b>3) FCDO SPT, in conjunction with the BASIC suppliers, should seek to enhance and formalise partnerships with key stakeholders at the global level to maximise synergies with, and leverage the impact of, BASIC investments.</b></p>	<p>2: BASIC has provided valuable support to building common donor positions in support of the use of social protection approaches in crises through supporting FCDO influencing efforts and strengthening donor coordination.</p> <p>4: BASIC technical assistance is less well adapted to directly servicing stakeholders, including other donors and local authorities, beyond FCDO country posts.</p> <p>7: The pace of change is necessarily slow and incremental . The expectations of stakeholders and timeframe for the programme need to be calibrated to this reality.</p>	<p>21: There was a good level of coherence between BASIC and other FCDO global programmes, although the extent of regular coordination was mixed.</p> <p>22: The aims and objectives of BASIC were broadly aligned with those of other key donors including the EU and USAID, but cooperation remains largely informal.</p> <p>23: Finally, cross-case analysis suggested achievement of external coherence is highly dependent on country context.</p> <p>28: BASIC is strengthening relationships between humanitarian and SP actors, but strategic partnerships have not yet been developed.</p> <p>35: BASIC support has also begun to improve coordination between donors and agencies on humanitarian and SP policy and programming.</p> <p>38: The evaluation has identified three main factors which have, and are likely to continue to, enable or constrain BASIC's ability to bring about outcome level change: How strategically users (are able to) draw on BASIC support in support of their objectives; the political economy of social assistance provision; and, funding environments, within FCDO and across humanitarian-SP actors.</p> <p>43: However, there is currently limited potential for BASIC to bring about diversified and more sustainable funding .</p> <p>62: Delivery modalities, FCDO CO engagement in advocacy and influencing activities and interest and active involvement of partner governments are some of the factors likely to drive sustainability of BASIC TA's work. The COVID-19 pandemic was viewed as an opportunity to drive sustainable change to social protection approaches in crises.</p> <p>64: Feedback from key informants also supported the view that a TA programme in combination with a funding programme can create more power to exert influence and generate sustainable impact rather than a TA facility on its own.</p>



Recommendations	Supporting conclusions	Supporting findings
<b>4) BASIC TAF, in conjunction with FCDO SPT, should ensure that the best practices developed under SPACE are integrated and further enhanced. This should be prioritised during the inception phase.</b>	<p>1: BASIC provides appropriate, efficient and effective demand driven support to FCDO country posts in supporting the development of new or strengthened country plans and programmes and supporting their decision making.</p> <p>2: BASIC has provided valuable support to building common donor positions in support of the use of social protection approaches in crises through supporting FCDO influencing efforts and strengthening donor coordination.</p>	<p>8: While the initial provision of TA by BASIC and SPACE was highly driven by demand at the country level, the need to balance the responsive nature of the support with a more strategic approach emerged during implementation.</p> <p>11: Whilst consideration of gender-responsive and inclusive SP in the initial stages of TAS was relatively weak, this improved dramatically with the advent of SPACE.</p> <p>14: BASIC adapted rapidly and flexibly to the Covid-19 crisis by establishing SPACE.</p> <p>50: While the launch of SPACE and overall response to TA requests was efficient, efficient delivery of the Research workstream was severely compromised by procurement delays and funding uncertainty, with the latter also impacting the planning of TA requests and the transition to a longer-term delivery mechanism for the TA workstream.</p> <p>53: Gender and inclusion considerations are reflected in BASIC's TA delivery (particularly under SPACE) and plans for the Research workstream.</p> <p>56: Feedback from stakeholders indicated consensus on BASIC and SPACE responding to requests in a timely manner.</p> <p>59: At the global level, SPACE is likely to have acted as a catalyst to shaping the COVID-19 responses of a wider pool of users and different donors.</p> <p>60: There is evidence from the country case studies that BASIC/SPACE is acting as a catalyst contributing to national policy and legislative reforms, most notably in Nigeria.</p> <p>61: Findings on effectiveness (see EQ 3.3) indicate that there is only limited evidence that BASIC has improved institutional capabilities, although SPACE has directly facilitated coordination and learning between experts along the humanitarian-development nexus.</p>

## Appendix 9. Mapping EQUALS criteria to report content

*This section presents a mapping of EQUALS criteria to report body and Appendix sections to indicate where evidence that we have met each criteria can be found.*

**Table 10.1: Mapping baseline reporting to EQUALS criteria**

#	Criteria	Report section	Appendix section
1. STRUCTURE AND CLARITY			
1.1	The product is accessible to the intended audience (e.g., free of jargon, written in plain English, logical use of chapters, appropriate use of tables, graphs and diagrams).	All	NA
1.2	It is clear who has carried out the evaluation. The roles and responsibilities of evaluation management team are clearly defined.	1	2.10
1.3	An executive summary is included, and it can stand alone as an accurate summary of the main product.	Executive Summary	NA
1.4	The annexes contain – at the least – the original TORs, the evaluation framework, the use and influence plan, a bibliography and a list of consultees. Annexes increase the usefulness of the product.	NA	1,2,10,8
1.5	The product is of publishable quality.	All	All
2. CONTEXT, PURPOSE, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES			
2.1	The product provides or references/links to a relevant and sufficient description of the intervention to be evaluated. At the least, this should include detail on the intervention's anticipated impact, outcomes and outputs, target groups, timescale, geographical coverage, and the extent to which the intervention aimed to address issues of equity, poverty and exclusion.	2	1
2.2	The product describes the intervention logic and/or theory of change.	2	1.3, 4.1
2.3	The product provides a relevant and sufficient description of the local, national and/or international development context within which the intervention was operating. There is an assessment of the policy context for the intervention and this includes reference to poverty reduction strategies, gender equality, environmental protection, and human rights.	2	1.3
2.4	The purpose and objectives of the evaluation are clearly articulated. Accountability and learning have been considered and it is clear to the reader why the evaluation has been undertaken and how the findings of the evaluation will be utilised.	1	
2.5	The product describes the target audience(s) for the evaluation findings and clearly identifies the key stakeholders for the evaluation.	1	
2.6	The product explains the timing of the evaluation and clearly acknowledges how the timing of evaluation outputs relate to strengthening the utility of the evaluation	1	
2.7	The product clearly outlines what aspects of the intervention were and were not covered by the evaluation.	1	
3. METHODOLOGY			
3.1	The evaluation design is clearly stated (e.g. the type of qualitative or quantitative designs such as RCT, case-based etc), and choice of evaluation criteria are justified.	3.1	2.2.2
3.2	The evaluation framework is clearly articulated indicating the evaluation criteria, evaluation questions, data sources and methods.	-	2.2.1-2.2.3
3.3	The evaluation methods are described and justified, and limitations discussed alongside strategies undertaken to mitigate risks.	3	2.2.4,2.5
3.4	Primary and secondary data sources are clearly distinguished, reliable/valid and sampling strategies are explained and justified including sample sizes. The approaches to data disaggregation and triangulation are explained.	3	2.2.5
3.5	Where applicable access to data sources is provided.	-	2.2.4
3.6	Any departures from the TOR, inception phase and / or original evaluation design are adequately explained.	-	1.2
3.7	The product discusses any inherent imbalances or biases that interviews, and other data collection may have created, and how these were overcome.	3	2.2

3.8	Instruments were tested and validated (e.g. pre-testing of questionnaires).	3	2.2.6
3.9	The participation of stakeholders in the evaluation (design, implementation, feedback, dissemination and use) is clearly explained. Where stakeholders were not able to participate, secondary data sources were identified and referred to.	-	2.3
3.1	The evaluation process provided affected stakeholders with access to evaluation-related information in forms that were accessible to those stakeholders and respected people and honoured confidentiality. All quotes/ data are anonymised (names removed etc).	-	2.3, 2.6
3.11	To what extent has the evaluation been implemented in accordance with Paris Declaration principles? Have issues of country ownership and management been addressed? To what extent has the evaluation used country systems? How far has the evaluation harmonised approaches with other donors? Has the evaluation contributed to building evaluation capacity within partner countries?	-	2.4
4. ETHICS AND SAFEGUARDING			
4.1	The methodology and inclusion of participants respected concerns around human rights, gender, age, ethnicity, disability, caste, religion, geographic location, ability, socio-economic status and hard to reach groups. If not, the reasons are provided, and they are justifiable.	-	2.6-2.7
4.2	The report describes how the approach adhered to international best practice and standards of ethical conduct in evaluation in sufficient detail, and draws on relevant aspects of DFID's Ethical Guidance for Research, Evaluation and Monitoring Activities; the report demonstrates ethical considerations throughout the process, referencing gender and/or power dynamic considerations, privacy and confidentiality of evaluation participants etc.	-	2.6
4.3	The principle of "Do no harm" is cited and the report explains how this was upheld throughout all activities.	-	2.6
4.4	Where vulnerable community members participated, or highly sensitive geographic or thematic areas were covered, the report explains how formal approval from an Ethical or Institutional Review Board were obtained.	NA - Research not undertaken with sensitive groups.	
4.5	Stakeholders affected by the intervention are properly considered in terms of their data protection and access to their own personal data. The practical arrangements and safeguarding considerations around collecting information from vulnerable individuals or groups were adequately considered and not expected to affect the data quality and the welfare, security and well-being of these groups.	2	2.6-2.9
4.6	If there was a reward or compensation structure for participants, or risk of participant burden, there is a discussion and explanation of the effects on results (and biases to results).	NA	NA
4.7	The report explains how stakeholders affected by the intervention were and/or will be provided with appropriate access to evaluation-related information in forms that respect confidentiality (beneficiary feedback).	-	2.11
4.8	The report documents the approaches taken in relation to quality assurance, managing data integrity and responsible data practices including privacy, confidentiality and consent.	3	2.13
4.9	All data collection instruments (and those of secondary data) are clearly shown to not have any ethical problems associated with them, or where there are questions, they are adequately addressed.	NA	2.6, 2.2.6
4.1	If any digital tools are developed that influenced the delivery of activities or were used for data collection, the report explains how the implementation reflected the Principles for Digital Development (see DFID Digital Strategy 2018 to 2020: doing development in a digital world), and explains the application of ethical considerations in design and deployment.	NA	2.9
4.11	The anticipated risks and challenges, and mitigation strategies, both contextual and methodological, are discussed as well as any unanticipated issues.	3	2.14
5. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS			
5.1	Information is presented, analysed and interpreted systematically and logically, and against the evaluation questions and criteria	4, 5	
5.2	The evaluation is transparent about the sources and quality of information, and references or sources are provided. Evidence is clearly and sufficiently triangulated.	4, 5	2, 9

5.3	Evidence can be traced through the analysis and into findings, conclusions and recommendations. There is sufficient cross-referencing.	4, 5	9
5.4	The analysis includes an appropriate reflection of the views of different stakeholders (reflecting diverse interests). They are disaggregated to show impact and outcomes on the different stakeholder groups.	4, 5	
5.5	Where appropriate the analysis and findings address the cross-cutting issues of gender, poverty, human rights, HIV/AIDS, environment, anti-corruption, capacity building, and power relations.	4, 5	
5.6	The relevance of the context (e.g. developmental, policy, institutional) is considered.	4, 5	9
5.7	Findings are useful and they are presented in ways that are accessible to different users.	4, 5	
5.8	Issues of attribution are considered.	4, 5	2.2.2
5.9	Unintended and unexpected findings are identified, and discussed	4, 5	
5.1	Conclusions provide reasoned judgement based on the evidence presented in the analysis and findings.	5	9
6. RECOMMENDATIONS			
6.1	Recommendations are relevant to the evaluation and targeted at the intended users.	5	
6.2	They are prioritised and clearly presented, enabling individuals or departments to follow up on each specific recommendation.		
6.3	They are actionable and realistic for intended actors to take forward.		
7. LESSONS			
7.1	Lessons are presented separately with a clear logical distinction between findings, recommendations and lessons learned. OCED DAC defines Lessons as "Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact."	5	
7.2	Lessons are valid (i.e. they have not been generalised from single point findings).		
7.3	Lessons reflect the interests of different stakeholders, including different sexes.		
7.4	Lessons contribute to general knowledge and they are useful.		
7.5	The mechanism by which lessons will be shared with key stakeholders (across DFID and beyond DFID) is clearly documented		3
8. MANAGEMENT			
8.1	Stakeholders and end-users have been given opportunities to comment on the draft findings, recommendations and lessons. The evaluation report reflects those comments and acknowledges disagreements.	3	2.11
8.2	Differences of opinion (within the evaluation team, or amongst stakeholders consulted) are fully acknowledged in the report.	4, 5	
8.3	There is a use & influence plan within the report. It identifies how dissemination of evaluation results could lead to improved utility.	-	3
8.4	The report indicates whether the evaluation team was able to work freely and without interference.	-	2.12
8.5	Any conflicts of interest are openly discussed.	-	2.12
8.6	Information sources and their contributions were independent of other parties with an interest in the evaluation.	-	2.12
8.7	There is a commitment within the report to understand how the evaluation outputs have been used and monitor the impact of the evaluation findings.	5	

## Appendix 10. BASIC programme evaluation Terms of Reference

*This Appendix presents the original Terms of References for the evaluation and a summary of the agreed deviations from this document and the Inception Report.*

### 11.1 Terms of Reference

#### A. Introduction

These Terms of Reference are for an evaluation of the Better Assistance in Crises (BASIC) programme managed by the DFID Social Protection Team (SPT) in the Inclusive Societies Department (ISD).<sup>111</sup> The programme of £20.5m started on 30 October 2018 and will end in March 2024. It aims to help poor and vulnerable people cope better with crises and meet their basic needs through more effective social assistance in contexts of recurrent shocks, protracted conflict and forced displacement. The evaluation will assess the performance of BASIC in:

- Influencing national governments' and development partners' policies, programmes, systems and evidence on the use of social protection approaches in crises
- Strengthening human and institutional capacities to use social protection approaches in crises
- Delivering quality programme services to governments, partners, and HMG/DFID teams

The evaluation will also generate learning for DFID, governments and partners that provide services such as technical assistance, research and capacity strengthening on what works to influence policy, programme, and systems-level change. The primary recipients of this evaluation are the DFID Social Protection Team and suppliers. Secondary and Tertiary users are specified in Section C. The evaluation should commence in late May/ early June 2020 and evaluate BASIC implementation until March 2024.

#### B. Purpose and objectives of the evaluation

##### Purpose of the evaluation

In line with the definition of a performance evaluation, the purpose of this evaluation is to independently assess the effectiveness of the BASIC Programme in achieving desired outputs and contributing towards the desired outcomes and impact. The evaluation will provide a deeper understanding of the quality of the implementation to enable adaptive programming and to inform future programmes design. It will:

- Provide near real-time evidence to improve BASIC programme processes, ways of working, knowledge exchange and learning, but it is not expected that outcome or impact data would be available early enough in the evaluation to inform significant adaptations to the programme approach during implementation.
- Provide evidence and learning to DFID / HMG, governments and partners on how technical assistance and research can contribute to a greater use of social protection approaches in crises.
- Inform the design of future centrally managed programmes (next phase of business planning, e.g., BASIC 2.0) and deepen global evidence and learning on programme modalities that work to effect changes in policy, programmes, and systems.

An independent performance evaluation is necessary in addition to the regular monitoring of process and outputs delivery by the programme as there are clear evidence gaps in how technical assistance and research (and the way they are combined) can influence behaviour and choices of policy makers and practitioners. Understanding the relevance, quality and value of technical assistance remains weak, and more in-depth study through this evaluation is needed to draw out the impacts of this type of assistance and the combined impacts of technical assistance with research.

##### Objectives of the evaluation

The primary objective of the evaluation is learning, with accountability being a second objective. The objectives of this evaluation are to:

- Assess whether, why and how BASIC programme is achieving its stated outputs and outcomes, and progress towards impact; if intended outputs and outcomes were realistic and appropriate, and if there were any unintended outputs and outcomes,
- Identify what is working (and not) and why in promoting a greater use of social protection approaches in crises and policy change and enhanced capacities through technical assistance, research, influencing and capacity strengthening; generate evidence and learning on the effectiveness of the programme (and how it can be improved),
- Provide evaluative evidence that can strengthen the approach to monitoring within and across programme workstreams, with a particular focus on strengthening the programme logframe, and providing practical support to strengthen monitoring of BASIC TAS and BASIC Research.
- Generate learning and evidence on what works from the combination of technical assistance, research, influencing and capacity strengthening in promoting policy, programme and systems-level change in crises, assessing the effectiveness of delivery modalities used in the programme and their combination,
- Learn from the above and make recommendations on what form a future service delivery programme should look like, in particular the next phase of business planning for BASIC 2.0.

### C. Recipient, use and influence plan, and stakeholder engagement

The primary recipients of this evaluation are the DFID Social Protection Team and BASIC suppliers (TAS and Research). The secondary end users are DFID internal stakeholders such as:

- DFID Country Offices and teams implementing social protection and humanitarian assistance programmes in crises,
- Governments and partners implementing social protection and humanitarian assistance programmes in countries,
- Inclusive Societies Department (ISD) and other DFID departments / teams implementing centrally managed programmes delivering technical assistance and research. Learning from the evaluation will contribute to improved programming across ISD (including development of BASIC 2.0) and DFID.
- DFID Internal stakeholder groups: internal BASIC reference group, the shock- responsive services group and affiliated groups as listed below

The tertiary end users of the evaluation are external technical assistance and research programmes, governments, donors, agencies, think tanks, and consultancy firms involved in social protection and social assistance in crises. As part of the design phase, the most important external end users will need to be identified with an initial list below (see Tables 1 and 2). The findings of the evaluation will need to be disseminated to different groups to share the learning on what works and what does not to influence and shift policy and programmes for greater use of social protection approaches in crises. This applies to both the global and country level influencing carried out through BASIC. Given the variety of end users of the evaluation, all reports should be written in plain English for policy-making audiences who do not have a background in research and evaluation.

**Table 1: Indicative evaluation use, influence and uptake plan**

End user	Influence objective	Communication channel	Influence enabler
Primary			

End user	Influence objective	Communication channel	Influence enabler
DFID's Social Protection Team	Influence future policy and programming on use of social protection approaches in crises.  Influence approach to engaging/influencing country offices and international partners on social protection in crises policy, programmes, systems and capacity.	Co-design and approval of evaluation framework  Regular communication on progress and findings of evaluation  Succinct findings papers, briefings, presentations and other comms tools on key evaluation and policy questions	Confidence in evaluation methodology and quality  Confidence in wider relationships of evaluation team with BASIC suppliers
TAS supplier	Demonstrate what works and why across different technical assistance modalities, their combinations and articulation with research	Consult during design of evaluation framework and methodology  Robust analysis and presentation of findings	Confidence in evaluation method and quality
Research Supplier	Demonstrate what works and why in research and evidence uptake	Consult during design of evaluation framework and methodology  Robust analysis and presentation of findings  Close link of evaluation with BASIC research	Confidence in Relationship of evaluation team with supplier's research team
<b>Secondary</b>			
DFID Country Offices/teams, government and partners	Influence design and implementation of Humanitarian and SP policies, programmes and systems including TA to increase the use of social protection approaches in crises	Effective dissemination of findings on what works	Timely and appropriate communications
DFID TA Facility and research programmes (other than BASIC) / Teams and internal stakeholder groups	Demonstrate what works to make policy and programming shift Influence design and delivery of TA and research programmes	Effective dissemination of findings	Timely and appropriate communications
<b>Tertiary</b>			
External TA and research programmes	Demonstrate what works to make policy and programming shift Influence design and delivery of TA and research programmes	Effective dissemination of findings	Timely and appropriate communications

In addition to the evaluation recipients there are a wide range of evaluation stakeholders who will be engaged and consulted at various points of the evaluation process, both in data collection and dissemination of findings. See Table 2.

**Table 2: Indicative evaluation stakeholders**



Essential target groups	Relevance to evaluation
<b>Internal</b>	
DFID staff working on social protection and on humanitarian assistance in HQ and in country	Direct and indirect BASIC programme recipients (i.e., those involved in the BASIC programme directly and those that are reached through more indirect means – knowledge exchange and learning events)
Essential target groups	Relevance to evaluation
Internal groups and communities of practice: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internal reference group for BASIC</li> <li>Shock responsive services group</li> <li>Protracted Crisis Community of Practice</li> <li>Group on Helpdesks and TA facilities</li> <li>Social protection community of practice</li> </ul>	Direct and indirect BASIC programme recipients (i.e. those involved in the BASIC programme directly and those that are reached through more indirect means – knowledge exchange and learning events)
<b>External</b>	
Government policy makers and implementers (national and local level) working on (shock- responsive) social protection policies and programmes, and on humanitarian assistance / DRM	Intended programme recipients, potentially direct through BASIC TA and/or research, recognising some will be more directly involved in programme activities.
Donors and partners in country (WB, UN agencies, NGOs and Civil society, Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement)	Potentially direct programme recipients depending on the nature of BASIC TA support. Indirect recipients through synergies and coherence of BASIC TA, research and knowledge exchange and learning.
Other development partners globally (in SP and humanitarian linkages), including (not exhaustive): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>External reference group for BASIC</li> <li>ECHO TA facilities and any other relevant TA facilities (if new emerge)</li> <li>CaLP</li> <li>CashCap</li> <li>World Bank</li> <li>UN agencies</li> <li>Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement</li> <li>NGOs working in the nexus</li> <li>ODI, OPM, IDS, Climate Centre and other relevant Think Tanks and organisations</li> <li>Grand Bargain workstreams and groups (e.g., GB sub-group on linking humanitarian cash and social protection)</li> <li>Like-minded donors (e.g., from the common donor approach to cash)</li> </ul>	Level of awareness and support for linking humanitarian assistance and social protection.

## D. Scope

The evaluation will focus on systems change resulting from the BASIC programme workstreams, influencing and activities. This might also need to consider proximate and intermediate indicators of social protection and humanitarian assistance systems, programmes, policies and approaches in crises that will be observable over the life of the BASIC programme. It will not seek to identify changes in the lives of recipients of social protection approaches in crises. The evaluation will look at each of the BASIC workstreams independently and then the synergies achieved (or not) across workstreams. The evaluation will generate its own evidence on the effects of programme workstreams but will also need to link to any reviews or evaluations planned by BASIC programme suppliers.

The BASIC research workstream might include evaluation of social protection / assistance programme impacts on people's needs, wellbeing and resilience. This might include a focus on the impact of research and / or technical assistance on policy and programmes and the ways in which research and / or technical assistance have influenced change. Whilst the two teams will need to establish a good working relationship, the scope should remain separate, with this evaluation focusing on research as one of the BASIC ways of working. The DFID SPT will be evaluating its Gender Responsive Social Protection (GRSP) programme at the same time as the BASIC evaluation. Whilst

these programmes are separate, they have similarities in delivery mechanisms, particularly the provision of technical assistance to improve social protection policy and programming. The evaluations will be conducted separately but should establish a good working relationship to support broader learning on technical assistance.

## **E. Methodology**

The Theory of Change for BASIC (in Annex 1) forms the basis for this evaluation which will be a theory-based evaluation. Evaluation findings will in turn inform and help refine the theory of change and logframe. Mixed methods will be used, generating primary data and drawing on secondary monitoring and evaluation data, to test pathways of change and respond to the evaluation questions.

The supplier will develop approaches and methodologies to explore the effectiveness of TAS (including capacity strengthening and knowledge management and learning), of Research and of the synergies between them. These could be one of the following theory-based methods or a combination. It is expected that the methods will be different for TAS and research and potential across actors:

- Process mapping or tracing,
- Contribution analysis, or
- Outcome mapping.

The supplier will develop an appropriate evaluation approach, design and methodology to answer the evaluation questions in ways that will provide credible, timely, insightful and substantive evidence to meet the needs of the main audiences. Indicative evaluation questions are listed below, suppliers will refine these questions and the supplier will agree a final set of evaluation questions with DFID, in consultation with BASIC suppliers. We expect the supplier to explain why their approach, design and methodology is suitable and appropriate to the context and the objectives of the programme, how it will test the theory of change, and robustly measure achievement of programme results. We do not expect that the evaluation will require the collection of primary data from beneficiaries of social protection or social assistance programmes in crises. However, suppliers may want to make the case and set out the rationale for such data collection. This would need to be agreed with DFID.

The evaluation methodology will be finalised during the inception phase and approved by DFID before moving into implementation. However, bidders are expected to provide enough detail both on how they will address the scope set out for the inception phase and their proposed approach to evaluation implementation. The supplier should include an evaluation matrix which shows how each of the evaluation questions will be addressed, including key data sources and methods. Suppliers should consider whether to use comparison or control groups.

The evaluation will look across the breadth of programme interventions and then complement this with deep dives or case studies into specific interventions and activities to better understand change processes. This should be done at the national level – e.g., national policies and stakeholders – and the global level – e.g. influence on social protection and humanitarian assistance networks and global policies. The evaluation will need to distinguish between spheres of programme influence from those directly involved in BASIC activities to those indirectly or more distantly affected. It is too early to determine which countries are suitable for deep dives or case studies given BASIC TAS has started less than a year ago and BASIC research hasn't started yet. Some countries that may be covered by BASIC (TAS and / or research) are listed in Annex 1. Four deep engagement countries will be selected once the BASIC research supplier is in place: such countries will receive a combined package of BASIC TAS and BASIC research.

We expect the evaluation to conduct analysis in at least some of the four BASIC deep engagement countries as well as a representative sample of the countries where BASIC is providing either TAS or research alone. We are also interested in evidence of BASIC influencing non-BASIC countries. We expect the evaluation team to have capacity to follow up on anecdotal examples of impact (or explore potential impact) in two non-BASIC countries. This will be a much lighter-touch process than the analysis to take place in BASIC countries. The supplier should develop an approach to country selection for baseline studies, and criteria for country deep dives, and during the inception phase, DFID and BASIC suppliers will work with the evaluation supplier to refine country selection. The final list of countries will be signed off by DFID and the evaluation supplier will be expected to confirm acceptance for Duty of care.

If circumstances change significantly in any of the countries selected for deep dives / case studies during the evaluation implementation, DFID and the Supplier will review the situation, and decide whether the evaluation should be conducted in alternative country/ies. DFID retains the right to approve/reject alternative countries. Changes of costs due to change of country/ies cannot exceed the total value of the Evaluation programme. Changes in countries and associated costs and budgets will require DFID's approval. Suppliers will recognise – from programme documentation and DFID policy statements – the importance attached to gender, disability and social inclusion. This must be reflected throughout the conduct of the evaluation and addressed sufficiently in the evaluation methodology, findings and lessons.

## **F. Data collection and analysis.**

The supplier will receive access to all available project monitoring data and evaluation data that is collected by BASIC suppliers. They will also be responsible during inception phase for working with the BASIC suppliers to ensure robust monitoring – indicators and methodologies – are put in place (or refined) that are both functional to monitoring progress and evaluating the programme. Following the revision of supplier monitoring frameworks we expect the evaluation supplier to draw heavily on the robust and thorough approach to project level monitoring conducted by supplier. A minimal list of methods for information gathering follows but we expect additional and/or innovative methods to be explored in the inception phase:

- review of documents (e.g. internal BASIC TAS and research monitoring documents, outputs; policy and programme documents from partners and governments at national and global levels)
- in-house surveys to DFID staff in Whitehall and country offices, and other key partners who have benefitted from BASIC services or requested services (both TAS and research);
- interviews and surveys with actors who have benefitted directly or indirectly from BASIC TAS and BASIC research;
- in-depth discussions with the suppliers, SPT and a variety of stakeholders, including staff working on other TA facilities, to develop an informed comparative view of these frameworks in relation to BASIC.

We will require the supplier to engage with and collect primary data from a broad range of stakeholders, representing different interests, experience and backgrounds. The supplier will develop a robust approach to sampling within their methodology. Suppliers are expected to propose their approach to primary data collection and ensure there is sufficient budget, fieldwork and time allocated. Where in-country work is required we expect the evaluation to work with local evaluators in the most efficient and cost-effective way. The supplier will develop a clear approach to in-country work, including how they will obtain national ethical approval and will manage logistics including policies and practices on duty of care and safeguarding.

## **G. Draft evaluation questions**

The evaluation will be split in two phases with the inception phase refining the evaluation questions to be addressed in the implementation phase. The scope of the evaluation is split in questions:

- on the performance of BASIC for accountability reasons, and
- on learning for future programming.

Questions are structured following Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Evaluation criteria. The questions below are extensive, although not exhaustive and it is recognised that there is overlap between questions. The supplier may propose modifications to reduce or merge questions with a clear justification. Where appropriate, questions should include the dimensions of gender, disability and social inclusion and how BASIC support impacts on these dimensions. The supplier will refine and finalise the evaluation questions in Annex 2 during the inception phase, and they will be formally signed-off by DFID before starting the inception phase.

## **H. Data sources**

The full list of data sources will need to be completed during the inception phase but currently consists of the following:

- BASIC Business case
- BASIC TAS logframe
- BASIC Annual Reviews (first completed in October 2019)

- BASIC TAS call-down reports and deliverables
- BASIC TAS Knowledge Management strategy and outputs (starting in December 2019)
- Feedback forms on TAS from commissioning teams
- BASIC TAS KPIs and monitoring
- BASIC Research ToRs, reports and deliverables
- BASIC research KPIs and monitoring data
- Reports and deliverables from other related programmes
- Social assistance in crises programme monitoring and evaluation datasets (depending on country selection)
- Partners and governments policy and programme documents (at global and country levels)
- Primary data to be collected from key stakeholders benefiting directly or indirectly from BASIC TAS and BASIC research (DFID / HMG, partners, governments, donors etc...) – See Table 2. We do not anticipate that the evaluation will involve collection data from social assistance programme beneficiaries. However, if the supplier feels primary data collection from programme beneficiaries is necessary then they should set out a strong rationale and this will need to be agreed with DFID.

Examples of external data sources to be read during the inception phase are:

- European Commission (2019). Social Protection Across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus: A Game Changer in Supporting People through Crises. Summary reference document. Guidance Package on Social protection across the humanitarian-development Nexus (SPaN). [https://socialprotection.org/system/files/Guidance%20Package%20SPaN\\_Summary%20Reference%20Document.pdf](https://socialprotection.org/system/files/Guidance%20Package%20SPaN_Summary%20Reference%20Document.pdf)
- Guidance notes: Working with cash-based safety nets in humanitarian contexts: <http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/calp-humanitarian-practitioners-guidance-notes-en-web-.pdf>
- UNHCR paper on alignment in refugee settings: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/5cc011417.pdf>
- OPM Shock-responsive social protection study
  - Toolkit: <https://www.opml.co.uk/files/Publications/a0408-shock-responsive-social-protection-systems/srsp-toolkit.pdf?noredirect=1>
  - Policy Briefs: <https://www.opml.co.uk/publications/shock-responsive-social-protection-systems-policy-brief-series>

## I. Evaluation outputs

All outputs are expected to be high quality and accessible. Reports should include a well-designed and succinct Executive Summaries of 2-3 pages and innovative approaches to communicate findings (infographics, blogs...) should be proposed. In line with DFID's evaluation policy, all evaluation reports will be published together with a management response setting out how DFID will respond to the recommendations.

The outputs listed below for the implementation phase are indicative. We expect the supplier to provide a list of outputs for the implementation in their proposal building on the ones suggested below, including a workplan covering both the inception and implementation phases. This list will constitute the minimum outputs expected for the implementation phase: with suppliers improving or adding to these outputs but not reducing their number or scope. A more detailed view of the outputs for the implementation phase will be agreed with and signed-off by DFID during the inception period.

As the programme evolves, expected outputs for the Implementation Phase can be reviewed at Annual Reviews and at the BASIC programme midline. DFID retains the rights to review and approve any changes to expected outputs for the Implementation Phase. The midline and endline will be reviewed by DFID's Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service (EQUALS). All outputs will be reviewed and subject to approval by the DFID SPT, with selected outputs being reviewed by BASIC reference groups and BASIC suppliers (see governance arrangements). The Supplier will grant DFID an irrevocable right to publish and re-use the outputs from the evaluation.

### Inception Phase (6 months):

- *Revised logframe and report with recommendations:* on a detailed monitoring framework for the programme and for each partner, working with each partner to strengthen their existing monitoring framework including indicators, methodologies and systems required for tracking progress

- *Methodology developed for the impact indicators in the logframe*
- *Detailed evaluation methodology for the programme:* including assessing the evaluability of the BASIC programme and finalising the evaluation questions
- *Final evaluation work plan, budget and milestone payment schedule:* for the implementation phase, identifying proxies for harder to measure indicators and questions – spanning the entire programme, looking both at the individual workstreams and how well they work together
- *Communications/Use and Influence Plan:* The evaluator should include a communications/use and influence plan in their inception report. This should focus on identifying key audiences and their current levels of interest as well as plans for engagement and how learning and good practices on the effectiveness of TA, its combination with research and its measurement can be best communicated. This should include how to bring BASIC suppliers together to share learning, and how to engage other DFID teams (SP and non-SP).
- *Inception Report and Stakeholder Mapping:* An inception report should itemise all the elements of the evaluation as specified in the Terms of Reference. It should detail the methodology that will be used for the evaluation. To inform details of the evaluation design, some stakeholder mapping will be necessary.

### Implementation Phase (up to 41 months)

- *Baseline Report:* setting out the initial available data across outcome and output indicators and the baseline situation for the specific evaluation case studies that will be conducted (e.g. country case studies, TA study, ways of working assessments or others as detailed in the supplier's methodology).
- *Midline Report:* providing a review of progress to date and making recommendations for programme adaptations and wider lessons for DFID and BASIC suppliers. We would expect a substantial, thorough midline report to be completed near the middle of the programme.
- *End line Report:* the final report will be delivered at the end of the BASIC programme with the focus on capturing the longer-term outcomes of efforts to strengthen the use of social protection approaches in crises and providing recommendations on how DFID, governments, partners and the wider social protection and humanitarian sectors can take this agenda forward. We would like the final report to be delivered after the end of the BASIC programme, with the focus on capturing the longer-term outcomes, while reviewing other findings with the benefit of further perspectives and evidence which may be captured.
- *A learning series including short, action-orientated briefing papers, and events* (webinars, roundtables, seminars, training modules, a set of presentations to DFID) on a range of themes including: measurement and evaluation of the effectiveness of TA and its combination with research, lessons in what works to promote an increased use of social protection approaches in crises, influencing governments and national partners etc. (from mid to end of programme). The inception report should propose the themes and timeline for the learning series, with some room for adaptation over the course of implementation. This element of the evaluation will provide more timely assessment of programme performance, including any recommendations for changes in ways of working. Suppliers should outline their initial proposal on the learning series – numbers and times.

### Reporting

- *Brief monthly (inception) and Quarterly (implementation) progress reports.* The Supplier will be expected to provide quarterly progress reports to which specific outputs will be tied. Reports will take the form of a presentation to the DFID SPT.
- *Annual reports:* DFID conducts Annual Reviews of all programmes to assess progress against the logframe, ensure that the programme is on track, and consider if any adjustments should be made. The Supplier will be expected to produce Annual Reports using DFID's standard format to feed into BASIC Annual reviews (due 30 October each year). Annual progress reports will provide detail on progress against agreed evaluation activities, outputs, indicators and milestones, and highlight learning to date and recommendations for adaptation, including (as appropriate) suggested changes to the theory of change based on emerging evidence (deadline end September each year).
- *A final progress report to feed into DFID's BASIC Programme Completion Report (PCR):* The Supplier will be expected to produce a final report using DFID's PCR format.
- *Financial reporting:* The evaluation team will be expected to report on VFM measures, and this will be assessed during DFID Annual Reviews and quarterly reviews. The Supplier will also be required to provide regular, highly accurate financial forecasts and reports (preliminary budgets prior to DFID's financial year, monthly reports for financial forecasting; quarterly financial reports, annual audited financial statements). DFID will closely monitor forecasts and spending against budgets, including through a review of spending in quarter three each year. Annual Reviews of the programme will include financial scrutiny.

## J. Timeline

This evaluation should commence in financial year 2020/2021, in May / early June 2020, and evaluate BASIC implementation throughout the life of BASIC until the end of March 2024. The inception phase will last six months from contract signature. The implementation phase will start immediately following the approval of the inception phase report and will last for up to 41 months concluding at the end of the project in March 2024. There is potential to extend this contract for up to 2 years, subject to programme need, available budget, supplier performance and appropriate approval.

## K. Budget and payments

The contract value (excluding VAT) will be up to £700,000 including all costs (incl. in-country): management costs, professional fees, travel, duty of care, local taxes and other expenses. There is potential to extend this contract by up to £350,000 (excluding VAT), subject to programme need, available budget, supplier performance and appropriate approvals. Annex 1 outlines current countries of BASIC activities, however the final geographical footprint of the programme is not known. Bidders should propose an approach for country selection and include costs related to in-country evaluation activities. At a minimum this should include 4 country visits, but bidders should propose a flexible approach to this element of the evaluation. Expenses incurred by the supplier will be paid as actual costs incurred.

The contract will be performance-based for both inception and implementation phases, and all outputs will be approved by the DFID SPT. Suppliers should propose a payment schedule, identifying at which milestone each output (from the list in paragraph 46) will be paid. For the implementation phase DFID reserves the right to withhold up to 15% of output payments if Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are not met. The supplier will propose an output-based price for each of the Inception Phase deliverables (see paragraph 46) in line with the KPIs at table 3 below. The output-based price should cover fees only (with expenses for both the inception and implementation phases reimbursed as actual costs incurred). For inception, if the criteria are not met, payment for outputs not delivered will be withheld until satisfactory delivery of outputs.

The table below presents the KPIs proposed by DFID that will be further refined with the Supplier during the inception phase and approved by DFID. These will be reviewed as part of the supplier's annual performance review and linked to milestone payments. Final milestones will be updated and agreed during the inception phase in line with the workplan and report submissions.

**Table 3: Key performance indicators**

<b>KPI 1 Management, Delivery and Financial</b>	Milestones/deliverables provided on time to the satisfaction of the client (delivered within 5 days of planned date, approved by SPT after a maximum of two rounds of comments)
	Accurate and timely submission of expenditure forecast and invoices (within 2 days of planned date and within 5% variance of that quarter)
	Up to date delivery chain map and risk register (updated within the last quarter, verified at annual review and/or by DFID SPT spotcheck)
<b>KPI 2 Customer and Partner relationship</b>	Active engagement with DFID (monthly/quarterly meetings as agreed)
	Active engagement with BASIC suppliers (monthly/quarterly meetings as agreed and annual presentation to the KML leads)
	Active engagement with key stakeholders identified in the evaluation communication and uptake plan (specific indicator to be determined at the end of the inception phase once a final communication and uptake plan is approved)

## L. Roles and Responsibilities



The evaluation team will report to DFID's SPT. The primary point of contact for the evaluation team is the Senior Responsible Officer of BASIC. The SPT programme manager will be the contact for programme and contract management issues. Governance arrangements will be developed by DFID during the inception phase, but DFID SPT will be ultimately responsible for milestone and outputs approvals and enabling participation of country offices. The BASIC internal and external reference groups will be involved as per the to be determined governance arrangements.

The Supplier will provide regular updates to DFID on the progress of the evaluation; brief monthly updates are likely to be appropriate during intensive periods with quarterly or six-monthly updates at other times. These updates should be in the form of a meeting, with minutes provided by the supplier. Suppliers should expect to deliver three formal presentations at DFID, one for each phase of the evaluation (baseline, midline, endline; noting this is in addition to tele-conferences, as necessary, and other plans for communications). These meetings will be hosted in London but may involve teleconferencing or video conferencing with DFID country offices. The supplier may use video conferencing for some participation but should budget for core members to attend a minimum of one meeting per phase.

## **M. Input, qualification and expertise of supplier**

This work will be carried out by a team of experts, who have solid expertise in conducting evaluations of this nature, and strong sector skills (in particular humanitarian cash and social protection). The team of experts will include the following skills and expertise. Evaluation methodology and themes:

- A team and team leader with strong track records in delivering robust evaluations in the field of social protection and humanitarian assistance
- The team should have expertise of successfully designing and undertaking monitoring and evaluation in developing and fragile and conflict affected countries, including regional and multi-country programmes, and evaluations across multiple partners
- The team should contain members with expertise in evaluating:
  - Social protection programmes and systems that can or seek to respond to shock and / or build people's resilience to shocks
  - Humanitarian assistance and linkages with development / social protection
  - Technical assistance services;
  - Research;
  - Capacity building;
  - Policy and practice influencing;
  - Knowledge management and learning.
- The team should contain members with expertise in conducting evaluations using different approaches and methods, including:
  - Theory based evaluation
  - Synthesis and interpretation of quantitative data sets
  - Qualitative and quantitative primary data collection and analysis
  - Disaggregated data collection and analysis to generate insights into what is effective, why and how in different contexts for different groups
- The team should contain expertise in delivering flexible and responsive evaluations and demonstrate ability to critically reflect upon and respond to emerging findings and the changes to the external environment.

### **Leadership and partnerships:**

- Knowledge and expertise of working with DFID, developing country governments, development and humanitarian partners, other donors and civil society
- The team and any consortia should reflect substantive and meaningful partnerships with consultancies and/or research institutes and evaluators based in the global south to ensure they are strategically engaged within this scope of work.
- The proposals must clearly outline the roles and responsibilities, including governance and reporting structures between partners.
- Demonstrated ability to provide intellectual leadership, strategic advice and challenge to successfully drive forward complex programmes of work, with expertise in working with a range of partners to use critical reflection and evidence to improve programme delivery.



## Communications:

- Constructively engaging and working with a wide range of stakeholders with different interests and levels of expertise
- Expertise in developing and delivering timely communication, dissemination and promotion of learning with a wide range of stakeholders (donors, developing country government, UN, civil society) through appropriate channels and tailored products (workshops, web-based activities, accessible and engaging reports, practical guidance etc.), and achieving meaningful uptake and use of evidence;
- Demonstrated ability to analyse a wide range of varied and complex evaluation data and information from a variety of sources and distil this into strategic programming and policy advice for management teams
- Demonstrated understanding of how organizations learn and drive change processes and use of evaluation strategies for assessing organizational change;
- Demonstrate plain English writing skills.

It is expected the supplier will have the skills required to produce work that will meet the standards of the Government Statistical Service (GSS) <https://gss.civilservice.gov.uk/>, the Government Social Research Service (GSR) <http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/networks/gsr> as well as DAC <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/qualitystandards.pdf> and DFID's standards [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/204119/DFID-Evaluation-Policy-2013.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204119/DFID-Evaluation-Policy-2013.pdf).

## N. Constraints and dependencies

We expect that there will be a number of risks and challenges in delivering this work. We have listed a few of the more significant challenges below. Therefore, suppliers should set out how they will identify, mitigate against, manage, and report additional constraints, dependencies or risks during the implementation of the evaluation. A full risk assessment should be conducted by the supplier during inception phase. Ongoing risk management will be needed during the evaluation, with any high or severe risks flagged to DFID immediately.

- Discontinuity in the programme services delivery: BASIC TAS is currently being delivered by EACDS Lot B but will be re-tendered after the first year of implementation. BASIC Research procurement is under way but not completed yet. Bidders will have to deal with the resulting challenge of developing a baseline and comparable mid-line and end-line.
- Discontinuity in the evaluation team, given the duration of the evaluation.
- Risk of changing policy environments and staff resources in DFID with potentially scaled-back ambitions and / or different priorities.
- Difficulties in accessing policy-makers, programme staff and other relevant stakeholders to collect data necessary to assess outcomes and impacts.
- High Duty of Care risk in accessing certain countries where BASIC delivers services. See section on Duty of Care.
- The evaluation will accompany programme implementation to generate baseline, mid-line and end-line data on programme contributions to outcomes and also to identify lessons. Ideally, the programme would learn, adapt and course correct during implementation. However, the feasibility of this will depend on the implementation cycles for each programme workstream, and the time lag for activities to be implemented and to start to lead to desired changes. The supplier will need to propose an approach that recognises this gap in implementation of BASIC activities and intended outcomes and impacts and design an evaluation framework that can generate lessons within this context.
- Identifying case studies or countries in which to conduct deep dives will depend on (a) having a critical mass of BASIC TAS projects and research and (b) the timely implementation of these, such that case study countries or projects can be identified and followed. As such, the evaluation may need to consider a phased approach to conducting baselines.
- The evaluation will be reliant to some extent on the quality of supplier's monitoring data (TAS and research suppliers). Indicators on quality of TA are largely based on self-reporting or client reporting, and can be subjective and/or qualitative indicators. The supplier will need to work with suppliers to ensure these are the right indicators and are measured as robustly as possible and to identify ways to triangulate measures and/or conduct deep dive assessments into a smaller number of cases to trace results independently.
- The evaluation supplier will need to work collaboratively across BASIC programme suppliers, strengthening and influencing their approach to M&E and also work in close collaboration with any

independent evaluations or reviews planned by suppliers (especially within the research workstream). The bid should outline how the evaluation will engage and coordinate with BASIC suppliers, including supporting their capacity and approach to M&E.

- The programme aims and outcomes – contributing to humanitarian and / or social protection systems change in country and creating a step change in practice across the sector – are high ambition. However, it is important to recognise the scale and scope of TA interventions. These will often be small scale TA projects that look at a specific part of the social protection system or a specific constraint to the use of social protection approaches in crises. Therefore, when assessing impacts the evaluation needs to be realistic and proportionate, being mindful of what the individual TA projects are trying to achieve and their effectiveness in doing that, as well as how and when these smaller scale changes add up to higher order systems change.
- DFID SPT will procure a new TA Facility in 2020 to provide knowledge and technical advisory services to DFID teams (and through them governments and other country stakeholders) for the full life of the programme. Delays in procuring and starting the new TA facility may slow down the number and scope of TA projects for DFID, affecting what the evaluation can look at.

## **O. Conflict of Interest**

There is a Conflict of Interest between this contract and any contract related to the delivery of other BASIC services (BASIC technical assistance services and BASIC research). Any supplier, expert and sub-contractor involved in the delivery of BASIC services (in the past, currently or in the future) is excluded from bidding for this contract. The selected supplier for BASIC evaluation will be excluded from any tendering and contracting for future BASIC services (technical assistance and research). The supplier should immediately declare any arising issues around Conflict of Interest as they proceed through the work and ensure that appropriate mechanisms are put in place to manage this conflict. Bidding organisations should use the Register of Interests to indicate any potential conflict of interest with this request, including related current work, planned related future work, or related work completed recently.

## **P. Confidentiality**

All evaluation personnel are under an obligation not to disclose to any third parties any confidential and commercial information obtained either directly from DFID or by virtue of their engagement in relation to this contract. Confidential information may be in any form and shall include all information that, due to its character, nature or method of transmittal, a reasonable person would treat as confidential.

## **Q. Ethics**

Suppliers will have an ethics policy/code (consistent with but expanding upon DFID's Ethics principles for evaluation and research) and apply ethical clearance protocols, where appropriate. This will explicit how suppliers and sub-contractors will obtain national and organisation ethical approval. Suppliers should set out how they propose to ensure the confidential treatment of project documentation and data collected throughout the evaluation.

## **R. Branding**

The evaluation outputs will use UK Aid Branding and BASIC reporting template.

## **S. Safeguarding**

DFID's aim across all its programming is to avoid doing harm by ensuring that their interventions do not sustain unequal power relations, reinforce social exclusion and predatory institutions, exacerbate conflict, contribute to human rights risks, and/or create or exacerbate resource scarcity, climate change and/or environmental damage, and/or increasing communities' vulnerabilities to shocks and trends. DFID seek to ensure their interventions do not displace/undermine local capacity or impose long- term financial burdens on partner governments, therefore, require partners to lead and robustly consider environmental and social safeguards through its own processes and to live up to the high standards in safeguarding and protection which DFID requires.

The Supplier will produce a robust risk analysis ahead of implementation, including setting out mitigating safeguarding measures. A clear reporting and whistle blowing procedure to ensure reporting of any cases of misconduct to DFID should be put in place.

## T. Duty of Care

Overall, we have assessed DoC as high risk because of the contexts in which the programme and evaluation case studies might be conducted and the proximity to unpredictable and risky events such as floods or disease outbreaks. See Annex 3 for an example of risk rating.

## U. Background to BASIC Programme

Extreme poverty and fragility are closely interlinked: 59% of extremely poor people live in countries affected by fragility, environmental vulnerability or both, and where humanitarian needs are greatest. But the humanitarian system is ill-suited to respond: while crises are most often protracted or recurrent (86% of aid goes to protracted crises lasting three years or more), financing and delivery models are mainly short-term and reactive. Social protection approaches can help address these weaknesses; and help deliver the UK Humanitarian Reform Policy and World Humanitarian Summit commitments, including to more than double the use of cash in crises by 2025. But social protection approaches are underutilised in crises due to limited evidence, knowledge and capacity to guide programme design and delivery, and political economy challenges to reform.

Social protection here is defined as a broad range of public, and sometimes private, instruments to tackle the challenges of poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion. Social protection programmes and systems exhibit a wide range of objectives from directly reducing income poverty and other deprivations (such as lack of access to health, education, hygiene, nutrition, protection, shelter, etc.) to promoting human development, access to jobs and basic social services, addressing economic and social vulnerabilities and contributing to pro-poor economic growth. Social benefits under different social protection schemes can be transferred in cash or in-kind and can be contributory or non-contributory depending on where they are financed through a social insurance system by beneficiaries or directly by governments.

An IDS Working Paper from 2018 on the scope for integration between social protection and humanitarian response concluded: 'Whether or not more integration will provide more efficient and effective responses to crises depends on the type of shocks and the crisis context, as well as the capacity and coverage of the social protection programme to deliver to additional caseloads. Based on a review of the existing evidence, the paper concludes that important gaps need to be filled with regard to the technicalities of linking short- and longer-term interventions in humanitarian contexts, particularly in relation to mobile populations and refugees, and understanding better the political economy factors that facilitate bridging the humanitarian–development divide.'<sup>1</sup> Some donors and agencies have since then issued guidance<sup>2 3</sup> on how to align humanitarian cash to national social safety nets and how to programme social protection across the humanitarian -development nexus. However, the gaps in evidence and in how to link the technical functions remain. The incentives and disincentives for actors to change policy and align and/or integrate are still not well understood. And not enough testing has been done of different methods of applying social protection approaches in crises to allow cross-country learning and scale-up.

Better Assistance in Crises (BASIC) has therefore been set-up to help fill these gaps in evidence and practice. It is a Centrally Managed Programme (CMP) funded by the DFID Social Protection Team (SPT) that aims to help poor and vulnerable people cope better with crises and meet their basic needs through more effective social assistance in contexts of recurrent shocks, protracted conflict and forced displacement.

With a budget of £20.5m for five years, BASIC aims to tackle bottlenecks at global and country level that prevent greater use of social protection approaches in crises, through three inter-related workstreams:

- *Technical Assistance Services (TAS) (£9.625m)*: for country support, capacity building, learning, coordination and high-level policy influencing across multiple countries and at global level, and
- *Research (£10m)* that strengthens both global and country-specific evidence on using social protection approaches to respond to crises, in different contexts.

- *Monitoring and Evaluation (£0.875m)* to measure the impact of the programme activities through an independent evaluation.

Further information on the programme, including the Theory of Change are detailed in Annex 1. A logframe has been developed for the first year of the BASIC TAS workstream, see Annex 1.

## V. General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR)

Please refer to the details of the GDPR relationship status and personal data (where applicable) for this project as detailed in Annex 4 and the standard clause 33 in section 2 of the contract.

## W. Annexes

Annex 1: Summary of BASIC Programme

Annex 2: Draft evaluation questions

Annex 3: Duty of Care risk rating

Annex 4: GDPR

Annex 5: Additional documents – attached separately:

- BASIC Research ToRs
- BASIC info sheet external – September 2019
- Grand Bargain workshop report – Linking humanitarian cash and social protection 2019
- Nigeria reports

### Annex 1: Summary of BASIC Programme

The BASIC Business Case can be found on devtracker <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300467>. The current logframe can be found here: [http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati\\_documents/50245633.xlsx](http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/50245633.xlsx)

**BASIC Theory of Change:** The overall BASIC programme intended impact is: “Vulnerable people are better able to cope with crises and meet their basic needs through:

- More efficient social assistance in crises (earlier, more timely, less fragmented, lower cost);
- Social assistance in crises more effective in addressing household needs;
- Diversified, comprehensive and more sustainable funding for social protection approaches in crises (domestic, development, private).”

The BASIC programme’s expected outcomes in the Theory of Change are:

- Improved human and institutional capability and capacity;
- New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented;
- Increased political commitment to and use of social protection approaches in crises;
- Greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives across the nexus between humanitarian aid and social protection;
- Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice.

**BASIC TAS:** BASIC Technical Assistance Services (TAS) aim to deliver high quality support to UK Government, governments and partners across a wide range of development and humanitarian challenges such as programme design, risk and contingency financing, understanding changing systems and strategic integration of humanitarian action and development. BASIC TAS respond to:

- DFID Country Office (CO) requests for expertise and support to using social protection approaches in crisis. While DFID will always be the commissioning party for contractual purposes, BASIC responds to demand from governments and partners in country.
- Centrally commissioned ToRs on cross-cutting issues. While DFID SPT will be the commissioning party in such case, BASIC can respond to demand from international actors provided themes are in line with BASIC and DFID priorities.
- In the future BASIC will consider responding directly to demand from partners and governments at country and global levels.

Funds of £9.625 million have been approved for five years for BASIC TAS from financial year 2018/19 to 2023/24. BASIC TAS are currently delivered through an existing DFID framework agreement: the Expert Advisory Call Down Service (EACDS) Lot B, through a consortium of 60 partners managed by DAI Europe

Ltd. Support is currently provided through individual EACDS call down contracts for each piece of TAS. Delivery of TAS started in March 2019.

The BASIC TAS provide services in the following areas:

- High quality technical assistance to the design and delivery of country plans, policies, programmes and systems
- Capacity building provided for the design and delivery of country plans, policies, programmes and systems
- Creating greater awareness, knowledge, learning and political commitment across countries and agencies on using social protection approaches in crises

EACDS Lot B provides services to TA contracts for BASIC. These services include a team that provides operational support to the delivery and quality assurance of call down contracts, and contracts suppliers for the delivery of the TA. Given that the EACDS framework will close before the end of the BASIC Programme, a new delivery mechanism for BASIC TAS will be selected in the course of the programme. BASIC TAS also uses the Humanitarian and Stabilisation Operations Team database (HSOT, managed by Palladium) as a delivery route.

While BASIC TAS is demand based, we are developing an approach to develop a coherent TAS portfolio by prioritising demand and supporting the development of long-term plans that deliver on the programme's expected results. BASIC's focus on recurring shocks, protracted conflicts and forced displacement, and its demand-led nature, resulted in the following first batch of countries for technical assistance since March 2019: Yemen, Nigeria, Mozambique and Lebanon (twice).

Medium-term TA plans are currently being developed for Lebanon, Yemen and Nigeria, and short-term TA for Afghanistan, and the DRC. A centrally commissioned study on the role of Management Information Systems (MIS) in crises started in 2019 with Yemen and South Sudan as case studies. Countries with high potential for transformational impact are prioritised. Transformational potential is currently defined as:

- a country office developing a new multi-year Business Case,
- an opening or government shift in policy towards greater use of social protection or
- significant influencing opportunities with other donors and global actors.

Yemen and Nigeria are likely to be the first countries prioritised for the provision of longer-term TA. Prioritisation might change over the course of the programme to adapt to evolutions in needs, contexts and opportunities.

Based on the transformational potential as well as country office interest and capacity, BASIC will also select up to four 'deep engagement' countries and provide them with sustained advisory, research, learning, and policy influencing over longer time periods as required. The four deep engagement countries will be selected and signed off by DFID, during the BASIC Research Inception Phase. An initial mapping exercise has identified the following potential countries for BASIC Research and to potentially become deep engagement countries: Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq, Nigeria, DRC, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Niger.

So far, BASIC has de-prioritised country contexts where the MAINTAINS (Maintaining Essential Services After Natural Disasters) programme operates. These are: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. MAINTAINS is a DFID research programme that will develop an improved evidence base on how education, health, social protection, nutrition, and water and sanitation services can adapt and expand in response to shocks such as floods, droughts, cyclones and disease outbreaks. However, BASIC and MAINTAINS teams have agreed to continuously coordinate: if BASIC services are needed, those will be designed and delivered complementarily to MAINTAINS.

**BASIC Research:** The BASIC research workstream is currently being procured (contract award expected in March 2020) for a total of up to £10m for four years (from contract signature around March 2020 until March 2024).

The overall objective of BASIC Research is to deliver and maximise uptake of new policy and operationally-relevant evidence on: how and when to use social protection approaches in different crises contexts, to deliver more

effective and efficient social assistance so that vulnerable people, in particular women, children and people with disabilities, cope better with crises and meet their basic needs. The research is aimed at influencing policy and informing operational design. Research uptake will mean more evidence based – and therefore more effective – policy positions and development initiatives by DFID, governments, other donors, and agencies in a range of DFID priority and other countries. BASIC Research will procure the services of research experts to manage and deliver three research workstreams:

- Workstream 1 will focus on global questions; it shall use country-level evidence generated through workstream 2 where relevant and could include learning and evidence generated through practice supported by BASIC TAS and other DFID and non-DFID funded programmes. We expect an ambitious and rigorous approach to research, requiring collection and analysis of new data and rigorous use of secondary data.
- Workstream 2 will focus on country level research responding to policy and operational needs in up to four BASIC deep engagement countries. Research methods will include quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods, including experimental or quasi-experimental research methods where feasible.
- Workstream 3 will focus on research uptake, through the development and implementation of a research uptake strategy, which will include dissemination of robust research outputs, and learning events through which to share and discuss emerging lessons and research findings. The uptake strategy will be part of the Evidence, Learning and Policy Strategy for BASIC Programme.

### **Coordination with other programmes**

BASIC will complement and coordinate with other existing and planned DFID centrally managed social protection programmes and other research investments especially on protracted conflict contexts. DFID's Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme (HIEP) supported shock responsive social protection research has played a catalytic role, but it did not address protracted conflict and forced displacement contexts. DFID funded joint World Bank/UNHCR research on Forced Displacement, has a small social protection window, but will not provide technical assistance. The MAINTAINS programme is focussing its research on shock-responsive service delivery but will not cover conflict related contexts. The Centre for Disaster Protection is supporting countries to strengthen their disaster planning and get finances in place before disaster strikes. And the Gender Responsive Social Protection Programme is a centrally managed social protection programme, managed by the DFID Social Protection team, with limited focus on crises contexts. Synergies and shared learning between these programmes are a priority. An internal and an external reference group are being set up for this purpose.

Gender and disability are key considerations for BASIC. Providing better assistance in crises can potentially help improve outcomes for women, girls, disabled people and other marginalised groups, but further research is required. Research from more stable contexts, suggests that social assistance can provide major benefits across protection, health, nutrition, education and empowerment objectives. There is a need to research this from more crises contexts and to build sensitivity to these objectives into the design of any programme or policy. BASIC is working closely with the Gender-Responsive Social Protection Programme to share and apply learning, to ensure a strong gender lens to the activities and approaches of this programme. BASIC's aim to increase the use of social protection approaches in crises is strongly in line with the Paris Declaration of 2005, in particular the principles of ownership, alignment, results and harmonisation.

## **Annex 2: Draft evaluation questions**

### **Effectiveness Performance**

- When and how do BASIC technical advice and capacity building services lead to
- policy, programme and systems change? What is effective, and why? What doesn't work and what are the blockages? Of the different types of TA provided what was more effective and cost-effective and why?
- When and how do BASIC research products lead to policy, programme and systems changes? What is effective and why? What does not work and what are the blockages?
- How can TA be delivered in a politically sensitive and appropriate way?
- Is the overall TAS portfolio strategic and effective? Why and how could this be improved?
- If and how is SPT staff contributing to programme effectiveness?



- Does the combination of TAS and research in those countries where both workstreams operate generate synergies and influence and change policy and practice effectively? Which combinations work and why?
- Has each BASIC workstream and has BASIC achieved its intended outputs and outcomes?

### **Learning**

- Given BASIC is primarily operating in crises contexts, how does TA need to be different from stable contexts to be effective?
- What different portfolio approach would need to be taken to improve overall programme effectiveness?
- What other services could be offered in addition to TA and research (e.g. funding of pilots, funding of cash transfers) to improve effectiveness?
- What are good indicators of and methodologies for measuring the effectiveness of TA? This should include appropriate consideration of rubric-based approaches. What lessons are there on the monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of TA?
- How should TA, research and knowledge exchange and learning be leveraged to have maximum influence on policies, programmes and systems at (a) the national level and (b) global level?

### **Relevance Performance**

- Timeliness and relevance: Does the TA model through each delivery route provide high quality TA in time and in line with demand? Is demand being met and if not why not?
- Is research responding to demand and priority needs? Is research addressing priority operational needs?
- Are TA and research responding to priority issues at national level and at global level?

### **Learning**

- What would need to happen to meet demand? Identify what kind of TA and capacity strengthening is most useful to (a) DFID advisors / team (b) client governments (c) partners and why? and how this should be made available to them.
- Briefly review how the overall operating context within DFID for knowledge and evidence services has evolved (e.g. more centrally managed programmes) and what that changing context means for how these types of services are framed in the future.
- Are both BASIC workstreams working coherently to deliver joined up policy relevant advice, support and learning for DFID, national governments and partners at national and global levels? What can be done to improve this?

### **Efficiency Performance**

- Assess the overall operations of BASIC TAS including the number of contracts, the range of work, the selection of different suppliers and experts, the services provided by the lead supplier in terms of value for money.
- Assess the overall operation of BASIC Research including the number of research projects, the range of work, the selection of the supplier and different research providers in terms of value for money.
- Have the intended outputs been achieved? Are the outputs proportionate to cost?

### **Learning**

- Make recommendations for potential efficiency improvements for future technical assistance models.
- Could economies of scale be achieved by delivering several TA facilities (e.g. delivering several DFID Social protection TA programmes together) through one supplier?

### **Sustainability Performance**

- Influencing global policy: Broader policy and programmatic change globally among wider networks of humanitarian and development partners – what did change? What was effective and why and what didn't work? Where have the greatest shifts taken place?
- Influencing governments (including donors) and partners– have programme workstreams led to any change in policy, programmes and systems that are likely
- / have potential to be sustained beyond the funding of the project (recognising limitations in timing or evaluation)? Have the programme workstreams led to any change in the human and institutional capabilities of DFID, governments and / or partners? what works and what doesn't – looking across



research, influencing and TA/systems strengthening work? What are the major factors that influenced the achievement (or not) of sustainability in different contexts?

### **Learning**

- The contribution of the capacity building output in developing DFID's own capacity should be explored further to inform any future call-down mechanism of this type.

### **Impact Performance**

- What have been the impacts of TAS on policy and programme design and implementation in (a) BASIC TAS and deep engagement countries; and (b) globally?
- What have been the impacts of the research on policy and programme design and implementation in (a) BASIC research and deep engagement countries; and
- (b) globally, including measuring the effectiveness of research uptake?
- How effective has the combination of TAS and research together been with influencing and providing thought leadership in promoting policy and programme change in crises? This will be measured in the deep engagement countries and globally.
- What has been the impact as per indicators in the logframe(s).

### **Learning**

- If and how can we evaluate if social protection approaches in crises lead to better outcomes for affected households than humanitarian approaches?
- How can research and TAS influence the behaviours, policies and operations of national governments, individually and in combination? What can partners / external actors do to enhance this influence? What are the limitations on the influence of external actors, and on the effects that the provision of TAS can have?
- What works to strengthen knowledge exchange and learning across the sector and to drive a step change in global practice? What should future phases of DFID support to social protection approaches in crises policy and practice focus on?

### **Concluding**

- Make recommendations for a technical assistance and research model including other and additional services and capabilities for BASIC and DFID in the future, based on the findings of the formative questions of this evaluation.

### **Annex 3: Duty of Care risk rating – Examples**

BASIC operates in a variety of countries as illustrated in Annex 1. The below indicates an example of high duty of care risk country for which BASIC can deliver services.

## DFID Overall Project/Intervention / Summary Risk Assessment matrix

Location: **Mogadishu/South Central Somalia**

Date of assessment: **11 Dec 19**

Theme	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score
	Mogadishu Airport	Mogadishu	Kismayo Airport	Kismaayo	Dollow	Other Parts of South Central Somalia
OVERALL RATING	4	4	4	4	4	4
FCO travel advice	4	4	4	4	4	4
Host nation travel advice	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
Transportation	3	4	4	4	4	5
Security	3	4	3	4	3	4
Civil unrest	2	4	2	4	4	4
Violence/crime	3	4	2	4	4	4
Terrorism	3	5	3	4	4	4
War	2	2	2	2	2	2
Hurricane	1	1	1	1	1	1
Earthquake	1	1	1	1	1	1
Flood	1	1	1	1	1	1
Medical Services	2	4	3	4	5	5
<b>Nature of Project/ Intervention</b>						

1 Very Low risk	2 Low risk	3 Med risk	4 High risk	5 Very High risk
			SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN NORMAL RISK	

## DFID Overall Project/Intervention Summary Risk Assessment matrix

Location: **PUNTLAND**

Date of assessment: **11 Dec 19**

Theme	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk Score	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score
	Garowe	Bossaso	Galkayo	Other Parts of Puntland
OVERALL RATING	4	4	4	5
FCO travel advice	4	4	4	4
Host nation travel advice	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
Transportation	5	4	5	5
Security	4	4	5	4
Civil unrest	3	4	3	4
Violence/crime	3	3	5	4
Terrorism	4	4	5	5
War	2	3	3	3
Hurricane	2	2	1	1
Earthquake	1	1	1	1
Flood	2	2	1	1
Medical Services	4	5	5	5
<b>Nature of Project/ Intervention</b>				

1 Very Low risk	2 Low risk	3 Med risk	4 High risk	5 Very High risk
			SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN NORMAL RISK	

# **DFID Overall Project/Intervention Summary Risk Assessment matrix**

Location: **SOMALILAND**

Date of assessment: **02 January 20**

Theme	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score
	Hargeisa, Berbera	Borama, Burao	Other Parts of Somaliland
OVERALL RATING	4	5	5
FCO travel advice	4	5	5
Host nation travel advice	Not available	Not available	Not available
Transportation	4	4	4
Security	4	4	4
Civil unrest	3	4	4
Violence/crime	3	4	4
Terrorism	4	4	4
War	2	2	3
Hurricane	1	1	1
Earthquake	1	1	1
Flood	1	1	3
Medical Services	4	5	5
<b>Nature of Project/ Intervention</b>			

1 Very Low risk	2 Low risk	3 Med risk	4 High risk	5 Very High risk
			SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN NORMAL RISK	

## Annex 4: GDPR

Schedule of Processing, Personal Data and Data Subjects. This schedule must be completed by the Parties in collaboration with each-other before the processing of Personal Data under the Contract. The completed schedule must be agreed formally as part of the contract with DFID and any changes to the content of this schedule must be agreed formally with DFID under a Contract Variation.

Description	Details
Identity of the Controller and Processor for each Category of Data Subject	<p>The Parties acknowledge that for the purposes of the Data Protection Legislation, the following status will apply to personal data under this contract:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ The Parties acknowledge that Clause 33.2 Protection of Personal Data and 33.4 (Section 2 of the contract) shall not apply for the purposes of the Data Protection Legislation as the Parties are independent Controllers in accordance with Clause 33.3 in respect of the following Personal Data:</li><li>▪ In respect of Personal Data necessary for the administration and/or fulfilment of this contract<sup>4</sup>.</li><li>▪ For the avoidance of doubt the Supplier shall provide anonymised data sets for the purposes of reporting on this project and so DFID shall not be a Processor in respect of data gathered from citizens as part of the research activities as it does not constitute Personal Data.</li></ul>

### 11.2 Departures from the Terms of Reference and inception phase

**The design of the evaluation of BASIC was based on the ToR for the evaluation.** We have modified the approach set in the ToR based on the results of our inception phase in the following ways:

**Evaluation questions:** The evaluation questions specified the ToR were refined to ensure they responded to the needs of the target audiences, were clearly specified and appropriately aligned to the evaluation criteria. This process resulted in some themes being added to the list of evaluation questions, including more coverage on GESI issues, the ToC, contextual factors, coverage of internal and external coherence and the management, as well as measurement of VfM. An overview of changes to these questions can be found in Appendix 2.

**Sampling:** The evaluation ToR proposed the assessment of four BASIC deep engagement countries, as well as a representative sample of countries where BASIC is providing either TAS or research alone. However, with the recent initiation of the research workstream's inception phase, there was not clear understanding of the extent to which the research workstream would focus on engagements outside the deep engagement countries except the possibility of coverage in terms of the global research themes. Rather than representative sampling, the evaluation team discussed and agreed with the FCDO SPT that the approach to sampling for country selection for in-depth investigation by the evaluation team would be purposive, with the stratification of BASIC supported countries according to whether they are defined as deep engagement countries (and as such benefitting from both research and TAS workstreams), by type of intervention and their context. In addition, rather than examine the evidence of BASIC's influence in non-BASIC countries (as suggested in the evaluation ToR), the evaluation team in agreement with the FCDO SPT reframed the focus of the lighter touch case studies to examine results generated in the countries not classified as deep engagement countries, which benefit from BASIC TAS or research (global) support.

**Counterfactual:** The evaluation team recognises the challenge of data collection in non-BASIC countries (in that it is difficult to engage stakeholders do not support by the programme in the evaluation process) and in addition note the extensive geographical coverage of BASIC (supporting circa 30 countries), as well as the specificity of the context in each country posing challenges for selection of appropriate comparators. As such, a more viable approach to the capture of what would have happened in the absence of BASIC is proposed; namely soliciting the views of stakeholders during KII on what would have happened in the absence of BASIC support.

The following departures from the Inception Report were made and agreed with FCDO when delivering the baseline phase:

- **Revision of the indicators used to carry out secondary data analysis.** Some indicators and sources suffered from considerable data gaps and quality issues. The revised set of indicators used are presented in Appendix 5.
- **Increased the number of globally focused Key Informant Interviews.** In response to feedback around how the evaluation will assess the global effects of the programme, we increased the sample size of KII interviews from 30 to 40. This was done at the expense of removing the infographic and animation from the use and influence plan.
- **Changes to the in-house survey questionnaire:** Several edits were made to reduce survey response times during main-stage implementation. These changes were agreed with FCDO and are documented in Appendix 5 and discussed in Appendix 2.
- **Niger country case study was dropped in favour of Somalia.** Due to wider FCDO country engagement considerations on behalf of the programme team, we were requested to exclude Niger from our sampling frame and Somalia was selected instead.

# Appendix 11. Endnotes

- 1 Appendix B provides an overview of the status of TAS projects and SPACE 2 learning products.
- 2 The procurement of one project (Part-Time Multi-Donor Cash Adviser for the WFP Multi-Purpose Cash Programme in Lebanon) has been halted temporarily and was not included in the analysis.
- 3 In this case, an engagement is defined by the SPACE supplier as the production of an output that is directly linked to a specific country.
- 4 SPACE and SPACE H were delivered between May-September 2020 and SPACE II commenced in Oct 2020 and is expected to close in Aug 2021.
- 5 FCDO (2020). BASIC Annual Review 2020.
- 6 FCDO (2018). BASIC Business Case.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Results from inception phase consultation.
- 12 Ibid
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- 20 Although we also propose the option of thematic cases for learning case studies, where the case unit is a particular theme or region.
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- 34 Stephen Gill (2011). Kirkpatrick's Four Levels of Training Evaluation: A Critique, May 2011
- xxxv As stated in the FCDO Digital Strategy 2018 to 2020.
- xxxvi As set out in the UK Data Protection Act 1998.
- 37 UNHCR (2021) Jordan Factsheet. Available at: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Jordan%20country%20factsheet%20-%20February%202021.pdf>
- 38 Key informant interviews.
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- 40 Georgia Plank and Fiona Samuels (2017) Cash transfer programming for Syrian refugees living in Jordan host communities Literature review. London: Overseas Development Institute.
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- 68 [fmhds@gov.ng](mailto:fmhds@gov.ng)
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- 88 KII Group 1 & 2: FCDO, Aug 2021.
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